Michael Antony, copyright May 15, 2007.
Please note that table of contents and footnotes are at the end of this entire webpage.
THE MASCULINE CENTURY
A Heretical History of Our Time
(copyright, Michael Antony 2001-2007)
PROLOGUE
Every
age appears to be one thing to itself and something else to each of the
ages that follow. When we look back on most periods of the past we can
only see them as a mistake, a wrong turning, an age so misguided,
ignorant or deluded that it seems to have been in the grip of
collective madness. But when we read the writings of that time, what
often strikes us is their sense of normality, as if for people then no
other reality was conceivable. Every age lives in a closed world, and
according to a truth of its own, which will one day be discredited.
Societies
under totalitarian rule suppress dissent. More open societies merely
smother it. The weight of similar views is so overwhelming that any
alternative is buried under tons of rubble. But
usually the prevailing sense of the sane, fashionable and “modern” way
of looking at the world is so all-pervasive that no other thoughts can
easily be formed. Even when an age is split by intellectual conflicts,
the opposing creeds often rest on the same unquestioned premises.
The worldview of the age thus remains in place almost unnoticed. It is
like the air that is breathed. Superficial changes, decade by decade,
in fashions, morals, politics, economic circumstances, even scientific
theories do not destroy the overall perspective, which is confidently
believed to be eternal. And yet a time inevitably comes when this
orthodoxy falls apart, and is derided by all as an enormous delusion.
From the new perspective, the old worldview suddenly belongs to a
previous age.
At what point do we move from being inside an age to being outside of it? How
does an age lose its hold over our sense of reality? The great cataclysms of history, when an entire social order was swept away by some catastrophic event, are easy to point to -- the French Revolution, the First
World War, or, for Eastern Europeans, the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Yet every so often in history a moment comes when, even without some
catastrophic punctuation mark, we have a sudden sense that we are at
the end of an era. The worldview of the age begins to slip from our
eyes as a mask slips from a face. The ground seems to shift under our
feet and we feel within us the malaise and vertigo of a new sense of
vision.
For
us in the West too the end of the Cold War broke up the old perspective
on the world. For the last decade and a half Westerners have floundered
about trying to find a new way of organizing the future: the building
of Europe, the fight against globalization, the war on terror, the
struggle against global warming. Each sect campaigns hysterically to
impose on sceptics its own particular vision of the great struggle of
the age, the defining crusade of our time, since in our
Marxist-militarist culture we can no longer conceive of history except
as struggle. But there is something else that has added to the sense of
an end. For the accidental divisions of our calendar have suddenly led
us to view our own age, the modern age, as a previous century, a
century apart from us, which we begin to look at with the vague sense
of superiority with which we always view “the past”. The fashion-ridden
eagerness of every generation and decade to see itself as different
from what went before is pushing us now to see the new century as
different, to invent distinctions between us and the twentieth century,
as though arbitrary numbers had some occult influence on reality. But
this shallow impulse is leading to a more profound change of
perspective on the modern age.
The
twentieth century, which acquired its own sense of a definitive break
with the past through the mystique of the calendar, and which bristled
with manifestos of Modernism even before the Great War fell like a
judgement on the old order, maintained the illusion of being a single
age right up to the shores of the present through the force of
numerological superstition. Now that it has retreated across the moat
of a millennium we can at last look at it with the eyes of strangers,
or rather with the eyes of those departing from a house where they have
lived all their lives. This, then, was the age we lived in! What was
familiar for so long suddenly becomes strange, questionable, alien,
monstrous. We begin to grasp that a set of ideological and
philosophical assumptions, of emotional attitudes derived from the
traumatic experiences that forged it, underlay the whole world-view of
the age, and all its beliefs, values, ideals and creative works. We
begin to understand the psychology of our times with the same shocked
insight with which we first comprehend the psychology of our parents:
we see what childhood traumas made them what they are. To uncover the
premises of our thinking, of our sensibility, of our approach to life
itself, and to realize that there was and is nothing inevitable about
them, that they are historical accidents, arbitrary, timebound, and condemned to disappear, is one of the most disorienting but also
liberating experiences. We see at last that what we are is not the
product of a rational process but of chaos, confusion and nightmare.
Once
we free ourselves from the tyranny that calls itself (and has always
called itself) “modern thinking”, we begin to understand that the
century we have just emerged from was no more definitively modern than
the eighteenth century or the nineteenth. This perception is dimly
reflected in the shallow, muddled academic debate about
“post-modernism” or even “post-modernity” – two radically different
notions which those given to this kind of chatter often confuse.
While the 20th century artistic movement known as Modernism will
certainly have an end (though so-called “post-modernism” is merely a
pretentious, academic extension of it), modernity itself is
inescapable, unending and forever changing. But though modernity cannot
end (at least until the scientific civilization collapses back into
ignorance and superstition), particular ages of modernity can end and
have ended. Every age has called itself modern since the late 17th
century. This was when it first occurred to men that the change they
saw as characterizing the sub-lunar world might not always be for the
worse, that there was a possibility that knowledge might be
accumulated, making progress possible. Every age since then has
brandished its modernity like a banner, and has sought in some way to
reject, ridicule or discredit the past. And yet every age has finally
become part of that past, as quaintly old-fashioned in the eyes of
those who came after as the past it so contemptuously rejected. The
modernity of the 20th century is coming very slowly to resemble the
modernity of the late 17th or mid-19th centuries. It has
acquired a period quality, an air of the style of other days. And the
more foreign and alien it appears to us, the more it cries out for
analysis and understanding, to determine how and where and why it was
an arbitrary, abnormal and even mad period of history. Now that we have
crossed the divide of a century and a millennium, the calendar itself
is urging us to analyze our particular “modern age” or the 20th century
as we would any other age that we seek to understand across an ocean of
time.
THE AGE OF AGGRESSION
The
masculine century! Can anyone doubt who has paused for a moment over
the century that produced the two world wars, the atomic bomb, the Nazi
extermination camps, the Soviet and Chinese gulags in which tens of
millions were done to death, universal military training in peacetime
all over the West for the first time in two thousand years, the cinema
cult of the muscle-bound, mass-murdering action hero, and an
unprecedented movement among women to lay claim not merely to male
rights but to the masculine character, to a masculine sensibility, to
the right to fight in the front line – can anyone doubt that the
century that has just ended was the most masculine period in all of
human history?
The
cult of the masculine pervaded the century to a degree unimaginable to
Shakespeare or Chaucer, to Boccaccio or Petrarch, to Racine or
Stendhal, to Goethe or Novalis, to Christine de Pisan or Jane Austen.
In all its most characteristic works, from the erection of gigantic
towers by mammoth machines to the obscene destruction of helpless
cities by a thousand planes or by a single bomb, the projection of
immense aggressive power was the obsession that dominated the age.
Never before have so many millions of human beings been massacred, so
many millions uprooted and driven across entire continents, in the
pursuit of grandiose schemes of destruction and reshaping of the world.
And in the shadow of this all-conquering masculine cult, femininity has
been reduced to a contemptible caricature – rejected and despised even
by the movement that calls itself feminism. A civilization which lived
for a thousand years with the cult of the Mother of God, and for
thousands of years before that with the Mother Goddess, has shrunk its
female deity to a dangerously schizophrenic dualism: on one side that
disreputable figure of fun, the Whore of Babylon, the porn star with
big knockers, object both of desire and derision, and in the other
corner her new masculinized challenger – the sterile, power-hungry,
feminist male clone, with her adolescent virtual variant, the
computer-generated female kick-boxer, on an obscure and violent quest
in a childless castle of horrors. Need one point to the plunging
Western birth-rate as a direct consequence of the dethronement of the
mother-figure? The self-appointed leaders of women themselves have
eagerly accepted the premise that only male virtues count, that women
too must cultivate the male mind and the masculine character in order
to achieve that masculine nirvana: liberty, equality, independence,
power, being constrained by nothing and bound to nobody. And our
destiny is to sink into demographic decline, cultural chaos and
gradually be replaced by other peoples, in the stubborn belief that our
obliteration of the feminine pole of human nature was the last blow
struck in a long, historic campaign of liberation.
But
there are signs of hope. Over the last thirty or forty years (starting
in the cultural civil war of the 1960’s) we have seen a series of
movements of revolt, often confused, often at cross purposes, often
unaware of their own drift, which added together seem to point to a
retreat from the masculine century. While women have rushed to imitate
male behaviour under the banner of liberation, we have seen men making
tentative and fitful moves in the opposite direction – reclaiming the
right to wear long hair, colourful clothes, to express their feelings,
to weep for joy or sorrow like their ancestors of two hundred years ago
– after a long period during which men were shorn like prisoners,
dressed in dark suits and their emotions stifled as contemptible marks
of effeminate weakness. Are these stirrings of change signs of a tide
turning, or merely passing trends? Will they be sabotaged and
counteracted by the noisier movement of women to adopt all the most
aggressive aspects of masculinity, thus forcing men to return to it?
Are we in the midst of a shift of civilization, more gradual perhaps
but comparable in its effects to the one brought about by the French
Revolution or the First World War? Is the long testosterone rampage of
Western man finally at an end? Or is this merely a new and paradoxical
twist in our headlong career of aggressive self-destruction?
Such
are the themes of this book. The orthodox view of every age is to see
itself as a norm by which other ages are to be judged. It is my
conviction that the century we have just emerged from will come to be
seen as a psychopathic age, a period of collective mental derangement,
reflected not only in our apocalyptic wars but in our systems of
thought, our political ideologies, our economic system, our literature,
our art, even our sexual relationships – and from this mad period we
are struggling in confusion to get back to some semblance of human
normality. And the root of our psychosis has been the over-development
of the masculine pole of human nature. How we became a
high-testosterone civilization, glorifying violence, aggression and
competition, seeing struggle and conflict as the motor forces not
merely of social progress and economic prosperity but of the evolution
of life itself, how the character of Western humanity was transformed
over the past century and a quarter, first by an extreme militarization
of men, and then by a catch-up masculinization of women, how we
intoxicated our species with a cult of aggression until it killed more
of its own kind in the last hundred years than in the previous two
thousand – these are the themes we shall explore. And we shall look
finally at our chances of emerging from this nightmare, whether the
perversions that human nature has undergone in the modern age (in
particular its enslavement to a cult of work as irrational and
self-destructive as that of the Easter Islanders) can be reversed, or
whether the conditions we have now created have made any return to
human normality impossible – except perhaps through the disappearance
of the Western race itself.
CHAPTER ONE
THE IMAGE OF WESTERN MAN
1) THE REVOLT OF THE SIXTIES
Writers
are led to subjects by a whole web of personal experiences and it is
rare to be able to identify a single incident that seems to have set
the whole train of thought in motion. It is even rarer to discover that
this incident perhaps influenced the direction of one’s entire life.
But I remember such an incident from my early childhood.
I
must have been five or six years old, lying on the floor reading one of
the ten volumes of Arthur Mee’s Children’s Encyclopaedia, which my
parents had recently bought from a door to door salesman. In a house
without many books I had thrown myself upon these heavy tomes as a
drowning man seizes a piece of floating wreckage, and I scarcely let my
older brother and sisters get a look at them. We lived in a tiny New Zealand
town called Waikanae, where my father was postmaster, and this
encyclopaedia was my only window onto the outside world. In one section
there was a series of pictures of mankind down through the ages. I
remember the figures only vaguely: they were of course all men, since
this was still the fifties. I cannot say exactly now what periods they
represented. I suppose there was an ancient Greek, then a Roman, then a
medieval knight, a cavalier, an eighteenth-century aristocrat – the
usual potted history of humanity, seen through Western eyes. What I
remember vividly is that I liked all the figures except the last one:
twentieth-century man.
He
had a short-back-and-sides haircut, and one of those faces that looks
solid, square but at the same time boring, unimaginative, tame,
domesticated, bourgeois. Perhaps he was a scientist or a bureaucrat.
Perhaps he wore glasses. He was probably dressed in a grey suit and
tie. And I remember thinking: “No, I’m not going to become like that,
I’m never going to look like that. Never. That’s not my idea of a man.
The cavalier, the medieval knight, the eighteenth-century aristocrat,
those are the men I’m going to become.” And when I think back now I am
sure it was because of their hair. They all had long flowing hair and
grand colourful clothes.
I
had never seen a man with long hair in real life. All my heroes were
short-haired rugby players, whose games I re-enacted with cotton-reels
on my mother’s sewing table, with an excited commentary in the
histrionic voice of the leading rugby broadcaster of the day. Yet the
long hair of the knights and cavaliers is something I recognized at
once as a fine thing to have. I had only ever seen women with long hair
but I had no wish whatsoever to be a woman or to look like one. I
wanted to be a long-haired man. I thought of them as looking not like
women but like adventurers – wild, dashing, swashbuckling figures who
lived life to the full. I hasten to emphasize (in this age of intimate
confessions) that this curious predilection was not accompanied by any
tendency to adopt girlish clothes, hair or behaviour at any stage of my
childhood. My schoolboy sartorial tastes remained rigorously
conventional – as did my obsession with girls, which followed the usual
awkward, baffled, guilt-ridden course that was par for the times. But
when in my student years long hair for men suddenly came in, I adopted
it instinctively, with a sense almost of recognition, and of relief
that at last things were getting back to normal. And in later years
when I was a long-haired vagabond wandering about Europe
and I talked to young German and French “freaks”, they often told me
similar stories to mine. When they were children they had seen pictures
in history-books of long-haired medieval kings and knights and they had
at once known that that was what they wanted to look like — that was
what men ought to look like, not like their short-haired fathers. And
the fact that their fathers were the war hero generation and hated long
hair as sissy made them all the more determined to have it. Long hair
seemed to our generation the expression of all the most intense and
passionate possibilities of life. I was determined from an early age
not to live a short-haired existence.
Where
did this determination come from? Why did so many of our generation
pick on the image of long hair as what we wanted to look like? I
suspect because it was the opposite of what our fathers looked like.
Personally I had nothing against my father, who was not only a champion
athlete but also a man of immense charm and charisma – affectionate,
sentimental and emotional (he sang like an opera-star, and cried in the
cinema and watching TV soaps, which made me cringe and resolve never to
do the same.) But the generation of male movie actors of that time,
represented at their most typical by John Wayne (whom my father
admired), exhibited a kind of caricature of masculinity, an ox-like
taciturn brutishness, a muscle-bound, narrow-minded, unimaginative
dumbness, for which our generation felt a growing contempt as something
oddly sexless. Was it because the war hero generation were somehow more
masculine than we could ever hope to be that we rejected all notion of
competing with them in those terms? Or was it one of those spontaneous
revolts of youth against a tendency in history that has gone too far,
as if youth somehow still has an ear for the dead, is in touch with
previous generations, and instinctively returns to the norms of human
behaviour from which their parents have deviated? Does youth have an
inherited memory of what past ages knew but what the world they have
been born into has momentarily forgotten? Does mankind have an in-built
correcting mechanism?
At
any rate as I plunged at sixteen into the turbulent years of university
(anti-Vietnam war protests, the counter-culture), I became convinced
that we were living a cultural revolution of historic proportions. The
revolt was not just against the Second World War generation but against
the entire direction of Western civilization since the industrial
revolution. I saw the start of the short-haired age as the French
Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, the introduction of trousers, the
disappearance of men’s bodies into dark shapeless suits instead of the
skin-tight breeches and colourful flowing cloaks that they had worn for
the previous five centuries. I saw the early decades of the nineteenth
century as the beginning of a dark age of Puritanism, a systematic
beating down of the spirit, a suppression of men’s feelings, a
mechanization of the mind, through industrialization, militarization
and institutionalization, which had turned men into dark-suited
zombies, slaves, oxen, cannon-fodder – a dark night of the soul from
which we were only now, in the bright explosive sixties, awakening. I
saw the last full human beings as the early nineteenth-century romantic
poets, protesting desperately against the dark night they saw closing
in on them, and I saw our generation as emerging finally at the other
end of the industrial tunnel, free to be as they were. My heroes were
Byron, Shelley, Blake, Keats, and later on, as a vagabond in France,
Rimbaud, but I saw our generation as freer than theirs, free from the
illusions of class, the need for material goods, the repression of sex.
Thanks to the pill, girls of our generation had at last understood that
we could make love without going through the time-serving slavery to
earn money, to buy a house and other material goods, which the system
had imposed on previous generations as a prior condition for having
sex. Embracing poverty, we were free to enjoy a life of love-making,
music, poetry, contemplation and endless travel, and the world was our
oyster. These convictions took a while to reach boiling point, but
after dropping out of a Ph.D. programme in Canada
I went on the road and spent seven happy years, during which I visited
every continent and worked for a total of less than eighteen months at
whatever casual work came my way. And I saw the end of the long-haired
counter-culture in the depression of the early eighties as the failure
of a collective dream as tragic and devastating as the defeat of the
English Revolution, which drove Milton to write Paradise Lost.
Ah,
sweet youth and its illusions! How much of this entire romantic reading
of the past stands up to analysis, from the perspective of middle age,
now that it is fading into the fond memories of a greying generation?
Like all unifying visions of history it is wildly subjective, an
arbitrary selection of events and aspects of former ages to support a
pre-ordained conclusion, a reconstruction of the past to justify a
certain direction in the present. And now as I look back on it (from
the serene, complacent comfort of a staid central European city), I am
embarrassed by the over-simplifications, the absurd inflation of
superficial, passing fashions into grand historic upheavals. But I also
find myself correcting it, modifying it, tacking on vast tracts of
ideological reasoning, in the light of experience and of subsequent
developments such as feminism and the other neo-Marxist ideologies that
sprang from that period. I see that my embellishments and modifications
are unconsciously trying to validate a core of beliefs which I still
hold to. In short, with the best will in the world I cannot free myself
entirely from this intoxicating vision. It is as though my mental
perspective on the world had been defined forever by the fresh and
magical perceptions of youth, and however much I modify the direction
of my thought, I cannot change its point of departure.
What
remains unaltered is my conviction that a change occurred in nineteenth
century Western man, a new culture, a new sensibility (or rather
insensibility) arose, and this cultural regime lasted till the late
1960’s, after which we began to emerge from it. A good deal of the
debate about feminism and about the alleged crisis of masculinity in
this age would become more coherent if we understood that the men of
the first half of the twentieth century were not normal men by the
standards of history. What we saw in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was a process of extreme masculinization and
militarization of Western man which reached its apogee in the two
greatest wars in history. Fighting these apocalyptic, hellish wars
transformed men into harder, tougher, more self-controlled and less
emotionally expressive beings than any generation of men before them.
The militarization of man had never been carried out on such a massive
scale in the West since the Roman Republic
or the ancient Germanic tribes. Never since those times had the entire
male population been trained seriously for war by compulsory military
service – which in most European countries lasted between one and three
years throughout the entire twentieth century. In the Middle Ages only
an aristocratic warrior caste (or mercenary professionals) trained
regularly for war, and mass participation in wars was rare, short-term,
and undertaken without serious training. There were isolated
experiments in conscription, briefly by Sweden in the 16th century, and more durably by Prussia in the mid-18th century. But only with the Napoleonic wars did several European countries, starting with France,
begin to conscript their entire male populations. At first it was only
for the duration of the wars, and in 1815 it came to an end. But as
militarism gathered pace in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
conscription in peacetime was introduced over much of the European
continent. Military training for all men, for periods of up to three
years, was seen as vital if a country was to be ready for war at any
time. The readiness to take part in battle became an essential part of
the male character – even its most important part. No other quality of
a man could ever compensate for his inadequacy as a soldier. This
growing militarization of society reached its culmination in the two
world wars, in which poets, artists and philosophers all joined
enthusiastically in the greatest mass slaughter in human history. In
the twentieth century total war became the central human experience for
an entire world-wide civilization. The preparation for this monstrous
immolation of human beings became part and parcel of the male character
and the male identity to a degree not seen for over a thousand years.
To
get an idea of what this means, if you made a list of the thirty
greatest European and Western writers of every century for the past
millennium, you would find that the twentieth century list had by far
the biggest number who had seen war at first hand and been in the line
of fire. You can take names almost at random: Hemingway, Faulkner,
Malraux, Céline, Orwell, Evelyn Waugh, Mailer, Solzhenitsyn, Böll,
Grass – all of them war veterans. Which great creative writer of the
19th century actually fought in a war? I can only think of Stendhal,
Tolstoy, and Maupassant. Nietzsche observed one at close quarters,
Crane described one at second hand and Byron set off on one, dying of
disease before seeing action – but none of these men actually stood in
a front line and got shot at. In no century before ours can you find
such a high proportion of the major writers of the age whose character
and sense of manhood was forged on the field of battle. The age we have
emerged from was, beyond comparison with all ages of the past, an age
of war, in which war conditioned men’s sense of identity and personal
worth. The fact seems an obvious one as soon as you state it, but
because it is obvious it has been ignored. We have taken for granted a
fact which lies at the root of the fundamental distortion of human
nature in the age we have just lived through.
It
is this unique culture of war and the type of man it produced that both
the pacifist counter-culture of the late sixties and the feminists of
the seventies rebelled against. The two rebellions were linked but also
at cross purposes. The young men revolted because they did not want to
be like their fathers, and rejected the whole cultural baggage of the
warrior role and their gender destiny of brave cannon-fodder. By
extension, they rejected the whole cult of work, competition, material
achievement, self-sacrifice for the goal of wealth – a fusion of
aggressive drive and conformist slavery like the warrior cult itself.
The rebellion of the young women was more complex. In true Oedipal
fashion they wanted to be like their war-hero fathers but felt rejected
by them and prevented from imitating them by the barrier of gender
roles – which they wanted removed. The young men were like
Tamburlaine’s sissy pacifist son who rejected war and preferred wine,
women and song. The young women were like Agamemnon’s daughter,
Electra, despising their mother, worshipping their warrior father, and
demanding the right to be like him. Seventies feminism was both revolt
and the ultimate conformity: revolt against the exclusion of women, the
gender apartheid that kept them from participating in the culture of
masculine values, but at the same time a profound capitulation to that
culture – a mass conversion of women to the cult of aggressiveness,
competition, achievement, dominance, power. And ironically this
adoption of the masculine character by women occurred (like many
imitations of the dominant class by the lower orders) a generation
late, when the men were already trying to retreat from it. This
time-lag produced one of the great mismatches of history: pacifist,
hippie, drop-out male meets aggressive, competitive, over-achieving
female. The feminist drive to move women in a masculine direction put a
rapid end to the counter-culture’s attempt to move men in a feminine
direction. By the 1980’s the hippie drop-out men were cutting their
hair and re-entering the system, afraid that their jobs and positions
had been usurped by the new generation of ambitious, ladder-climbing
women. The new orientation of women towards material success –
Madonna’s Material Girl – pushed the men back into the competitive mode
with a vengeance. And so the stock-trading, yacht-racing golden boy in
his BMW replaced the hippie drop-out. From then on the only males who
remained committed to a change in the masculine character were the
vocal homosexual minority.
When
one sex tries to change its traditional image, it is limited in how far
it can go by its need to remain attractive to the other one. The young
men of the late sixties and seventies became long-haired, pacifist
drop-outs with the approval and encouragement of the girls, who
rewarded the new fashion with their sexual favours. But as women, under
the influence of feminism, became more ambitious, aggressive and
competitive, they forced men to return to the stereotype
of masculinity in order to remain attractive to them – except for those
men indifferent to women. The gay minority thus filled the vacuum after
the collapse of the counter-culture and became the new noisy vanguard
of change. But for the tiny homosexual minority to try to lead a
re-alignment of the male character as a whole was a doomed cause. It
only confused the issue and stigmatized all non-conventional male
behaviour as “gay”. An opposite current of violent, aggressive
subcultures emerged among young men in the 1980’s: skinheads,
hooligans, “yobs”, drunken “lads”, soon to be followed by gangster
rappers. They had new role-models: the grotesquely muscled action-film
heroes and the tag-wrestling human gorillas. Against this aggressive
tide, the pallid figure of the “New Man” came to be seen as a weak,
masochistic wimp – submitting to a strain of aggressive feminism which
wanted men to assume the domestic role that women now rejected. He
became another awful warning to conservative pundits of the perversions
of political correctness and the decline of Western manhood.
But
the world wars were not the only factor in the masculinization of men
in the last hundred or so years. The great wars were merely the climax
of a movement already begun with the Western colonization of other
parts of the world and the cult of the intrepid pioneer. Pioneering
culture was essentially masculine culture, in much the same way as the
army. Many gold-mining towns in America and Australia
had almost no women, except for bar-room dancers and prostitutes. The
feminine values developed in eight hundred years of aristocratic
European civilization were forgotten in the brutal struggle to survive
on the frontier or in the outback. The civilization of high art, of
sonnets and sonatas, was erased from the memory of the men on the wagon
trains pushing through the territory of fierce Indian tribes. The
sonnet and the sonata belong to a world where the feminine values of
grace, wit, elegance, charm, compassion, gentleness have their honoured
place. In the world of the wagon train only the masculine values of
courage, strength, endurance, hardness and aggressiveness have any
usefulness. Femininity is the luxury of a prosperous, peaceful and
secure society. When the Anglo-Saxons undertook the forceful settlement
of other continents, they left all that behind them. Women became
marginalized figures – and often confused ones, torn between the need
to wield hoe and rifle and the unreal lure of the Paris
fashion catalogues. Then when the New World imposed its imprint on the
Old after its decisive intervention in the First World War, the
ultra-masculine, pioneering culture came home to Europe and especially
to Britain.
The
suddenness of the transformation of human types brought about by the
Great War is not yet part of our mental picture of the century. A dandy
like Oscar Wilde, feeding on the old aristocratic tradition of
drawing-room wit and elegance, would never be possible again. Wilde’s
effete obsession with what it is to be a gentleman (“A gentleman never
looks out the window” he replied when complimented on the view from his
townhouse) was replaced by Hemingway’s cruder obsession with what it
takes to be a man – a compound of the American pioneer culture and the
war culture. This shift in the primary focus of men’s sense of worth
from their class to their sex excluded women at the very moment when
they were finally acceding to political rights. It should be obvious
that it is easier for a woman to be a “gentleman” than to be a “man”.
Women are more at home and respected in the world of Wilde than the
world of Hemingway. If the measure of human worth is style, class and
wit, women can display style, class and wit as well as any man. If the
yardstick of human excellence is testosterone-charged physical courage,
women will generally be seen as inferior specimens. This is the key to
the unenviable position of American women throughout their history and
of all Western women in the Americanized twentieth century. Condemned
to inferiority by a one-sidedly masculine culture, they faced a
dilemma. Should they seek to emulate the dominant masculine values and
prove that they too can be hard, tough and aggressive? Or should they
accept a social ghettoization and continue to display the feminine
qualities which society as a whole looks down on as secondary? The
women’s liberation movement of the seventies took the first course:
masculinization. And in so doing it sabotaged any attempt to move the
general values of society back in a more feminine direction.
But
the path seventies feminism took in its masculinization of women had
already been laid down by earlier generations. The First World War, by
pushing women into the factories to replace the mobilized men, gave
them new skills, new confidence, a new independence. They were then
expected to abandon all that when the war ended and return to a
domestic role. The dislocation of sexual mores caused by both wars, as
women began to see their traditional holding off till marriage as
absurd and wasteful when their boyfriend might be killed the next week,
had far-reaching consequences. After the First World War the massive
shortage of marriageable men (since so many young men had been killed
or maimed and hence taken off the “market” in each of the belligerent
countries) led women to compete harder for men. Women compete by
putting out sooner, and the relative sexual liberation of the 1920’s
was the result. The same thing was replayed after the Second World War,
but with a time lag. The actual loss of life among Western Allied
servicemen was lower in the Second World War than the First, but the
time they spent absent from home was longer (especially for the
Americans.) This caused a baby shortage during the war and a baby boom
after the war, as husbands rejoined wives or men got married. The
effect of this came twenty years later as the baby boom women suddenly
found a shortage of men in their normal target age-group. This has
generally been two to three years older than themselves because of the
earlier puberty of girls. A baby-boom woman, born in 1947 or 1948, was
looking for a man born in 1944 or 1945, and she had a hard job finding
one in an age-group a quarter smaller than her own. Of course she could
look for a mate among the men of her own age, but they were already
well provided for by their normal matches two or three years younger
(who were even more numerous.) The surplus baby boom women thus had to
compete vigorously for a limited market of men. The extreme sexual
liberation of the late 60’s was the result. For the first time in
history middle-class girls put out on a first date, afraid that if they
didn’t there wouldn’t be a second one. The pill removed the fear of
pregnancy even as a new cult of liberty removed the social stigma. The
unprecedented wealth of sexual opportunity for men (no longer obliged
to pay for sexual variety) meant in turn a new instability of marriage.
And if women could no longer trust marriage to last, because the girl
at the bus-stop was always likely to steal their husband, then the
traditional division of marriage roles broke down. The contract whereby
the man earned the money while the woman raised the kids no longer
worked if the man was likely to be spirited away by another girl
tomorrow. So the woman had to earn too. And if she wanted financial
independence, she had to earn not just a supplementary income but a
real one, which meant demanding access to the top jobs. And so the path
of feminist demands was laid down not just by ideology but by
demography, and by the change in sexual mores it imposed. The
dislocations of our society are striking proof that the mobilization of
all the young men to fight total war is a disaster for civilization
itself, with consequences that affect all future generations.
Such
are the themes of this book. It explores the thesis of the masculine
century: that a fundamental change occurred in the character of Western
man over a period of the recent past which we can, if we wish, neatly
bracket between the American Civil War (the first modern war) and the
Vietnam war – that second civil war which tore
America apart, and which marked the end of old-style Western
imperialism. Or to measure it by a broader standard, a period which
began with Darwin and Marx in the 1860’s and ended – after a century of
wars based on the two ideologies of violent struggle which these men
developed – with the final defeat of Marxism and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
We will examine this change in Western man’s character, its causes, its
reflection in thought and literature and art, its evolution, its
consequences, and the confusions and conflicts of the period of
normalization that we are now entered upon. And we will see how much
light this can throw upon some of the most confused and tangled
ideological and social debates of our time.
2) MASCULINITY: CONSTANT OR VARIABLE?
Some
researchers claim that for the past thirty or forty years the male
sperm count in the West has been steadily falling. One study indicated
a decline of one third in sperm counts since 1940. The same trend
applies, allegedly, to penis size, testosterone levels and various
other physical yard-sticks of virility. While the methods of data
collection and measurement have been questioned, there is a surprising
consensus even among serious scientists that something like this may be
happening.1 Of course this could be the result of dioxin or
other forms of chemical pollution, the use of female hormone-like
substances in fattening cattle or poultry, or various other
environmental influences which affect the human endocrine system,
inhibit the action of male hormone and interfere with the
transformation of foetuses into fully-fledged males – thereby leading
among other things to an increase in homosexuality. But it may also be
a simple swing of the pendulum. The Western male may be moving back to
normality after a period of excessive masculinity, due to the
militarization of the entire male population in the world wars. We are
unfortunately unable to measure the sperm counts and testosterone
levels of men of previous centuries to determine whether early
twentieth century man was an average male, or was an excessively virile
type which is now fading.
This
of course raises the question: is virility a constant or a variable,
over time, place, race and culture? And if it is variable, does it have
a norm? And who is to say what this norm is? More specifically, what
allows us to say that the highest sperm count is the most normal? Or
even the best for the survival of the species? Why should we lament its
fall? High sperm counts and testosterone levels may appear to maximize
survival chances for our race in the short term, but if these overly
masculine, aggressive males make another catastrophic war with one
another, it may well lessen survival chances in the long term. And if
the excesses of the cult of masculinity have led to such a devaluation
of women’s character and role that Western women have rushed to adopt
the reigning masculine values, pursue careers and reject motherhood,
provoking a crisis in marriage and a fall in birth-rates, then this
again may threaten rather than enhance our chances of survival as a
race. Perhaps a move back to a less masculine norm may be a way of
improving relations between the sexes, stabilizing marriages, and
revalorizing the feminine personality and the essential female task of
child-bearing. All of that may well be more important to our survival
than retaining high male sperm counts, given the enormous overkill in
the amount of sperm we produce anyhow. A single ejaculation, after all,
produces enough sperm (in the colourful phrase of one geneticist) to
impregnate the entire female population of Europe.2
While
sperm counts of past ages cannot be measured, there is a certain amount
of evidence about penis size. This can be found in the sculptures of
the past. Both classical and Renaissance sculptures depict rather small
penises by modern standards (and somewhat larger testicles in
proportion.) The copy of Michelangelo’s David in Caesar’s
Palace in Las Vegas has been given a much larger penis than the
original to satisfy the erotic expectations of modern American women.3 Now
it has been suggested that the penis on statues in the past was
deliberately reduced in size to make the owners appear more virtuous.4
A large penis might indicate a culpable degree of concupiscence. This
is one of the most peculiar ideas academia has ever come up with. There
would seem little reason for the Greeks to make a god like Dionysos,
patron of orgies, appear chaste. Or a Satyr, the very incarnation of
coarse sensuality. Yet the statues of these figures, notably those of
Praxiteles, have very small penises. Of course one could argue that
these figures are depicted as slim, girlish-looking adolescents, and
slim, girlish-looking adolescents generally have small penises even
today. But why would the incredibly rugged, muscular Farnese Hercules,
attributed to Lysippus, be deliberately given a small penis by the
standards of his age? (By our standards it is very small.) Why would
the Greeks and Romans, who did not consider sex a sin or nakedness
shameful, sculpt pricks just as small as those of guilt-ridden
Renaissance Christians? Giant phallic symbols were carried in religious
processions in classical times. Fertility gods like Priapus were shown
with enormous erect members, which did not seem to shock classical
sensibilities. Why would they have hesitated to depict other penises
life-size? Even in the Renaissance, does anyone imagine that the statue
of David, which stood in the main square of Florence,
would have been viewed (as it was by the local populace) as a heroic
symbol of the city’s manhood if it had had an unusually small penis by
the standards of the age? This notion of the deliberate artistic
downsizing of the penis in the name of virtue sounds like an example of
academics conjuring up theories out of the air to explain away
inconvenient facts. You might as well argue that the naked breasts of
Renaissance women were painted smaller than life-size to make them seem
virtuous. But surely if an artist had wanted to make a woman seem
virtuous he would have covered her breasts up. The only safe conclusion
is that penises were probably sculpted true to the size the artists
actually saw on their models. There would seem, then, to be some
physical evidence that penises (like breasts) in both ancient times and
the Renaissance were smaller than they are today. Which means that if
penis size is now shrinking, we are probably only getting back to the
historic norm.
In
short, if there appears to be a decline in masculinity or virility by
various measurements over the last two or three decades, we should be
asking ourselves whether this represents a decline from an historic
norm or a return to one. Was the period of militarism of the two world
wars a norm by which all later ages are to be measured, or a period of
unusual and excessive masculinity from which we are only now returning
to normal?
3) US AND THE MEN OF THE PAST
While
there is still expert disagreement over the measurement of sperm
counts, and even penis size, there is a certain amount of anecdotal
evidence of a recent decline in virility, based on everyday
observation. The Western male of today quite simply looks less
masculine than his father or his grandfather. The male film stars
idolized by women in recent years, Brad Pitt, Keanu Reeves, Leonardo Di
Caprio, are several degrees less masculine-looking than Clark Gable,
Burt Lancaster, or Sean Connery, even without invoking that old macho
icon, John Wayne. This trend cannot be dismissed as mere fashion.
Fashion reflects the norms and ideals of an age. But again, the
question is: which appearance represents the more average human male
over the past five hundred years? John Wayne or Leonardo Di Caprio?
Clark Gable or Brad Pitt? Which face, with hair and clothes suitably
adjusted, would fit in more inconspicuously into a Botticelli painting?
Or one by Raphael? Or Van Dyck? Or Watteau? The answer should be
obvious. The young men at the turn of the 21st century look far more
like those of previous centuries than do the men of the world war
generations. We are returning only now to the age-old norm.
If
you go into any great art museum and look at the paintings of the men
of the Renaissance or the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is
clear that their faces are quite different from the men of the
mid-twentieth century. This is not merely the effect of hair styles.
There is a sensitivity, a sensuality, a childishness, even an
effeminacy in the faces of Renaissance men that is totally absent from
the battle-hardened faces of modern war veterans. The square-jawed
American or Australian type of face, which became curiously the
archetypal face of European men as well for most of the twentieth
century (you find it in French actors like Lino Ventura or Scotsmen
like Sean Connery), is poles away from Van Dyck’s portraits of Charles
I or the Stuart princes. Put Van Dyck’s Stuart princes alongside John
Wayne (who was Scots and Irish and therefore of similar genetic stock)
and they look like two different sexes. From Donatello’s
girlish-looking David to the Cupid of Canova, or the soft young men’s
faces of Botticelli, Raphael, Rubens, or Watteau, we
have a depiction of the male sex that is utterly alien to what we
conceive of as masculine today. The evolution towards the modern type
of face is gradual but it can be traced. The square-jawed type is
scarcely found in British portraits before the mid-nineteenth century.
You begin to find it among prominent Victorians. Thomas Arnold, Thomas
Carlyle, Robert Peel have strong faces already evocative of the
twentieth century. The trend becomes accentuated in later Victorians
like Gladstone, whose coarse, blunt features are in marked contrast to
the slim, sensitive faces of his 18th century predecessors, the Earls
of Chatham, or Lord Melbourne, thirty years his senior. Among portraits
of American presidents the square-jawed type comes a little earlier,
perhaps reflecting the popular social origins and hard early lives of
some of them. Ulysses Grant has a strong, modern, plebeian face
(suggestive both of his military career and his heavy drinking); so
does Zachary Taylor, a backwoods farm boy who spent forty years as a
career soldier mostly fighting Indians. One finds certain modern,
angular traits in Jefferson at the
beginning of the century – in marked contrast with Adams, his
predecessor, who has a softer, rounder, more babyish, typically 18th
century face. By the time we get to Herbert Hoover in the late 1920’s
the square-jawed modern type predominates. In the 1930’s we see the
emergence of American cartoon characters like Dick Tracy and Superman
with their enormous prominent jaws, a physical feature scarcely seen in
any painting or sculpture before that period. The masculine
lantern-jawed face stands at the opposite extreme from the child’s or
the woman’s face. It advertises men’s rejection of any of the
characteristics associated with these other categories of human being:
sensitivity, gentleness, spontaneity, emotional expressiveness. Manhood
in the age of war (the period from 1914 to 1945 was called by the
historian Eric Hobsbawm a 31-year war with truces) is manifested
entirely in the jutting, square jaw, indicative of strength, courage,
determination, combattiveness, stoicism, the ability to endure pain and danger
without flinching. These qualities had become indispensable in order to
survive the hellish experience of the trenches, which was now the fate
marked out for men as a sex.
It
is clear that more recent generations of men have gone back some way
towards the softer, more boyish, even more feminine face of earlier
times. You see it in today’s politicians’ faces, which are far less
rugged than the faces of the war generation. Who knows how changes of
this kind can be explained? Perhaps it is the types of physical and
emotional experience people undergo which partly determine physical
appearance. Those European countries which till recently had long years
of compulsory military service expected the boys they sent away to come
back physically changed, more masculine-looking than they would have if
they had spent those years at university instead. It is not merely in
the arm muscles or the size of the shoulders that the change occurs; it
is in the shape of the face and the lines etched by its habitual
expression.
This
sort of analysis of the evolution of men’s appearance and character is
not new. It is something that preoccupied various writers early in the
20th century. There was a widespread conviction that a great change had
taken place in men, though people couldn’t agree on what it was or when
it had happened. Some writers, such as Wyndham Lewis, became obsessed
with the relative degree of masculinity or effeminacy of various
contemporaries. Lewis at first hailed Hitler as a masculine type, and
when he turned against him proclaimed him a sissy. The transformation
of men by the Great War into shorthaired, sun-tanned, hard-faced
Hemingway tough guys was the most obvious sign of some definitive
change in the species – and everyone in the 1920’s and 30’s had to
resemble the war veteran by also cultivating suntans and short hair,
even the women. But there had been an almost mystical presentiment
about some impending change in human beings even before the war. “On or
about December 1910 human character changed,” announced Virginia Woolf.5 Jean
Arp, a Swiss Dadaist, put it four years later: “Suddenly, in about
1914, in accordance with the laws of chance, the spirit was transmuted.”6
Much of this concerned the new artistic movements which claimed to
perceive reality in new and unprecedented ways. Gertrude Stein saw 20th
century perceptions of the world as utterly different from any before.
“The earth is not the same as in the 19th century,” she proclaimed, and
used this to explain Picasso.7 While some saw this
change as simply the sudden leap into “the modern world” of motor-cars
and telephones, others tried to trace its origins to some change in the
human soul further back in the past. T.S.Eliot had his theory of the
dissociation of sensibility, which he situated in the mid-seventeenth
century. He claimed that before that age men like Donne were able to
“feel a thought,” and that since then thought and feeling had become
separated; modern man had become desensualized and thinking had become
abstract. W.B.Yeats is closer to our preoccupations when he contrasts a
portrait of Woodrow Wilson with one of a Renaissance man. He dwells on Wilson’s
wooden posture, dead expression, the lifelessness of his hands, as
opposed to the sensuality and sensitivity of those of the Renaissance
man, who seems to quiver with life. Yeats is not talking about the
superior technique of the Renaissance painter but about something that
has happened to men in between. He ascribes this apparent deadening,
this desensualizing of man, to the whole process of industrialization,
democratization and modernization that he detested so much. This
anti-democratic bias was shared by the fascist movement – though, the
latter, by contrast, celebrated the new masculine toughness of the
First World War veterans and made the cult of war-like virility the
centre of their ideology. For the fascists (and their Futurist allies)
the suntanned, shaven-headed ex-soldier was the new type of man who had
left behind every form of weakness, effeminacy and sickly
sentimentality and had become a rugged instrument of national power and
national regeneration through the bracing force of war. In 1914 the
Italian Futurist Filippo Marinetti proclaimed: “the present war is the
most beautiful Futurist poem which has so far been seen”, and hoped
that it would sweep away such “pastist” rubbish as philosophers,
libraries, museums and history.8 The first Modernist
movement in art thus announced its revolutionary intention of violently
abolishing the past. The Italian fascists, like the Soviets, saw
themselves as creating a New Man, and Oswald Mosley thought that the
fascist New Man would be as different from all others as “men from
another planet.”9 Ernest Junger, a leading German writer of
the twenties, asked: “Why is it that our age in particular is so
overflowing with destructive and productive energies?” and answered:
“It is war which has made human beings and their age what they are
.…War, father of all things, is also ours. He has hammered us,
chiselled and tempered us into what we are.”10 The
generation that had fought the war saw itself as different, marked out
by history from all those who had gone before, like a generation of
Cains. Mussolini spoke of a “trenchocracy” – the natural right to rule
of the “aristocracy of the trenches”, the men who had fought at
Armageddon.11 War veterans were used by the British government to crush rebellion in Ireland and break general strikes, while in Germany and Italy
they brawled their way to power. It is arguable that fascism merely
expressed in extreme form a change in behaviour, styles and sensibility
that had taken place across the board in Europe and America.
Mid-twentieth century man was, in degrees which varied from country to
country, essentially fascist man: man formed by war and for war.
The
instincts of the counter-culture generation of the late sixties,
rejecting not merely the politics of war but the character of man it
was based upon, and expressing their revolt in long hair, beads,
effeminate clothes, gentle manners, a cult of peace and love, reflected
a profound insight into the psychological foundations of the cult of
militarism. What they rejected was the whole image, identity and style
of mid-20th century man – the fascist New Man forged by war. They saw
war as a culture, based on a certain concept of manhood. That ideal of
manhood – a cult of aggressiveness, courage, toughness, callousness,
brutality and violence – was, they believed, at the root of men’s
willingness to make war. They believed that if they could change the
concept of masculinity, in some sense make men less “masculine”, they
could eliminate the taste for war, and thereby change the direction of
civilization and save it from self-destruction.
But
what did they mean by “masculinity” – and what did they mean by
changing it? Can it be changed? Or is it an immutable fact of human
nature? Was it not as pointless to try to change the instincts and
character of men as the character of lions or bulls? To what extent are
masculinity and femininity biological constants, and to what extent are
they socially conditioned? Are they universal characteristics of the
human species, or are they the variable products of particular cultures
and periods? Before we go any further in the exploration of how men’s
(and women’s) character, behaviour and image evolved over the past two
centuries, we have to examine these questions and define more precisely
what we are talking about, and what we mean by masculine and feminine
characteristics.
4) MASCULINE AND FEMININE: STILL “CONFUSED CONCEPTS”?
Freud commented that masculinity and femininity were “among the most confused concepts in the sciences”.(12) He also believed that all psychological behaviour would one day be shown to have a chemical basis. (13) This
intuition has proved correct. We have already discovered the chemical
basis of masculinity and femininity, and we can now give these concepts
a much clearer definition than was available to Freud.
Scientific
research into these aspects of the human personality has not, however,
been conducted in a social vacuum. It has taken place on an academic
battlefield, and its reception has been determined by the positions
critics have adopted in the great ideological debate between Nature and
Nurture, or between biology and social influences on behaviour. This
debate has been made even more passionate and bitter by the frequent
alignment of the two sides with right-wing and left-wing political
views. The most extreme position on the social and environmental side
was taken by the feminist movement. Every since the late 1960’s the
feminist movement has developed an elaborate system of beliefs, which
is now preached in six hundred Gender Studies departments and
programmes in American universities, whose basic dogma is that all
so-called “masculine” and “feminine” psychological and mental
characteristics are merely social constructs, the result of social
conditioning in gender roles. Feminists make a dogmatic distinction
between “sex”, the purely physical differences in genitalia and bone
structure between men and women, and “gender”, the behavioural and
personality differences, which they define a priori as
“socially constructed”, the products of upbringing, ideology and
culture. They believe there is no biological basis for any “gender”
differences. Gender roles and gender characteristics are merely a set
of conditioned behaviour patterns which have been imposed on human
beings for thousands of years by a male power structure called “the
patriarchy”, to perpetuate the power of men over women by training
women to be submissive and men to be dominant. It is above all the
tyrannical imposition upon women of the child-caring role which is
responsible for differences of character and behaviour.
(14) Without the conditioning by this power structure there would
be no psychological differences between men and women.
Now
the scientific research that has been undertaken in the field of gender
differences over the past twenty years has very largely refuted this
elaborate feminist belief system. Researchers have come down quite
heavily in favour of a biological basis for the observed differences in
mental characteristics, behaviour and personality between men and
women. The social conditioning in gender roles which undoubtedly takes
place is merely reinforcing mental and psychological characteristics
which are innate in the immense majority of each sex. It is
because these gender characteristics are observed as naturally
occurring in each sex that children are encouraged to conform to type,
in order to ensure later success in attracting the other sex and mating
– which parents desire for reasons of their own genetic survival. The
basis of these gender-typical characteristics is the influence of male
and female hormones on the fœtus, notably in producing different brain
structures in men and women.
Now
as might be expected most feminists have reacted to this research by
ignoring or dismissing the evidence. Typically they will insist that
there is “no proof” and then refuse to look at the proof. This
refusal to accept scientific research only shows the degree to which
the radical feminist ideology, like the Marxism it sprang from, is an
irrational faith more akin to religious belief than intellectual
inquiry. Disciples of such faiths simply shrug off any evidence which
discredits their basic thesis, because its collapse would lead to the
disintegration of the emotional world-view on which their whole lives
have been based. More mundanely it would lead to the collapse of a
whole section of academic studies in American universities dedicated to
an unscientific dogmatism, the collapse of an entire industry of
feminist writing and lobbying, and the fatal weakening of a political
movement which, in the name of justice and equality, has gained
enormous influence not only over the universities and schools, but over
politics, social policy, the courts and the law throughout the Western
world.
But
the establishment of the biological basis of gender differences in
behaviour and personality – the firm linking of gender and sex – does
not mean that gender behaviour is immutable or immune to social
influence. While character traits may legitimately be called
“masculine” and “feminine” because they are a product of hormonal
influences, these characteristics may still be
enhanced or decreased by a person's upbringing, cultural
conditioning, and life experiences. Research has cast a good deal of
light on how sex hormones interact with activities and
experiences. Some activities can increase male hormone levels (levels
in top tennis players double before a big match) while other
experiences can decrease them (losing the match, stroking a kitten or
singing a baby to sleep.) Activities that repeatedly raise testosterone
levels will masculinize the character. Military service and competitive
sports masculinize by repeatedly raising testosterone levels in order
to make it easier to furnish the efforts required. Moreover, the
constant raising of testosterone levels will increase the desire to
engage in these activities. The discrediting, therefore, of the extreme
feminist position, while it allows us to talk meaningfully of masculine
and feminine psychological traits (which radical feminism essentially
denied), does not prove the immutability of these traits, or their
imperviousness to social influence. These traits can still increase or
decrease in ages, cultures and generations, in function of the
experiences people are subjected to. A society engaged in total war for
a long period will end up with more masculine (hard, tough, aggressive,
unemotional, insensitive) men than one that has been at peace,
cultivating the arts, for centuries. Women subjected to a competitive
work market, or encouraged to play aggressive sports, will become more
masculine than they would if conditioned differently. Men deprived of
competitive or aggressive activities will become less masculine. This
is what allows us to study the evolution of masculinity as a reality,
not merely a cultural concept. It is a set of real, hormone-related
characteristics, not merely a set of social prejudices or stereotypes.
But it is a set of characteristics that can vary with changing
conditions or between different societies. That is the necessary
theoretical premise for our thesis of the masculine century: that there
was an increase in masculine traits in Western men over a hundred year
period from the late 19th century to the last third of the 20th
century, and there has been an increase in masculine traits in Western
women over the past forty years.
The
scientific research that has established the biological basis of
certain mental and behavioural differences between men and women has in
recent years been given a good deal of publicity. Every few months the
British Sunday supplements have told us about one more skill,
characteristic, or behaviour pattern that research has now linked to
male or female hormones. Map-reading ability, talkativeness,
promiscuity, even autism have been found to have a definite gender bias
or hormonal basis. But the fact that such research has filtered out
into the general public and become “popular”, through the informed
curiosity of journalists, does not make it less serious. Scientific
popularizers play an essential role in informing the general educated
public of what is going on in each field of research, in an age when
nobody can possibly master all disciplines or have access to all the
specialized literature. Many highly-qualified scientific writers have
published works which present scientific findings in a readable,
accessible manner, while remaining rigorous in their citation of
scholarly journals. Works of this kind are the immediate source of the
following brief summary of the latest research in this field. Anyone
interested in the scientific studies on which these books draw should
consult the works themselves, where the references are given in detail.
Our interest here is merely to keep before our minds the latest
generally accepted scientific findings in this area (always subject to
further developments), so that the reader will have an idea of what set
of characteristics is meant when we use the terms “masculine” or
“feminine” and what degree of biological as opposed to social basis
these terms have.
The
scientific notions of masculinity and femininity that have emerged in
recent years are based on studies of the foetus and its development,
the process by which the fœtus is “sexed” by male
and female hormones, as well as on studies of male and female brain
structure, partly through examining the different effects of various
kinds of brain damage on men and women. The most lucid and accessible
account of this for the non-scientist is provided in the book Brainsex by Anne Moir and David Jessel, and the follow-up book by Anne and Brian Moir, Why Men Don’t Iron.
Good accounts can also be found in the work of Matt Ridley, Steve
Jones, Anthony Clare or scientific researchers such as Doreen Kimura,
one of the pioneers in this field.(15) These authors, incidentally, do
not always share one another’s world view or ideological leanings. What
interests us here is not their social conclusions, but the research
they cite.
From
this mass of research there has emerged over the past few years a
coherent picture of the process by which the human brain is “sexed” or
given a distinct male or female character. The important discovery of
recent years is that the “sexing” of a foetus is progressive, and it
does not depend directly on genes or chromosomes, but on hormones.
5) THE SEXING OF THE FOETUS
A
baby when conceived is either a boy or girl genetically. In addition to
the X chromosome provided by the mother, it has either received a Y
chromosome or another X chromosome from its father, and it is the
presence of a Y chromosome which makes a genetic male. But for the
first few weeks of its development it is physically identical in the
two cases. Then at six weeks the presence of a Y chromosome prompts the
embryo to develop testes instead of ovaries. The testes produce male
hormones or androgens, the main one being testosterone. These hormones
“instruct” the embryo to develop according to a male blueprint and not
a female blueprint.
It
has been shown that if the male hormones are in some way counteracted
or neutralized so that they have no effect on the embryo (and later the
foetus), the latter continues to develop along female lines and becomes
a baby girl, even if it has a Y chromosome and is genetically male.
Similarly, a female fœtus subjected to high enough levels of male
hormone will develop into a male. What determines the physical sex of
the baby (which sex organs it has) is not the chromosomes it receives
at conception but the hormones it produces and is conditioned by during
its time in the womb.
The
fact that the physical sex of a foetus is determined progressively and
in stages by the operation of hormones is what allows a certain number
of things to go wrong. Clearly in such a long transformation process
the possibility opens up of a foetus which is incompletely “sexed”, or
has been made male or female to a greater or lesser degree. The action
of male hormone on the foetus may occasionally be interfered with, and
the consequences can be very marked. Male hormone may be partially
neutralized by the pregnant mother taking a drug that mimics female
hormone (certain anti-diabetic drugs used in recent decades had this
effect.) This may mean that certain aspects of the male fœtus will not
be masculinized, but will retain the female default form. The result
may be sons of a more feminine appearance or character. They may also
be homosexual, if the neutralization of male hormone occurred at the
precise phase (three months into gestation) when mating behaviour is
fixed in the hypothalamus of the foetus’s brain. If the mating centre
in his brain remains female, a male will be homosexual, irrespective of
whatever other aspects of his body or brain have been masculinized, or
how masculine he looks. Similarly, female foetuses whose mothers have
taken substances which mimic male hormone (such as certain synthetic
steroids used in the 1970’s) or who suffer from a condition called
congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) which makes them produce large
quantities of adrenal androgens, will begin a partial transformation
into males. Again whether this transformation affects their physical
appearance, their genitals, their brain structure, their character,
their sexual orientation, or a combination of these, will depend on the
phase of foetal development when the high dose of male hormone occurred
and how long it lasted. What often happens is that little girls who
suffered from that condition in the womb grow up like boys. They are
rough at school, get into fights, take no interest in dolls, prefer to
play with boys rather than girls, grow up to do typically male jobs
such as engineering, and either become lesbian or make down-to-earth
marriages for companionship rather than love. In short, the action of
male hormone upon them at the foetal stage gives them a typical (even a
stereotypical) masculine character.
It
has therefore been shown fairly conclusively by this research that many
psychological characteristics that we normally think of as masculine
and feminine are in fact directly caused by the action of male and
female hormones on the foetus. Some people have ended up with
“wrong-sex” psychological characteristics because they have been
conditioned in the womb by “wrong-sex” hormones. It appears that most
cases of feminine boys and masculine girls are not the product of their
upbringing or conditioning. Parents do not create these gender-atypical
personalities by the way they treat the children (on the contrary, they
are often worried by their offspring’s “wrong-sex” behaviour.) Nor are
these children brave rebels against gender conformity, who have somehow
decided to be different out of strong political conviction or
irrepressible independence of mind. These children are simply the
products of hormonal influences on their brains in the foetal stage. In
short, the fact of children conforming or not conforming to gender type
is generally neither the product of social conditioning nor a conscious
revolt against conditioning: it is the product of biological drives in
the child. The feminist belief that a minority of masculine women, who
revolted against their gender conditioning and lived successful,
high-achieving, male-clone lives, are a vanguard of brave pioneers
showing the way for all women to follow is a gross delusion. The
majority of women are not going to follow, unless they too were subject
to anomalous hormonal influences in the fœtal stage. Feminism in its
radical form is a forlorn dream of making universal a small number of
biological accidents.
The
complicated, accident-prone nature of the process by which the fœtus is
sexed by the influence of hormones explains the variety of anomalous
cases that can occur. These may involve physical traits, psychological
and mental traits, genital abnormalities, wrong-sex mating instincts or
confusion over gender identity. Any of these can occur alone or in
combination. According to the German researcher Dr Gunther Dörner, one
of the pioneers in the field, there are three distinct phases in the
sexing of the brain of a fœtus. The hormones first operate on the sex
centre of the brain, which determines male and female physical
characteristics (how masculine or feminine people look); then they
operate on the mating centre, which determines which sex they are
attracted to; and finally on the gender role centre, which determines
degrees of masculine and feminine behaviour and character. Dr Milton
Diamond, an American specialist in gender identity problems, broadly
agrees but adds another phase, where the brain acquires a sense of
which sex it is. This “gender centre” has been located, like the mating
centre, in the hypothalamus of the brain.(16) This
picture of the sexing of the fœtus goes some way towards explaining why
homosexuality comes in various shapes and guises – and why not all
homosexuals are effeminate-looking men or masculine-looking women. It
depends what other aspects of their character or appearance (if any)
got the wrong dose of hormones, apart from the mating centre of their
brain. Anatomical differences have been found between the brains of
homosexuals, heterosexuals and transsexuals.(17) Transsexuals, who have
a brain gender centre with a different sex from their body, are rare –
estimates range from one in 30,000 males and one in 100,000 females to
about three times that, judging by numbers who consult doctors for sex
reassignment surgery.(18) It manifests itself early, most commonly when
a little boy is convinced he is really a girl, and suffers agonies from
being in what he feels is the wrong body. Because of anomalies in the
effects of male hormone, the gender centre of his brain remained female
while everything else became male. There is no cure for transsexuals
except getting used to it, or a sex change in adulthood.(19) Even
more dramatic, the anomalous hormone levels in the foetal stage may
occasionally affect the genitals, leading to a hermaphrodite with
in-between sexual organs. This imposes terrible choices on doctors
whether to surgically remodel genitals – and which way to do so (since
they can’t ask the baby which sex it thinks it is.) This has led to
some tragic cases where the individual was physically remodelled into a
sex different from the one in his brain – the surgeons unwittingly
created a transsexual. (20) These cases tend to prove that “gender”, or
the mental sense of which sex one is, is not a product of upbringing
but of biology.
What are the factors that can affect the action of hormones in the development of the foetus,
and lead to these various anomalies – apart from medical conditions and
certain prescription drugs taken by the mother? Researchers are working
on a number of hypotheses. One factor that has been suggested is stress
during pregnancy. Dörner claims that more male homosexuals than usual
were born in Germany
at the end of the war, because of the stress felt by their pregnant
mothers due to the intensive bombing and fear of the approaching enemy.
Stress is apparently a male hormone inhibitor (as its role in impotence
would suggest.) (21) Dioxin pollution is another prime suspect (and
dioxin is produced by combustion of certain common materials such as
plastics at very high temperatures, which often occurs when cities are
fire-bombed.) It has been shown that injecting minute quantities of
dioxin into a pregnant rat will result in the male offspring being
undersized and homosexual, because dioxin inhibits male hormone in its work of transforming foetuses into males.(22) Greenpeace
on its American website lists the following effects of dioxin pollution
on the human male reproductive system: reduced sperm count, testicular
atrophy, abnormal testes structure, reduced size of genital organs,
feminized hormonal responses, and feminized behavioural responses.
There is some anecdotal evidence of an increase in recent decades of
both homosexuals and hermaphrodites among various species of animals,
both wild and domestic. Farmers seem to be finding more male homosexual
sheep than before, though it is hard to make historical comparisons
because of a lack of precise records. Norwegian scientists have
observed that polar bears are being born hermaphrodite in increasing
numbers, and have concluded that it is because the mothers eat seals,
which concentrate in their blubber the PCB’s spewed out by industrial
pollution. PCB’s (a sort of dioxin) appear to mimic oestrogen and to
feminize male foetuses. (23) All this would seem to suggest the direct
effect of industrial pollution on both human and animal reproductive
systems. The female hormone-like substances used in industrialized meat
production and the countless other new chemicals that have entered our
organisms in recent decades (through industrial chemicals, fertilizers
and so on) may also have an effect on the human endocrine system, and
may result in a certain feminization, lower sperm counts and a growing
number of homosexuals. At the moment the evidence is lacking to
quantity any such effect, because we have no standards of comparison
for these things over long historical periods.
6) SEX IN THE HEAD
Parallel
to the studies of how foetuses are sexed, there have been remarkable
new discoveries concerning the differences between male and female
brain structures. Various skills such as language are acquired in
different parts of the brains of males and females, so that injuries in
the same part of the brain will lead to quite different kinds of loss
of skill for men and women. This different brain structure gives men
and women, in their majority, different natural abilities, strengths
and weaknesses. It also seems to explain the tendency of boys and girls
to choose different professions, even after strong educational
campaigns to break down stereotypes. In the main, they choose
professions which call on qualities that their own sex displays to a
greater degree.
A
variety of studies, both clinical studies of brain differences, hormone
levels and psychological tests on large samples of men and women, have
enabled scientists to draw a fairly coherent picture of the character
and behavioural differences between males and females that appear to
have a biological basis. What does this picture suggest are the
typically masculine characteristics – characteristics that can be
related in some way to male hormone, or to a male brain structure?
RAGING BULL
The
first is greater aggressiveness, with its related manifestations of
assertiveness, competitiveness, the urge to dominate, and physical
courage in the face of danger. This is directly related to the male
hormone testosterone, produced in the testes. A chimpanzee given extra
doses of testosterone will bully its inferiors mercilessly, and may
attack others of superior rank and even rise in the hierarchy, at the
expense of bigger rivals. Its willingness to take greater risks of
injury will make it more dominant. A castrated rat will tend to welcome
an intruder rather than fighting it. Castrating a bull vastly reduces
its aggressiveness. This effect of testosterone on levels of
aggressiveness scarcely requires scientific demonstration; it is a
matter of everyday observation of castrated and non-castrated male
animals, even down to the domestic cat. Men in their prime have, on
average, somewhere between ten and twenty-five times more testosterone
in their bodies than women, and will experience a far greater surge of
testosterone when confronted with anything that provokes an aggressive
reaction: a challenge, conflict, danger or competition.24 Because
competition stimulates the production of testosterone, men generally
enjoy competing more than women, because their brains are wired to
enjoy a testosterone high. They therefore invent activities that will
provoke this high. This applies not only to their professional lives
(where their competitive instinct may give them an edge over women in
their race up the corporate ladder), but to their leisure and sporting
activities, which are very largely competitive.
The Duchess of Marlborough noted in her diary: “His Grace returned from the wars today and pleasured me twice in his top boots.”25 The Duke of Marlborough
effect has been observed in male crickets, which mate vigorously after
winning a fight. Levels of testosterone in top male tennis players have
been found to rise between 40 and 100 per cent before a big match.
Victory in the match raises the level even higher. Losing the match
lowers it. With women tennis players the rise in testosterone levels is
much less marked, and they start from a level ten times lower. Winning
does not seem to make as much difference to their testosterone levels
as whether they played well. The much greater testosterone high of the
male winner means that he will go on to the next round of the contest
with an advantage, because the testosterone high of winning is
something he wants again. (It also makes him attractive to women, who
seem programmed to go for sports champions.) This testosterone high is
experienced by males watching sports as well as playing them. The
triumph of one’s team boosts testosterone levels, which explains the
huge importance sports have for men as spectators, and the frequency of
fighting after football matches. Sports events caused pitched battles
among spectators even under the Roman empire. Women are far less inclined to watch sport because they don’t usually get the same hormonal high from it.
It
has been pointed out that the difference in intensity of male and
female testosterone highs has a particular biological cause. Women’s
bodies, having no testes, produce testosterone from the adrenal cortex,
which is where they also produce cortisol. Now cortisol is an anxiety
reaction which provokes flight rather than fight. It is produced in a
man’s body when things are going badly, and it counteracts the
testosterone and decides him on a tactical retreat. In men the two
chemicals are produced from different sources – testosterone from the
testes and cortisol from the adrenal cortex, and there is no link
between them. In women both testosterone and cortisol are manufactured
in the adrenal cortex, and their production is linked. This means that
women’s testosterone high is always counteracted by an antidote of the
caution-inducing cortisol. A woman never experiences anything like the
blind testosterone burst of the man, which makes him utterly oblivious
to danger and convinced he is indestructible. The adrenaline rush
produced by stress and danger is also far greater in men than in women,
and it helps men perform better, whereas it doesn’t help women.26
Men are therefore greater risk-takers because of their chemistry, which
explains war-time charges in the face of machine guns, the extreme
risk-taking of bull-fighters or racing-car drivers, and a higher male
level of dangerous driving on the roads.
MAN THE SPACE TRAVELLER
The
second group of characteristics associated with male hormone and found
to a higher degree in the average male are spatial and navigational
skills. Boys can generally rotate three dimensional objects more easily
in their heads than girls can, are better at map-reading, and better at
games that involve aiming objects at a target. Navigational skills are
also greater in males of other species such as rats and chimpanzees,
which can find their way through mazes far better than females.27
This may be related to the greater roaming patterns of many male
animals. Men were also traditionally the sex which hunted, which often
required very long expeditions. Navigational skills, like
aggressiveness, are directly linked to testosterone : a male rat’s
performance in maze-running will be improved by an injection of
testosterone, and a rat castrated very young will perform as badly as a
female (rats’ brains are not yet fully organized or “hard-wired” when
born and are thus ideal subjects for the study of the effect of
hormones upon them, as experiments on them are similar to modifying a
fœtus’s brain.) Women, on average, are poorer map readers than men,
have less sense of direction in strange cities and have more difficulty
rotating objects in their minds.
If
we put together these two male characteristics of greater
competitiveness (or combattiveness) and better spatial skills, we
arrive at an explanation as to why men spend so much of their leisure
time in sports – which are mostly competitive aiming activities,
usually to get a ball or other object to a certain target. These
activities test male-brained spatial skills in a competitive,
testosterone-enhancing context. If we move for a moment from the realm
of scientific research to that of everyday observation, the average
person’s leisure activities provide a good illustration of this. On a
quiet Sunday afternoon after a barbecue among friends, the men will
start playing darts, table tennis or pétanque (or lacking any sporting
equipment will throw stones at a bucket) while the women chat and
exchange gossip (that is, commentary on others’ behaviour in order to
reinforce their social bonds, sometimes at the expense of the absent
person, and also to reaffirm the social rules.) If the women join in
the men’s game it will be for a short time only (just to get their
attention) and it will probably end in a playful but noisy quarrel, so
that the women can switch the contest to their superior verbal skills.
They are not so much interested in the game as in relating to the men
through it. What interests the men is the game itself, and the women’s
excitable presence is a distraction from it. These different patterns
of behaviour can be observed in every school playground all over the
world. The boys play noisy, competitive, physical games, often
involving aiming skills or some degree of aggression, while the girls
cluster in groups sharing secrets, establishing relationships, making
special friends or quarrelling with them – and probably going home to
write about these emotional episodes in their diaries. The boys’ games
will later be extended into a huge range of sports in which men compete
in spatial ability (aiming, navigating and co-ordinating eye and hand,
often at speed.) These include all ball games from football and tennis
to golf, as well as bowls, bowling, archery, shooting, darts,
billiards, boxing, or the high-speed driving and navigation of vehicles
on land or water. In all these sports men are better on average than
women, even though in many of them strength is not decisive. The most
exciting sports involve aiming skills (passing a ball) while running at
top speed under the threat of a violent collision of bodies – football,
rugby, American football. Men have enormous respect for sporting
ability and give sports champions very high status, perhaps because
most sports, in testing spatial and aiming ability rather than brawn,
are in effect testing the “maleness” of the brain. The most
“male-brained” man seems to be looked up to by other men as a natural
leader. The role sporting ability plays in the careers of corporate
executives and politicians in America may be a reflection of this instinctive male respect for signs of a very masculine brain.
THE DYSLEXIC MATHEMATICIAN
Associated
with the greater spatial ability of men is their greater skill in
mathematics. Among gifted American children, the number of boys in the
very highest category of natural mathematical ability is thirteen times
greater than that of girls.28 In the top one per cent of American children who shine in sciences, boys outnumber girls seven to one.29
By contrast, men on average have poorer verbal skills than women. Girls
generally learn to talk earlier than boys, develop a larger vocabulary
younger, and make complex sentences sooner. There are four times more
boys than girls in remedial reading classes. Women usually score higher
than men on the verbal parts of IQ tests, and lower on the
spatial-mathematical parts. These differences have been related to
different areas of the brain found to be active when doing various
tasks. Males seem to employ only one part of their brain to do
mathematical tasks, while females use various parts of their brain.
Similarly, women concentrate their verbal skills in one part of their
brain only, while men employ different parts. Brain specialization
seems to be what gives each sex an edge in the field it is good at.
Though of course we are dealing with averages and there are a minority
of exceptions in both sexes, it has now been established beyond
reasonable doubt that these are inherent, biological differences, not
due to any social, educational or cultural factors. Of course the fact
that each sex finds certain subjects more difficult often causes them
to shun those subjects, leading to an even greater gender gap in
achievement in them. Natural gender abilities will influence the fields
each sex chooses to study and the professions the majority of them will
enter. Since reading is fundamental to all subjects, the lower average
reading ability of boys will lead more of them to general academic
failure and a lack of qualifications. (This rate of failure has been
increased by the fact that the teaching of reading skills, due to
trendy academic fads, is now worse than at any time in the past.)
INSENSITIVE BASTARD
A
fourth quality related to higher levels of testosterone is greater male
insensitivity to both pain and noise, and a less sharp sense of smell
and hearing. Women’s touch sensibility is so much greater than men’s
that in many sample groups tested there is no overlap of scores between
the least sensitive female and the most sensitive male.30
Men will have radios up higher than women because they quite simply do
not hear as well, especially if there is competing noise. Noise
insensitivity becomes a quality of great importance in war, especially
in conditions like the trenches of the First World War, where the level
of noise from prolonged artillery bombardments drove some men mad. At
firework displays it is considered girlish and shameful for men to jump
or cry out at a nearby explosion, but acceptable (and even attractive)
in women. Popular prejudice (which is often nothing but codified
experience) quite rightly associates insensitivity to loud noises with
masculinity, and sensitivity to loud noises with femininity.
In
addition to these differences, which can be related either to hormones
or to differences in brain organization, there is emerging a whole lore
of behavioural differences between the sexes based on large numbers of
controlled experiments, as well as on widespread observations and
surveys. While the link to hormones or brain differences has not always
been proved, it is strongly suspected, as these behavioural differences
appear to be fairly constant across cultures. A brief summary of these
will complete the picture of characteristics that we can legitimately
refer to as masculine or feminine.
THE CHATTERING HOUSEWIFE AND THE STRONG, SILENT TYPE
Women
not only have greater sensitivity to touch and sharper hearing; they
also have better peripheral vision and greater powers of visual
observation. Women can remember more random visual details in a room
than men can, and can memorize random items better.31 This
ability of women to “notice” things may well be related (either as
cause or effect) to their role as food-gatherers in ancestral
hunter-gatherer societies. Women had to notice the berries, roots,
mushrooms and edible plants, differentiate among them and remember
where each one was. Women’s spatial sense is one of static visual
detail, not the broad sense of orientation of the hunter. Women
navigate by landmarks rather than a general sense of direction. This
acute female sense of visual placement makes certain decorative arts
(like flower arrangement or interior decoration) distinctly feminine
(if practised by men, the men tend to be effeminate.) To the average
man’s mind, this sense of visual detail makes women obsessively
conscious of things not being in their place in a room, compulsively
tidy, and fussy about such things as the books piled carelessly on a
chair or a few clothes lying harmlessly on the floor. This difference
may also lie behind women’s justly reputed ability to tidy and organize
rooms faster and more efficiently than men – which makes them natural
housekeepers. They may simply carry a clearer picture in their minds of
what the room should look like, and what things have to be moved to get
it into that state.
Men,
on average, not only have poorer verbal skills than women but they also
have less tendency to talk or communicate. Girls start off by talking
earlier and continue to talk more throughout their lives. It is rare to
hear a man complain of his wife: “She never talks to me.” It is one of
the commonest complaints wives make of husbands. Most women need to
verbalize their experiences; men have less need to. Men have difficulty
expressing feelings of love in words and prefer ritual actions like
giving flowers. Women believe not only in expressing feelings verbally
but seem to need constant verbal reassurance about the feelings of the
other. (This difference gives rise to standard comic routines of the
sort: “But I told you I loved you three years ago, Mabel. I’ve never
signalled any change: why do you need me to repeat it now?”) Women like
to discuss things in order to get the feel of what the other thinks;
men discuss in order to reach a decision or find a solution. Women
complain of a problem in order to elicit emotional sympathy; men
respond by offering little sympathy but a practical solution. Men
seldom ask for help in dealing with a problem, as they think of it as
an admission of weakness or incompetence. Women often ask for help
quite unnecessarily in order to have social interaction and build up a
network of mutual support for when they really need it.
Men
are not only less interested in communicating, they are also less
interested in other people’s feelings. They are less socially observant
than women, and less sensitive to others’ states of mind and of the
undercurrents of social situations. Women hear tones of voice better
and intuit the feelings underlying them. A man will fail to notice that
a certain subject of conversation is embarrassing to a dinner guest;
only his wife’s kick under the table will alert him to the fact. At the
extreme end of this insensitivity to others’ feelings lies autism,
which is an overwhelmingly male condition, five times as frequent in
boys.32 The autistic person often fails to recognize or
respond to others’ emotions at all. Boy babies respond less to people
and hold less eye contact than girl babies, but are more fascinated by
moving objects. Men seem to value social relationships less, whether
those of family or friends, and seem self-centred to many women. Women
are more physically affectionate towards babies and small animals,
wanting to cuddle them. Men prefer a relationship of playfulness: they
like to test an animal’s reactions or make a baby laugh. Men’s
emotional bluntness and insensitivity to feelings is something women
often find distressing. Of course insensitivity may be a vital
characteristic for survival if you have to cut a sheep’s throat or
bayonet an enemy, stay in a trench under deafening shell-fire, order
other men to go to certain death, or keep charging the enemy while your
best friend is decapitated at your side. The harsh and violent
conditions in which mankind has often lived until now have made both
sides of human nature necessary: insensitivity and sensitivity,
aggressiveness and nurturing. A psychological specialization along sex
lines has probably developed as the simplest way of combining opposite
qualities in the species.
A CRYING SHAME
This
greater degree of insensitivity makes most men more able to control
their emotions (except for those linked to testosterone, such as anger)
or at least to hide their emotions. Their range of facial expressions
is more limited. Men in battle seldom stop to cry over dead friends, or
over the killing they have to do, and even afterwards they often have
difficulty grieving. The fate of many war veterans in the past was a
quiet sinking into depression or alcoholism, unable to talk about what
they had been through. Men have more difficulty than women in
expressing sorrow, especially through tears. Some men cannot cry at
all, and most only do so on rare occasions of great distress, whereas
most women will weep on much slighter pretexts.
Now
the feminists argue that this difference in weeping is purely the
result of social conditioning. They point out that even today many
mothers discourage boys from crying by trying to shame them with the
old adage: “Boys don’t cry.” But despite the fashion today of a
feminist ideology of unisex treatment of boys and girls, it is
difficult to get out of the habit of expecting more physical courage
and less tendency to cry from boys than girls. Perhaps because boys are
usually more boisterous and rougher in their play than girls from the
earliest age, they project an expectation of more toughness, which
adults then respond to by joining their game. Crying is a sudden
abandoning of the boy’s habitual persona of toughness, and we encourage
him to get it back. Adults are perhaps responding to the boy’s pattern
of behaviour as much as they are imposing one. We often make the same
gender distinctions in the way we respond to crying by adults. It is
not uncommon to meet women of thirty or forty who, despite great
composure and strength of mind at other times, burst into tears at any
emotional or stressful confrontation with anyone else. While this may
seem a sign of fragility, most people wouldn’t find it abnormal or a
cause for concern. If a man of that age burst into tears in a similar
situation, most of us would find it a cause for great concern – and
feel that he was suffering from depression or needed help. At the very
least he would be considered a person of very feminine temperament. The
very exceptions confirm the rule that crying is more common among women
than men, and therefore appears a more “normal” habit among them.
Feminists
of the gender-bending persuasion have in recent times made a great fuss
about tears, urging men to weep more, and claiming that their
reluctance to cry is merely the reflection of the repression of men’s
emotions by modern Western culture. This is something one can agree
with up to a point. The stiff upper lip is one of the characteristics
of that ultra-masculine-militarist culture which began in the
Anglo-Saxon world in the mid-nineteenth century and lasted for over a
hundred years. It is undeniable that this culture pushed certain male
traits to an extreme. But the argument should not be taken too far.
They are after all “male traits” that have been pushed to this extreme.
In other ages and cultures too the control of the emotions of pity and
sadness has always been thought of as a masculine trait, and giving way
to tears as feminine. Men in Shakespeare’s time wept much more readily
than we do – Othello, Coriolanus, MacDuff are among his weeping
military heroes – but he still called tears “woman’s weapons”. Tacitus
noted that among the ancient German tribes the women wept freely at
funerals but not the men. “A woman may decently express her grief; a
man should nurse his in his heart.” 33 In most cultures it
is women who do the ritual weeping for the dead. However much the
tendency to cry varies from one culture to another, in all of them
women tend to cry more than men – which would suggest a biological
basis to this tendency. There appears also to be a universal gender
difference in human reactions to tears. A woman’s tears, however slight
their motive, generally inspire protectiveness in a man, and may even,
in a woman he finds attractive, be a sexual turn-on for him. Women have
long known that the way to win an argument with a man is to cry. Women,
on the other hand, do not find men’s tears a sexual turn-on, unless the
tears are rare and exceptional and justified by a major tragedy. This
is because women do not enjoy the opportunity to protect helpless men,
as men enjoy protecting helpless women. Tears express helplessness, and
for some reason men are turned on by signs of helplessness in women.
Men’s sexual urges are bound up with protectiveness, and may be
triggered by signs of female vulnerability, perhaps associated with
sexual surrender, or at least sexual opportunity. By contrast, a woman
faced with a weeping man is usually acutely embarrassed and at a loss
to know what to do, partly because he is no use to her sexually in that
state and it does not therefore attract her. Men avoid crying in front
of others because they know their helplessness does not endear them to
others, or inspire protectiveness. It will usually inspire some pity,
but pity mixed with contempt; mostly it will inspire worry that they
are not able to look after themselves. Even a woman comforting a man in
pain feels contempt if he cries or moans too much. It is a commonplace
jibe by women that men make a great fuss when they are ill or in pain.
This jibe reflects the instinctive female contempt for men who show any
signs of self-pity – women in reality despise men’s tears. The mother
who tells her wailing son “Boys don’t cry” is not only enlisting his
male pride in order to put an end to a particularly trying noise. She
is also expressing her own expectation of male stoicism in the face of
pain, and trying to make sure he grows up to meet the exacting
standards of fortitude which his future female mating prospects will
judge him by.
Tears
are in fact a giving way to emotion, a surrender of the self and of
self-control, a giving way to a feeling of childish helplessness –
impulses which are part of the psycho-sexual responses of women far
more than of men. Men are expected to stay in control of themselves
even during the sexual act. If a man gives way to a rush of emotion
during sex, it often triggers a premature ejaculation. Surrender to
their feelings is what men have to avoid in order to keep the act going
long enough so that the woman can surrender to hers – which is
essential to her sexual satisfaction. During sex women strive to let
go; men strive to avoid letting go. Some men think of car accidents or
horror movies in order to dull the pleasure and postpone the moment of
release. The very demand by women today for expert sexual servicing by
their partners is likely to keep men firmly stuck in the self-control
mode. Since weeping is like an emotional orgasm, men have good reason
to demonstrate their power of holding it back. The reluctance to cry
will therefore remain a permanent characteristic of men, even if they
are now once again doing it more often than in the militarist century
(and even publicly now on such occasions as sporting triumphs or
defeats when they are physically drained.) A difference in the tendency
to cry seems to be a permanent and universal difference between the
sexes, which is reinforced by upbringing precisely because it has been
observed to occur naturally.
HEARTLESS MONSTERS
Men
not only give way less easily to the emotions of self-pity that induce
weeping, but are generally more capable of separating emotions from
rational considerations and making decisions more coldly. This may be
partly because men’s emotions are concentrated in the right half of
their brain, and the two halves of male brains do
not have as many nerve fibres between them as female brains do. Men are
thus more capable of compartmentalizing than women, and show more
detachment from personal feelings.34 Men have condemned
their own sons to death on many famous occasions, because they
considered the law had to be applied impartially. Women instinctively
recoil from this as unnatural. There is a marvellously evocative scene
in the last act of Shakespeare’s Richard II
where the Duke of York denounces his son for treason against the new
king and demands his execution, while his wife goes down on her knees
to beg for her son’s life. This might seem an endearing characteristic
in women, and a harsh one in men. But the reverse side of the coin has
been women’s reputation for scheming nepotism (favouring their children
and relatives) in the exercise of power, which has made men
traditionally suspicious of women participating in politics. The belief
that women cannot put personal feelings aside in making decisions
slowed their access to political rights, especially in newly developed
democratic systems which tried to combat all forms of nepotism,
intrigue and favouritism.
THE ETERNAL PLAYBOY
This
same male capacity for emotional detachment is often evoked in
discussing men’s sexual behaviour. Most research seems to show that men
are generally more capable than women of enjoying sexual relations
without any emotional involvement. The market for paid sex has always
been extremely one-sided: few women find the idea of sex with a male
prostitute enticing enough to pay for it. Women, notably feminists,
have often denounced men’s relative heartlessness and coldness in the
domain of sexual relations. Books like Shere Hite’s Reports on
Sexuality (whatever their dubious value as representative surveys) are
long litanies of women’s complaints about men’s insensitivity, lack of
tenderness, lack of awareness of women’s feelings, and inability to
express their own. While some currents in the feminist movement have
tried to advocate women adopting the same cold detachment in the
pursuit of sexual pleasure, most women find it against their nature.
Research tends to back them up. One notorious study at an American
university by researchers Clark and Hatfield, in which attractive men
and women asked strangers of the opposite sex either to go on a date
with them, or to sleep with them, found a huge gender difference in
responses to the sexual proposition. While half of both the women and
the men agreed to go on a date, seventy-two per cent of the men agreed
straight off to have sex with the attractive female stranger, and not
one woman with the attractive male stranger. 35 The results
were the same when the 1978 study was repeated in 1982 and 1989
(despite the AIDS crisis.) Now while some feminists have poured scorn
on this research for its naive assumption that people will actually
admit in advance what they are willing to do, it does happen to
correspond to most men’s experience. The majority of women are simply
not as interested in casual sex as men are. An attractive woman in a
bar or club who wants to go home with an average-looking man has only
to say yes to one of the dozen approaches that will be made to her in
the course of an evening; she literally cannot miss. An attractive man
generally does miss more often than not. Question the first twenty men
walking out of any club and you will find not only that their score
rate is low but that it is far lower than they would like. An
average-looking woman who is not too fussy can score as often as she
wants, because there is a huge surplus of men trying desperately to
pick up. You do not find at the end of the night a bar full of young
women forlornly looking into their drinks and getting drunk because all
the men have gone home. But despite their perennial disappointment,
men’s persistence in hunting does apparently pay off. All studies done
have shown that men claim to have had far more sexual partners than
women have (in most Western countries, around twice as many.) Moreover,
men in such studies generally report that they would like to have even
more partners, while women claim to be content with what they have. The
need for variety seems to be built into the male sexual appetite. Most
male animals (stud bulls, roosters) will copulate many times in a row
if presented with a different female each time, but generally baulk at
copulating again with the same one. Novelty itself arouses the male.
This greater natural promiscuity of men is clearly a reproductive
strategy: it pays men genetic dividends to spread their seed far and
wide. Having multiple partners increases a man’s procreative chances;
it doesn’t increase a woman’s, since her offspring can only come from
her own body. Promiscuity may in fact diminish a woman’s genetic
survival chances, if it lessens her ability to persuade a man to
support her offspring for life (he will usually do so only if he
believes her children are also his, a belief which will be undermined
if she has a number of partners.) The pattern observed in most cultures
of expected female fidelity and a certain tolerance of male infidelity
corresponds to the genetic survival strategies logical for each sex.
Even
though most women today indignantly reject the notion that men have
somehow a greater “right” to infidelity than women do, because it is
somehow “more natural” for men, studies of patterns of jealousy tend to
suggest that women are in fact more tolerant of sexual infidelity by
partners than men are. Studies across a range of societies have shown
that while most men are more upset by the sexual infidelity of their
partner and care less about emotional infidelity, most women are more
upset by emotional infidelity.36 This difference fits in
with the woman’s overriding biological need to ensure the continued
commitment of her husband to her and her children. It makes little
practical difference to her genetic survival if he spreads his seed
around, so long as his nurturing instinct is confined to her offspring
and he has no intention of abandoning his family and starting another
one with someone else. It is this possibility which she sees as a
serious threat – when his bit on the side becomes an emotional affair,
tempting him to change the object of his long-term emotional (and
financial) investment. He, on the other hand, needs to be sure that his
offspring are in fact his, so that his lifelong providing efforts will
go into his own genetic survival, not another man’s. This is the
biological basis of the widespread “double standard” whereby a
husband’s infidelity is regarded as a venial slip-up, and a wife’s
infidelity is a serious matter that threatens the marriage. In terms of
the real, biological interests of each sex the double standard is both
reasonable and justifiable.
It
is one of the odd paradoxes of the feminist regime we now live under
that men’s concern about whether their offspring are really their own
has been downgraded to an almost contemptible obsession – as if there
is something reprehensible about a man caring more for his own genetic
offspring than another man’s. It is also associated with “controlling”
attitudes to his wife. The politically correct view is : what right has
a man even to know whether his children are really his own? This
prurient interest by men is seen by the feminists as the motive behind
the “patriarchal” oppression of women and the limitation of their
freedom – the cloistering and chaperoning that still takes place in
Muslim countries to ensure against wifely infidelity, which might cast
doubt on the paternity of offspring. Men, according to the feminists,
have a duty to support both wife and children without having any right
to know that the children are in fact their own. Yet in contrast with
the contempt in the feminist West for men’s interest in their
biological links with their children, the children’s interest in
discovering their biological fathers has been erected into a sacrosanct
right. Adoptive parents or adoption authorities are in many countries
now bound to reveal the identity of the biological parents to children
who want to know. The knowledge of their biological father – even a
sperm donor – is now thought to be an inalienable right of children,
part of their right to “construct their identity”. Why the biological
link of paternity should be acknowledged to be of vital importance to
children but not to fathers is one of the mysteries of the politically
correct ideology.
SLUTS AND NICE GIRLS
The
systematic gap in reported numbers of sexual partners between men and
women (surveys from Sweden give a male lifetime average of 15 partners
and a female average of 7; American surveys have ranged from a 47% to a
74 % gender gap) has led to suspicions that men over-report and women
under-report numbers of partners.37 It has been suggested
that both might lie because of cultural attitudes whereby men are
admired for sexual success and women scorned for sexual availability
(reflecting the fact that men have to make an active effort to score,
while women just have to say yes to some barfly pestering them.) After
all, among heterosexuals, there must be one man and one woman in each
encounter, so the total scores must be equal for both sexes. But an
explanation of the gender gap in scores has been put forward. Surveys
of numbers of sexual partners never take in prostitutes, who are
regarded as an atypical group whose behaviour would distort the
statistics. It is probably a small number of prostitutes, each with
several thousand partners in a life-time, who make up the shortfall in
women’s average score.38 But the handful of high-scoring
women is not necessarily confined to prostitutes. There is some
evidence that a small number of women who are not prostitutes also
enjoy casual sex in much the way men do, and log up large numbers of
partners. Now a survey would have to take in an enormous random sample
to include the right proportion of this tiny class of promiscuous women
– hence the difference in average scores. The traditional male division
of women into sluts and nice girls may not be entirely devoid of basis,
if a very small number of women exhibit masculine sexual behaviour
(perhaps through having a brain sex centre like a man’s) while the vast
majority of women find this behaviour unappealing. If an attractive
woman enjoys casual sex like a man, she will clearly find no shortage
of male partners, and will soon rack up a far higher score than most
heterosexual men (as do many gay men, among whom the masculine appetite
for novelty also operates in both partners.) There is some evidence
that bisexual women are the most promiscuous category of females in
their relations with men, having more partners, starting sex at an
earlier age, and becoming prostitutes in higher numbers than
heterosexual women.39 This might indicate a partly
masculinized brain, which has a male sex centre, giving them a
masculine, promiscuous sex drive, but a mating centre that is still
partly heterosexual. The high proportion of prostitutes who are
bisexual suggests that these women are simply exploiting a masculine
trait in themselves which enables them to have sex with the detachment
typical of men. If five per cent of women enjoy casual sex with
strangers, but seventy per cent of men do, then the five per cent of
women will be in considerable demand – and might be tempted to profit
from it financially. This may be the origin of the universal phenomenon
of prostitution: a small number of (slightly masculine) women in almost
every society find casual sex with strangers the easiest way to make a
living, while the vast majority of women find it repulsive (thus
keeping the price of sex relatively high.) When in the late sixties
many young women suddenly engaged in casual sex, the prostitutes were
furious for the harm it did to trade. They saw giving it away for free
as a form of sexual dumping.
VIVE LA DIFFERENCE
To
summarize what researchers have found: the characteristics associated
with male hormone and a male brain structure, and therefore rightly
thought of as masculine, and generally found to a greater degree in men
(or in women subjected to unusual levels of male hormone in the foetal
stage) are aggressiveness, competitiveness, spatial and navigat-ional
skills, mathematical ability, a certain sensory and emotional
insensitivity, and a capacity for emotional detachment, even in sexual
relations, with an accompanying greater drive to sexual promiscuity.
Most researchers now believe these qualities are innate, related to
male hormone, and are not caused by education or upbringing, though
they may be reinforced by it. The corresponding feminine qualities,
found far more often in women than men, and linked with female hormone
and a female brain structure, include better verbal skills, and a
greater tendency to talk, communicate and express feelings. Women
typically display less aggression, more empathy and compassion; less
competition, more co-operation; less hostility, more welcoming of
strangers into groups. They have, on average, greater sensitivity to
pain, greater fear of violence, more sensitive hearing and sense of
smell, and better social observation. Women generally show more
spontaneous nurturing instincts towards babies and young animals, a
freer expression of emotion by word, gesture or facial expression, and
a greater ability to cry. Most women need to feel a greater emotional
closeness to someone before sex becomes enjoyable. This gives them a
greater couple-forming instinct and, according to all social research
done, on average a greater degree of fidelity and less enjoyment of
casual, impersonal sex.
These
innate differences in psychological characteristics between the average
man and woman are reflected in persistent differences in choice of
profession, in spite of the recent removal of much of the
discrimination of the past. Far more boys than girls will choose to be
mechanical engineers or airline pilots, because these jobs require
spatial or mathematical skills that men typically possess to a higher
degree. Women’s greater verbal skills, social interaction skills, and
compassionate, nurturing instincts will lead more girls than boys to
choose social and caring professions, such as nursing or teaching
(especially for smaller children.) Both men and women will choose
medicine and law because these professions have aspects that call on
the typical strengths of both sexes: the empathetic, social and verbal
skills of the female, and the problem-solving, analytical and technical
skills of the male. 40
Of
course, because of nature’s very inefficiency in sexing foetuses, there
will always be a number of individuals who have brains that function
more like those of the opposite sex. Quite simply, they have wrong-sex
brains, just as one may have wrong-sex sexual predilections, or the
physical appearance associated with the other sex. This “wrong-sex”
ability may be in only one particular mental area – as when male poets
have exceptional verbal skills or female mathematicians have
exceptional mathematical skills, without necessarily manifesting any
other “wrong-sex” characteristics. But these individuals will remain a
minority: no amount of social or educational reform is going to ensure
an equal distribution of all talents, skills, mental characteristics,
interests and aspirations between the sexes, because in their majority
they are too different. The atypical minority, the result of biological
anomalies, are not going to form a vanguard that the rest of their sex
will follow. The radical feminist goal of obliterating all behavioural
and character differences between the sexes could only be brought about
by dosing all female foetuses with male hormone and all male foetuses
with female hormone (which would lead to a homosexual majority and
extinction within a short time.) Without that extreme expedient, it is
very unlikely that we will ever have a society where there are equal
numbers of male and female car mechanics and kindergarten teachers.
While it is right and natural to make room in society for all
individuals, whether typical or atypical of their sex, and to give them
every opportunity to fulfil their particular talents and emotional
needs, it is absurd to imagine that exceptions caused by biological
accidents will ever become the rule.
Now
if this catalogue of gender characteristics which have now been linked
with male and female hormones sounds familiar and obvious, it is
because it corresponds pretty much to the traditional stereotypes of
each sex which Western society (as well as most others) has always
held. This has been particularly galling for the feminists, who are
furious to discover scientific research confirming age-old sexist
prejudice. They try to ignore, discredit, or reject these findings as
mere “patriarchal” propaganda, even though it is,
paradoxically, female researchers who have been most active in this
field, and responsible for many of these findings. It is, of course,
quite typical that women scientists should be particularly interested
in a very social and human aspect of biology – it reflects the typical
female attraction towards the human and social rather than the
technical side of any subject. Most women researchers would probably
admit this without the slightest embarrassment, because they do not
find gender-typical behaviour anything to be ashamed of, but simply an
amusing fact of life, which they enjoy observing in themselves or their
colleagues. Why should a woman (or a man) be ashamed of recognizing
that certain of her (or his) personality traits, interests or mental
inclinations are gender-influenced or gender-typical? It is one of the
reflexes of women, when disagreeing with male colleagues, to say “As a
woman, I see this differently” or “You’re putting a man’s point of view
there.” Nobody sees this as sexist (though if a man said it, they
might.) It is one of the factors enhancing understanding of situations
to be able to take into account how things may be viewed differently
according to sex, cultural origin, or life experience – so long as such
differences of viewpoint are not regarded as a disqualification. Most
people who have not been brainwashed in an ideology hostile to the
opposite sex are quite interested to hear how the emotional reactions,
sensibilities or attitudes of the other half of humanity (the half they
fall in love with) may differ from their own. Popular books which
discuss gender differences, such as the best-selling Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus,
have been read with shared amusement by thousands of couples, delighted
to discover the exact description of their mate’s most exasperating
foible. This study of typical psychological differences has probably
increased understanding and tolerance between men and women. The
attempt in recent decades by a neo-Marxist feminist movement to arouse
hostility between the sexes, to convince women that they are eternal
victims of male oppression, and that even to mention gender differences
is to reinforce this oppression, has certainly poisoned the atmosphere
in many intellectual and professional milieus in Anglo-Saxon countries.
But this poisonous ideology has not diminished the fascination of
normal human beings with gender differences, especially on the
continent of Europe, where feminism
has not yet destroyed the spontaneous liking that most men and women
feel for each other, and their instinctive sense of their different but
complementary characters.
WHICH WAY THE SEXES?
We
have made this long digression into the mental and psychological
differences between men and women in order to justify the use of the
terms “masculine” and “feminine” as meaningful, precise terms,
referring to characteristics now known to have a basis in biology, and
not merely vague, subjective, prescriptive, ideological or
culture-based words that have no meaning beyond the prejudices of a
given age. When we talk of a “masculine” characteristic we are not
therefore talking of a characteristic arbitrarily associated with men
by a particular culture with particular gender roles. We are talking of
a characteristic linked to male hormone, which for this reason will be
found on average to a greater degree in men than in women across all
cultures. The evolution of masculinity and femininity can therefore be
analysed as a real evolution of behaviour and psychological
characteristics over ages or generations, not merely an evolution in
cultural concepts or social attitudes.
But
it is equally important to grasp that the scientific evidence for the
biological basis of gender characteristics does not mean that they are
immutable, or that they are exactly the same across all ages and
cultures. Characteristics which have a biological base may still be
modified, increased or decreased in the course of life by the
activities people engage in. Some activities, as we saw, can
increase male hormone levels (levels in top tennis players double
before a big match) while other experiences can decrease them (losing
the match, stroking a kitten or singing a baby to sleep.) Activities
that repeatedly raise testosterone levels will masculinize the
character. That is the whole point of military training – men are
toughened by repeated challenging experiences that call on more
testosterone. A society engaged in total war for a long period will end
up with more masculine (hard, tough, aggressive, unemotional,
insensitive) men than one that has been at peace, cultivating the arts,
for centuries. If the women of that society serve in the army as well,
or do the same jobs as men, they too will become more masculine –
though in proportion to their lower levels of testosterone. Men who
engage in hard physical labour, and spend their leisure time playing
aggressive sports or taking part in barroom brawls, will have far
tougher, more masculine characters than men who work as kindergarten
teachers and spend their free time at art exhibitions. Moreover, if
gender roles are quite similar in a society, the characters of the two
sexes will be closer than in a society where their roles are very
different. American pioneer women, often doing heavy manual work or
living in dangerous or rough conditions, sometimes learning to ride,
shoot and rope cattle alongside the men, were undoubtedly tougher and
more masculine than the aristocratic or middle class women of Europe
at that period. Modern women, doing stressful, competitive jobs and
practising hard, competitive sports are probably more masculine than
the ladies of fashion of the 18th century, whose soft,
simpering, childish characters so infuriated the early feminist, Mary
Wollstonecraft. The roles played in society thus modify the
characteristics of each sex – but they do so within certain limits
which biology imposes. A society could not simply decide to reverse the
set of characteristics displayed by each sex, through a different form
of social conditioning, because it cannot alter the brains hard-wired
by hormones in the fœtal stage. But it can, within limits, modify,
increase or decrease these characteristics, by changing behaviour
patterns which in turn change the chemicals involved in the behaviour.
Military service and competitive sports masculinize the personality by
repeatedly raising testosterone levels in order to make it easier to
furnish the efforts required. Moreover, the constant raising of
testosterone levels will increase the desire to engage in these
activities. This means that entire societies and ages can develop very
different average levels of aggressiveness, hardness, competitiveness,
taciturnity, sexual promis-cuity, or other masculine traits, simply
through the experiences people are subjected to. This is what allows us
to study the evolution of masculinity as a reality, not merely a
cultural concept. It is a set of real, hormone-related characteristics,
not merely a set of social prejudices. But it is a set of
characteristics that can vary with changing conditions, as people
engage in different levels of the activities and behaviour that
interact with and reinforce the hormones at the base of it.
Once
it has been established that masculine and feminine characteristics and
behaviour patterns are partly fixed and partly modifiable by the
activities engaged in, the question may be asked whether there is any
social benefit from increasing or decreasing masculine or feminine
characteristics. Is there any advantage in making men less masculine
and women more so? Or making both sexes more masculine? Or both sexes
more feminine? Is there an advantage in reducing dimorphism (difference
between the sexes) or increasing it? And what happens to a society when
changes of these various kinds occur?
We
may summarize our main argument very briefly by suggesting that between
the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries Western society saw an
unprecedented masculinization of men through warfare and
militarization. Sixty-five million men took part in the First World
War, perhaps as many as had taken part in all previous wars in Europe
put together. Most continental European nations had compulsory military
service for at least a year throughout the whole of the 20th
century – an intensity and a duration of militarization unprecedented
for well over a thousand years, and only now coming to an end. The
militarization and masculinization of men reached a high-point with the
Second World War, and over the past thirty to forty years many young
men have tried to reject it and move back to a more “normal” degree of
masculinity in historical terms. But over these same decades there has
been a rush of Western women into the work market and a vast increase
in the level of competitive and aggressive behaviour among females,
leading to a certain masculinization of their personality. The men,
struggling to get back to a more normal character after the
testosterone excesses of a half-century of war, have had their task
complicated by the tendency of women to adopt masculine competitive and
aggressive behaviour in the job market where they are now rivals. This
has left men over the past thirty years rather confused and uncertain
about their own path away from the characters of their ultra-masculine
war-hero fathers and grandfathers. Will their abandonment of extreme
masculinity cause them to be outflanked by more aggressive women? This
uncertainty has led to various contradictory styles of behaviour among
young males, with wild cultural swings from flower-power pacifism to
shaven-headed cults of violence and back again. Along with the
poetic-looking Brad Pitts and Leonardo DiCaprios, we have, in stark
contrast, the hero of the action movie – a grotesquely over-muscled
caveman, for whom violence and mass-murder are the only sure
demonstration of manhood. The contradictory extremes of recent male
movie icons illustrate the uncertainty of men over the degree of
aggressiveness and masculinity they are supposed to exhibit in an age
of general retreat from the warrior ideal combined with increased
female aggressiveness.
Now
the feminist movement applauds the whole process in contemporary
society by which women are being masculinized. They want to push it
even further. They want a unisex upbringing, where girls are made to
play with trucks instead of dolls, and boys with dolls instead of
trucks, as a way of making the sexes more similar in character and
removing men’s supposed competitive edge in the job market. Their whole
obsession is identity of job roles and identity of earnings between the
sexes. They want a world where there are equal numbers of male and
female kindergarten teachers, car mechanics, “fire-fighters”, policemen
and secretaries. To this end they want women to become more masculine
and men more feminine so that their characters will become identical
and interchangeable. Men are to take on an equal child-raising role and
women an equal financial provider role in every couple. This is the
official goal of state-financed feminist movements the world over. It
is the goal of the obligatory female Minister of Gender Equality in
every government, and of the European Union campaigns of positive
discrimination, to stamp out every last vestige of perception that some
jobs or roles are more suitable for one sex than the other. All of this
is being done in a quite mad obsession with an absolute of “justice”
and “equality”, to make up for the alleged “oppression” of the past –
that is, the specialization of gender roles that previous ages thought
more practical for the survival of society.
We
will argue later that this entire social goal is a fatal mistake. In so
far as it can be achieved, it will result in confusion, emotional
frustration, a loss of attraction between the sexes, an increase in
homosexuality, less stable marriages, less time for children, and a
continued fall in birth-rates. As women become more masculine they will
want more high-stress career jobs and fewer children. As men become
less dominant and are discouraged from seeing themselves as providers
and protectors of the family, they will simply adopt a playboy role
rather than a father-of-the-family role. If men are
deprived of the satisfactions of the “paterfamilias”, they will become
footloose pleasure-seekers, not docile house-husbands. Commitment to
marriage and children will diminish in both sexes, and stable marriages
will cease to exist. (This is the avowed goal of radical feminism, a
“matriarchy” where men are no longer part of the family, but function
as sperm-donors and casual lovers, financing with their taxes and
punitive child support payments the female-headed households.) The
worsening crisis of falling birthrates and an ageing population will
lead to an even faster rise in Third World
immigration into Western countries. In the long term this will threaten
the cohesiveness and unity of Western societies, the survival of
democracy and of everything that used to be called Western civilization.
The
only way to avoid the fatal consequences of a collapse in the European
birth-rate is to foster the nurturing, feminine side of human nature,
and to try to reverse the over-development of the aggressive,
competitive, productive, masculine side. Both sexes need therefore to
move away from the masculine ideal, and this will only be possible if
women re-embrace and rehabilitate the feminine ideal. Both sexes must
move in the same direction, and it must be away from the worker-slave,
competitive, masculine role, towards the nurturing, children-loving,
family-oriented feminine role (which women must take the lead in
adopting, because men are not going to perform women’s role for them.)
That is, quite simply, the only way the West will breed enough to
survive as a civilization, and avoid a demographic collapse into chaos
and civil war. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, it is not short-term
economic success but demography and national cohesiveness that will
determine the balance of world power, and which civilizations will
dominate the future of the human race.
But,
you might say, this is all very well as a theory. What grounds are
there for taking it seriously? Our first task, therefore, is to
substantiate our basic argument: that a process of masculinization of
men took place in the course of the nineteenth century, culminated in
the mid-twentieth century, and that since the 1960’s we have been
trying, sporadically and with varying degrees of success, to get back
to normal. What evidence can be found for this? How can we possibly
measure the degree of masculinity of another age? We cannot measure the
sperm counts or testosterone levels of the sixteenth century or the
eighteenth. The only record available to us is in the works left behind
by the artists and writers of the past. Works of art and literature at
least give us an image of men and women in various ages and how they
behaved. By comparing these images with one another and with the men
and women of today we can gain some idea of whether male and female
characters have changed over time, and in what direction. The next
chapters will therefore enter the realm of art and literary criticism.
We will see what we can find out about our ancestors from the images of
themselves they have left behind.
7) IMAGES OF MEN IN THE ART OF THE PAST
We
have already remarked on how effeminate the men in Renaissance
paintings look, compared to John Wayne or Clark Gable. When
iconographers and literary critics approach the works of art of the
past, that is in fact one of their frequent themes: the effeminacy of
the male icons. But it tends to be assumed, especially by more recent
critics, that this effeminate image is intentional on the part of the
artist – that a certain androgyny, or sexual crossing over, is a
conscious theme of his work. Hence a whole motif of androgyny,
hermaphroditism, bisexuality, the deliberate blurring of genders, is
read into the works of various artists of the past. Here
are some examples of the type of comment made, taken from one of the
leading contemporary iconographers of sexual types and symbols, Camilla
Paglia, in her brilliant and provocative book Sexual Personae.
Donatello’s
youths are always sexually ambiguous. His marble clothed David (1409)
has a graceful, feminine hand and girlishly delicate face with a small
pretty mouth. 41
Bernini’s androgynous angel….
I see Donatello’s androgynous David in every face in Botticelli.
Like the Graces’ impenetrable circle, androgynous Mercury is narcissistic and self complete. 42
Let us pause for a moment over this comment, about Botticelli’s Primavera.
Anyone who looks at this painting is struck not by the androgyny of the
figure of Mercury (his embodiment of both masculine and feminine
traits) but by the extreme femininity of the female figures. By
comparison with the women in the painting, Mercury is a cave man. It is
the whole species represented which is more feminine than anything we
have ever seen in our age, and the males and females have a normal
degree of differentiation within this feminized species. Why focus only
on the male figure as feminine, and ignore the extreme femininity of
the women?
Cellini’s
Perseus, one of the most masculine figures in Renaissance sculpture, is
according to Paglia “a homoerotic glamourization of the beautiful boy”.
43 She goes on:
Giulano
de Medici belongs to a category of Renaissance androgyne separate from
that of the beautiful boy. I call it Epicoene, or the man of Beauty.
The man of beauty has an active, athletic adult maleness. But in
insolent narcissism, he retains an ephebic transsexual quality,
expressed in a feminine alabaster skin, here arising from the dazzling
white marble. 44
She
adds that Lord Byron and Elvis Presley are other examples of this
androgyne type. Paglia goes on to find Androgynes (sexually ambiguous
figures, mostly men with feminine characteristics) throughout Chaucer,
Spenser, Shakespeare, Rousseau, Goethe, Byron, Shelley, Stendhal,
Balzac, Burne Jones, etc.
Is
it not legitimate to wonder, finally: if all the typical male figures
of works of art and literature for over four centuries were
androgynous, then where were the normal men? What were these figures
androgynous in relation to? Since androgyny is a state between male and
female, where were the “real men” that constituted the male pole they
were deviating from? And the answer seems to be, there weren’t any.
Apart from a few of Michelangelo’s older male subjects, like Moses (or
the power-figures of his Last Judgement), and a handful of muscular
Laocoons imitated from the classical model, we have no pictorial or
sculptural depictions of “real men” in this period. If one is logical,
one must conclude that for those ages these so-called androgynous
figures were the real men. There was nothing more virile than
that around. There were no John Waynes or Arnold Schwarzeneggers. The
most masculine they got was Michelangelo’s David or Cellini’s Perseus.
That was butch for the time. To call it androgynous is absurd. From
whose point of view are we judging?
If
an iconographer were transported from the 1950’s to comment on our
cinema stars, he would no doubt consider figures like Leonardo DiCaprio
or Brad Pitt or Keanu Reeves to be androgynous. He would think that
film-makers were exploring a theme of androgyny by choosing these
actors. But do we see them that way? Surely they strike us as fairly
average specimens of young men of our age. And perhaps that is how the
Renaissance viewed Botticelli’s Mercury; Cellini’s Perseus, and even
Donatello’s David: not as androgynous figures, but average young men.
The bias is in our minds, because we are emerging from an age of
extreme masculinity. When we see androgyny or effeminacy in the vast
majority of male figures in art and literature from the 14th century to the 19th, we should start looking at our own notion of masculinity as the odd one out.
I
grew up in a country where the male icons were rugby prop and lock
forwards, most of them built like gorillas. By comparison with them,
most European men of today look effeminate. It was a frequent comment
by American girl students travelling in Europe
in the 1970’s: “Don’t you think European guys all look like faggots?”
They were comparing them with American football players. If you have
invented a more masculine extreme, then anything short of it seems
effeminate. But a male type can hardly be called effeminate if nothing
more masculine exists in that culture. It is curious that nobody looks at the extremely feminine women of Botticelli’s Primavera and
concludes that the tennis-playing, mountain-climbing, hard-muscled
women of today are androgynous or man-like. But by comparison they are.
The whole species represented in Botticelli is several degrees more
feminine than Westerners today. And the males and females of Botticelli
are in perfect relation to each other, the women far more feminine than
the men. Surely each age has its own norms of masculinity and
femininity. And surely one can only call a figure androgynous who is so
by the standards of his own age. And though it is often
difficult to tell what those standards were, the only evidence we have
to go on – other works of art – indicates that these allegedly
effeminate figures were the normal males of the time. Certainly the
notion that our standards are universal, that Botticelli or Donatello
would have considered John Wayne or Clark Gable or Arnold
Schwartzenegger to be normal-looking males, is an assumption we have no
right to make.
When we survey the whole range of extant painting in Western Europe, from the 13th century to the 19th,
the spectacle is one of an almost uniform effeminacy of feature, by the
standards of our age. This is true whatever the fashion in the
portrayal of physical types. From the painfully thin figures of Thierry
Bouts or Roger Van der Weiden to the fleshy types of Rubens two
centuries later, the faces all have a delicacy, a fineness or a
softness that is alien to those of the mid-twentieth century. Here and
there we come upon exceptions – in the massiveness of some of
Michelangelo’s male figures in the Last Judgement (the most
masculine work in the whole Renaissance, and reflecting a new, harsh
counter-Reformation vision of authoritarian power) or the military
sternness of the faces in David’s Oath of the Horatios
(reflecting the new militaristic ethos of Napoleonic France.) But these
exceptions only make the norm all the more evident. Whether you take an
extreme example like Van Dyck’s portrait of the Stuart princes, with
their delicate, girlish faces, long blond curls, languorous
expressions, silk and velvet clothes, teetering high-heeled boots, and
gloves lazily dangling from a limp-wristed hand, or whether you take a
more average portrait, like Titian’s Portrait of a Man, thought
to be Ariosto, with its fine long nose, soft eyes, sensitive lips,
delicate bone structure – the dominant impression given by most of the
paintings of the past is of a European race less hard, less
coarse-featured, less square-jawed and heavy-boned than the men of the
twentieth century. John Wayne, Clark Gable or Lino Ventura would look
decidedly out of place in any painting in Europe before 1850 and any
painting in America
before 1800. We must conclude on the only available evidence that
Western men have changed in appearance. They became in the early
twentieth century far more masculine-looking than they have ever been
before, and they are now beginning to change back again. What can
explain this? The obvious answer is: experience of war, of hard
physical labour, and the brutal pioneering conditions of the New World.
It is notable that in all the works of art of the past the faces which
are most reminiscent of those of the mid-twentieth century are to be
found on the statues of certain Roman emperors of plebeian origin –
Trajan, Hadrian, Probus – all of whom were career soldiers who had
spent their entire lives making war.
8) IMAGES OF MEN IN LITERATURE SINCE 1700
When
we look at how men were described in the literature of the past, it is
again striking how effeminate these descriptions appear to us. But to
conclude that the author was consciously portraying an effeminate or
androgynous figure, by the standards of that age, is just as
illegitimate as to assume Van Dyck was deliberately portraying
effeminate figures in his portraits of Charles I or the Stuart princes.
The prejudices are all ours. The actor Richard Burton claimed that he
hated playing Shakespeare’s young lovers, such as Ferdinand in The Tempest, or Florizel in A Winter’s Tale,
because he considered these young men to be “ladies.” They offended his
1950’s post-war generation’s sense of masculinity. It is highly
unlikely that Shakespeare would have seen these heroes as in any way
effeminate, any more than Hamlet or Romeo. What were to him normal
young men were “ladies” to the mid-20th century war generation. The
characters in drama, however, are only portrayed through their poetic,
flowery speech, and we have to imagine what they looked like. It is
only in the novel as it emerges in the 18th century that we finally get detailed physical descriptions of men, and those descriptions make a fascinating study.
Few of us who saw the film Tom Jones
in our youth will have had any sense of the hero as someone effeminate.
Because, after numerous adventures and amorous entanglements, he gets
the pretty girl, we think of him as a bit of a young dog. In reading
the book too we get this feeling: an impulsive young hot-head, with a
lot of good red blood in his veins. It is revealing therefore to look
closely at how Fielding actually described the red-blooded young dog of
his day.
But
let us start with a fascinating general comment Fielding makes about
male attractiveness early in the novel. He is talking (à propos of a
minor character) of the difference between a mature woman’s love for a
man and a girl’s love for a boy, “which is often fixed on the outside
only and on things of little value and no duration, as on cherry
cheeks, small lily-white hands, sloe-black eyes, flowing locks, downy
chins, dapper shapes….” He concludes that these are
“the outward ornaments of the person, to which men are beholden to the
taylor, the laceman, the perriwig-maker, the hatter and the milliner,
and not to nature.” 45
Any
reader who doubts our general thesis ought to look carefully over this
list of qualities considered sexually attractive in a young man:
“cherry cheeks, small lily-white hands, sloe-black eyes, flowing
locks”. You have to read the passage twice to make sure he is not
talking about women here. For these are qualities we would consider
attractive today only in women – particularly the “small lily-white
hands”. How many women today would find “small lily-white hands”
attractive in a man (or small anything for that matter?) Compare it
with the sort of list that a twentieth century author might make of
male attractions: height, breadth of shoulder, square-cut rugged
features, prominent jaw, etc. Let us take a popular novel even from the
late Victorian period, Rider Haggard’s King Solomon’s Mines
(which, published in 1885, falls at the start of the period when
extreme masculine values were beginning to take over) and see how he
describes his hero:
One,
a man of about thirty, was one of the biggest-chested and longest-armed
men I ever saw. He had yellow hair, a big yellow beard, clear cut
features, and large grey eyes set deep into his head. I never saw a
finer-looking man and somehow he reminded me of an ancient Dane. 46
I
will suggest later on that the late-nineteenth century colonial and
American ideal of a man is an atavistic throwback, leaping over a
thousand years of aristocratic, courtly civilization to the
pre-civilized Viking. No contrast could be greater between this
emphasis on a big chest and long arms (essentially gorilla
characteristics) and Fielding’s emphasis on cherry cheeks and small
lily-white hands. What a difference a century makes!
These characteristics of Rider Haggard’s hero persist throughout the popular literature of the 20th century. Here is Zane Grey:
The
rustler’s broad brow, his large black eyes, his sweeping beard, as dark
as the wing of a raven, his enormous width of shoulder and depth of
chest, his whole splendid presence so wonderfully charged with vitality
and force and strength, seemed to afford Ventners an unutterable
fiendish joy because for that magnificent manhood and life he meant
cold and sudden death. 47
Here
we have again the enormous broad shoulders and the deep chest – gorilla
man. But let’s continue with Fielding. On the next page he actually
describes the late nineteenth and twentieth century ideal of a man
while discussing a minor character. But the description is full of
disdain, as though this male type was the opposite of attractive:
His
shape and limbs were indeed exactly proportioned, but so large, that
they denoted the strength rather of a ploughman than any other. His
shoulders were broad, beyond all size, and the calves of his legs
larger than those of a common chairman. In short, his whole person
wanted all that elegance and beauty, which is the very reverse of
clumsy strength, and which so agreeably sets off most of our fine
gentlemen; being partly owing to the high blood of their ancestors, viz. blood made of rich sauces and generous wines, and partly to an early town education. 48
Fielding
does not explain directly why physical size and strength should be so
despised, but he implies it in the references to a ploughman and a
“chairman” : strength denoted a member of the labouring classes. A
delicate, effeminate-looking man was a gentleman, a man who had never
wrestled a plough or carried a sedan chair. We can see that the
eighteenth-century ideal of male appearance is essentially bound up
with social class, with not being a manual worker. By contrast, the
twentieth century ideal comes from the American democratic culture of
the working man, particularly in his idealized frontiersman or cowboy
incarnation. The equation is clear: aristocratic man is effeminate man,
democratic man is masculine man. The paradox of all this is that as
democracy advances throughout the 19th and early 20th
centuries, leading finally to women’s right to vote as the culmination
of democratic principle, Western man’s masculinity also increases as
the male ideal embodies more and more of the physical toughness of the
working man, the colonial pioneer or the common soldier. And as the
ideal of man shifts in this masculine direction, the sexes grow apart,
and the man’s incomprehension of women, his sense of women as an alien
species also increases (sometimes wrapped up in high-sounding moral
principles about feminine delicacy, etc.) Rider Haggard’s colonial
adventurer hero cares a lot less for the company of women, and
understands them far less, than Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones.
Eighteenth-century aristocratic man, by today’s standards an effeminate
fop, understood women perfectly and adored them. He shared the same
sensibility, the same tastes, the same emotional range. He had a far
greater psychological territory in common with women than does
twentieth-century man, moulded by a pioneering ideal which is a
throwback to the pre-civilized Viking.
The
hero Tom Jones is described with approval by his beloved Sophia’s maid
as “a very fine gentleman, and he hath one of the whitest hands in the
world….. and one of the sweetest temperdest, best naturedest men in the
world he is.” She goes on that he is “so pretty a creature” and that
“his breath is sweet as a nosegay.” Again a modern reader, unaware of
eighteenth century notions of male attractiveness, would be puzzled by
this list of feminine traits.49
9) MEN IN LOVE, YESTERDAY AND TODAY
But
Tom’s behaviour in love is even more feminine, by twentieth century
standards, than his appearance. His first meeting with Sophia after he
has fallen in love with her shows him in all the confusion and
hysterical nervousness of a young girl:
“Oh! I know too well that heavenly temper,” cries Jones, “that divine goodness which is beyond every other charm.” “Nay,
now, ” answered she, “I understand you not. – I can stay no longer, –
I,”– “I would not be understood,” cries he, “nay, I can’t be
understood, I know not what I say. Meeting you here so unexpectedly – I
have been unguarded – for heaven’s sake pardon me, if I have said
anything to offend you – I did not mean it – indeed, I would rather
have died – nay, the very thought would kill me!” “You surprize me,”
answered she, – “how can you possibly think you have offended me?”
“Fear, madam,” says he, “easily runs into madness; and there is no
degree of fear like that which I feel of offending you. How can I speak
then? Nay, don’t look angrily at me, one frown will destroy me. – I
mean nothing — blame my eyes, or blame those beauties — What am I
saying? Pardon me if I have said too much. My heart overflowed. I have
struggled with my love to the utmost, and have endeavoured to conceal a
fever which preys on my vitals, and will, I hope, soon make it
impossible for me ever to offend you more.”
Mr
Jones now fell a trembling as if he had been shaken with the fit of an
ague. Sophia, who was in a situation not very different from his,
answered in these words: “Mr Jones, I will not affect to misunderstand
you; indeed I understand you too well; but for heaven’s sake, if you
have any affection for me, let me make the best of my way into the
house. I wish I may be able to support myself thither.”
Jones,
who was hardly able to support himself, offered her his arm …. and thus
this young pair tottered and trembled along, the lover not once daring
to squeeze the hand of his mistress, tho’ it was locked in his. 50
There
are several things to be noted here: the extravagant loquacity of
Jones, giving full verbal rein, however incoherently, to his feelings;
his extreme emotional confusion; and his nervous trembling, almost to
the point of fainting. There is even the hint that he will die of his
love. All of these are characteristically feminine reactions, and we
see this sort of scene as quaintly old-fashioned because we are unable
to imagine men acting in this way any longer. I remember as a student
seeing a very old Russian film version of Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot,
in which the actors threw themselves on the floor with emotion and
rolled about hysterically in exactly the way Dostoyevksy described. The
New Zealand
cinema audience howled with laughter. Modern Anglo-Saxons cannot
conceive of this degree of emotional demonstrativeness in a man any
longer except as comedy. Tom Jones behaves in this scene like an
hysterical girl: he can’t shut up, he is totally incoherent and he is
trembling all over. No twentieth-century hero could be depicted in this
state except as broad comedy or to render him ridiculous, or make him
remember the incident afterwards with burning shame. It would be either
comedy or it would be a scene of utterly humiliating failure – the
young woman would certainly reject him for not being sufficiently cool,
masculine and controlled in his behaviour. Yet Fielding, while smiling
a little at the extravagance of young love, means us to identify with
his lovers here, to share their emotions, to see this as a decisive and
successful declaration, which, far from making the heroine despise the
hero as an hysterical, immature, faint-hearted, girlish adolescent,
makes her fall in love with him completely.
Do
we need to reiterate that what we see happening here is a love-scene
that takes place on feminine psychological territory: endless
high-flown words, emotional confusion, hysteria, trembling and
faintness in both partners? The twentieth century male is silent,
taciturn, refuses to indulge in poetic hyperbole, expresses his
feelings through verbal understatement, and would long since have
passed, if he were serious, from the verbal to the physical act. To the
extent that we find Jones’ behaviour comical or old-fashioned here, we
acknowledge the gap in sensibility between our age and Fielding’s and
the gap is almost entirely one of masculine as opposed to feminine
sensibility. It might even be suggested that what sets our age most
apart from the last five centuries is the way we use words, or rather
fail to. People in previous ages were loquacious, garrulous, verbally
incontinent to a degree that stuns us today. Conversations in novels by
writers like Fielding or Jane Austen are an exchange of long speeches.
This is not a question of crude novelistic technique; every document of
the times confirms that this was the way people actually talked. Is not
verbal diarrhoea one of the characteristics of femininity? Is not the
complaint “he never talks to me” the most constant complaint of the
modern woman about her man? Is not the shift from a loquacious
civilization, where people declaimed for long minutes their innermost
feelings in elaborate sentences, to a society of one-line wisecracks
and terse, pithy understatements, one more demonstration that we have
shifted from a feminine to a masculine culture?
Let us compare Fielding’s scene for a moment to a love scene in an early twentieth century novel, Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms. In the first scene between the lovers, a soldier and a nurse, he tries to kiss her and she slaps his face.
She was looking at me in the dark. I was angry and yet certain, seeing it all ahead like the moves in a chess game.
He agrees that she was quite right to slap him, and after a moment she relents:
“You are a dear. I’d be glad to kiss you if you don’t mind.”
I
looked in her eyes and put my arm around her as I had before when I
kissed her. I kissed her hard and held her tight and tried to open her
lips; they were closed tight. 51
In their second meeting she is more forthcoming: after they kiss, she suddenly says:
“And you do love me?”
“Yes.”
“You did say you loved me, didn’t you?”
“Yes,” I lied, “I love you.” A minute later as he kisses her he reflects:
I thought she was probably a little crazy. It was all right if she was. I did not care what I was getting into. This
was better than going every evening to the house for officers where the
girls climbed all over you and put your cap on backwards as a sign of
affection between their trips upstairs with brother officers. I knew I
did not love Catherine Barkley nor had any idea of loving her. This was
a game, like bridge, in which you said things instead of playing cards.
Like bridge you had to pretend you were playing for money or playing
for some stakes. Nobody had mentioned what the stakes were. It was all
right with me. 52
This
sort of cool calculation is of course what characterizes sexual
relations in our time. It doesn’t mean love does not exist, or is not
intense; it means that it generally comes after sex, not before. Love
develops as the sexual relationship becomes a drug, both physical and
emotional; it is not a precondition for it. And in order to get to the
sexual act, every stratagem and cool calculation is acceptable. Now
this detached, cynical attitude to sex had existed before in literature
but it had always been considered immoral. It was the behaviour of the
villainous seducer, the “cad”. Here is a typical cad in Madame Bovary, as the heroine subjects him to a standard female interrogation on his love for her:
“Do you love me?”
“Of course I love you.”
“A great deal?”
“Yes, a great deal.”
“And you’ve never loved anyone else?”
“Did you think I was a virgin?” he exclaimed with a laugh.
At that Emma started to cry and he forced himself to console her, salting his protestations with little jokes.
“It’s
only because I love you so,” she said. “Do you realize that I can’t
live without you?.… There’s no one you like better than me, is there? I
know there are heaps of women prettier than me, but none of them know
how to love you better than I do, do they? I am your slave and your
concubine. You are my king, my idol…..”
He
had heard all these things so often, that by now they had lost all
spice of originality. She was just like all the other mistresses he had
had. …..This practised seducer could see no difference in the
sentiments concealed beneath a similarity of surface. Because wanton,
mercenary lips had murmured similar protestations in his ear, he had no
great belief in the sincerity of this, his latest conquest. 53
The
note of the cynic in love was therefore familiar in the literature of
the nineteenth century. It was the voice of the cad, who treats a
sincere, passionate woman as if she were a whore. What is relatively
new in Hemingway is that this same note is now the voice of the
average, decent hero, and this same cynical seducer later falls deeply
in love with the woman he has coolly seduced. In other words a
detached, calculating, exploitative attitude to a woman, seeing
seduction as a chess game, is no longer incompatible with being a
decent man with a capacity for true love. Cynical sexual exploitation
is merely one phase on a trajectory which can also include the deepest
passion.
Now
this would have been incomprehensible to Fielding, for whom the two
types of sexual love were reserved for two quite different sorts of
women: the lower-class whore or easy lay and the virginal beloved. In Tom Jones,
these roles are played by Molly and Sophia. Molly, the peasant girl Tom
gets pregnant, is described as a handsome girl with the forward, bold
character of a boy, and it is her masculine forwardness, her ability to
have sex like a man, which somehow justifies Tom’s taking advantage of
the sexual opportunity offered. Sophia, on the other hand, must be a
virgin till marriage as the very demonstration of the femininity of her
character – which gives her an urge to have sex only when love is
profound and permanent. In the twentieth century all women are
potentially both whore and virginal beloved. It is of course the war
that has broken down this distinction, and Hemingway’s Catherine
Barkley is the first to admit it when she confesses to her new lover
her regret that she did not sleep with the fiancé killed in France. “He could have had anything he wanted if I had known.”54
The shadow of death has made sex urgent and has reduced to absurdity
and meanness the pattern of holding off till marriage that had
characterized decent, respectable women’s behaviour until then. What
the war has done of course is to make women’s sexual behaviour resemble
men’s. The woman’s traditional, instinctive holding out for permanent,
legally sanctioned love (the only guarantee she would not be left
literally holding the baby) has been overtaken by events – the complete
disruption of traditional courtship patterns by world war. With this of
course goes a peculiar taciturn, inarticulate manner of communication
between the lovers. Despite the occasional bit of weeping (just to
prove they really are female) Hemingway’s women, like his men, are
strong silent types who do not go in for great floods of verbal
self-revelation. What we might call emotional minimalism becomes the
style that seems most appropriate to those who have lived on intimate
terms with death. It is as if the clipped, stiff-upper-lip
understatement of military bureaucracy had oozed out to become a
generalized social phenomenon. The romance between nurse and soldier is
wonderfully emblematic: both are institutionally trained to repress any
tendency to emotional attachment. They cannot afford too much
attachment because they live on close terms with death. If the other is
going to die soon, you want to feel as little as possible. We can of
course understand this in the context of war itself. What is appalling
to reflect on is how this emotional anaesthesia spread through an
entire culture and influenced the pattern of its relationships from
then on.
But
let us return to our theme of the nature of the hero in eighteenth
century fiction. We have seen the effeminacy, by modern standards, of
Tom Jones – and Fielding’s curiously effeminate conception of what
makes a man attractive to women. Here is a later version of it:
Stendhal’s Julien Sorel, hero of The Scarlet and Black. This is how Stendhal introduces him to us:
He
was a short lad, about eighteen or nineteen years of age, with
irregular but delicately cut features and an aquiline nose. His large
black eyes, which in calmer moments revealed a thoughtful fiery spirit,
were at that moment alive with the most savage hate. ……. His trim and
slender figure gave more promise of agility than of strength. The
thoughtful expression and the extreme pallor of his face had from his
early childhood made his father think he had not long to live, or would
live only to be a burden to his family. An object of scorn to everyone
at home, he hated both his brothers and his father. In Sunday sports on
the public square, he was always beaten.
It
was only a short time back, in fact rather less than a year, that his
handsome face had begun to make some of the young women speak of him in
friendly terms. 55
By
modern standards, particularly the standards of twentieth-century
American fiction or cinema, this is a very unlikely hero. Weak,
effeminate-looking, always beaten in sports – and yet turning the
women’s heads. This is not a combination that would seem very credible
in the modern Anglo-Saxon world, where success in sport is for a young
man the necessary precondition for success in love. (Try to imagine Tom
Cruise playing a hero who is always beaten by other men at every sport
and still gets the girl.) But Stendhal is not alone in pre-modern times
in making a sharp contrast between the traditional masculine, athletic,
martial virtues and the softer, more sensitive qualities that attract
women. In the sixteenth century Marlowe has the conqueror Tamburlaine
discussing his sons:
But yet methinks their looks are amorous,
Not Martial as the sons of Tamburlaine;
Their hair as white as milk and soft as down,
Which should be like the quills of porcupines,
As black as jet, as hard as iron or steel,
Bewrays they are too dainty for the wars;
Their fingers made to quaver on a lute,
Their arms to hang about a lady’s neck,
Their legs to dance and caper in the air. 56
This
is the same contrast between the martial and the amorous character
which Shakespeare’s Richard III makes in his opening speech (with some
strikingly similar imagery).
Grim-visaged war hath smoothed his wrinkled front,
And now, instead of mounting barbed steeds
To fright the souls of fearful adversaries,
He capers nimbly in a lady’s chamber
To the lascivious pleasing of a lute. 57
We
have already seen it in the earlier part of Marlowe’s play, when Agydas
is astonished that his beautiful lady, Zenocrate, could possibly love
the warlike Tamburlaine:
How can you fancy one that looks so fierce,
Only disposed to martial stratagems?
Who when he shall embrace you in his arms,
Will tell how many thousand men he slew;
And when you look for amorous discourse,
Will rattle forth his facts of war and blood,
Too harsh a subject for your dainty ears. 58
This
suggestion that warriors have too little in common with women to make
good lovers is a commonplace of sixteenth century literature.
Shakespeare’s Prince Hal jokes about the famous soldier Harry Hotspur
in the same terms, satirizing the sort of taciturn, tough-guy
conversation he would have with his wife.
“Oh my sweet Harry,” says she, “how many hast thou killed today?” “Give my roan horse a drench,” says he, and answers “Some fourteen,” an hour after; “a trifle, a trifle.” 59
Othello’s
attractiveness to Desdemona is also called in question because of his
war-like character, his lack of courtly manners. He himself blames her
suspected infidelity on the fact that he “has not those soft parts of
conversation that chamberers have.” The belief that successful lovers
must have soft, tender characters with a talent for poetic, amorous
talk – the very opposite of tough, manly soldiers – was widespread
until two hundred years ago. It is one of the attitudes the nineteenth
century cult of militarism and masculinity was to change. In Stendhal’s
time, writers could still assume that women preferred more feminine,
less warlike traits in men, though things were evolving even then and
he felt the need at times to defend his view. By the late nineteenth
century, the proliferation of heroes of military background (from
Tolstoy to Thackeray) had gradually instilled the notion that every
lass loves a soldier, and the masculine traits that go along with him.
This of course corresponds to the huge expansion of armies throughout
the nineteenth century, and in many countries the adoption of
compulsory military service on the Prussian model. It culminates with
generalized conscription in the First World War, and an entire
generation of men with brutal combat experience, which becomes almost a
prerequisite for the “real man” the women of the 20th century go for.
Julien
Sorel, then, is meant to typify the slightly girlish young man that
women were often thought in previous ages to find most attractive. This
does not at all mean that he is a milksop, despite being a relative
physical weakling who is beaten and bullied by his loutish brothers and
father. His spirit is still masculine: he burns with a secret romantic
adulation of Napoleon, and relives in his mind all Napoleon’s battles,
through the stories of his mentor, an old soldier. He is therefore a
red-blooded male, with a typical boy’s ambitions. Girlish though he
might be in looks, he has a male mind. It is this combination, Stendhal
suggests, which slays the ladies. This is the impression he makes on
Madame de Rênal, the mayor’s wife, whose children he is going to tutor.
Madame
de Rênal… just by the front door …noticed a young peasant, still almost
a child, whose face was extremely pale and bore the mark of recent
tears. ….
This
young peasant had such a fair complexion and his eyes were so gentle
that Madame de Rênal’s somewhat romantic nature made her at first
imagine it might be some young woman in disguise who had come to ask a
favour of the Mayor. She pitied the poor young thing, standing unable
to move in front of the door, and evidently not daring to lift a hand
to pull the bell. Madame de Rênal went up to him …….He started when a
gentle voice said close to his ear: “What brings you here, my boy?”
Julien
turned round sharply and, struck by the very gracious look on Madame de
Rênal’s face, partly forgot his shyness. Very soon, astonished by her
beauty, he forgot everything, even why he had come. Madame de Rênal had
to repeat her question.
“I’ve come here as tutor, madam,” he said to her at last, utterly
ashamed of the tears he was doing his best to wipe away.
Madame de Rênal was left speechless. They stood very close together, looking at each other. Julien had never met anyone so well-dressed, especially
a woman with such a dazzlingly beautiful complexion, who had spoken to
him so gently. Madame de Rênal gazed at the large, round teardrops,
halted in their passage down this young peasant’s cheeks, which had
been at first so pale and were now so pink. Very soon she began to
laugh, with all a girl’s irresponsible gaiety. ……What! was that the
tutor she had pictured to herself as a shabby slovenly priest, who
would come to scold and beat her children!………
As
for Madame de Rênal she was completely taken in by the beauty of
Julien’s complexion, his big dark eyes and his fine head of hair, which
was more than usually curly from his having just plunged it into the
basin of the public fountain to freshen himself up. To her great joy
she discovered something of a young girl’s timidity about this tutor
fate had forced upon her……..
Stendhal comments a few paragraphs further:
His
bashful manner and the almost feminine contour of his features did not
appear in any way ridiculous to a woman who was herself extremely shy.
The virile strength that is commonly considered essential to manly
beauty would only have made her feel frightened. 60
“Virile
strength” would see its shares rise in the course of the century, but
for Stendhal’s heroine it is still largely a negative. Stendhal has
already told us that “Feminine sensibility was developed to an
excessive degree in Madame de Rênal.” His perspective on this
relationship is clear: the extremely feminine woman needs a slightly
feminine man in order to feel reassured and no longer frightened,
either of him or of her own sexual urges. The girlish appearance of
Julien captivates her, awakens perhaps a maternal feeling, certainly a
tenderness that allays her fear and timidity. What we see in this story
is a relationship between two rather feminine beings, each of them
extraordinarily sensitive, timid, emotional, and obsessive, but one of
them also animated by the competitive, conquering, possessive urges of
the male. Julien sets himself the goal of holding her hand one evening;
then of kissing her. His seduction of her is a series of challenges to
his male pride and courage, almost a series of acts of aggression
against her, motivated by a determination to dominate his fear, which
is compounded both by the adulterous situation and the class and age
difference between them. This deliberately planned campaign has a
masculine, conquering character, but the careful detailing of every
step forward or backward, every tiny vicissitude in the long march
towards the consummation of their affair strikes us as curiously
feminine, in its preoccupation with trivial events, closely observed
gestures, meaningful glances, nuances of feeling, imagined slights and
fleeting sensations of triumph. The novel of seduction as we see it in
Stendhal is essentially a study of the feminine soul, and what is
extraordinary to a modern reader is the degree to which the male, while
retaining his conqueror’s motivation, entered into and shared the
feminine soul in that era.
I
would argue that love relationships up until the end of the nineteenth
century took place on female psychological territory. The man entered
the woman’s world in order to seduce her – a world of sighs, blushes,
flirtatious glances, subtle hints, animated conversations and
passionate declarations. But after the First World War, with Hemingway,
we see the woman entering the man’s world, and the relationship between
them taking place on male psychological territory: silence,
understatement, the wry tough humour developed in the trenches,
suppression of feelings, the escape from communication into
drunkenness, and a physicality with hardly any verbal preamble. What we
regard instinctively as modern behaviour in love is in fact masculine
behaviour. Brett in Hemingway’s The Sun also Rises is typical
of these hard-drinking, tough-girl masculine women of between the wars,
who act as one of the boys. Despite her aristocratic origins, she is as
hard as nails, manipulating a bevy of male admirers and keeping them
all at her feet as she indulges in a series of adulteries, which she
discusses frankly with them as though it were a regrettable emotional
vice that she cannot control. Near the beginning of the book, the
narrator Jake confesses to her that he is under some emotional stress
because he loves her. Her reaction is to treat him as an invalid,
suffering from a temporary emotional illness.
“Couldn’t we live together, Brett? Couldn’t we just live together?”
“I don’t think so. I’d just tromper you with everybody. You couldn’t stand it.”
“I stand it now.”
“That would be different. It’s my fault, Jake. It’s the way I’m made.”
“Couldn’t we go off in the country for a while?”
“It wouldn’t be any good. I’ll go if you like. But I couldn’t live quietly in the country. Not with my own true love.”
“I know.”
“Isn’t it rotten? There isn’t any use my telling you I love you.”
“You know I love you.”
“Let’s not talk. Talking’s all bilge. I’m going away from you, and then Michael’s coming back.” 61
Here
we see the post-First World War woman adopting a totally male pattern
of behaviour. This is not merely in her admission of compulsive
infidelity of the Don Juan type. It is also in her remark “Talking’s
all bilge”, a fairly startling remark for a woman to make, since
talking is usually the one thing women traditionally insist on, and are
indeed biologically programmed to do to an excessive degree. Of course
she does use Jake as a confidant, and talks to him to cheer herself up
after her affair with a Spanish bullfighter thirteen years younger then
her. She feels virtuous about her decision to break off with this boy:
she doesn’t want to “be a bitch” and ruin a mere child. They joke
together about the young bullfighter’s desire for her to grow her hair
long and become more “womanly”. That is certainly one thing Brett is
never going to become. There is a strong hint in the book that the
impediment between her and Jake is not merely her compulsive infidelity
but also his war wound, which has apparently affected his potency. As a
psychological symbol, this is brilliant, since her entire behaviour
castrates Jake. But even more, the wound left by the war has castrated
them both emotionally, by turning them both into taciturn, hard-boiled,
wise-cracking, hard-drinking, emotionally impotent males unable to give
themselves completely to a relationship. The war has eliminated the
feminine half of human nature: it has made masculine toughness and
self-control the only model of human behaviour. We see in Brett and
Jake the barrenness of love relationships conducted without the
presence of a feminine personality in either lover. The elimination of
femininity from the scene, leaving male minds inhabiting both men’s and
women’s bodies, leads to a landscape of utter desolation: suppressed
emotions, inability to give, inability to reveal vulnerability, to
express what one is feeling, to stick with one relationship – in short,
inability to communicate and inability to commit oneself. This is the
new sexual atmosphere of the peculiar ultra-masculine culture that
takes over after the First World War. Men-women relationships become as
superficial, hard-edged and promiscuous as male homosexual
relationships, which is psychologically what they now are.
What
is interesting in the novel is the utter lack of bitterness and moral
judgement about Brett. If this were a man having serial affairs while
keeping several women who love him on a string, it would certainly come
over as vicious and exploitative behaviour. But Hemingway makes the
character of Brett sympathetic, because the narrator remains in love
with her to the bitter end. It is not entirely clear whether the
narrator or even the author understands either her or the nature of
their problem. The problem is in fact that Brett does not relate to
Jake like a woman: she is like a male friend to him,
one of the boys, a good sort, a drinking mate, and therefore cannot
break down the barriers between them and enter the intimate emotional
world of his traumatic war experience, because male friendship thrives
on keeping those barriers in place. The inability to communicate
because she has lost the knack of emotional giving which women
traditionally possess leads to the failure of the relationship. The
last lines of the book echo the scene cited above, as once again Jake
feels depressed by his unfulfilled love for her and her decision to
leave. To stop himself getting drunk, he proposes a taxi ride through Madrid.
We turned out onto the Gran Via.
“Oh, Jake,” Brett said, “we could have had such a damned good time together.”
…..The car slowed suddenly pressing Brett against me.
“Yes,” I said. “Isn’t it pretty to think so?” 62
The
ending is bitter, but it seems to be bitter against life, not against
the peculiar selfishness of Brett’s character. We are apparently meant
to see this as genuine tragedy, not a portrait of an emotionally
frigid, shallow, self-indulgent woman, whose only glimmers of feeling
are the moments of self-pity when she understands what her shallowness
is causing her to miss out on. Yet there remains a doubt. Is Hemingway
deliberately creating, by the subtlest means, a portrait of a shallow,
selfish, “liberated” woman? Or are we meant to take seriously this
discreetly evoked war-wound as a legitimate impediment, condemning
their love forever to frustration and justifying her behaviour? What we
certainly have is a portrait of emotional impotence in both characters,
and it is the emotional impotence of a world from which the feminine
personality and capacity to love have disappeared. Whereas in the past
love was a process in which the man won over the woman by adopting to
some degree a feminine personality and behaviour pattern (sighing,
pining, becoming bashful, expressing his emotions in extravagant poetic
outpourings) in the twentieth century we have the woman adopting the
male personality and behaviour pattern. And the male behaviour pattern
of taciturnity, understatement, irony, detachment, drunkenness,
promiscuity and lack of commitment simply does not work in love and
ends up satisfying neither of them.
The
contrast could not be greater with the love scenes we saw in the novels
of Fielding and Stendhal. What is striking is the effect on Tom Jones
and Julien Sorel of seeing the emotional distress of the woman they
love. The sight, or even the intuition, of her state of emotion
immediately melts their male inhibitions and makes them declare their
love for her in the most passionate, eloquent terms. The love scenes of
those books are orgies of feminine emotion on both sides. The woman’s
revelation of her emotional vulnerability seems to unlock the man’s
emotions, and he expresses them in a way that closely mimics hers. One
could even say that traditional male courtship, ever since the 12th
century courtly love cult, was a ritual mimicking of feminine emotions
and behaviour by the male (he learns to sigh, flirt, pine, poeticize,
and express his feelings.) The two sexes communicated through these
feminine emotions, that is, on female psychological territory. Once we
move into a masculine age, and the woman imitates the man, she no
longer reveals these emotions, and so the man has no access to them.
The lack of any emotional display by the woman, above all the lack of
any signs of emotional weakness or vulnerability, appears to freeze the
man and makes him quite incapable of expressing any emotions of his
own. We see in Hemingway that as twentieth-century woman (under the
influence of war) begins to resemble a man and loses her emotional
spontaneity in her effort to be brave, cool, self-controlled, hard and
tough, the sexes lose all capacity to communicate emotionally. They can
only communicate with quips, jokes, wise-cracks and tight-lipped
understatements. The masculinisation of both sexes kills their capacity
for love. A cool, rather shallow friendship, with sex thrown in as a
gymnastic exercise, replaces love. There is no longer any emotional
release or transcendence of the self, because there is no surrender to
the other. When femininity disappears, the whole psychological process
called love, which is a product of femininity and the feminine capacity
to surrender the self, disappears as well. And it is no accident that
the radical feminists have declared war on love as such. They too see
it as linked with the feminine impulse to surrender, which they are so
determined to destroy and root out from the character of women, as
responsible for their alleged enslavement. And in rooting out both love
and femininity from women’s nature, they reinforce the unfeeling,
cynical, selfish, calculating, exploitative, brutal tendencies of men,
and ensure that these are increasingly shared by women, and dominate
the world.
10) LOVE IN HARD TIMES
The
decades following Hemingway’s masterpiece produced a whole wave of
literary and cinematic man-woman relationships of a hard-boiled,
understated, never-express-your-feelings kind. Humphrey Bogart and
Lauren Bacall became a star couple on the basis of this kind of screen
relationship. The emotional power was supposed to lie in the subtle
indirectness of the communication of love. Phrases like Bogart’s
“here’s looking at you, kid” and other tough-guy wise-talk become coded
expressions of the deepest passion. It is as if the words “I love you”
had taken on an obscene connotation, and the whole love-thing had to be
disguised as tough-guy buddies or pseudo-aggression in order to be
acceptable in the new hard-boiled world. Fielding and Stendhal would
have found this language utterly incomprehensible. They would have
wondered why lovers should communicate in the catch-phrases of Chicago
mobsters, and why this should seem a touching proof of deep sentiments.
They would have wondered why in films the dialogue between lovers is
reduced to clipped one-liners. How could love, the most verbose and
extravagant of emotions, ever be conveyed in these terse utterances? The
answer, of course, is that love no longer exists, because the female
has disappeared from the scene, and all that remains is two versions of
the male, one of them in a dress. Western humanity in the masculine
century became taciturn, tight-lipped, incapable of any emotional
display, incapable of love itself, because the feminine half of human
nature had vanished from the radar screen. Women instead became slavish
imitators of the stoic male war hero, the only model of humanity that
the war left standing.
It is interesting to see how closely Humphrey Bogart’s career mirrored the evolution of the image of the male in America.
Bogart started out playing gangsters and bad guys, and his tough,
hard-boiled way of talking was expressive of the hard gangster
personality. It was in sharp contrast to the far more articulate,
educated speech of the leading men. Screen heroes of the thirties like
Leslie Howard, Robert Taylor, Cary Grant and Stewart Granger were
gentlemen, with clipped, slightly British accents and polished,
educated manners. They expressed lofty sentiments towards women, and
would never have done a caddish thing. Then suddenly in 1941 Bogart
played the sleazy detective hero Sam Spade in The Maltese Falcon. The
film was so successful that Bogart became a star and could no longer be
used for villain roles. The tough-guy gangster suddenly became the
hero, but it would not have done to change the hard-boiled speech and
streetwise character which had made him popular. So how could this
low-life figure suddenly be an American hero without glorifying crime?
The solution was to make him a war hero, as with perfect timing Pearl Harbour propelled America into the war. Bogart starred in a series of war films, Across the Pacific, Casablanca and Passage to Marseilles,
in which the macho qualities of the working-class American male of the
mean streets and the billiard parlours were enlisted to boost American
popular support for the war. The war was no longer the cause of
wishy-washy, intellectual Jewish liberals fighting for international
socialism but an affair of red-blooded, street-fighting American boys,
speaking gangster lingo, settling the hash of big Nazi bullies. The
enlistment of the gangster in the war effort, the transformation of the
sleazy street-thug into war hero (with the gangster of course standing
in for the American working class), became a standard scenario repeated
in later classics like The Dirty Dozen. These are films of
social redemption, channelling the mindless aggression of the
working-class hoodlum into the legitimate violence of the patriotic
war-hero. Bogart’s shift from gangster villain to semi-gangster
all-American hero reflects the larger shift in American popular culture
from the polite, well-spoken gentleman as hero (Stewart Granger, Leslie
Howard, Errol Flynn) to the street thug as hero. Hollywood’s
war effort proletarianized the screen hero as part of the process of
making the war a popular crusade. But it did so by permanently boosting
the only type of proletarian who had screen glamour – the criminal from
the mean streets, who then became the standard hero of the fifties film noir.
This transformation of the gangster into a hero probably did more to
glorify brutal thuggery as the essence of all-American manhood than
anything else. And one aspect of this transformation was to make
acceptable the rough, tough and decidedly unchivalrous way this new
hero behaved towards women. We have already seen how in Hemingway the
cynical sexual attitudes towards women previously confined to the
caddish seducer suddenly became those of the ordinary decent young man
trying to score. In the same way the no-nonsense street-thug treatment
of women (“Shut up, sister, or I’ll give you a belt in the kisser”)
became an acceptable trait of the new tough-guy screen hero. And the
woman who was to match this new tough-guy hero had to be as rough,
tough, hard-boiled and monosyllabic as he was. The new screen
street-wise tough-girl (dancer, stripper, gangster’s moll, gold-digger,
female buccaneer) became a standard figure of the film noir
alongside the new gangster hero. The new screen tough-girl pushed even
further the masculinization of women represented by Hemingway’s Brett
after the First World War.
This
new image of men and women in the twentieth century is fundamentally
different from any image of human beings that any past age or culture
presents us with. We have lived with this image for so long now that we
generally fail to grasp how unique it is. Mid-twentieth-century man
left behind every single element in his character that might be called
feminine – above all any capacity to express any emotion except anger,
contempt, cynicism or aggression. And women followed him down the same
path, as under the pressure of the enormous glorification of male
toughness in war they began to imitate his character and try to match
him in toughness. The age of war transformed human beings into the only
kind of person that can survive war. And this became simply the nature
of modern people, and the essential character of modernity itself.
Now
there is a tendency in literary criticism to see everything in terms of
modes, schools and literary fashions. To explain the extraordinary
feminine sensibility of the heroes of eighteenth century novels the
academics have come up with the term “the cult of sensibility”, as if
this were a sort of artificial literary mode divorced from real life.
In the same way they see the tough, low-life characters of
mid-twentieth century American crime fiction and cinema as merely
reflecting a new literary fashion for gritty realism. But literary
modes reflect realities; they show how ages saw themselves. And there
is every evidence that the underlying reality of the male character of
each period was accurately reflected in these popular works of art. The
eighteenth century cult of sensibility, whatever its exaggerations, was
not a major new departure. It presented an image of men and male
behaviour that was not essentially different from what it had been over
the previous six centuries. There is an extraordinary continuity in the
image of man from the beginnings of European (post-classical)
literature right up until the late 19th century. The lady-like male
lovers in the poems of Marie de France and Chrétien de Troyes in the
12th century, in Boccaccio, Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, Racine,
Congreve and Fielding represent a continuity of character type from the
12th century cult of courtly love to the 18th century cult of
sensibility, which goes on with little change into the 19th century
romantic movement. It abruptly disappears in the 20th century.
Stendhal, Lord Byron, De Musset or Tennyson would have felt at home in The Decameron – at ease with Boccaccio’s
conceptions of love, of male behaviour, of relations between the sexes
– in a way that Hemingway, Miller, Raymond Chandler, Norman Mailer or
Irving Welch would not have. Despite the minor variations introduced by
each age’s literary movements, there is only one sharp break in
character and sensibility: between twentieth century man and everything
that went before.
11) MASCULINE AND FEMININE AT THE START OF THE 20TH CENTURY
As
the nineteenth century draws to a close we encounter fascinating works
which not only document but consciously mirror the changeover to the
new masculine ethos. There had already been a hint in Wuthering Heights
of a contrast between a new kind of masculine, violent, darkly tortured
hero, Heathcliff, and the pale, delicate gentleman, Linton. But this
dark hero emerged from the mists of Gothic horror fantasy, rather than
representing a new social reality. The real macho man comes from the
pioneering colonial experience, the struggle of man against nature,
either in the wilderness of North America
with Fenimore Cooper’s Indian fighters, or at sea with Melville’s
whalers. He is no longer the product of an aristocratic society, an
educated gentleman, with a code of civilized values, of honour and
chivalry. The North American literary tradition created a new type of
man not seen in European literature: man outside society, man alone
with the elements, man faced with nature not as a scenic backdrop to
sublime thoughts but as a brutal force to be wrestled with and
overcome. At the end of the century we see this new type of savage hero
brought into contact with the world of civilization in a key work, Jack
London’s Martin Eden.
Jack
London is an avatar of the pioneering, masculine spirit of the American
North West, where man alone is pitted against cruel nature in a
ruthless struggle for survival. As Leslie Fiedler demonstrated in his
classic study, Love and Death in the American Novel, woman is
almost absent from this American frontier world. Whenever by chance the
male hero encounters her, he flees her. Fiedler argues that this is
because American frontier man is already married to a mystical dark
goddess, Nature or the Wilderness – what Cooper’s eternal bachelor
Natty Bumpo calls “the spirit of the forest”. Marriage to a real woman
would take him away from the mystical Wilderness to a conventional,
humdrum domestic life of family responsibilities. He flees this as a
trap. In a sense woman represents civilization, and natural man wants
to remain in his Wilderness. This impulse is almost perceived as a kind
of spiritual vocation, an ascetic path towards mystical knowledge. The
closest he can get to other human beings is a relationship with another
man, often a man from a more “primitive” race that has kept in psychic
touch with the Wilderness, who becomes a spiritual mentor.63
Even the young boys Huck Finn and Tom Sawyer escape into their
Wilderness as a male refuge from the domestic tyranny of stern aunts.
Camilla Paglia points out that this American Wilderness is so totally a
male world that it is sometimes even seen as a god rather than a
goddess – as in Melville’s representation of the dark force of nature
as a gigantic male whale.64 Jack London takes this whole
theme to a more complex, sophisticated level. He brings his natural
hero into the city, and contrasts the masculine world of the American
Wilderness with a new kind of feminine world – not merely the trap of
marriage and humdrum domestic life, but a world adorned with all the
richness of art, beauty and literature of a high civilization. In Martin Eden we see the lone male hero of the savage natural world, a young sailor who has been in the South Seas
on whaling ships, a typical Melville hero, brought into contact with
the feminine world of civilization, poetry and art. That world is
represented by the upper class young lady, Ruth, who becomes the object
of all the young man’s aspirations: social, sexual and intellectual.
Unlike the lone male heroes of Cooper and Melville, who reject and flee
the tempting female, London’s Martin Eden falls under her spell.
The
relationship between them is a fascinating intersection of class and
gender opposites. She intimidates him to the point of confusion. She
represents an inaccessible, superior world, not only by her class and
her literary knowledge but above all by her ethereal femininity and
refined sensibility. The young man is big, muscular, clumsy, scarred by
fights, inarticulate and ill at ease socially. He is able to talk only
of his brawls, and is ashamed of his ignorance and lack of social
graces. On her side, there is both shock at his bad grammar and a
secret, almost shameful attraction to his coarse animal strength, which
becomes a means of release of her own repressed, over-refined sexuality.
Her
gaze rested for a moment on the muscular neck, heavy corded, almost
bull-like, bronzed by the sun, spilling over with health and strength.
And though he sat there, blushing and humble again, she felt drawn to
him. She was surprised by a wanton thought that rushed into her mind.
It seemed to her that if she could lay her two hands upon that neck
that all its strength and vigour would flow out to her. It seemed to
reveal to her an undreamed depravity in her nature. Besides, strength
to her was a gross and brutish thing. Her ideal of masculine beauty had
always been slender gracefulness. Yet the thought persisted …. In truth
she was far from robust and the need of her body and mind was for
strength. 65
We
might almost see this as a key moment of changeover from the old
aristocratic culture of Fielding and Stendhal, where crude strength
repels women and grace attracts them, to the new modern masculine
culture where strength is what women admire in men. This novel dates
from 1909. In a few years the First World War would confirm this
change. Never again in the century do we hear of women despising
strength in men as “gross and brutish” and preferring “slender
gracefulness”. The ultra-masculine character of the 20th century hero
was to be fixed once and for all by world war. We see this new
sensibility emerging here in Jack London’s brilliant insight into the
shift of civilization he was living through.
This
scene of the uneducated, lower-class man, who embodies all the strong
male virtues, intimidated by an inaccessible woman of higher class and
refined femininity, becomes almost a cliché in 20th century American
popular fiction and cinema. We find it in the American Western: the
big, tough cowboy hero reduced to speechless awkwardness by the
presence of an elegant, refined, feminine woman of superior class and
delicate sensibility (usually a recent arrival from back East, that
gateway to the European world and its aristocratic feminine
traditions.) The masculine and feminine souls are poles apart in this
American world, to a degree that Stendhal, Fielding, Congreve,
Shakespeare or Boccaccio (in all of whose works women and men converse
with ease and familiarity) would have found astonishing. The 12th
century poets of courtly love, though faced with mistresses of higher
social rank, were not themselves boors of a coarser sensibility. They
shared the same manners, style of speech, education, culture and taste
as their lady loves. To the 19th century American frontier male,
condemned to a rough life of hard labour in a savage wilderness, far
from any respectable female company, the feminine woman (from back East, that outpost
of Europe) is like a visitor from another planet, whom he can at first
only stammer and wonder at. In the classic Western the two worlds
remain irreconcilable, and after a brief moment of temptation, the
cowboy rejects the feminine world of civilization (which promises
domesticity and tameness) and rides off back into his masculine
wilderness, leaving the jilted girl gazing wistfully after him. In
later Westerns, the cowboy sometimes gets the girl, but only after
bringing her to understand (through some suitably violent plot) that
his tough manly virtues are worth more than her feminine refinements.
For he represents the real world, the Darwinian jungle, and she
represents an illusory and fragile superstructure of civilization and
poetry, which can only survive if protected by him and his brute force.
The reconciliation of the two worlds at the end of the Western genre –
when indeed it does occur – entails the triumph of the male world. He
is not feminized, she is slightly masculinized – at least to the point
of no longer fainting at the sight of blood and becoming capable of
reloading his Winchester
for him. His brute virtues are crowned by the blessing of her poetic
and refined appreciation, but we do not generally see him learning to
write poetry or play the piano. We see her rather learning to ride and
shoot. This victory of masculinity of course also represents the
victory of the democratic rural working man over the snobbish,
European-influenced upper class – part of the mythology of American
democracy. The victory of democracy over aristocracy is the victory of
honest, masculine, working-class, rural virtues over artificial,
high-class, feminine, citified ones. The twentieth century American
Western, when it involves a love-plot, is a fable of the conquest of
the feminine by the masculine world.
London’s Martin Eden,
while going over the same ground that will later be thoroughly trampled
by the Western film, treats the theme with much greater complexity. London’s
tough, ignorant, ultra-masculine hero strives to enter the poetic,
refined world of the feminine ideal and he succeeds in doing so. He
conquers the world of Ruth by educating himself and becoming a
successful writer. But in so doing he learns the artificiality and
falseness of her world. He is disillusioned to discover to what extent
men and women of the upper classes change towards him after his
literary success. He was exactly the same person, with the same talents
and virtues before and after his sudden fame; but those who rebuffed
him before now fawn upon him, including Ruth. In a mood of confusion
and bitterness, he rejects her advances when she comes to him and
offers to live with him. He decides to ship out to his beloved South Seas
again, the world of nature and the lone male. On the way, the sense of
futility overcomes him and he commits suicide by drowning. London’s
conclusion is more pessimistic than that of the modern Western. Instead
of the masculine world conquering the feminine by forcing it to
recognize the superiority of masculine virtues, in London the masculine
hero “conquers” the feminine world only by adopting (in fact
capitulating to) its values – which he then
discovers are corrupt and false. Unable to go back to what he was, he
has no way out except suicide. Moral: the feminine, civilized world is
a fatally corrupting influence on primitive, masculine man, who is
better off in his wilderness. This of course ties in with London’s
homespun brand of socialism, his instinctive contempt for the
bourgeoisie and the rich. And given the Darwinian biological myths of
struggle and conquest onto which his socialism is grafted, it is not
surprising that it eventually begins to resemble fascism.
The
opposition of the worlds of masculine clumsiness, ignorance and
naivety, and feminine sophistication, social graces and higher class,
is not merely American. It becomes a major theme of 19th century
English literature, in a period of increasing class mobility. It
underlies the torment of the relationship between Pip and Stella in
Dickens’ Great Expectations. Here the provincial, boorish boy
is made to suffer by the pretty, sophisticated girl, whose world he
longs to enter – even though its values, he discovers, are as false as
the basis of his own mysteriously acquired wealth. It is an important
motif in Hartley’s The Go-Between, where the young lower-class
boy is again fascinated and tormented by the older, more mature
aristocratic girl, who uses him as messenger to her lover. In fact the
real-life situation of lower-middle class writers, ambitious to rise by
their talents into a higher class, is often reflected in these
portraits of clumsy, socially inept boys sighing after upper-class
girls and the world they belong to. It recurs in Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited,
where the student narrator, of modest social background, feels a dual
fascination for an upper class fop and his sister. It appears as late
as Kingsley Amis, John Osborne and the Angry Young Men, the generation
of 1950’s non-U writers fighting for recognition by a snobbish
establishment. And in all of them there is that curious mix of envy,
resentment at exclusion, and desire to shag their way into a higher
class, with subsequent disillusionment, bitterness, hatred of the upper
class and a sense of betrayal of their own origins when they succeed.
The
novels of D.H.Lawrence add another dimension to this opposition of the
masculine and feminine worlds, and their alignment with class values. Lawrence’s
attitudes evolved radically during his life-time. He began his writing
career with an autobiographical portrait of a sensitive, artistic
miner’s son who, encouraged by his doting, educated mother, strives to
escape the brutal, masculine, philistine working-class world of the
mining-town, and move into the refined, artistic world of upper-class
culture. But Lawrence’s
long battles with the establishment and literary censorship caused a
shift in his sympathies. By the end of his life he identified with his
working-class roots and took the side of his rough coal-miner father
against his socially-ambitious, literate mother. For Lawrence
the working class becomes the bastion of a rough, raw, masculine
sexuality, as opposed to the prissy puritanism of the feminine upper
class. In his last book he transforms his hero from miner into
gamekeeper – shifting him from the industrial world
to the natural world, where he can tap into mysterious dark forces
(almost like those of the American Wilderness.) In Lady Chatterley’s Lover we
see in the affair between an aristocratic lady and her gamekeeper a
variant of Jack London’s classy rich girl and clumsy sailor. This time,
however, the gamekeeper Mellors has no aspiration to enter the lady’s
aristocratic, intellectual world. Married to a cripple, she is seen as
part of a frigid, sterile, frustrated and neurotic civilization. It is
the working-class male who holds the key to her redemption through the
crude, earthy sexual energy he represents. Mellors is the repository of
the mystical forces of nature, which he transmits to her through the
slightly unorthodox medium of anal intercourse. The upper class lady
must be sodomized in the mud by the gamekeeper in order to be liberated
from her frigidity and sexual repression. This is a rather more
vigorous variation on the Western film’s victory of male over female,
and democrat over aristocrat. Sex as a mystical annihilation of the
shallow, bourgeois, artificial feminine self through a sort of
masochistic union with natural, phallic man in his rough, unvarnished
state: this is Lawrence’s peculiar twist on the familiar theme of lower-class male subjugating upper-class female.
As
the twentieth century advances, the power of a new democratic
capitalism with its emphasis on work and material success begins to
threaten the existence of what both London and Lawrence
saw as the feminine world of upper-class higher culture. But instead of
this feminine civilized world being seen (as London and Lawrence saw
it) as something to be challenged and overthrown by the raw masculine
energy of natural man, some authors come to see it as a fragile
repository of vanishing values to be protected against a new brutality
and coarseness. This is the world we see in Tennessee Williams’ plays:
a world of beleaguered femininity. In his work we see old-fashioned,
European-style femininity struggling to survive in a world grown
hostile to it. We have the figure of the ageing Southern belle, relic
of a more gracious age when a European-style aristocratic society
flourished on the plantations of the South, trying to maintain her airs
and graces in a threadbare urban world of uncouth, coarse-minded men.
Amanda in The Glass Menagerie still lives mentally in the
vanished plantation world she knew in her youth – a world of chivalrous
male suitors, gallantly dancing attention upon graceful, charming
ladies. She dreams of finding a well-off husband for her daughter as a
way out of their humiliating poverty. But the daughter, Laura, is an
even more extreme case of female helplessness – she is crippled not
only in one leg but by her shyness, her delicacy, her sexual timidity,
all the exaggerated feminine characteristics which make her unfit for
the rough modern world. She is not only too shy to ensnare a suitor;
she is too shy even to follow a typing course to enable her to earn a
living. Instead, she retreats into an imaginary world of her own, her
collection of little glass animals. As often in Williams, this is a
tragedy of the woman as déclassé. The descent from (or the
disappearance of) that upper class milieu where the delicate, refined
female could depend on the protection of male chivalry leaves her at
the mercy of a crude, brutal, cash-nexus world which can only bruise or
destroy her sensitive soul. Even the boy Laura fancied at school, whom
her brother brings home to dinner, turns out to be crass, clumsy,
crude, tactless. Williams’ entire oeuvre is an exploration of human
sensitivity wounded or crushed by a brutal world. This often means a
sensitive woman who aspires to some kind of social refinement being
destroyed by a coarse, violent lower-class man. This scenario receives
its greatest dramatic treatment in A Streetcar Named Desire.
The
title is marvellously evocative of how sexual desire falls on a person
like a brutal road accident. But in this play Williams is not merely
using Blanche and her secret sex-life as a metaphor for his own secret
homosexuality, made burdensome by an intolerant society. He also sees
the whole sexual relationship between man and woman as a brutalization
of the sensitive, romantic, idealistic female by the gross and bestial
appetites of the male. Sex as degradation of the woman is the essence
of Williams’ curiously feminine, even feminist vision in this play. Stanley’s
rape of Blanche, leading her to lose her mind, and his wife Stella’s
refusal to believe what has happened in order to be able to go on
living with him, is a horrific image of heterosexual relations in mid-20th century America.
Williams has a vision of heterosexuality which many a militant lesbian
could identify with. Stella is made a slave to a brutal, ignorant,
unfeeling man by her own sexual appetites, which are shown as a sort of
masochistic vice she surrenders to. Here is how Blanche describes the
husband, Stanley:
He
acts like an animal, he has an animal’s habits. There’s even something
subhuman …. something ape-like about him….. Thousands and thousands of
years have passed him right by and there he is – Stanley Kowalski –
survivor of the Stone Age! Bearing the raw meat home from the kill in
the jungle! And you – you here – waiting for him. Maybe he’ll strike you or maybe grunt and kiss you! …. But Stella – my sister – there has been some progress since then! Such things as art – as
poetry and music – such kinds of new light have come into the world
since then! In some kinds of people some tenderer feelings have had
some little beginning! ….. Don’t – don’t hang back with the brutes! 66
In
this dichotomy between a coarse, brutal, lower-class male world and a
feminine world of refined aspirations towards art and beauty, Williams
is clearly on the side of the female. The male bias of London and Lawrence
has been reversed, by identifying the male not with some mythic
frontier wilderness, or nature’s mysterious energies, but with drunken
poker games in smoke-filled rooms, coarse sexist jokes, violence and
rape. The play is a devastating indictment of the modern urban male
world. William’s vision of heterosexuality is not a typical male
homosexual’s view but a female homosexual’s view, with all the disgust
directed at male sexuality. By contrast, female sexuality is always
treated positively in Williams’ work. He repeatedly evokes an idealized
archetype of a heterosexual relationship – that of a protective
mothering woman tenderly in love with a delicate poetic boy of shaky
sexual orientation, who often dies tragically. Blanche had such a
relationship with her young poet husband, but she caused him to commit
suicide when she discovered his bisexuality and expressed her disgust
for it. Blanche later tries to recapture the same kind of poetic
relationship by seducing teenage boys, and is dismissed from her school
for an affair with a young pupil. But even the predatory, paedophile
aspect of her sexuality is not condemned by the author, because it
retains a tenderly protective nature. The same pattern occurs in other
plays of Williams: a sensual, protective female actively woos a passive
neurotic male. In Cat on a Hot Tin Roof Maggie the Cat is the active wooer of the passive, sexually confused Biff (also accused of homosexuality.) In Night of the Iguana the
sexually voracious Maxine takes in the defrocked priest Shannon and
saves him from the general disaster of his life. Female sexuality is
generally benevolent in Williams: despite a certain hunger and
voracity, it finds its fulfilment only with those weaker, more
sensitive males who can relate to the feminine character. That is why
Blanche is driven to seduce young boys: they are the only males who
correspond to her need for a poetic, sensitive relationship. Men of her
age strike her as coarse, over-masculine brutes, lacking in that
chivalric respect and delicate feeling for women that she longs for.
This makes Blanche, if not an incipient paedophile, at least a
hebephile. Repelled by the crudeness of men, she turns to adolescents,
where she is the gentle initiator of innocence, moved by the sight of
the shyness she once felt. Williams seems to be saying that woman’s
normal sensual desires have been perverted in the modern age because of
the lack of any feminine, sensitive element in adult men which she can
relate to. Unfulfilled in her relations with men because of their
coarse, crude, over-masculine character, she becomes a seducer of young
boys. We have said that Williams’ perspective on men is close to a
lesbian viewpoint. Would it be too much to suggest that Williams was a
kind of “closet heterosexual” – acting out in homosexuality his
problematic relations with women? His failure to find the woman who
could provide the understanding, sympathetic love for the timid,
sensitive boy he was, leads him to seek in his turn to give that love
to a clone of his younger self. And to create endless variants of that
idealized woman in his work.
In
Williams’ portraits of women we see above all the helplessness of
femininity in a world that no longer has any place for it. Blanche’s
delicate sensuality, her passion for adolescent boys (which was current
among 18th century European aristocratic women, themselves
initiated at a tender age by older husbands not usually chosen for
love) has been criminalized as paedophilia by a coarse, Puritanical,
ignorant culture which degrades the sexual impulse. In Stanley’s
eyes she is a whore, who can be raped with a good conscience. There is
quite simply no place left for her – except the madhouse. Another
extreme case of femininity, the sensitive woman artist in Night of the Iguana,
selflessly looking after her dying poet father, is also a doomed being
with nowhere to go. Her sexual frigidity blocks the one avenue left
open for the lonely, destitute woman – latching on to a sympathetic
man. While London’s Martin Eden
showed us the impasse of the honest natural man in a feminine,
civilized world of deceit, lies and hypocrisy, Williams’ work shows us
the impasse of the sensitive feminine woman in a masculine world of
crudeness, mercenary sordidness and brutality. Williams’ sympathy is
entirely with the feminine sensibility, which aspires towards the
higher realm of poetry and art. This was also the perspective that
Lawrence and London’s
Martin Eden started out with, but we have seen how they changed their
minds. Both of them decided the feminine world of poetry, art,
civilization – essentially an upper class world – was false and
artificial, and returned to the natural, masculine world of their
roots. They saw the energy of natural man’s relationship with the
wilderness as the primitive force making for the renewal of a sick,
over-refined, neurotic, bourgeois civilization. Their view in fact
echoes fascist thinking in its primitivism, its violence, its masculine
revolt against civilized values as effeminate and weak. Tennessee
Williams updates and reverses their whole perspective by seeing the
American capitalist world emerging from the Second World War as
essentially masculine in its crude, aggressive energy – crushing under
its industrial, commercial wheels the feminine values of sensitivity,
art, and poetry. In a sense we can see the earlier authors as
reflecting some of the impulses that led to fascism, while Williams
reflects the horror at the world fascism created – and not only fascism
but a brutalizing industrial system. From our perspective Williams’
vision of things perhaps seems closer to the reality of the century
than Lawrence’s or London’s
view. The citation for Hemingway’s Nobel prize praised him for
depicting “the hard face of the age”. Williams’ work represents, in
contrast, a passionate protest against the hard, masculine face of the
age, and its destruction of the sensitive, feminine side of human
nature. This destruction is forever symbolised to him by the
disappearance of the graceful world of the Southern belle, whose
idealized image, filtered through the mist of childhood memories,
haunted him all his life.
12) SEX IN THE MASCULINE CENTURY: HENRY MILLER
The
masculinization of the relations between men and women which we saw in
Hemingway develops in a variety of ways throughout the twentieth
century. With the addition of sexual explicitness in literature, we
arrive at a cold, detached objectification of sexual relations never
before seen outside pornography. This is most striking in Henry Miller.
Miller is admittedly a complex figure, full of contradictions, and his
work has a bewildering variety of moods, from earthy realism to the
wildest poetic surrealism. But when we think of sex in Miller’s books,
perhaps the mood that we think of most often, and which amuses us most,
is one where he chronicles what might be called the trivialization, or banalisation,
of sex – its reduction, in a Russian feminist’s phrase, to “no more
than drinking a glass of water”. Here is a typical passage (sharply
abbreviated for effect) from The Tropic of Capricorn:
It’s
a trying day and on the way home I bump into the sister of one of my
friends and she insists on taking me to dinner. After dinner we go to a
movie and in the dark we begin to play with each other and….. go back
to the office where I lay her out on the zinc-covered table ….. When I
get home there’s a telephone call from Valeska…. It’s very urgent….
When I get there I meet her cousin, a rather attractive young woman who
…. had just had an affair with a strange man because she was tired of
being a virgin…. Maybe now she was pregnant… Valeska takes me aside and
she asks me if I wouldn’t care to sleep with her cousin, to break her
in, as it were…. The two of them began to paw me … I undressed them
both and put them to bed … When I got home my wife was awake and sore
as hell …I lost my temper and I clouted her … the kid woke up and ….
began to scream. The girl upstairs came running down
to see what was the matter. She was in her kimono.... In the excitement
she got close to me…. We put the wife to bed…. While the girl upstairs
was bending over her I stood behind her and lifted her kimono. I got it
into her and she stood there a long time talking a lot of foolish
soothing nonsense. Finally I climbed into bed with the wife and to my
utter amazement she began to cuddle up to me…. 67
What
is hilarious in this passage is the sheer profusion of sexual activity
going on and how busy the narrator is. Any woman who knocks on the door
appears to be ripe for it. Sex is as mundane and impersonal and
frequent as having coffee. It is a world of surreal sexual
availability, and sex appears to happen wordlessly by a sort of tacit
complicity, as if the entire world is in on the lark and keeping an eye
out for any passing opportunity to indulge. This is what gives much of
Miller’s work a comic, happy, optimistic atmosphere. It is like
watching calves gambolling in clover. So much sex around strikes us as
healthy, fun, and satisfying to all concerned. Unfortunately there are
two problems that periodically arise. Some women want money for it,
especially in Paris,
so the whole thing becomes a contest to get the sex without paying the
money (usually this means cheating or stealing from the woman.) The
other problem is some women want some feelings to be attached to it.
This leads to rather more brutal measures to convince them of the
inappropriateness of this association of ideas.
Let us first look at an incident from Quiet Days in Clichy, which
we may entitle “Tricking the Half-Witted Whore”. Carl and the narrator
pick up a slightly cracked poetry-writing French girl, who makes
herself at home in their flat and offers them sex for two hundred
francs, which she claims to desperately need. She then sets about
writing a poem naked.
I
was sitting on the divan and she was standing in front of me stark
naked, her ass staring me in the face. I thought I would see if she’d
continue writing should I put a finger up her crack. I did it very
gently as if exploring the delicate petals of a rose. She kept on
scribbling without the least murmur of approval or disapproval, merely
opening her legs a little more for my convenience. In an instant I had
a tremendous erection. I got up and shoved my prick inside her. She
sprawled forward over the desk, the pencil still in her hand. “Bring
her over here,” said Carl, who was in bed and squirming about like an
eel now. I turned her round, got it in frontwise and, lifting her off
her feet, I dragged her over to the bed. Carl pounced on her
immediately, grunting like a wild boar. I let him have his fill and
then I let her have it again, from the rear. When it was over she asked
for some wine, and while I was filling the glass she began to laugh. It
was a weird laugh, like nothing I had ever heard before. 68
It
is clear this girl is mentally unbalanced. This does not worry them
from a moral point of view, but they are a bit afraid of her,
especially when she asks for the revolver in her bag and calmly
announces that she feels like shooting someone.
“You
have had a good time for your two hundred francs – now it is my turn.”
With this she made a leap for the bag. We pounced on her and threw her
to the floor. She bit and scratched and kicked with all her strength. 69
They
throw some water on her and hustle her out. They have already stolen
back the two hundred francs from her purse and it is hidden under a
paper on the desk. She sees it as she reclaims her unfinished poem.
They deny indignantly this is her money and she believes them and
meekly apologizes. They put her in a taxi without a cent, with
instructions to take her to a hotel.
The
Miller persona Joey remarks to Carl: “You’re not worried about her are
you? If she’s crazy she won’t need money, nor a hotel either.” (In
other words, in case you missed the point, a crazy bitch can fuck for
her taxi-ride and her bed.) Even Carl balks at this: “Listen Joey,
you’re a hard-hearted son of a bitch. And the money! Jesus, we fucked her good and proper.” 70
Apart from sorting out a few details of what and how things had
happened, the revolver, the money and so on, this is where the incident
is left.
It
is a little less happy than the atmosphere of calves in clover that we
saw above. There is an odd detachment in the description of sex with
this crazy girl, a sort of experimental curiosity, reinforced by her
own utter passivity. This is the virtual rape of a zombie, whom they
pass back and forth like a rubber doll. Now you might say: why not, if
she doesn’t object? She is after all a whore. But the point of this
narrative seems to be the passive acquiescence of the girl in an act
which the narrator himself clearly thinks of as a sordid act of
domination and aggression. He doesn’t conclude: “she was a good sort
and we had a good time together.” There is no complicity between them
and the girl. What they are doing is playing a dirty trick on her –
“fucking her good and proper”. This is not a joyful sensual encounter
with a sexually liberated woman, or even a simple transaction with a
prostitute. It is the sly and brutal using of an unbalanced human being
for what they themselves consider a squalid act of spoliation.
The
woman’s passive acquiescence as they use her as a rubber doll suggests
she is utterly indifferent to what is happening, but her subsequent
rage and attempt to take violent revenge with the revolver suggests
otherwise. Her sense of humiliation may be gauged by the desperate
struggle on the floor afterwards. That she meekly accepts their word
that the money she finds is not hers only seals her humiliation. She
has been screwed, swindled and subjugated. The sequence we have here is
the using of the woman as an object, followed by her rage and revolt
against this treatment, followed by a physical subjugation and
humiliation that makes clear who has the power. Now we may partly
excuse this behaviour because the woman was after all a prostitute
(even if only an occasional and half-witted one) – but this pattern
recurs often in Miller, whether the woman is a prostitute or not. There
is a determination that she shall be made to submit to rubber doll
status, and her rebellious feelings in the matter will be subdued by
some forceful means. Even more disturbing, the act of sex with a
stranger has become, through sheer repetition, so trivialized and
meaningless that any woman who tries to attach some feelings to it, to
return the act to the realm of human relationships, excites a male
reaction of anger and contempt and a desire to put her in her place.
There is even moral indignation – as if she is breaking the rules. Just
as prostitutes indignantly reject a client’s affectionate kisses as if
these are breaking the rules by trying to introduce sentiment into a
commercial act, so Miller indignantly rejects a woman trying to
sentimentalize a casual screw. There is another passage later in the
same book, where the narrator has just met a beautiful Danish woman,
who has told him she is a widow.
I
knew she wanted me to talk love. Say anything you like, do anything you
like, but use the language of love – the glamorous, sentimental words
which conceal the ugly, naked reality of the sexual assault.
I
placed my hand squarely over her cunt, which was steaming like manure
under her dress, and said: “Christine, what a wonderful name! Only a
woman like you could own such a romantic name. It makes me think of icy
fjords, of fir trees dripping with wet snow. If you were a tree I would
pull you up by the roots. I’d carve my initials in your trunk…..” I
rattled off more silly nonsense, all the while clutching her firmly,
pushing my fingers into her gluey crack. I don’t know how far it would
have gone, there in the kitchen, if our hostess had not interrupted us.
She was a lascivious bitch, too. I had to mush it up with both of them
at the same time. 71
This
is of course on one level merely comedy, a parody of human sexuality,
of its inherent hypocrisy, of the gaping contrast between the palaver
about icy fjords and the reality of the “cunt steaming like manure”.
But the grossness of the images is striking. Who ever thought of a cunt
as “steaming like manure”? The image is one of repugnance, disgust. The
second thing that strikes one here is the contempt, the curiously
puritanical indignation against women’s sexual availability: “She was a
lascivious bitch too.” Why this contempt for a woman for her sexual
appetite? Why not thank your stars for it, if all you want to do is
screw? But above all there is a contempt for the mental stratagems by
which women justify to themselves their own sexual desires: a contempt
for “the language of love, the glamorous sentimental words which
conceal the ugly naked reality of the sexual assault.” Now this need
for emotional euphemism, the need to beautify the act, to call it
love-making rather than fucking, to place it within the context of an
affective relationship (however fleeting) rather than a purely
gymnastic exercise, is what has traditionally been seen as the natural
feminine perspective on sex. This is how most women have always
approached sex, apart from prostitutes. Perhaps because being shafted
is a rather more intimate experience than doing the shafting, women
have usually wanted some assurance of the benevolence of the mind on
the other end of the prick inside them. Precisely because love-making
and rape look superficially similar, women want some assurance that
what is happening in the man’s mind is the former and not the latter.
Now it is this feminine approach to sex that Miller contemptuously
rejects: he insists on the woman having sex like a man, as a purely
gymnastic exercise, as much animated by aggression as by affection. The
phrase “ugly, naked reality of the sexual assault” makes clear how
aggressively he views the act. The word “ugly” even suggests a degree
of repulsion and disgust. Is this the disgust of wounded adolescent
idealism, of surfeit, or of being obliged by need to screw women you
don’t really find attractive? And yet this Danish girl was allegedly a
great beauty. Where is the appreciation of this beauty? Why does he
cynically parody the man’s traditional seductive strategy of soothing
and charming, reassuring with words of praise and affection, in order
to get inside what he wants? Is it not worth the effort? Does the woman
not have the right even to this small concession? Normally a man’s
seductive urges are inspired, and become sincerely affectionate and
tender, in direct proportion to the physical desirability of the prize.
But Miller has lost all patience with normal male strategy. He wants to
force this girl to face brutal reality and accept a fuck on his crude
terms. Here is how it continues: he and his friend Carl invite
Christine home to a small party, a foursome.
Carl moved his acrobat over to the divan. I lay down on the rug with Christine, in the next room. It was a bit of a struggle at first, but once I had gotten her legs open and the juice flowing, she went at it with gusto. After
a few spasms she began to weep. She was weeping over her dead husband,
so she confessed. I couldn’t make it out. I felt like saying. “Why
bring that up now?” I endeavoured to find out what it was,
precisely, that she was thinking of with respect to her departed
husband. To my amazement she said: “What would he think of me if he
could see me lying here on the floor with you?” That
struck me as so ridiculous that I felt like spanking her. An unholy
desire possessed me to make her do something that would warrant a true
display of shame and remorse. 72
That something is to get her into a partouze or group
sex act. They all four lie on a divan in the dark and stimulate
whatever bits of one another they can get a hand to. Christine is
excited to fever pitch by both men.
Carl
now threw herself on Christine who was beside herself. I was lying so
that I was now able to tickle her arse while Carl dug away at her. I
thought she would go mad, from the way she was wriggling about and
moaning and gibbering.
Suddenly it was over. Christine bounded out of bed and made for the bathroom. 73
The
other three “burst into peals of laughter” as if they had played some
sordid trick on her. She came out screaming that they were disgusting,
and left, slamming the door. One can only agree with her.
The
question which arises here is that of authorial attitude. The behaviour
of the Miller persona and Carl is genuinely repulsive. Theirs is the
attitude of the men’s dirty joke session, or the graffiti on toilet
walls. Women’s feelings are shit, all they want is a good rogering, and
the sooner they are brought to this realization and given one the
better. An author of genuine breadth of human sympathies, a Tolstoy or
a Flaubert or a Maupassant (all of them great womanizers), would (if
they had lived in a more sexually explicit age) have placed this coarse
male attitude in sharp counter-point to the distraught feelings of the
woman afterwards, as her mental and emotional world (the fond memory of
her husband) is broken in pieces. But Miller is utterly indifferent to
what the woman might be feeling. He records the men’s attitude as
perfectly normal and appears to share it. Christine is the oddity, the
stiff bourgeois bitch with hang-ups about sex and love, who in her
widowhood is obviously gagging for it, but wants it to be wrapped up in
some sentimental tosh so it won’t violate her romantic memories.
Miller, the militant guru of some radical version of sex without the
crap, intends to dish it up for her raw – “the ugly naked reality of the sexual assault.” And make her grovel for it, too, the slut.
Now
in other books Miller is quite capable of lyrical, idealistic flights
of purple prose about love and women. But on the level of the practical
sex life his characters lead among the whores and losers of Paris,
he sees woman as merely a fucking machine. Any time she tries to emerge
from this role he brutally shoves her back into it. Any woman who
pretends to find sex more than just a pleasurable gymnastic exercise,
who insists on linking it with some bullshit emotion, is slapped down
as a neurotic screwed-up bitch who needs a good gang-bang to set her
right. In short, Miller in his macho mode insists on woman going to the
logical conclusion of liberation-masculinization and adopting a totally
male attitude to sex – detached and purely physical – or else he
despises her as a phoney or a deluded fool. Some of Miller’s female
admirers and imitators like Erica Jong are only too happy with this,
because it corresponds to their own masculinized attitude to sex. But
Jong is under the illusion that this represents some sensual revolt
against traditional American Puritanism. In reality it represents the
opposite of sensuality – the beginnings of crude sexual consumerism,
which has undertones of aggression, contempt and disgust that are
thoroughly puritanical.
Now
this is not, as we said, the only mood or attitude to sexual love in
Miller’s work. He also has poetic moods, in which he goes off on riffs
about love which are pure romanticism – especially because they are
nearly always directed at an unattainable woman, or one that has been
lost. There is a section in Nexus where he talks of love in terms that are reminiscent of Petrarch or Dante (an effect reinforced by the archaic subjunctives):
Which
of us has not said to himself, in his blind adoration of one beyond his
reach – “What matter if she be never mine? All that matters is that she
be, that I may worship and adore her forever!” .….And even though it be
untenable, such an exalted view, the lover who reasons thus is on firm
ground. He has known a moment of pure love. No other love, no matter
how serene, how enduring, can compare with it. 74
He goes on for a couple of pages with this kind of thing:
If there is anything that deserves to be called miraculous, is it not love? What other power, what other mysterious force is there which can invest life with such undeniable splendour? 75
But
this occurs in a novel where he is losing his wife to a lesbian
relationship, a situation he finds unendurable (though it does not seem
to trigger any questioning of his own treatment of her.) None of this
lyricism comes out in any actual physical relationship he has. What we
see in Miller is an absolute division of personality between poetic
idealism about love when reflecting on his own feelings in lonely
solitude, and a brutal contempt for the feelings that a woman may
associate with sex when he just wants to screw. His feelings are purely
selfish. His own self-pity leads him, when he is suffering from
unrequited love, to identify with the romantic or courtly love or
Petrarchan literary traditions, but these poetic texts give him no
insight into what women may be feeling when he feels nothing. In fact
the idealistic conception of love comes to Miller only when he doesn’t
think about sex at all. It is always linked to unrequited love or
unattainable women. He never describes a sex act in poetic or romantic
terms. When he describes sex he becomes fixated with the crude physical
mechanics of it as if he finds them morbidly fascinating – perhaps even
vaguely disgusting. The effect is never sensual. He never describes a
naked woman’s body as beautiful. He appears in fact to find naked women
ugly. Every sex act is mined for its grossly comic potential, not its
poetry. Miller can be poetic about woman only until she gets her gear
off. When he gets down to the sex act he sees only the grotesque.
Now
comic, crude and ribald descriptions of sex had appeared before in
literature, and not only in pornography. They were part of the medieval
fabliau tradition, of which Chaucer’s The Miller’s Tale (by an odd coincidence of names) is a good example. But the joke in these fabliau
tales is just as often on men as on women. Illicit sex is treated as a
grotesque farce in which both sexes can end up being made fools of. In
Miller the joke is always on women, and it usually involves taking
advantage of them sexually, in violation of their own emotional needs.
In Sexus he is so determined to deny his wife Maude any
affectionate content to their sexual acts that he prefers to screw her
while she is asleep: “sneak up on her, slip it to her while she’s
dreaming.” This is an almost schoolboy obsession with turning sex into
a dirty trick played upon the woman. Why this extraordinary aversion to
normal feelings? We are driven to the conclusion that this perpetual
joke against woman’s romantic illusions, this reflex to degrade woman,
to rub her nose in the sordidness of the sex act which she
romanticizes, hides not only a hostility to women, but a bitterness, a
deep disillusionment with sex, a determination to destroy a romantic
illusion which he must once have held. There is in Miller a real hatred
and contempt for the process of romanticization and idealization of sex
which women are prone to. Why? Does it reflect self-hatred? His own
disillusionment with love? His own hurt? A lack of belief that he can
inspire such love? Some deep shock of his adolescent sensibilities in
the face of crude or hurtful sexual experiences? Whatever it is, his
reduction of sex to the “ugly naked reality of the sexual assault”
looks like revenge but may well be (as he later claimed) therapy. What
interests us is that this aggressive attack on the romantic, rosewater
attitude to sex is a violent rejection of the typical feminine view of
it. And this is what makes Miller so important to 20th century attitudes to sex.
His
approach is central to the entire treatment of sex in Modernism as a
movement, both in art and literature: a rejection of sensuality, of
idealism, of the beauty of human bodies, of the emotion that transforms
an animal act into a form of spiritual communion – all the elements
characteristic of the traditional feminine attitude to sex. Instead, most nudes by 20th century artists are ugly – ugliness is the most basic modernist ideological dogma. What the 20th century artist depicts is meat : ugly, stark, even repulsive. Female beauty is despised in the 20th
century as Victorian pretty-pretty sentimentality, naiveté, hypocrisy –
or even cheap pornography. Cabanel, Leighton and other painters of
superbly beautiful female nudes are now downgraded as Victorian
soft-porn merchants. The 20th century artist’s view of sex
is crude and unappetizing, featuring ugly bodies in degrading and
repugnant poses. The main achievement of modernism in painting is to
make female nakedness repulsive. It has a forerunner in Manet’s coarse,
in-your-face, grubby little whore Olympia,
and reaches a climax with the cult of sexual repulsion seen in the
likes of Eric Fischl or David Salle in the 1980’s – where a frozen
chicken’s arse becomes a caricature of female genitals. Miller is the
literary avatar of this modernist tradition. It represents the triumph
of the ultra-masculine viewpoint – an ascetic, puritanical contempt for
sex, while at the same time brutally enjoying the female bodies
despised for their sluttish availability. Above all it jeers at the
deluded romanticism with which women conceal from themselves that they
are being used like rubber dolls to jerk off into. Miller’s entire treatment
of sex is a humiliation and a demolition of the feminine sensibility,
the feminine viewpoint, and a glorification of a male attitude to sex
which is that of the locker-room and the toilet wall.
The
whole point of romance or romanticism (in the popular sense of the
word, applied to sexual relationships) is to make sex enjoyable for
women, by placing it within the emotional context that suits the
feminine sensibility. Women still use the word “romantic” for any male
attitude or behaviour that puts them in the mood for sex. The essence
of this is euphemism, of never stating the physical facts too baldly.
Female romance literature of the bodice-ripper type is full of rosy
euphemisms for body parts in order to conceal from the mind the crude
reality of what is happening – to keep it all, so to speak, in the
dark. But this attitude underlies not merely cheap romance but the
highest love poetry. In fact one could almost suggest that love poetry
developed in answer to this specific feminine need. The female demand
for an emotional, sentimental accompaniment to sex is what gave rise to
the cult of courtly love in the 12th century, the source of the love
cult that has persisted as one of the striking features of European
culture for the past eight hundred years. At the start of the twelfth
century European men got the idea from somewhere that if you make an
effort to emotionally excite women before love-making, they do it more
enthusiastically and this increases the man’s pleasure too. This new
cult of love represented a softening, one might say a feminization, of
men’s approach to sex – working upon a woman’s emotions, her response
to affection, flattering her with praise of her beauty, claiming to be
desperately in love with her so as to appeal to her sympathy, begging
her for pity’s sake to grant the boon desired, a kiss, an embrace.
Through a gradual stimulation of her erogenous zones, starting with the
lips, she then could be induced by sexual excitement to willingly allow
access to the prize. Romantic courtship, in short, is elaborate
foreplay (which replaces the estrus of other primates in getting the
lubricating vaginal juices flowing, thereby increasing the pleasure for
both partners.) This would have contrasted starkly with the brutal
approach generally taken in previous ages, where a woman was held down,
possibly tied down, on her wedding night and raped – an approach still
found in certain more traditional areas of the world today. In the
medieval German epic the Nibelungenlied, based on much earlier
Frankish sources, the plot turns on the revelation that Siegfried,
using his magic invisibility, helped his friend Gunther to hold down
his athletic bride Brunhild on her wedding night. This suggests that
force was normally used on these occasions. In fact the woman expected
force to be used: Brunhild is furious to discover that Gunther was not
man enough to master her by himself. The point of the 12th century cult
of courtly love was to replace rape by seduction, to excite the woman’s
senses until she wants the act as much as the man does. What we take
for granted now in sexual relations was something that had to be
learned. One of the key signs of European culture’s emergence in the 12th century from the age of barbarism it had been plunged into by the fall of Rome was the development of this new, more refined approach to sex.
In
short, the Western cult of love, which seduces women into willingly
indulging in sex, rather than imposing it upon them as their duty to
their lord and keeper, was a transformation of sexual relations which
began in the 12th century. It has given us not only our greatest works
of literature, but the whole ideal of happiness that has ruled our
culture ever since. Despite the centuries long efforts of the Christian
church (and the more recent efforts of feminism) to denigrate it, the
ideal of happiness for Western humanity for the past eight hundred
years has been sexual love. The state of emotional intoxication and
sexual excitement in which a girl will willingly allow herself to be
penetrated for the first time becomes the state of shared exhilaration
which the lovers seek to recapture as often as possible. The emotional
experience of love-making creates the deep bond which then colours the
whole way they relate to each other in their life together. This cult
of love is found in every traditional European folk-tale and popular
story with a happy ending (which means nothing else but a marriage for
love.) The cult continues without much variation from the love-poems of
the troubadours of the 12th century until those of 19th century
romantic poets like Shelley or Browning or Yeats. And of course the
tradition goes on in the popular music of the present, which is
overwhelmingly about love. But from the perspective of most “serious”
literature and art, this whole tradition came to an abrupt end with
twentieth century modernism, and a period of virulent anti-romanticism
set in.
Everything
associated with the naive and innocent illusions of the nineteenth
century, and above all romantic love, was condemned and ridiculed by
the cynical worldly-wise twentieth century, which was determined to
reduce everything to the crudest physical squalor. At first modernists
like T.S. Eliot and James Joyce used the counterpoint of sordid modern
experiences with allusions to the grand passions of the literature of
the past as a way of expressing their contempt for the modern age. But
this modernism was rapidly interpreted by its critics and successors as
a send-up of the past for its unreal romanticism and a gleeful
wallowing in the ugly squalor of the present as the true, gritty
reality. It is in the context of this new modernist cult of cynicism
and crude realism that we have come to see Henry Miller as depicting a
typical twentieth century attitude to sex – one without the romantic
crap. One that simply deals with the meat as meat, the brutal facts of
sex without the hypocritical emotions and false embellishments of
rosewater romanticism. The important thing to grasp from the point of
view of our subject is that this whole modernist development is a
change toward a totally masculine view of sex, that the doing away with
romance is a doing away with the feminine viewpoint and the whole
emotional ritual of romantic foreplay devised to excite the female
imagination. In so far as men typically like hard porn and women like
rosewater romances, the shift in serious literature from nineteenth
century romanticism to twentieth century pornographic crudeness is a
shift from a feminine to a wholly masculine perspective.
13) SEX AS AGGRESSION: MILLER
But
in Henry Miller there is more than just a “cut the crap and let’s fuck”
attitude. There is a consistent representation of the sexual act as
aggression, as a degradation of woman. And there is contempt for the
female because she accepts being fucked and even likes it. Once you
have removed the ritual of romantic courtship – the emotive-affective
approach devised to make sex agreeable to a woman – then her acceptance
of it becomes either a capitulation to male aggression, through
masochism or naive stupidity, or else unabashed, masculine-style sexual
enjoyment. But woman’s unabashed male-style sexual enjoyment tends to
repel Miller: as we saw, she becomes “a lascivious bitch” if she likes
it, while she is a stuck-up, frigid bitch if she doesn’t. In his
contempt for women we can detect an adolescent puritanical inability to
accept women’s sexual appetites – to accept that they actually like
being fucked. Most men at some time or other find it nothing short of
miraculous that women actually like this being done to them. A man
cannot help thinking that what he does to a woman is, on one level, an
act of aggression and domination of an almost sadistic kind. You cannot
shove a stiff thrusting organ into a supine, spread-eagled body without
feeling power over it. The fact that the woman, as you shove into her
with aggressive force, actually groans with pleasure, whispers
endearments, and embraces you tenderly, either inspires feelings of
affection and reciprocal tenderness towards her, or else inspires
contempt for her masochism. Now in Miller’s case it is generally
contempt. Even when the woman is beautiful and desirable he seems
unable to empathize with her feelings, unable to feel that she is
allowing this potentially humiliating thing to be done to her out of a
touching trust in him and his feelings for her. All he sees is a
lascivious slut squirming round his cock, and he despises her. This is
the ultra-male mind at work, the semi-autistic mind, the mind incapable
of empathy, of being affected by the feelings of the woman underneath
him. He sees it all with scientific detachment, which makes the whole
thing humorous, ridiculous, grotesque. Without tenderness and love, the
act becomes a brutal expression of power over another body. That women
should like this at all is astonishing, even comical. That some of them
still pretend to themselves that this animal act expresses love is to
Miller a mind-boggling paradox, an enormous, never-ending cosmic joke.
This
is what gives Miller an obsession with sex – his appalled disgust that
anyone should actually like opening their legs and being penetrated by
a stiff prick, and above all that they should read some bullshit
emotion into this grotesque animal act. Miller cannot get over the
contempt inspired by the submission of a woman to him; and because he
desires women tremendously, this makes sex for him a sort of emotional
conundrum. He will describe the sexual act hundreds of times, because
every time there is an unresolved conflict that he cannot get to the
bottom of: the conflict between his desire to do this, and his contempt
for the woman who allows it to be done to her. He explores the depths
of this contempt and disgust through a relentlessly comic and grotesque
representation of sexual acts. He never describes a woman having sex as
physically desirable or beautiful. What obsesses him is not her beauty
or desirability, but the extraordinary oddity that she should want
this. Not only that she wants his cock, but that she slavers over it,
she squirms with it inside her, she whimpers for more, she begs on her
knees to be fucked. It is in short the masochism of women’s desire that
forever astonishes and fascinates Miller. It is the mind of a man who
is so far from understanding or empathizing with the female personality
that he can only see her behaviour as he would see it if it were a man
doing the same thing – like one of Genet’s prison punks, a grovelling
masochist, submitting to an arrogant, brutal, contemptuous thug. In
Miller heterosexual relations have all the atmosphere of the most
violent prison-house homosexual relations. It has been observed that
male homosexuality is often brutal and sado-masochistic in the Jean
Genet manner because of the absence of a woman, the partner who
traditionally demands tenderness and a simulation of love. Because
Miller’s relations are mostly with cheap prostitutes or local losers,
this simulation of love and tenderness is not required. This makes the
relationships in their essence sado-masochistic – a contemptuous
triumph of arrogant rapist over abject masochist. There are no feminine
emotions present in the sexual acts he describes: no tenderness, no
love, no affection, no delight in being desired, no trust in the
protection of the lover, no ecstasy of surrender. Nor are there any
answering male emotions: tenderness, protectiveness, gratitude, elation
at possession, pride and joy in giving pleasure. There is merely a
detached, hilarious observation of grotesque masochistic submission, a
hedonistic, amused enjoyment not merely of a physical but of a mental
shafting of woman after woman. It is a vision of sex
in which the feminine sensibility, so well understood by Stendhal, has
become an alien world. The ultra-masculine mind of Miller, like that of
most lesbian feminists, simply can’t understand how women can bring
themselves to do it.
Kate Millet, in her ground-breaking 1969 study, Sexual Politics,
sums up Miller’s attitude to women in this way: “since sex defiles the
female, females who consent to sexuality deserve to be defiled as
completely as possible. What he really wants to do is shit on her.” 78
This is harsh, but close to the truth. Unfortunately Kate Millet then
ruins her own critical insights by trying to fit them into the
neo-Marxist feminist theory of “the patriarchy” and its age-old hatred
of women. She claims that Miller’s “most original contribution to
sexual attitudes is confined to giving the first full expression to an
ancient sentiment of contempt.” 79 The whole argument of
her book rests on a belief that this contempt for women has been
universal and constant in history, underneath the pretences and
hypocrisy which “the patriarchy” has at various times resorted to in
order to disguise its oppression. She sees Miller as a traditional, not
a revolutionary figure: “what we observe in his work is a compulsive
heterosexual activity in sharp distinction (but not opposed to) the
kind of cultural homosexuality which has ruled that love, friendship,
affection – all forms of companionship, emotional or intellectual – are
restricted exclusively to males.” 80 Once again this is an
apt comment about Miller – the only problem with it is Kate Millet’s
evident conviction that this “men’s house” mentality is typical of
Western civilization over the past thousand years. Nothing could be
further from the truth. These are the attitudes of ancient Greece and Rome, not the attitudes of Europe since the 12th
century. The idea that “love, friendship, affection” should be
“restricted exclusively to males” would have struck every European
writer on love from Chrétien de Troyes or Chaucer through to Chekhov or
Yeats as incomprehensible nonsense. It would have seemed normal,
however, to Plato or Cicero. It is precisely the influence of the
“men’s house” culture (with its roots in the militaristic societies of
Greece, Rome and Germany) which came to an end in Europe with the
courtly love cult of the 12th century – where women suddenly assumed
centre stage in the European imagination, not merely as sex objects but
as love objects. If we deny the significance of that historic shift, we
make nonsense of eight hundred years of literature devoted
overwhelmingly to the theme of love between the sexes. What we see in
Henry Miller and the new 20th century masculine militarist culture is a
sudden abandonment of this long European tradition of courtly and
romantic love – which sees love between man and woman as the most
important thing in life – and a return to the “men’s house” culture of
ancient Rome – where men are for serious friendships and women are
merely for sex. Miller represents at its baldest the atavism of the
masculine century, product of the merger of American frontier barbarism
and the new militarism of the age of the world wars –
the leaping back over a thousand years of civilization to the sexual
attitudes of a Viking camp or the barracks of a Roman legion.
Miller
often seems unaware of the extent to which he is rejecting the entire
tradition of love of eight hundred years of European civilization. In
passages like the one cited above on the “miracle of love” he pays
lip-service to the idea of love celebrated in the literature of the
Renaissance – but it remains for him a purely abstract idea. There is
an unbridgeable gap between his adolescent literary idealism about love
and the crude, even repulsive physicality of his own experiences. The
moment he strips a real woman naked, his romantic idealism goes out the
window and he begins talking of cunts steaming like manure. He can’t
bring the two together – the abstract idea of love
and the gross physicality of sex. And this again is typical of the male
mind and of extreme masculine attitudes. The masculine mind
compartmentalizes. Idealism about love is in one box, fucking is in
another. But whereas men in the past compartmentalized women themselves
– the angels and the whores, the Sophias and the Mollies, the women you
fell in love with and married and those you just screwed – Miller
compartmentalizes the world into a literary intellectual realm of
idealism and a physical reality of stinking cunt. All real women are
just cunts squirming for it. All real sex is gross. The ideal is
unearthly, ineffable, non-physical – if it is love it must be
unrequited. We can see that the over-masculine world of universal
sexual grossness has within it a puritan streak which leads ultimately
to its opposite – the world of medieval asceticism, rejection of the
flesh as repulsive. The extreme masculine mind is a Saint Augustine,
oscillating between a cynical, gross, exploitative sexuality and a
disgusted renunciation of the flesh for an entirely spiritual life
(from which women are excluded.) The two things – sexual grossness and
asceticism – are different sides of the same
masculine coin. In contrast, it is the feminine mind (whether in a man
or a woman) which idealizes the physical, which transforms sex into
love, which beautifies bodies and blurs the distinction between
physical and spiritual, between human and angel. We can see this in
Bernini’s sublime sculpture, The Ecstasy of St Theresa,
where the saint experiences the divine as a sort of orgasm with the
invisible. Cynics think they are being clever when they snigger that
Bernini’s statue, modelled on his mistress, looks as if she is having
an orgasm. That is precisely what he is trying to convey. It is the
essence of the feminine sensibility to fuse together the sensual and
the spiritual, to live such moments as an emotional intoxication that
envelops both body and mind. Woman at her most feminine has a capacity
beyond that of any man to believe that in her sensual ecstasies she
attains a spiritual realm. She cultivates her own beauty in the belief
that it symbolizes her spirit, that a man who desires her body loves
her soul. The cult of beauty, which is a feminine cult (related to
woman’s greater narcissism), is essentially a belief in the
spirituality of a physical ideal, the belief that physical beauty can
reach such a level of perfection that it transcends the earthly and
becomes almost divine. All feminine art (that is to say, all European
art between 1400 and 1900, created by relatively feminine men) is an
art of beauty, an art that seeks to raise the physical to a peak of
perfection where it becomes a symbol of the divine and takes on
spiritual attributes. And the cult of ugliness in art which
characterizes our time is the greatest testimony to the
over-masculinity of the age, the neurosis of the over-masculine mind
which sees ugliness and repulsiveness everywhere, even in the female
body – which sees even the supreme object of male
desire, the golden bowl of the symbolist poets, as merely “a cunt
steaming like manure”.
Miller
does not represent, then, the culmination of some age-old wicked
“patriarchal” contempt for women. He represents a revolution against
the previous eight hundred years of Western civilization, something
radically new and specific to the twentieth century. He represents a
rejection of the whole literary and cultural idealization of love
between the sexes that began in the 12th century with the cult of
courtly love, continued through the growing European convention that
marriage should be based on love, celebrated by Shakespeare, and
reached a climax in the romantic movement where love prevailed over all
other values including life itself. This cult of love implicitly
recognized the equality of worth of women and men, for the obvious
reason that it would be an absurdity to value above life a union with
an inferior being. And the key to this cult was the imaginative entry
of men into the feminine world, where sensual experiences reach an
intensity beyond the physical, where bodies take on angelic attributes,
where orgasm becomes an emotional surrender to the divine. In short,
where love becomes a path to mystic experience. This feminine capacity
to spiritualize sexual relations, because the extreme of physical and
emotional pleasure becomes an experience of spiritual transcendence, is
precisely what Miller denies and rejects in his new cult of sex without
the crap. Miller brutally rejects women’s specific sexual sensibility
and insists on her accepting sex on male terms – an aggressive shafting
to which the slut must submit, thereby proving she is a slut. “The ugly
reality of the sexual assault” must be rammed down her throat or up her
asshole to squelch the last drivelling delusions that there is any
spirituality or idealism or poetry in this animal act. And she must be
made to like it, and accept the fact that when she likes it she is a
whore and when she doesn’t she is a stuck-up neurotic bitch. This is
the new atmosphere Miller brings into sexual relations in the twentieth
century. It is the atmosphere not merely of pornography (which has long
existed in various shapes and forms) but of aggressive slut-pornography
– the pornography of gang-bang and brutal degradation.
Now
whores have existed in all ages, and may partly correspond (as Fielding
suggests in his description of the tomboyish Molly) to the reality of a
small percentage of girls who have masculine sex drives and are capable
of enjoying casual sex with large numbers of men. But never until
Miller were all women reduced to the status of whores by a major
writer. There is of course in this age no longer a division of women
into the virginal ladies you fall in love with and marry, and the crude
whores you shag – Fielding’s Sophia and Molly. In the 20th
century, with the sexual liberation brought about by the wars, the two
categories become one. But in Miller, instead of this leading to a
recognition of the multi-faceted nature of women’s sexual feelings –
their need for sex, but their need also for the emotional
superstructure of love and sentiment – it leads merely to a treatment
of all women as whores. Love and sentiment become a form of
contemptible sham or humbug with which these bitches disguise from
themselves their desire to be shafted into a coma. Sophia becomes
merely a hypocritical, sanctimonious little prick-teaser: underneath
she’s a Molly, and the sooner she is given a good seeing-to to convince
her of this fact the better. This is the real revolution in sexual
attitudes that Miller represents in its starkest form. It is a
masculinization of sexual attitudes until the feminine half of sexual
feelings has disappeared without trace. Miller represents the total
triumph of the masculine approach to sex, the abandonment and eclipse
of the long Western tradition of sex in the feminine (known as love)
which was the main theme of Western literature between the twelfth
century and the early twentieth. It remains to be seen how total or
permanent this eclipse is.
14) SEX AS WAR : NORMAN MAILER
Henry Miller’s attitudes have now become so standard in the West that it is hard to grasp how
recent and revolutionary they are. The entire culture of pornography
that has developed across the Western world in the last thirty years –
becoming the biggest entertainment industry on earth – has reinforced
trillion-fold the same image of woman as disposable fucking machine
that Miller first brought into serious literature. His crude cynicism
towards sex and his contempt for women as sluts have now become the
default male attitudes of the locker room and the stag party. This does
not mean men are no longer capable of love or the tenderest feelings
towards women: merely that they have to keep these feelings a secret
from other men, because the locker room “men’s house” mentality, of
crude aggressive exploitation of the female, is now the only one they
acknowledge among themselves. But the same thing has now occurred more
recently in the attitudes of women to men. A similar female locker room
mentality has also developed, seen in the male strip shows for
women-only audiences, where hordes of women grovel on their knees to
suck a male stripper’s cock. What Miller’s work reflected in the mid-20th
century was the mismatch or time-lag between a generation of sexually
cynical, exploitative, hardboiled men (product of war, Depression, and
social dislocation) and their female contemporaries, still mostly under
the spell of love and romance, or passively accepting sexual
exploitation. It is from this mismatch that much of his humour comes,
as men simply fuck while women imagine they are making love. But the
mismatch could not last. The sexual revolution meant that this male
capacity for detached cynicism was imitated by women. With the arrival
of women’s liberation in the late sixties female writers such as Erica
Jong jumped on the Miller bandwagon by masculinizing sexual relations
for women too and reducing them to a matter of impersonal meat.
Sexually “liberated” women ceased to see the sexual act as a surrender
to the male appetite (for reasons of affection) and began to see it as
a demand for a male performance (for reasons of pleasure.) Jong’s quest
for “the zipless fuck” and her view of the male as simply a walking
prick are clearly imitations of her idol Miller’s quest for an
impersonal “cold fuck” and his conception of woman as merely a walking
cunt. As a new generation of Western and above all American women
followed men down the masculine path and adopted a masculine
aggressiveness, the sexual relationship between men and women became
one of competition, challenge and pressure to perform of a ruthless and
often hostile kind. This is the world depicted by Norman Mailer. But
Mailer goes all the way to the logical end of this path. As the
man-woman relationship becomes dominated (for both sexes) by masculine
competitiveness and aggressiveness rather than feminine affection and
tenderness, the ultimate expression of this relationship is hatred,
violence, and even murder.
Norman
Mailer’s attitudes to sex and women cannot be separated from his
attitudes to violence and manhood, the chief obsessions of all his
work. It is useful to look for a moment at what created these
obsessions. Mailer was a clever Jewish boy who went to Harvard at
sixteen, and soon after graduating went into the army in a Texas
regiment and took part in the war in the Pacific, which he finished as
a sergeant. He came out of it, paradoxically, not confidently assured
that he had passed the definitive test of his manhood, but obsessed
with proving it again and again for the rest of his life. When Mailer
is not writing of competitive sexual marathons, he is writing of tests
of courage – in war, in boyhood cliff-climbing, in the boxing-ring, in
street-fighting, in barroom encounters with thugs, in living in
dangerous neighbourhoods, in screwing dangerously connected women, in
cat and mouse interviews between a murder suspect and menacing, violent
policemen. The whole of his oeuvre concerns tests of nerve or of
manhood of one sort or another. He freely admits this obsession.
Looking back on his earlier years, he confides : “By the time The Deer Park was
published, I had come to recognize that I was concerned with living in
Hemingway’s discipline”, that he shared with Hemingway the realization
that “even if one dulled one’s talent in the punishment of becoming a
man, it was more important to be a man than to be a very good writer,
that probably I could not become a very good writer unless I learned
first how to keep my nerve, and what is more difficult, learned how to
find more of it.” 81 One is tempted to wonder why a war
veteran of thirty-two (as he was at the time referred to) should still
be so belatedly bent on “becoming a man”. Most men would feel this
process was over by the age of thirty-two, whatever the results, and
would turn their attention to other things than keeping their nerve and
finding more of it. Perhaps he tries to answer this question when he
tells us elsewhere that his mentor Hemingway was a man who “struggled
with his cowardice and against a secret lust to suicide all of his
life.” He adds: “There are two kinds of brave men: those who are brave
by the grace of nature and those who are brave by an act of will” and
concludes that Hemingway was the second kind. 82 No doubt
he intended these remarks to refer also to himself. It suggests that
the war experience by which the brainy Jewish boy from Harvard became a
tough sergeant in a Texas
regiment was so harrowing that it marked him for life. He had to keep
doing this one thing, finding his nerve, over and over again. Mailer is
the epitome of the twentieth century obsession with masculinity – an
obsession imposed by an ultra-masculine, militarist culture even on men
not naturally endowed with any great bravery or virility of character,
but an obsession from which they seem unable to escape.
In
Mailer, men’s relations with women are therefore seen almost entirely
through the prism of challenge to manhood and competitive response to
the challenge. Women in his world appear as tests to be passed, or
opponents to be defeated, not as pleasures to be enjoyed. This accounts
for the peculiar tensions of fear and aggression that run through these
relationships. There are in his books no feminine women who fall in
love with a man and simply want to be loved (the one or two that come
closest are treated as problems, because they don’t represent trophies
to parade before other men, and are neurotically dependent and
troublesome to get rid of.) Women that are worth having are seen as
defiant, teasing, challenging the man’s virility, his implicit claims
to sexual prowess, with a hard cold character which mirrors his own
aggressive instincts. One finds in relationships in Mailer all the
complex resentment which the raising of the 20th century male to
war-hero status has inspired in Anglo-Saxon women: “OK, so you’re the
hero, let’s see you prove it.” Mailer’s typical woman character demands
to be shown proofs of the man’s courage and virility at every turn. She
often puts him in situations where he may be threatened with a beating
or knifing by a stronger man, just so she can see if he has what it
takes. On the level of sex, the virility test is at its most obvious:
how long can he keep it up? Sex is depicted as a physical and
psychological contest between the man striving to make the woman come
through marathons of fucking, and the woman’s resistance to coming,
which is always equated with a stubborn refusal to surrender to him.
(The idea that it might be a problem of vaginal insensitivity or a need
for more clitoral stimulation does not seem to occur to him: the latter
would perhaps be seen as cheating.) The heroine of An American Dream,
a girl named Cherry (slang for virginity, just to ram home the point)
is a night-club singer who has never come with a man inside her until
the hero, Rojack (nicknamed Raw-jock), manages the feat. He becomes her
conqueror, earning his right to possession through penile prowess,
almost like a knight in the lists. Mailer’s obsession with the notion
of a woman’s surrender to the man’s virile power by having a vaginal
orgasm is the key to the transformation of sex into a contest, a
struggle for dominance. (Because of the importance of this concept in
Mailer, we will use the term “vaginal orgasm” for convenience to mean
an orgasm purely from fucking, without manual stimulation of the
clitoris – even if this is not what many people mean by it.) In
Mailer’s view, a woman who doesn’t come in this fashion hasn’t been
tamed and mastered by the man. Such a man is a failure in her eyes and
in his own: he is not man enough to deserve her. In this way the
complexities of human emotional relationships are all reduced to the
one simple test: is your cock up to it? Love itself becomes a mere
matter of testosterone and erectile function.
But
Mailer has not invented this world. It is the world he sees around him,
or the one he chooses to move in. It is a world where the slightest
gesture of tenderness, affection or humanity is almost unknown. It is
the world of New York’s mean streets, dominated by ruthless gangs, and of Greenwich Village
bars where the pick-up scene is driven by competitive sexual
exploitation. It is a world of brutality, violence and perpetual
menace. The epitome of Mailer may be found in his short story, “The
Time of her Time”. In it the narrator, a regular Mailer character
called Sergius O’Shaunessy, a tall blond Irishman (just so as to create
the illusion of fictional distance from the short Jewish author), has a
relationship with a Jewish student. Sergius lives in a Village loft
where he improbably gives bull-fighting lessons (shades of you know
who) and spends his evenings picking up girls. The area he lives in is
a dangerous borderland between gangs of blacks and gangs of Puerto
Ricans. When he talks with a friend in a bar about his bull-fighting
school and the latter admires his ability to take care of himself in a
fight, he has to be careful not to boast, so as not to arouse the
antagonism of three big black gangsters sitting nearby, who are
sullenly eyeing him. Danger is everywhere. He tells of a knife-fighter,
an ex-army instructor, who bragged in every local bar of his
knife-fighting skill, till he was finally challenged one night on the
way home by a Puerto Rican knife-fighter who had heard about him.
Hopelessly drunk but unable to refuse the fight, the army man loses
badly. But this is not a question of physical wounds, which can be
healed. There is a permanent wound to his pride, his reputation, and he
goes downhill rapidly into chronic drunkenness. He has lost the bout of
his life, the one challenge that counted. Sergius recalls similarly a
boxing match he lost in the Air Force – the one fight he can never
forget. This is a world where men’s honour and sense of worth depend on
rising to the challenge and winning. It is against this background that
we are introduced to the sexual challenge presented to Sergius by the
Jewish girl. We are implicitly warned that it too will have existential
importance.
The
Jewish girl, like many others before her, has heard from girl friends
about Sergius’ sexual prowess and has decided to try him out. He for
his part is provoked by her sexually not because she attracts him but
because she irritates him profoundly with her pretentious literary
chatter, and sex is a way of putting her down. Now this is a peculiar
notion to start with, one reinforced by Sergius’ nickname for his tool,
the Avenger. Why he should see fucking a girl as a punishment for her
snobbery and intellectual pretentiousness rather than a reward for it
is not made clear. It has echoes of Miller’s notion of sex as a means
of degrading a woman rather than giving her pleasure. But whereas
Miller degrades a woman by fucking her with total disregard for her own
pleasure, Mailer-Sergius can only degrade her adequately if he makes
her come and thereby conquers her with a masterful demonstration of his
phallic might. We have moved on from the Miller stage where sex itself
humiliates a woman; now only making her come (with no hands) humiliates
her. Fucking thus becomes a kind of caning, with orgasm as a substitute
for tears. If she survives a marathon rogering without coming, she has
won, like a boy enduring a caning without crying. If she comes, her
sexual satisfaction is inseparable from an emotional sense of defeat
and subjugation.
Needless
to say, the Jewish girl is a hard nut to crack. After valiant efforts
for an hour, Sergius fails by a minute or two to bring her to orgasm
and goes off into his own. He feels a “murderous” resentment because
she “had fled the domination that was liberty for her” in refusing to
come. She angrily curses him as selfish and incompetent for coming too
soon. But her insults, instead of provoking him to throw her out, only
stoke his competitive urge. She finally confesses that she has never
come from fucking; her boyfriend brings her off orally – obviously a
wimpish cop-out. This news makes Sergius determined to become the first
to give her an orgasm by fucking, because this experience will remain
in her memory forever. It seems oddly important for him to be
remembered by this girl forever, considering how much he dislikes her.
Again it suggests that the memory is related to defeating her soundly,
giving her a thrashing she will never forget, rather than giving her
pleasure. He is convinced over their next two encounters that she is
almost ready, she is about to enter “the time of her time” of the title
– the moment of her first vaginal orgasm from fucking alone. It is a
sort of biological urge to be the first inside her at that crucial
moment which outweighs his dislike for her as a person. He views giving
her her first vaginal orgasm as a bit like putting his permanent brand
on her; it is too sadistically satisfying to forego. He thinks of it as
being “her psychic bridegroom”, leading her “down the walk of her real
wedding night”. And adds: “Since she did not like me, what a feat to
pull it off.” 83
When
she shows up at their last rendez-vous, she reveals that she has just
been with her boyfriend in the sack, and the thought of his juices
inside her excites Sergius. “The worst of it was, this quickened me
more.” To such an extent that he ejaculates after half a minute. She is
unexpectedly nice about this catastrophic failure, which takes him back
mentally to his disastrous defeat in a key boxing match in his Air
Force days. She performs fellatio to get him back on his feet, so to
speak, and he goes into her again, this time with cold calculation,
like a metronome. He “threw her a fuck the equivalent of a fifteen
round fight.” She comes close, but not close enough. He then withdraws
for a moment, turns her over on her belly, and enters her anus.
“Holding her prone against the mattress with the strength of my weight,
I drove into the seat of all stubbornness, tight as a vise, and I
wounded her, I knew it, she thrashed beneath me like a trapped little
animal, making not a sound, but fierce not to allow me this last of the
liberties, and yet caught, forced to give up millimeter by millimeter
the bridal ground of her symbolic and therefore real vagina.” 84
The result is a sort of mini-orgasm, which gives him the clue she is
now ready for the big one, which he duly delivers into her vagina,
whispering at the crucial moment: “You dirty little Jew”, which
“whipped her over” the top. She has her orgasm, “she was loose in the
water for the first time in her life” and she ends up sobbing: “Oh
Jesus, I made it.” After gratefully whispering “was it good for you
too?” she falls into the sleep of the soundly thrashed. Only when she
awakens is there hatred in her glare. She gets dressed, shooting at
him: “That was a lousy thing you did last night.” Presumably it was the
anal rape she disapproved of, even though it seems to have done the
trick. Her hatred is unleashed by her parting shot, a remark made by
her analyst about Sergius (whom she has apparently described to him): “He told me your whole life is a lie and you do nothing but run away from the homosexual that is you.” Sergius concludes:
And
like a real killer she did not look back, and was out the door before I
could rise to tell her that she was a hero fit for me. 85
This
story encapsulates the loveless struggle between aggressive egos that
sexual relations have become in the new ultra-masculine world of
Mailer’s America.
Sex has become for both partners a challenging, competitive sport, a
bit like playing tennis: you don’t have to like your partners, you just
have to be determined to thrash them – to “make a notch in them” as the
girl says at the end. For Sergius to actually find this disagreeable
girl a “hero fit for me” is the final irony. He admires her for her
killer instinct, for using every means she can to destroy him after he
has symbolically broken her by making her come. He admires her fighting
spirit, the way a matador might admire a spirited bull. Sex has become
identical to war, where only one’s most aggressive opponents earn a
grudging respect.
Now
relations between men and women in previous centuries were also
sometimes characterized by a spirit of antagonism, with varying degrees
of playfulness. Shakespeare’s Beatrice and Benedict are the classic
couple who court each other through contests of hostile wit and sarcasm
– because they are too proud to admit their attraction to each other.
Sometimes too there was a convention in which the woman defied and
challenged the man, who had to engage in some sort of symbolic conquest
of her (perhaps by heroic feats, or by beating her in an athletic
contest, as in the Nibelungenlied.) If one looks at a Spanish
flamenco dance, the ritual of courtship displayed is one of female
defiance and male conquest through a display of fancy footwork – a more
spirited version of the Russian ballet, where the pattern is one of
female flight and male pursuit. But it was generally understood, over
the last few centuries at any rate, that once the couple came together
and agreed to their union – whether marriage or a clandestine affair –
sex itself would be conducted in a fairly amicable spirit, accompanied
by caresses, endearments and a desire to bring pleasure to the other.
As we have seen, the whole tradition of love over the past eight hundred
years, from the twelfth century cult of courtly love through to the
romantic movement, has sought to surround sexual intercourse with an
atmosphere of tenderness and mutual affection, designed to render the
act pleasurable for women as well as men. (This was at any rate the
cultural ideal, whatever the individual failures to live up to it.) It
is only in the last third of the 20th century that we have seen the
emergence of a conception of sexual intercourse (other than
prostitution) as a kind of wrestling match between opponents, devoid of
tenderness or affection, but characterized by a spirit of cool
competition in the achievement of an athletic result. This is the image
we see in most porn movies, and it became a major paradigm of late-20th
century sex. What this represents of course is sex on extreme masculine
terms, but with both sexes, not just the male, now participating in the
aggressive masculine ethos. It is as though women, brought up now on a
diet of pornography, have caught up with Henry Miller’s heroes and
readily accept the masculine idea of sex as an unemotional gymnastic
exercise. They no longer feel demeaned by this conception of sex, as
Miller’s female characters sometimes did, but take it as something
normal. But this means that the sexual act, with its aspect of a
wrestling match, more closely resembles a combat than an act of love.
And if sex expresses aggression rather than tenderness,
then aggression also becomes the ritual that defines the relationship
in which it takes place. Sex no longer brings a quarrelling couple
together in a renewal of their love, but becomes the focus and outlet
of their hostility to each other.
The
ultimate expression of this hostility between the sexes is rape and
murder. Mailer has a soft spot for rape, especially the anal rape of a
half-frigid woman. His determination to force anal sex on a reluctant
woman is repeated in the extraordinary sex-scene between Rojack and the
German maid after he has just murdered his wife in An American Dream.
Again, the final trigger of orgasm is an insult, this time not “You
dirty little Jew” but (in an apparent display of political eclecticism)
“You’re a Nazi.” 86 Some grounds for degrading the woman
must be found, but it is interesting to note that it is the woman’s
orgasm that is triggered by this insult, not the man’s. It appears that
the acceptance of an insult, the submission to degradation and
humiliation, is essential to the woman’s surrender to the “domination
that is liberty for her” – the release of vaginal orgasm. Degradation
is, in this view, an inherent part of woman’s sexual functioning. But
this makes her naturally resent an act which, even if it satisfies her
sexually, involves her emotional subjugation. In “The Time of her Time”
the Jewish girl’s achievement of orgasm, because it was brought about
by a brutal, loveless act, provokes not affection but resentment and
hatred towards her partner the next morning. This entire relationship
is conceived of in aggressive terms. Sergius’ attraction to the girl is
simply an urge to dominate, made clear in expressions like: “grind it
into her”, “lay waste to her little independence.” But the aggression
goes deeper. Because the whole relationship between the sexes is one of
domination, aggression, and violent resentment, Mailer ultimately fears
woman as a killer. She fights back against the sado-masochistic
humiliation of the sex act by undermining his virility whenever she
can, questioning his courage, pushing him into danger to test him, and
above all by using the jealousy and possessiveness he may feel for her
as a weapon to humiliate him in his turn. Thus Deborah, the powerfully
built, domineering wife in An American Dream, provokes her
estranged husband by telling him about the three lovers she has had
since he left, who were all better than him. We are asked to believe
that this petty act of verbal cruelty was what drove him to kill her –
starting with a slap, which provoked a wild wrestling match in which he
finally strangled her. This insult is apparently the reflection of a
far deeper blow to his pride as a man, to his very identity as a
heterosexual male. This is at any rate what Rojack tells the police
afterwards: “What does a wife ever accuse a husband of? She tells him
one way or another that he’s not man enough for her.” 88
Not
man enough for her. This is the idea that haunts Mailer. It forms the
central theme of his entire oeuvre. He suffers acutely from the
appalling situation of the artist in an over-masculine age. The male
artist frequently has a feminine aspect (which in the case of a writer
gives him his mastery of words and his sensitivity to mood, atmosphere,
others’ feelings), but this aspect the masculinized mid-20th
century American woman no longer respects or relates to. Unlike
Stendhal’s heroines who are attracted to poetic, relatively feminine
young men, Mailer’s mannish heroines (Deborah in An American Dream
is as strong as an ox) expect a man to be a walking ball of
testosterone and are ready at any moment to jeer at him if he isn’t. He
must therefore be constantly at war with himself, striving to preserve
his sensitivity for the sake of his art, while he is forced to crush it
for the sake of getting laid. The result is the odd persona of nearly
all his heroes: tough-guy types with a sensitive streak inside which
they have to conceal. They are all the time playing at being macho hard
men and scared of being found out. And what seems to be behind Mailer’s
rage is that woman, who ought to be the one creature he can open up to
and show his vulnerability to, is by far the most relentless inquisitor
into his weakness, watching for some advantage over him, ready to tear
him to pieces if she sees a chink in his male armour. Every woman in
Mailer’s fiction delights in putting her man in danger of death so she
can see whether he squirms. Even the dream-girl Cherry pushes Rojack
into dangerous confrontations with a boxer thug and a knife-wielding
ex-lover. If he fails to measure up, the woman stands ready to accuse
the hero not just of being a coward but of being a faggot. And the
harder he tries to be the opposite of faggish, the more she seems to
suspect him and to watch him for some sign of it. Sex in this situation
is not just an endless performance under hostile scrutiny: every
sex-act is a life and death defence of his identity as a man. Mailer
writes of Hemingway as being engaged in a constant day-to-day struggle
to prove his courage: “he struggled with his cowardice and against a
secret lust to suicide all of his life…. Each time his physical vanity
suffered a defeat, he would be forced to embark on a new existential
gamble with his life.”89 Mailer later
justifies a boxer who beats to death an opponent who had called him a
faggot, because it was the only way of proving he was not one: it was
either that or actually become a homosexual.90 This bizarre
logic suggests a mind unnaturally obsessed with the struggle to be
masculine, not merely in the sense of physical courage but also in the
sense of sexual potency and even heterosexual identity. In this curious
sexual-existential struggle, a failure of the glands becomes a failure
of the soul, an affair of suicidal gravity. Rather than accept this
destruction of one’s maleness, one must ultimately kill. Mailer’s world
is like a violent American prison, where there are only two choices:
become a castrated sexual slave to other men, or become a killer. But
the adversary Mailer’s hero is faced with, whom he must kill to
survive, is in the most revealing of his novels a woman. And because he
kills her to survive psychically, to destroy a mortal threat to his
virility, he feels absolutely no remorse for her murder. After killing
the wife he claimed still to love, Rojack goes into the next room and
shags the maid.
But
not only does murder awaken no remorse: it even has an erotic glamour.
Cherry, the new girl-friend, recognizes that Rojack is a killer because
he has the same look of radiance as a gangster she once saw who had
just killed another: “like he’d been painted with a touch of magic.” 91 That Mailer appears seriously to believe this – the
wonderful liberating and transforming effect of murder – is not the
least disturbing aspect of his work. These sentiments might be shared
by an SS camp guard: killing is satisfying, it liberates you from
shallow and inhibiting moral taboos and gives you a magical glow that
makes you irresistible to women. Cherry seems overjoyed that her lover
is a murderer; it confirms the rightness of her choice of a real man.
The idea that a human life has some absolute value and that taking life
is breaking a moral taboo does not seem to cross Mailer’s mind. Even
Deborah’s own rich Mafioso father at the end of An American Dream
appears rather pleased that his daughter was murdered and comes close
to congratulating his son-in-law for doing it. What is disturbing is
that these attitudes to the murder of a woman are not subject to any
commentary, judgement or critical distance on the part of the author:
he appears to share the amorality of his characters. Compare the flood
of remorse that follows the jealous murder of an unfaithful woman by
her husband in Tolstoy’s The Kreutzer Sonata. Despite his
passionate, fanatical denunciation of women, Tolstoy’s neurotic hero is
overwhelmed, like Othello, by the realization of the horror of what he
has done. Of course the lack of remorse may be a subject in itself –
but only if the author appears to be aware of it as an aberration, or
at least something worth looking at. Camus in L’Etranger
focuses on the peculiar detached attitude of the murderer towards his
crime as a sort of modern disease of the spirit, a psychological crisis
of a man in his relation to his own acts. But Mailer appears simply not
to notice that there might be something wrong with the act of murder in
the first place.
But
Mailer goes further than merely justifying murder as a necessary act of
psychic self-defence against a ball-breaking woman. He even endows it
with a spiritual significance as a means of self-development, rather
like yoga. In his definition of the new philosophy of Hip, he is
explicit on this: “Hip is the affirmation of the
barbarian…. it takes literal faith in the creative possibilities of the
human being to envisage acts of violence as the catharsis that prepares
growth.” 94 It is this that seems to lie behind the totally amoral representation of murder in his novels – whether that of Deborah in An American Dream or the Japanese prisoner in The Naked and the Dead. For
Mailer the violation of the moral taboo against murder becomes simply
one more proof of virility, of a mastery of the self – and of a hard,
clear-sighted affirmation of the Darwinian laws of survival: kill or be
killed. So closely does Mailer associate the instinct of violence with
simple good health, that he even believes that to repress violent
impulses may cause cancer. In one of his poems, a man who represses the
impulse to strike his mother (after murdering his wife) feels the fatal
cancer starting in his cells at that moment. All that seems to matter
to Mailer is whether the act of violence fulfils the individual’s
needs. All notions of morality, law, social responsibility or the
rights of others are so many contemptible bourgeois constraints on the
total self-expression of the individual. Mailer’s attitudes are close
to those of a psychopathic criminal. It is his own psychopathic streak
that gives him his insight into the mind of the killer Gary Gilmore in
his greatest book, The Executioner’s Song. Gilmore has become a
prisoner of his own myth: the American rebel, the violent convict whom
all respect, but who can only keep that respect by dealing out violence
when it is expected, who must kill to avenge a slight to his honour.
Survival in the prison world depends on the willingness to kill when
insulted or challenged; that morality outside the prison walls is what
makes a homicidal maniac. After a gratuitous, wilful rampage of
killings, Gilmore is condemned to death and fights a legal battle to
get the death sentence carried out. His obsession with death, a
death-wish filled with vague supernatural expectations of the
afterlife, is another theme that touches a chord with Mailer. The
daring of death is a compulsion to him. He no sooner thinks of some way
of risking death than he feels a compulsion to do it, in order to
appease the god who rewards the valorous and punishes wimps. In An American Dream
this includes a compulsion by the hero to walk around a balcony parapet
of a high building. If he fails to complete the tour of the parapet, he
feels something terrible will happen to his girlfriend. This voodoo
belief is borne out by the novel; she is in fact found dead because he
ducked this challenge to his courage. This sort of belief would be
comical if it were not so disturbing in a talented and influential
writer.
Mailer
represents the high-water mark of the aggressive, over-masculinized
concept of sexual relations as a form of competition, combat and
conquest – leading ultimately to a linking of sex with violence and
murder. Since his generation there has been a movement away from these
attitudes by most younger writers of literary pretensions, who treat
love and sex in a more normal way. The younger generation of British
novelists in particular treat relationships in a sensitive, complex
fashion, with an ability to understand both male and female viewpoints,
and a fairly normal conception of happiness in the couple, and of what
was traditionally called love. Their work reflects the difficulties of
negotiating both the sexual and the feminist revolutions and the
emotional traumas of infidelity, jealousy, divorce, separation from
one’s children, and all the problems and sorrows as well as the comedy
and absurdity of life in couples (or out of them) as we know it. These
novelists, both male and female, show a movement away from the
ultra-masculine ethos of the war generation, and reflect the more
feminine conceptions both of sex and the human personality which formed
part of the “love and peace” current of the counter-culture of the
1960’s and 1970’s. In America
the situation is more complex. The culture of hard, tough, masculine
attitudes is more deeply ingrained, and finds an expression in an
opposite current of the counter-culture : the masculinization of sexual
relations into something purely casual and impersonal, the reduction of
sex to meat, represented by Erica Jong, whose quest for the “zipless
fuck” is taken straight from Henry Miller. It is in fact more often
American women writers than men writers who are now stuck in the
ultra-masculine mode, the obsession with virility, and the crude
objectification of sex. Among males there has been no school of serious
writers following in Mailer’s wake. But the Mailer strain of
sado-masochism, of sex as violence and relationships as war, has not
gone away. It has merely moved to other media such as the cinema, or
down-market popular fiction. In cinema and television we see an endless
rehashing of the Mailer conception of sex as an aggressive,
competitive, sado-masochistic power game, often with the woman in the
dominant role. The film Basic Instinct became famous for
breaking new ground in showing a woman practising sex as a cold,
detached, sado-masochistic power trip. The whole thrill of the movie is
to know whether her sado-masochistic urges go as far as murdering her
lovers with an ice pick after orgasm – and we are still left guessing
at the end. Hollywood has interpreted feminism as a glorification of woman’s capacity for violence and
for associating sex with sadomasochism, just like a man. Women on
killing sprees are seen as liberated figures. The television series Sex in the City
reduces sex not so much to physical sadomasochism but to various mental
power-games and ways of exploiting the partner. A series aimed largely
at female viewers, it cannot be called feminist in any serious sense,
since the women characters are all airheads obsessed with men and
fashion. But it reflects what might be called “gutter feminism”, the
kind that is now prevalent in the women’s magazines, where men are
regarded as objects of consumption of various kinds. The male objects
may be trophy husbands, success objects, sperm providers, providers of
therapeutic support, housekeepers, or sex objects (to be exploited like
prize bulls and then thrown away, in a vindictive parody of male sexual
consumerism.) But what every episode has in common is the using of
people by other people, and generally (since it is about women friends)
the using of men by women. No relationship is spontaneous or the result
of a genuine emotion: they are all merely the carrying out of plans,
the attainment of objectives, and human beings are mere instruments in
the selfish calculations of others. What we see in American films today
is a constant raising of the stakes as men and women compete in the
sexual exploitation of each other in more and more ruthless ways – including
performance sex not merely as an athletic contest but as a means of
power over another human being. There is less and less evidence of any
sensual enjoyment of sex, and more and more a shift to sado-masochistic
exploitation of sex for mental and psychological domination of another.
This in itself shows how completely all relationships now take place on
masculine psychological terrain, where sex is a mind-game and a
power-trip, an affair of competition, conquest and ego, not an affair
of the senses, the soul or the emotions. In this world of female clones
of men, the feminine half of human nature has simply disappeared from
the radar screen of popular American culture.
The
pornography industry addressed largely to men has moved similarly onto
the terrain of violence and domination, with the sexual act being more
and more associated with aggression, punishment, humiliation, and
revenge upon the woman, for no other reason than that she is
attractive. This reflects the element of resentment and anger contained
in male sexual frustration. The consumer of pornography is almost by
definition a sexually frustrated man or adolescent, whose inability to
find sexual partners leads to rage against women, and fantasies of
revenge for the endless frustration and teasing arousal he has
suffered. Since the pornography-addict’s frustration is a kind of
hunger amid plenty – there are lots of pretty, sexy girls around but
none of them want sex with him – these fantasies often take the form of
a conviction that the seeming innocence and lack of sexual interest of
a young girl hides a secret lustfulness on her part. Hence the male
porn actor must “sock it to her” in order to demonstrate that her
innocence is sham, she is really a slut, and after a vigorous enough
shafting will soon be moaning and begging for more. The helplessness of
the sexually frustrated male must be exorcised by a fantasy of conquest
of the teasing unattainable female, in which he transforms her into a
sexual slave. The sequence of sexual tease by a woman, who feigns lack
of interest or scorn for the male even while flaunting her body before
him, followed by an act of aggressive sex in which the man takes his
revenge, is standard fare. The strip tease as entertainment plays with
this same range of sexual feelings : the exciting of male lust by a
tantalizing display of the woman’s physical charms while taunting him
that she is unattainable and not for him. This creates an atmosphere of
simmering male resentment, so that desire fuses with a smouldering,
violent lust for revenge. Every sexy woman is assimilated to the image
of the teasing stripper and becomes the object of a poisonous mixture
of desire and aggressive hatred. Because of the massive commercial
exploitation of male sexual frustration, the vast pornography industry
has unleashed upon the world a flood of images associating sex with a
violent urge for revenge on women. This is having a serious impact on
sexual attitudes in our age and how men and women relate to each other.
Civil
libertarians grotesquely defend the selling of gang-bang porn to
teenagers, and pretend that this has “no proven connection” with the
epidemic of adolescent gang rape in many Western cities. To deny that
this is having an effect on the young, or that there is any correlation
between the rise of gang rape as an adolescent pastime in the immigrant
housing projects of France and the universal availability to children
of gang-bang porn videos, is simply to deny common sense. It would be
like pretending that the flooding of the market with graphic
incitements to racial violence had no connection with acts of racial
violence. Imagine if someone argued there is no proof that a constant
diet of racist videos – showing blacks being lynched by whites or
whites by blacks – makes anyone a racist. Yet that is exactly what they
claim of violent, gang-bang sex videos. Of course watching racist
videos does not make the average white person rush out and kill a
black, or vice versa. But it will contribute to the state of mind which
makes some people do it when the circumstances arise which allow them
to. In the same way, watching gang-bang porn does not drive the average
boy out onto the street to rape the first girl he meets. But it will
have an effect on general attitudes to women, which will play a key
role in the spontaneous decisions of the individuals who do rape when
the opportunity arises.
The huge influence of pornography on our society, its infiltration
of everything from mainstream films to television to advertising to night club
entertainment to dance styles, can only be having a negative effect on the way
human beings conduct their sexual relationships. Increasingly sexual relations
in the real world are seen as a pale shadow of the pornographic fantasy world,
and couples begin to imitate pornography to spice up their relationship. But
this is a form of poison that can only undermine it in the long term. The
increase in the element of power, aggression, teasing, and domination in sexual
relations, the reduction of sex to a gymnastic exercise of a competitive kind, and the absence of any emotion except a selfish demand for an
efficient technical servicing by the other, is not likely to increase the
harmony or stability of couples. It can only lead to short-term sexual
consumerism. It is the feminine impulses of tenderness and fidelity that are
the cement of human relationships. The sex act is the ritual that defines what
the relationship is about. When sex becomes a playact of aggression, of a
gymnastic combat, then this repeated combat becomes the paradigm of the
relationship. When sex is an expression of the tenderness and love between two
people, then this love becomes the pattern of their relationship. The
masculinization of sexual relations today, as aggression prevails over
tenderness, has probably contributed greatly to the instability of marriage relationships, the
collapse of the family and a disastrous fall in birth-rates, which may in the
long term threaten the cohesiveness and even the survival of our civilization.
The attitudes to sex contained in Mailer’s work have
therefore had a huge afterlife in the popular entertainment industry. The
introduction of violence into sex (not of course Mailer's invention but given a
certain legitimacy by his prestige as a serious writer) has become a permanent
pollution of our cultural environment.
But equally important has been the introduction of sex into violence. Whatever
the early efforts of the Marquis de Sade in this domain, never until
the mid twentieth century had the casual gangster murder or the anonymous
killing in war been assimilated to a sexual act. Here again Mailer played a pioneer
role in making a new junction of sensuality and violence respectable. Look at
this description in the 1964 An American
Dream of the hero’s attack on a German machine-gun nest, for which he was
decorated.
And then the barrel of my carbine swung
round … and pointed … where a great bloody sweet German face, a healthy spoiled
overspoiled young beauty of a face, mother love all over its making, possessor
of that overcurved mouth which only great fat sweet young faggots can have when
their rectum is tuned and entertained from adolescence on, came crying,
sliding, smiling up over the edge of the hole, “Hello death!” blood and mud
like the herald of sodomy upon his chest, and I pulled the trigger as if I were
squeezing the softest breast of the softest pigeon which ever flew, still a
woman’s breast takes me now and then to the pigeon on that trigger, and the
shot cracked like a birch twig across my palm, whop! and the round went in at the base of his nose and spread and
I saw his face sucked in backward upon the gouge of the bullet, he looked
suddenly like an old man, toothless, sly, reminsicent of lechery. Then he
whispered “Mutter,” one yelp from the
first memory of the womb, and down he went into his own blood…. 95
Now
this is not grim realism representing the true horrors of war. It is a sensual
revelling in a moment of power and destruction of life, filled with obscene,
fantasied hatred for another human being. There is the soft, caressing of the
trigger, the almost sensual pleasure in the killing not of a hatchet-faced
hardened SS war criminal, but of a soft, good-looking boy with
mother-love written all over him. It is not the enemy’s hardness that arouses
the protagonist’s hatred, but his softness, his supposed effeminacy. This is of course gratuitous
queer-bashing, as it is very unlikely that a man could see at night, even by a
full moon, whether the enemy soldier he is shooting at is homosexual. It is
simply a way of evoking a general hatred and sadistic glee in killing, by
imagining that the man he is shooting embodies all the characteristics he most
hates in men. The dwelling on the supposed
homosexuality and soft good looks of the German soldier gives the killing
perverse sexual overtones, suggesting the sadism of a psychopath or serial
killer of homosexuals. This is a scene of sadistic fantasy of a thoroughly
unpleasant kind. We may see it as a forerunner of scenes of sadistic violence,
where killing is combined with a kind of drooling sensuality, in hundreds of
films and popular novels in the forty years since it was published.
Mailer’s
sadism here seems oddly like a fantasy world. His war experience perhaps led to
obsessions he never got over. But for all the sensual dwelling on the pleasures
of killing, we may surmise that Mailer’s experience in the war was not a
satisfying one, because the proof of his courage that he came back with did not
seem to him to be quite definitive enough. He had to keep proving it again and again
for the rest of his life. Nevertheless he felt he was infinitely better off
than those who have never faced the test of war at all. Here is his comment on
the Gulf War:
The stiffening of their resolve to be ready to die had
turned out in the end to be nothing but a gargantuan poker bluff. The Gulf
soldiers were now going to live with obsession: What would I have been like in
combat if it had turned out to be as bad as the minefields, the burning
ditches, the barbed wire and the fields of fire that I contemplated in my
dreams? That was an obsession to live with for the rest of
one’s life. 96
To
believe that any soldier would worry obsessively for the rest of his life about the fact that he hadn’t been
subjected to deadly danger in battle takes a peculiar mindset. Most men would
thank their stars and think no more about it. If they really craved danger or
wanted to be subjected to constant tests of courage they would take up
mountaineering, skydiving or motorcycle-racing.
But for Mailer this is not a question of the constitution of an
individual man needing greater or lesser doses of adrenaline. It is a question
of proving one is a man: something
universal, a sort of moral need inherent in all males, irrespective of their
individual thrill-seeking proclivities. Anyone who does not get off on this
particular adrenaline charge is not a man. But this means that kamikaze personalities
who thrive on adrenaline rushes are somehow more “men” than anyone else.
Masculinity can be equated, according to this logic, with a death-wish: the
willingness to risk death more readily than anybody else. Now it is true that
high levels of testosterone push men towards risk-taking. But few people would
claim that a suicidal highway speedster or a player of Russian roulette is more
a man than anyone else. Few people
would endow this frivolous, nihilistic, self-hating tendency to play with one’s
own life with any moral overtones of admirable virility. Mailer does. And
therein lies the central problem his writing poses, and his importance for our
analysis of the peculiar pathology of the masculine century.
Let us look again at that key sentence in Mailer which
sums up his peculiar obsession with courage and manhood:
By the time The
Deer Park was published I had come to recognize that I was concerned with
living in Hemingway’s discipline … that I shared with Papa the notion, arrived
at slowly in my case, that even if one dulled one’s talent in the punishment of
becoming a man, it was more important to be a man than a very good writer, that
probably I could not become a very good writer unless I learned first how to
keep my nerve, and what is more difficult, learned how to find more of it. 97
Now
when you look at it closely this is an amazing statement: “it is more important
to be a man than a very good writer”. And what he means by “man” is not the
French sense of “l’homme”, the human being in his full humanity, but the
American popular sense of tough guy, man with balls, man who keeps his nerve in
danger. We have perhaps lost the perspective that enables us to see how
extraordinary this statement is coming from a leading writer of the age. Try to
imagine Dante, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Molière, Fielding, Goethe, Coleridge, Dickens, Flaubert,
Joyce making the same statement: it is more important to be a “man” (meaning
tough-guy) than a good writer. Would any of these writers even have understood
what Mailer meant by being a “man”? Surely, they would have said, you are a man
by simple biological fact, you do not strive to be one: one of every two adult
human beings is a man, there is no particular effort required to achieve this,
compared with the huge effort required to be a good artist (“ars longa, vita
brevis”, or “the lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne.”) But for Mailer, as
for Hemingway, being a “man”—that is, a
tough guy—becomes the chief goal of life, more important than being a good
writer. What is more it goes on being a goal long after maturity is reached,
long after the adolescent has got over his fears of not measuring up either in
sexual relations or in masculine competition—even after he has been to war,
been married several times, fathered children, published books, faced audiences
and interviews, and reached middle age, he goes on being obsessed with being a
man, as though this boyhood hurdle had to be jumped again and again. This is
such a morbid and perverse obsession that I doubt if there is a single period
in the last thousand years before the twentieth century where any writer would
have understood what on earth Mailer and Hemingway meant by it. Plenty of
writers would have understood that one’s humanity, one’s decency as a human
being, was more important than artistic talent. But nobody would have put
physical courage, the ability to keep one’s nerve in danger, to face bullets or
to fight barroom bullies, before all other qualities a human being might have,
including creative talent. This new ideology is the product of the American
frontier tradition reinforced by the militarism of the two world wars. It is an
ideology where masculinity becomes a cult, a virtue more highly prized than any
other. We are back in the Roman world where virtue is etymologically derived
from the word for man, vir. You have
to go back to the first century BC to find a culture of militarism comparable
to the one we are emerging from—where a man like Cicero, for all his great talents, had to
endure the reproach of lacking manly courage. At no time between those two ages
has that quality ever been raised to such a pitch of obsession.
Think
for a moment of the end of the nineteenth century. Think of a figure like Oscar
Wilde. What was the most important thing for Wilde? To be a gentleman. There
are endless Wilde aphorisms on the subject. “No gentleman ever takes exercise.”
“No gentleman ever has any money.” “A gentleman may be an anarchist, never a
socialist.” This is what counted to him:
to be a gentleman, to belong to the right class, and to have the behaviour that
indicates this. It had been like this for a thousand years. The greatest
reproach one could make to another man was that he was not a gentleman, that
his behaviour was that of an inferior class. Now after the First World War all
this changes. With Hemingway (and later Mailer) the important thing is no
longer to be a gentleman but to be a man. It is not class but sex or gender
which counts, and gender defined in a peculiar normative way. A man is
contrasted now not with an inferior class but the inferior sex. To be called a
girl is the worst of insults, far worse than being called a peasant. Mailer in
fact calls President Eisenhower “a bit of a woman” on his first TV show with
Mike Wallace, and denounces the effeminacy of America’s political leadership.98
The words “woman” and “man” now have a heavier burden of association than
they have ever had before. It is no longer enough to be a man by simple
biological fact. One must demonstrate constantly that one possesses the
qualities specific to the male sex, those that contrast it with the female, and
the chief of these qualities is
aggressiveness, with all that that implies: physical courage,
risk-taking, and pride in this risk-taking, so that when challenged or dared to
fight one has no choice but to take up the gauntlet. And the great collective
ritual for demonstrating male courage is war. The willingness to go to war is
the test of balls for both the individual and the nation. The eagerness with
which General Curtis LeMay and other American military leaders envisaged war
with the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile
crisis is not merely a sign of the eternal war-mongering spirit of generals. It
is a pathology of the mid-twentieth century. They were contemplating not war on
a limited scale where a few thousand men might be killed, but war on the scale
of Armageddon where tens of millions would be killed in a matter of hours. And
they were eager to do it to show their balls and to teach the enemy a lesson.
This is a very different attitude from that of their predecessors in the
American Civil War, who showed the utmost reluctance to commit fifty thousand
men to battle. It is part of the twentieth century pathology that Hemingway and
Mailer both expressed and contributed to.
But violence, aggression, war, you will argue, have
been with mankind since the dawn of history. And they have been treated in
literature from the earliest days of writing. If we wish to maintain that the
twentieth century represents something new, a pathology of war, a granting of a
centrality to this phenomonen that it has scarcely ever had before, a cult of
the masculine values of aggressiveness and courage of an extraordinary kind,
then we must demonstrate it. We have to try to make our point by detailed
evidence, by examining attitudes to war in the past, and how they evolved in
the century of the world wars. We have already examined how descriptions of
men, and above all men’s behaviour in sexual relationships, evolved in the
literature of the past three hundred years. We have now to look at men’s
attidudes to war and violence, and how they too evolved.
The twentieth century was the age of the greatest wars and the
greatest mass murders of all time. Some two hundred million human beings were
done to death in wars, gulags, death camps and extermination programmes over a
period of about sixty-five years, from 1914 to the overthrow of Pol Pot in
1979. This figure includes the victims of famines deliberately engineered by
Mao and Stalin as instruments of extermination, but they account for only about
a quarter of the total number. No period of the past comes even close to the
scale of the mass killing that occurred during this sixty-five year period. Was
this merely the result of the technological advances in the means of killing in
the twentieth century by comparison with previous ages? Or was it a reflection
of changes in the mentality of man, and especially the development of
ideologies which made human lives mere instruments of abstract goals, and
glorified impulses which previous ages had restrained? What we will look at
over the next chapter is how human attitudes to war and mass killing changed
over recent centuries. For
though the bulk of the last century's killing was carried out by totalitarian states, some of
them in Asia, even the democratic Western nations that fought Nazism
and Japanese imperialism practiced techniques of mass killing from the air
which would have been condemned as immoral in any previous age in Western
history. How did we, the most democratic and civilized nations that have ever
existed, degenerate morally to the point where we could carry out, as a
deliberate tactic, the massacre by
burning alive of the inhabitants of enemy cities, knowing they were mostly
women, children and old men, incapable of doing us any harm? What was the path
by which this callousness, this cruelty, this ruthless capacity for indiscriminate
mass murder, developed in us? To try to understand this, we will see how Western
attitudes to war evolved over the ages.
For this we will examine how violence and war
were treated in the literature of the past. How was war seen in previous ages?
What emotions did it arouse? What visions did men have of it? How did they react to it morally and in their
souls? Did they see it as an appalling evil, a heroic enterprise or an
inevitable condition of life itself? And how did any of this change over the
years, and especially in the ages leading up to the century of war?
We have seen that the masculinization of the
depiction of sex in the twentieth century is shown in two ways: first in the
shift from an association of sex with love and tenderness to an association of
sex with aggressiveness and domination. And second in the shift from sex as a
way of expressing emotions to a mere act of physical gymnastics, devoid of any
feeling. We should keep in mind therefore that the over-masculine is both the
aggressive and the unfeeling—in its pathological forms, psychopathic violence and
autism. In analysing war in the literature of the past we should keep our eye
open for these markers and any signs of their increase. We should look both at
how much emotion and what kind of emotion is involved in war. Are the emotions
aroused by war compassionate or aggressive? Are they humane, pitying, tragic,
horrified, or are they above all cruel, hate-filled, triumphant, vindictive,
relishing the slaughter of enemies? Are the emotions of men who have taken part
in war, especially such emotions as horror and pity, expressed openly, or are
they suppressed under a carapace of indifference, hardness and non-feeling? And
is there a shift from one set of attitudes to the other over the past century
or so? In short, we will look for two indicators of extreme masculinity of
attitudes: hate-filled aggression and unfeeling indifference. These will be
uppermost in our minds as we briefly survey the literary treatment of war in
past ages in the Western world. In the process we will focus more detailed
attention on one or two authors where the emotions inspired by war seem to go
through an historic change.
CHAPTER TWO
WAR AND WESTERN MAN : IMAGES OF WAR IN WESTERN LITERATURE
1) WHY WAR?
War
appears to be a universal human activity. The various explanations that
have been put forward for this dismal fact lean, as always, either to
the biological or the social. Some have evoked the aggressive instinct,
the sheer pleasure of killing and domination, the lust for victory in the ultimate competition. Genghis Khan thought that “man’s
greatest good fortune is to chase and defeat his enemy, seize his total
possessions, leave his married women weeping and wailing, ride his
gelding and use the bodies of his women as a nightshirt and support.” 1 Others, such as the Marxists, have stressed economic
factors as the root of war. The Roman historian Tacitus blamed both the
laziness and love of fighting of the Germans for their propensity for
war: “The Germans have no taste for peace; renown is more easily won
among perils…. A German … thinks it tame and spiritless to accumulate
slowly by the sweat of his brow what can be got quickly by the loss of
a little blood.” 2 This reduces war merely to collective
criminality, a lust for easy spoils. But it hardly explains the no
lesser propensity for war of the Romans themselves, and what drove them
to try to conquer the Germans, a people with little wealth to steal.
The attacks of the Germans on Rome may be explained by greed for
plunder; that of Rome upon the Germans can only be
explained by a desire for domination or perhaps for security (Aristotle
had long since formulated the Orwellian paradox: “We make war in order
to live in peace.”) The gradual expansion of the Roman empire
by war was explained by Tacitus as an historic, divinely-ordained
mission, a “manifest destiny” believed in by generations of Roman
leaders.3 Alexander’s conquests, on the other hand, seem to
have been merely an enormous adventure, springing from the vast
ambition of one man.
The
feminists have claimed that war is a product of “patriarchy” or male
domination, but there is no evidence of this. As we shall see in a
later chapter, war was pursued with equal vigour by matrilineal tribes
among the Polynesians and the American Indians. The inheritance of all
land by females may even increase the tendency of the males to devote
themselves to plunder as their only source of wealth in the competition
for rich brides. War is not therefore the product of any particular
lineage system; nor, contrary to Marxist belief, is it the product of
any particular economic system. Nomadic hunters such as the Plains
Indians engaged in it fiercely, and appeared to be motivated as much by
ancient tribal enmities as by competition for seasonal hunting grounds.
Yet the most brutal early style of warfare, Greek phalanx warfare,
arose first in an agricultural society, when Greek farmers felt that
their crops were worth defending to the death in a standing battle with
no retreat.4 The industrial system in Europe ushered
in nearly a hundred years of peace (apart from a few minor wars in the
mid century), which was then followed by the greatest wars in history.
Trade seems to have been equally a motive for war and for peace. It
drove the English and Dutch to fight in the 17th century, but seems to have promoted peace in the 19th and in the late 20th
centuries. The taking of captives to be used as slaves seems to have
motivated wars among Africans, Plains Indians, Aztecs, Polynesians and
others. Pigs are the main booty in the tribal wars of New Guinea. The Trojan war is thought to have started from woman-raiding expeditions, which the myths relate as the abduction of Helen by Paris.
Some wars may in fact start as individual crimes which are then
collectively avenged. In this they resemble clan feuds on a larger
scale, in which each new generation seeks an opportunity to renew
hostilities to avenge dead ancestors. Many wars in medieval Europe seem to have followed this pattern. The actual casus belli
may take an infinite variety of forms: a dispute over territory, the
breaking of a truce, a border raid by undisciplined subjects, the
refusal of homage by a feudal vassal, a dynastic dispute over the
rightful succession to a throne, the desire for independence of a
people of different language or creed, rivalry over trade routes, an
insult shown to an ambassador or to a queen – there is scarcely a
reason great or small that has not been cause for war. The First World
War began as revenge for the terrorist assassination of the crown
prince of an empire, and each country that joined in then persuaded
itself it was merely responding to aggression. George W. Bush made one
war to avenge a terrorist attack, and another to force a country to
give up weapons it didn’t have. Israel
launched a war because its neighbours had threatened to – and its
stubborn occupation of neighbouring land has kept it in a state of
chronic war ever since. Once tensions exist between two peoples, the
smallest insult or threatening gesture may be enough to plunge them
into war. Such a gesture may be used as a pretext for war by a master
strategist like Bismarck,
or it may bundle a leader into war against his will, like Kaiser
Wilhelm I. The truth is that wars have an infinite variety of causes
and cannot be reduced to any one cardinal sin of human nature, or any
one aspect of human existence, economic or psychological. It is not so
important what causes wars as the fact that men are prepared to fight
them. And this depends very much on the warrior code, the military
institutions, the cult of manhood, the sense of honour, loyalty or
patriotism which prevail in a given country, as well as the power of
state coercion or the effectiveness of propaganda in persuading people
of the justice of their government’s cause. Some men in all ages appear
to have enjoyed war, in much the same way as they enjoy sport. To teach
men to derive some satisfaction from war is part of the purpose of all
military training. Its success can be gauged by the number of armies
that are made up of volunteers.
2) WAR IN EPIC POETRY
The
universal nature of war – since every people that ever lived appears to
have been acquainted with it in some form – probably led to its
acceptance in most ages and cultures as an inevitable fact of life.
This does not mean people did not condemn it or bewail it. There is a
view that became popular after the First World War among pacifists that
war was systematically glorified in the literature of the past and only
in the 20th century did people discover its true horrors. That is
nonsense. While early writings on war may celebrate heroic deeds, they
also lament war as an evil. In around 800 BC, the Greek poet Hesiod in Works and Days speaks in sombre tones of the warrior race – the
third race of men created by God, after a golden race who lived in
peace and plenty and died in their sleep, and a silver race who
“injured each other and forsook the gods”:
And Zeus the father made a race of bronze
Sprung from the ash tree, worse than the silver race,
But strange and full of power. And they loved
The groans and violence of war. They ate
No bread; their hearts were flinty-hard; they were
Terrible men, their strength was great, their arms
And shoulders and their limbs invincible.
Their weapons were of bronze, their houses bronze;
Their tools were bronze: black iron was not known.
They died by their own hands, and nameless went
To Hades’ chilly house. Although they were
Great soldiers, they were captured by black Death
And left the shining brightness of the sun. 5
There
is awe at these powerful men, but they are not admired. “The groans and
violence of war” is not a heroic image. Death overcame them, presumably
in their prime, and their lives were wasted. But the pacifist strain in
the poet’s attitude towards these monstrous warriors is partly belied
by the celebration of the next race, the heroes who fought at Troy.
Even though “foul wars and dreadful battles ruined some” the general
judgement is a positive one on their martial valour. They now live a
carefree life on the Isles of the Blessed. In Homer there is a similar
balance between the sense of the tragedy and horror of war and the
celebration of heroic deeds. The climax of the Iliad is not the
victory of the Greeks but the tragic defeat of their greatest enemy –
the death of Hector at Achilles’ hands and his father Priam’s moving
pleas for his body to be returned for burial. Consider the words of
Achilles to Priam as he relents and grants his request:
“We
men are wretched things, and the gods, who have no cares themselves,
have woven sorrow into the very pattern of our lives…. And you, my
lord, I understand there was a time when fortune smiled upon you also….
But ever since the Heavenly Ones brought me here to be a thorn in your
side, there has been nothing but battle and slaughter round your city.
You must endure and not be broken-hearted.” 6
This
compassion for the enemy king places the whole Trojan war in the
context of universal tragedy, of men constrained by fate to inflict
infinite sorrow on one another. The crux of the attitude to war in much
of the past was that it was considered beyond any man’s control. If
others are going to make war, what choice do you have but to defend
yourself? War is thus seen as inflicted by the gods, another way of
saying it is an evil inherent in man’s own nature. The Iliad ends on this note of sorrowful reflection with the funeral rites of Hector. Likewise the Odyssey, while it ends with Odysseus’s triumph, tells along the way so many tales of disaster that befell the heroes of Troy that its general atmosphere is also tragic.
The feats of arms recounted are overshadowed by the sombre vision of
Hades, that bleak land of the dead which awaits victor and vanquished
alike. Even Achilles is not rewarded for his valour, as in Hesiod, by a
carefree life in the Isles of the Blessed. Instead he is condemned to
Hades, and remarks bitterly that he would rather be alive and a
peasant’s slave than king over all the dead. The climax of the poem is
a thrilling, action-packed account of Odysseus’s fight with his wife’s
suitors, but he is prevented by the goddess Athene from finishing them
off. She commands the Ithacans to “stop this disastrous fight and
separate at once before more blood is shed.” 7 The poem
thus ends with a truce, not a total victory – an anti-climax that no
modern action film audience would accept. In Homer we feel above all
the emotions of personal grief and loss caused by war. War is a
disaster inflicted by divine malice. Martial glory is always
evanescent, if not ultimately futile.
In his Roman imitator Virgil, it is the same story. The Aeneid, like Homer’s epics, is about the heroes of the Trojan war, but it is the catastrophe of the fall of Troy at the start which overshadows the whole mood of the poem. It is to redeem that catastrophe by founding a new city, Rome, that Aeneas sets out on his mission. In Virgil’s depiction of the fall of Troy
we have the first powerful image of the end of the world, the collapse
of civilization, in Western literature. The departure of Aeneas from
burning Troy, after his wife goes
missing in the chaos and is killed, has a tragic sense of absolute loss
that is not found again with such intensity until certain passages of
Dante, or the end of Shakespeare’s Lear or of Milton’s Paradise Lost. War
is seen as the destruction of paradise – an entire civilization and its
ordinary, innocent way of life wiped out, its buildings razed, its men
killed, its women and children taken into slavery. The fall of Troy is thus the fall of man – it has the same mythic force in the classical worldview that the fall from Eden
has in the Jewish and Christian worldview. In this sense man’s fall is
his fall through war, the ultimate cataclysm – though paradoxically, he
is redeemed through war as well, the military expedition to found a new
Troy.
This disastrous fall of a great city-state is for the classical world a
far more powerful and haunting image of their remote past than the
rather artificial myth of the golden age in Hesiod. And this legend of
fallen Troy is even older than Hesiod: it is the very fount of Greek literature. And the fact that the fall of Troy
is seen as tragic by the Greeks themselves – those who brought it
about, the victors in the war – shows that for the Greeks war is a
tragedy for all who take part in it. The essence of Greek tragedy is
the sense of loss even in victory. War is inherently tragic, whether
you win or lose. The Greek poets write mainly of the vanquished in war,
not the victors, because it is defeat that reveals to man the true
nature of life. Aeschylus took part in the decisive battles against the
Persians at Salamis and Marathon. Yet in his play The Persians
he depicts not the heroic victory of the Greeks but the tragic calamity
that befell their enemies. The Greeks seem almost incapable of
conceiving of victory in war except as the tragedy of the vanquished.
Of
course the two great wars that tore apart the Greek world in the
classical period, the Persian invasions and the Peloponnesian war
between Athens and Sparta,
gave rise to their share of heroic speeches praising the fallen. It
could not be otherwise. People do not despise those who have died to
defend them. The ringing words that Thucydides puts into the mouth of
Pericles at the funeral oration at the end of the first year of the
Peloponnesian war have inspired Westerners for centuries, but only
because of their grim truth, not for any romantic glorification of war
itself:
Some
of them, no doubt, had their faults, but what we ought to remember
first is their gallant conduct against the enemy in defence of their
native land. They have blotted out evil with good …. In the fighting,
they thought it more honourable to stand their ground and suffer death
than to give in and save their lives. So they fled from the reproaches
of men, abiding with life and limb the brunt of battle, and in a small
moment of time, the climax of their lives, a culmination of glory, not
of fear, were swept away from us….
Make
up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends
on being courageous. Let there be no relaxation in face of the perils
of the war…. 8
These
are words spoken in a time of crisis, when a nation’s freedom was at
stake. They do not give a rosy image of war, or of the fallen soldiers,
but they are a moving tribute to them. Of course, whenever men have
fought heroically for their freedom or the very survival of their
nation, their sacrifice may inspire men of a later age to fight in a
futile or a foolish or an unjust war. But a savage war of aggression
does not discredit a heroic war of survival. Patriotism is only a
pernicious lie when it confuses the two. The problem of course is to
distinguish between them, and classical writers produced their share of
patriotic platitudes that could be used indifferently in both cases. A First World War poet bitterly quoted Horace’s lines, Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori
– it is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country – as having inspired
the misguided youthful idealism of the volunteers dying in the hell of
the trenches. Yet one could argue that the Roman poet did not intend
any general glorification of war. At twenty-three Horace had fought for
Brutus on the losing (Republican) side at Philippi.
He was deeply alienated from the decadent Empire of Augustus, in which
he lived as though in exile. In this disillusioned poem he was writing
about reforming the gilded youth of his time and teaching them
patriotic virtues. It was the remark of an embittered Republican,
harking back to an age when serving one's country was not a joke, and
perhaps remembering comrades who had died in the lost war to save the
Republic. But the lines were there to be exploited by Edwardian
schoolmasters in an age of aggressive jingoism, and no doubt they
played their small part in the madness of the First World War. The
Romans, whose empire was built upon endless military campaigns,
undoubtedly showed a great deal of callousness on the subject of war.
Tacitus in the Agricola rejoices cruelly at the spectacle of a
Roman victory won by sacrificing only foreign auxiliaries, not Romans.
The extraordinary level of cruelty of the Romans must be balanced
against Virgil’s tragic description of the fall of Troy, or his war-sickened hero’s remark that his tears were “the tears of things.”
When
we come to the ancient Germans, we have a warrior culture as primitive
as that of Homer’s world, where war is a way of life. We have seen
already how Tacitus describes them:
For
the Germans have no taste for peace; renown is more easily won among
perils, and a large body of retainers cannot be kept together except by
means of violence and war. They are always making demands on the
generosity of their chief….The wherewithal for this openhandedness
comes from war and plunder. 9
This
is a culture organized for war as the principal means of wealth – where
agriculture is left to women and old men – though the coveted prizes
are symbols of glory -- enemy weapons -- rather than luxuries.
Yet, curiously, the Germanic poets also see war in the gloomiest of
lights. The myths of the Nordics speak of a final war between the gods
and the forces of evil, which will bring about the destruction of the
world, Ragnarok. At the appointed time Odin and the other gods will go
out to do battle against the great wolf and the world serpent, knowing
it will mean their doom, but obliged to fight anyway. War among the
northern peoples is not a redemptive force – a battle between good and
evil that will lead to the permanent triumph of good, as in the
Christian Apocalypse. It is an utterly destructive one. The world ends
not by some stellar catastrophe but by war.
Among the Germanic tribes that settled England, the prevailing tone of descriptions of war is a bleak, tragic recounting of endless episodes of slaughter. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles recount
how ever since the 5th century, when the British king Vortigern,
abandoned by Rome, then at grips with Attila, invited the Angles from
northern Germany to come over and help fight against the Picts from
Scotland, only to find them turn against him and invite in their
kinsfolk to carve out their own kingdoms, the island had been a prey to
successive invasions. Every Germanic tribe seized its piece of the
country and fought both against the Britons (or Welsh, Germanic word
for foreigner) and against each other. After a brief period of greater
stability with Christianization, the country fell prey to Danish and
Norwegian Viking raids in the late 8th century, and two hundred years
of intermittent warfare followed. The Viking raiding armies landed each
year in a different place, demanded tribute, and slaughtered those that
refused to pay. The accounts of battles are filled with a dark, sombre
cult of heroism forever overshadowed by the imminence of defeat and
death for today’s victor. Here is the Battle of Brunanburh, in 937, as
told in The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles:
Here King Athelstain, leader of warriors,
Ring-giver of men, and also his brother,
The aetheling Edmund, struck life-long glory
In strife round Brunanburh …
There lay many a soldier
Of the men of the North, shot over shield,
Taken by spears; likewise Scottish also,
Sated, weary of war. All day long
The West Saxons with elite cavalry
Pressed in the tracks of the hateful nation,
With mill-sharp blades severely hacked from behind
Those who fled battle. The Mercians refused
Hard hand-play to none of the heroes
Who with Olaf over the mingling of waves,
Doomed in fight, sought out land
In the bosom of a ship. Five young
Kings lay on the battle-field,
Put to sleep by swords; likewise also seven
Of Olaf’s jarls, countless of the raiding army
Of Seamen and Scots …..
Never yet in this island
Was there a greater slaughter
Of people felled by the sword’s edges
Before this, as books tell us,
Old authorities, since Angles and Saxons
Came here from the east,
Sought out Britain over the broad ocean,
Warriors eager for fame, proud war-smiths,
Overcame the Welsh, seized the country. 10
In
form this is a poem that exults in victory, but in tone there is little
joy in this bleak triumph. The mood is harsh, dark, with a hint of grim
irony in the understatement of “hard hand-play”. Emphasis is on the
numbers of the slain, that they were young, that they included kings
and earls, that their leader Olaf had set out on a doomed voyage. At
the end it evokes the long history of slaughter on the island. This
poem describes a major invasion by Norwegian Vikings based in Ireland and Northumbria, aided by the Scots, and a rare, famous victory by the Mercians or West Saxons.
These were people living under a harsh regime of permanent warfare, who
for half a century had faced constant invasions by the raiding armies
that came year after year over the sea from the north, whence they
themselves had come generations before to take this land from the
Welsh. They speak of the invader Olaf without anger. They do not even
see themselves as victims of unjust aggression, for their ancestors too
were driven by the same lust for war, “warriors eager for fame”. But
they seem prisoners of a grim fatality, a mechanism of warfare that
never lets up. The victory today seems a short-lived one, for soon the
Viking raiding-armies will be back with fresh men to do battle again.
This is war as an ongoing catastrophe – not an episode, but a condition of life.
3) WAR IN THE CHRISTIAN AGE
The West Saxons
at the time of this battle were Christians, and the Danish and
Norwegian Vikings were “heathen men” who burned churches and sacrificed
captives to the gods. Christianity, for all its strictures against war,
could do little to stop it. Even when the Vikings were Christianized,
that part of their race settled in Normandy
(land of the Northmen) retained its thirst for conquest. Sicily and
England were both conquered by the Normans of northern France, and then
these same Normans, now established in England, invaded all of France
itself (on the pretext of dynastic claims, as they had done with
England.) The Church had from the start been forced to compromise its
pacifist ideology in dealing with the realities of a continent overrun
by Germanic warrior tribes. Despite Christ’s message of “turn the other
cheek”, and “love your enemies”, even the conversion of Constantine
had taken place under martial auspices. The vision of the flaming cross
in the sky on the eve of battle with the message “In this sign you will
conquer” was hardly a promising start for the reign of a pacifist
religion. The very legend suggests that conversion for this ambitious
usurper was not an awakening to a religious vision but a superstitious
bargain with a new god of war. The Christianized Romans, prey to civil
wars and coup d’états, sacking their own great temples with the
destructive zeal of converts, began slowly to sink to the same level of
barbarism as the Germanic hordes pressing on their borders. Even for
the most enlightened minds among them, faced with the task of defending
what was left of civilization, pacifism was not a serious option.
Before long Saint Augustine
had enunciated the theory of the “just war”, laying the doctrinal basis
for the long Christian compromise with the warrior culture.
Once
the worst had happened and the Germanic barbarians had overrun and
dismembered the empire, their conversion to Christianity did not affect
in the slightest their devotion to war. Franks, Burgundians, Visigoths,
Lombards, Saxons, Alemans, Danes made
war among themselves with alacrity. Dynastic conflicts, family
quarrels, or greed for more territory were reasons enough. The
conversion to Catholicism of the Frankish king Clovis by his wife Saint
Clothilde only increased his motivation to make war on the Arian
Visigoths. Catholicism only triumphed and imposed some kind of unified
order on Europe through the victory
of the Frankish warlords over their rivals. The Frank Charlemagne
completed the process of Christianization of the other Germanic tribes
by war, subjecting many of the Saxons to baptism at sword-point.
Catholic Christianity was therefore imposed on Europe
by a combination of the moral persuasion of Irish saints and the brute
force of Germanic warlords. It was not easy, given this history, for
the Church then to return to a purely pacifist stance, and an ongoing
compromise with the Germanic culture of warfare was inevitable.
This
compromise took various forms. Some involved curious contradictions, as
when the Norman bishops imposed a penance on their victorious troops
after the battle of Hastings for killing their Saxon adversaries – a
year’s prayer and fasting for everyone who had killed a man in battle
(and this despite the fact that William the Conqueror’s claim to the
English throne had been supported by the Pope.) 11 But
beyond this token disapproval, serious attempts were made by the Church
to restrain the newly Christianized nations from warring against one
another. A “Truce of God” was declared and paid lip service to during
the latter half of the 11th century. But Pope Urban II saw that the
martial energies of the Germanic military castes needed an outlet. He
saw an opportunity to reunite all Christendom by raising an army to
help Orthodox Byzantium against the assault of the Seldjuk Turks.
Though the Byzantine emperor’s appeal for assistance meant little to
Western princes, what did mean something was that the Seldjuk Turks had
taken Jerusalem
and were not only attacking Christian pilgrims but threatening
Christian shrines in the city. In a famous speech at a conference which
he called in Clermont in 1095, the Pope urged the princes to leave off
“unjust wars,” waged for pride and covetousness, for which they
deserved damnation, and to wage instead a war that would win “the
glorious reward of martyrdom” – a war to save the Holy Places from
defilement. The crowd, carried away by his rhetoric, roared “God wills
it!” and princes and barons put on the cross there and then.12 A great religious enthusiasm for what came later to be called the Crusade swept large parts of Europe.
There were of course more mundane factors at work as well. Certain
ambitious barons no doubt saw it as an opportunity to carve out
principalities for themselves in the East (since this is what they
actually did.) In the same way, poorer knights (often younger sons,
landless because of the new feudal custom of primogeniture) saw it as a
chance not only to assure their salvation but to win fame and fortune
through feats of arms. The Crusade, originally addressed to the ruling
military caste and preached by the monks of Cluny, soon took possession of the popular imagination as a war to liberate the Holy Land.
Masses of impoverished peasants began gathering to take part in it.
These masses of the poor were on a salvationist mission. Their goal was
not merely to save the Holy Places from the Turks, but to take
possession of Jerusalem
(in Muslim hands, but more tolerant ones than the Seldjuks, for four
centuries) and stay there till they died. The Crusade was for them a
militant pilgrimage. Such was the enthusiasm for striking a blow
against the infidel that some Crusaders launched pogroms against local
Jews as a warm-up before setting off. A hundred thousand poorly armed
peasants, including women and children, finally left France
on what was more like a migration than a military expedition, under the
leadership of a mad saint, Peter the Hermit. This “People’s Crusade”
had to cross more than two thousand miles of often hostile territory,
plundering and killing their way and being plundered and killed in
their turn, before they arrived at Constantinople. There the Byzantines
were far from happy to see such a vast, hungry horde, expecting to be
fed, and ready to loot and pillage like a swarm of locusts. They
hurried them on their way again and into enemy territory, where they
were promptly massacred by the Seldjuk Turks or captured and sold into
slavery. Only a handful survived to join the army of knights that
followed a few months later.
This
Frankish “army of princes” (all the knights from what is now France
were called Franks and this became a general word in the East for
Europeans), ignorant of the terrain and the enemy, stifling in their
armour in the unaccustomed heat, marched down the coast of what is now
Lebanon and Israel. Despite blundering into ambushes, they captured
city after city from the Turks (who were themselves not popular with
the locals) and quarrelled endlessly over who was to become the ruler
of each one. Finally, after two years of campaigning and bickering,
they managed to reach Jerusalem.
After a six-week siege in appalling conditions, they assaulted the city
and took it in 1099. After the gruelling hardships of the campaign,
where much of the besieging army died of thirst, hunger and disease, or
were ambushed and killed trying to get to the nearest water, they were
not in the mood to give quarter. They were also so reduced in numbers
they still had a desperate fight on their hands even once they got
inside. According to the anonymous Gesta Francorum, written by
a participant in the attack, after they got over the walls with wooden
siege towers, and then got the gates open, they pursued and killed the
Saracens all the way to the temple of Solomon, where the enemy gathered in force and made a stand.
The battle raged throughout the day, so that the Temple
was covered with their blood. When the pagans had been overcome, our
men seized great numbers, both men and women, either killing them or
keeping them captive as they wished. On the roof of the Temple
a great number of pagans of both sexes had assembled, and these were
taken under the protection of Tancred and Gaston of Beert. 13
It appears, however, that Tancred (a Norman knight from Sicily
who later became Prince of Galilee) was unable to stop many of those
under his protection being massacred by the mob. The disparate nature
of the Crusader forces, including surviving peasants from the People’s
Crusade, and the lack of any unified command, made the troops
impossible to control. Another eye-witness, Fulk of Chartres, spoke of
a complete bloodbath. “None of them were left alive, neither women nor
children were spared.” In the temple of Solomon,
he claimed, “the slaughter was so great that our men waded in blood up
to their ankles.” The image shocks, until one reflects that swords
cause a lot more blood to flow than bullets. It appears in fact that
there were survivors, including the emir, who with a number of other
Saracen prisoners was taken away to nearby Ascalon. But thousands died.
14
This
event, because of the very graphic descriptions by the Franks
themselves, has achieved a curious iconic status in modern discussions
of Islam and Europe. It has been
pointed to by recent politically correct commentators (including
President Clinton) as a shocking act of barbarism showing a terrible
Christian intolerance towards other religions. It was nothing of the
kind. It was a standard practice in warfare at that time, both in Europe and the East, to massacre the inhabitants of a city taken by assault which had refused a negotiated surrender. Limoges
was treated the same way in the Hundred Years War by the Black Prince,
every man, woman and child being killed in cold blood after the city
was taken. The French observed the same principle. Froissart in his Chronicles
mentions the siege of Breteuil by the French King Jean during the
Hundred Years’ War: “The defenders of Breteuil negotiated a surrender
to the King of France ….. They knew that, if they were taken by
assault, they would all be slaughtered without mercy.” 15
Yet this King, Jean II, was known as “the Good”, and was fighting
against fellow-Frenchmen – proof that this was not a measure motivated
by racism or religious intolerance. The threat of total massacre was
the one way of getting a walled city to capitulate without the dangers
and casualties of a final assault – and threats had to be carried out
if they were to work next time. Surrender had to be rewarded by
clemency, and stubborn resistance punished by massacre. Nor was this
harsh policy a European monopoly. The Ottoman Turks behaved with the
same ruthlessness when they captured Constantinople
from the Orthodox Christians in 1453: they threatened to massacre all
the inhabitants if there was no surrender, and they did. But it is a
fact that despite the standard nature of this practice, it was always
condemned as an atrocity by the victims and their sympathizers. The
sacking of Jerusalem
gave the Crusaders a reputation for ferocity for which they were long
afterwards reproached, notably by the later Muslim leader Saladin, who
was a relatively humane general for his time. When he in turn besieged Jerusalem
in 1187 (after swearing an oath to take it “by the sword”, that is, by
a bloodbath), he reminded the Franks of their actions in 1099 and asked
them: “Am I to act differently?” In the event he did act differently.
But when comparisons are made with Saladin’s more humane treatment of
the Christians when he retook Jerusalem
it is often forgotten that the defenders this time negotiated a
surrender, which according to the rules of war in that age meant a very
different outcome. Those who surrendered a city before the final
assault were entitled to mercy; those who fought to the end were not.
Balian, Jerusalem’s
Frankish leader in 1187, told Saladin that, unless he promised to spare
the lives of the defenders, they would in desperation kill all their
Muslim prisoners and destroy the Muslim holy places. This tough
negotiation led Saladin to offer generous terms (and his army was
disciplined enough for him to be able to enforce the terms.) There is
therefore no basis for the ludicrous contrast made by self-flagellating
Western commentators between the brutal Christian sacking of 1099 and
the disciplined, restrained occupation by the Muslim army in 1187. It
merely reflected the difference in outcome between resistance to the
death and negotiated surrender. 16
4) COEXISTENCE IN OUTREMER.
The
bloody massacre by the Franks in 1099 has entered so far into myth that
it has even been cited by some Arab authors of recent years as having
inflicted a sort of psychic wound on the Islamic world which explains
the permanent hostility that set in between the two cultures and
religions. This is pure fantasy. This massacre was soon dwarfed in the
memory of Arab historians by the vastly greater massacres carried out
by the Mongol invaders a century later, as they slaughtered their way
through every Persian and Arab city, burning many of them to the
ground, destroyed the Abbasid empire, devastated the region’s
irrigation system (putting back their agriculture for hundreds of
years), and threatened the very survival of Islam. By comparison with
the catastrophe inflicted on the Arab world by the Mongols, the
Crusaders were a minor nuisance. As for permanent hostility between
cultures, this has been blown out of all proportion by 20th and 21st
century politics. The presence of the Crusaders in their narrow coastal
territories was so little troubling to local Muslims that Saladin had
huge difficulty arousing them to engage in anything resembling a holy
war to drive the Franks out. What kept the Frankish kingdoms alive for
two hundred years was the indifference of their neighbours to their
presence and the disunity among Muslims. There was
as much hostility between the Shia Muslims of Fatimid Egypt and the
Sunni Turks, or between rival Turkish dynasties, Seldjuks, Danishmends,
and Ortoqids, as there was between any of them and the Franks.17
Saladin had to defeat all his rivals by force before turning on the
Crusaders – and his rivals did not hesitate to call on the Franks for
help. But the Franks too fought among themselves, and soon regarded the
Byzantine empire, their supposed
Christian ally, as a rival power, to be attacked when it suited them.
Turkish, Byzantine, Arab and Frankish rulers engaged in a complex dance of
alliances, which often ignored religion to an astonishing degree. When
the mighty Seldjuk Sultan Mohammed of Baghdad sent an army into Syria
in 1115 to impose his authority over the local rulers with a view to a
united push against the Crusaders, it was opposed by an alliance of
local Muslim princes with the Frankish king, Roger of Antioch.
Initially they even formed a joint army. But after various manœuvres it
was the Frankish forces alone which ambushed the Sultan’s army at
Tel-Danith and destroyed it. 18 That was the last time the
Seldjuk Sultans bothered to intervene against the Crusaders. Seventy
years later when Saladin tried to unite the region by crushing Muslim
rivals in Aleppo and Mosul, they too called on the Franks for help against the leader of the jihad.
The
Franks, for their part, were not only divided into bickering kingdoms,
but could count on only desultory and irregular support from the
European powers. Though events such as the loss of Jerusalem
briefly mobilized European energies in a new crusade, the conflicts
among European powers prevented any sustained flow of help. After the
brief two-year campaign of Richard the Lionheart ended in 1192 (with
Saladin dying the following year), the dream of taking back Jerusalem
faded. It became a vague romantic ideal that fewer and fewer European
kings were ready to pursue with serious purpose. The fact that
Christian pilgrims were once again allowed by treaty into Jerusalem
removed some of the urgency, and the Frankish kingdoms to the north of
the city guaranteed their safety along the way. During their two
hundred year stay in what they called Outremer, the Frankish princes in
present-day Syria and Lebanon
became to a large degree local warlords, depending for their survival
on local alliances, and on preventing their neighbours from uniting
against them. They acclimatized to the region and spent their time like
any other warlords, making and breaking alliances, engaging in raids
and counter-raids with their various Turkish, Arab and Armenian warlord
neighbours, and when they were at peace went falconing with them. Many
of the knights who settled in Outremer soon adopted Arab dress and
customs (often to the horror of newcomers from Europe.)
Most of them learned Arabic and appreciated the sophistication of Arab
art, science and culture – becoming a conduit for the influence of the
more advanced Arab civilization on Europe. “We who were Occidentals now have been made Orientals,” Fulk of Chartres remarked in his Chronicles, and went on:
He who was a Roman or a Frank is now a Galilean or an inhabitant of Palestine. One who was a citizen of Rheims or of Chartres now has been made a citizen of Tyre or of Antioch.
We have already forgotten the places of our birth .… Some already
possess here homes and servants which they have received through
inheritance. Some have taken wives not merely of their own people but
Syrians, or Armenians, or even Saracens who have received the grace of
baptism…. Different languages, now made common, have become known to
both races, and faith unites those whose forefathers were strangers….
Our parents and relatives from day to day come to join us…. For those
who were poor there, here God makes rich. Those who had few coins, here
possess countless besants; and those who had not had a villa, here, by
the gift of God, already possess a city. Therefore why should one who
has found the East so favourable return to the West? 19
Fulk
was writing near the beginning of a process of integration which went
on for another two hundred years (a longer period than the European
settlement of New Zealand),
during which the Franks felt increasingly part of the local culture.
This culture had always been a bewildering mix of religions and had had
a Christian element for much longer than a Muslim one. The Franks had
no intention of leaving again, and saw this as their permanent home.
Though they were occasionally reinforced by fresh crusading armies from
Europe (usually incompetent and
ineffective), they were mostly on their own, and their fate was
ultimately played out in the shifting politics of the region.
Still,
the politically correct self-flagellators will argue, surely the whole
Frankish presence was an act of Christian aggression against the Muslim
world? But there was in fact no hard and fast border between the two
worlds. It was Seldjuk Turk aggression against the Christian Byzantine
empire which had triggered the European response, and it was Islam
which had invested an area once substantially Christian. Access to the Holy Land
was a vital interest for European pilgrims, who were numerous in the
11th century, and it was worth fighting to preserve. Breaking with
previous Muslim practice, the more intolerant Seldjuk Turks had blocked
that access. Moreover, as far as incursions into the other culture’s
“territorial sphere” were concerned, Muslim Arabs had conquered Spain (where they stayed for seven hundred years) and had occupied Sicily till the Normans
captured it in 1061. The Ottoman Turks were soon to destroy the
Christian Byzantine empire and embark on a five hundred year conquest
and occupation of much of Eastern Europe.
Until the late 18th century, with the British in Bengal and the
Russians in the Central Asian Khanates, it was the Muslims who were the
greater territorial aggressors, conquering far larger areas of Europe
and ruling far larger Christian populations than Europeans did of the
Muslim world. But this did not, contrary to recent myths, cause any
deep political hostility between the “two civilizations” for any long
periods. What is astonishing is how little effort Europe
as a whole made to resist Muslim aggression. There was a brief
concerted struggle by European maritime powers against Turkish
expansion in the Mediterranean in the
16th century. But once a maritime balance had been achieved which
guaranteed their freedom of movement on the seas, there was no united
stand whatever to stop the Ottoman advance into Eastern Europe. European nations were totally disunited, preferring to fight one another, even in alliance with the Turks. Francis I of France
allied himself with the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent against the
Austrian Habsburgs, with little thought for the Christian Hungarians
who were being reduced to servitude under Muslim occupation. When the
Turks were threatening the gates of Vienna,
no armies from the West rode to the rescue of the Austrians. Apart from
princes belonging to the Habsburg family, only the Poles helped them.
In the 18th century Britain and France
strenuously opposed Czar Peter the Great’s crusade against the Turks,
and a century later allied with the Turkish empire in a war against Russia
without any thought for Christian solidarity. The Western nations
deliberately prevented the liberation of the Christian Slavic peoples
from Muslim Turkish rule and propped up the Ottoman empire because they feared Russian expansion more. The sloth and indifference of Europe
in driving out the Turks was almost scandalous – it showed how little
religious solidarity counted in the struggles for power and influence
among nation-states.
Only in Spain
was there a serious and sustained effort by the Christians of the small
northern kingdoms to push out the Muslim occupiers – because there the
oppressed Christians to the south were the same race and nation as
themselves. The rulers of Aragon and Castile
knew that they could annex the territories they liberated. Their own
“crusade”, the Reconquista, therefore served the purpose of building a
great nation-state. But to imagine Englishmen or Frenchmen felt any
deep Christian solidarity for Serbs or Romanians or Hungarians under
Muslim rule is a delusion. They felt very little, judging by their
actions. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries Europeans preferred to
slaughter one another in the wars between Catholic and Protestant
powers – while the Muslim advance over vast swathes of Christian
territory in Eastern Europe was
greeted with general indifference, except in the countries in its
immediate path. The Western nations continued pragmatically to trade
with the Ottomans, even at the height of their invasion of Europe
– and trade was more important to them than religious solidarity. The
Turks occupied a strategic position as intermediaries between Europe
and the Orient – a role which made the Ottoman empire rich until it was
bypassed by the maritime route to India and the Russian conquest of Siberia.
It was only this geographic outflanking which eventually led to the
decline of the Turkish empire – not any concerted military
counter-attack by Europe. Britain and France, on the contrary, tried to prop up the Turkish empire
for as long as possible (a treason against their own civilization which
has left its traces in the Balkans until the present day.) What is
astonishing from our perspective is that the war of civilizations did
not in fact take place, because most of Christian Europe was so
extraordinarily indifferent to the advance of Islam into its territory.
The clash of civilizations, far from being a long historic struggle, is
by and large a modern historical invention. Even in the 12th century,
there was often so little religious zeal on both sides that when
Richard the Lionheart, in 1192, made a truce with Saladin (leaving
Jerusalem in Muslim hands but with the rights of Christian pilgrims
guaranteed) and Richard’s envoys bluntly announced that Richard was
only going back to Europe to consolidate his position and would soon
return and capture Jerusalem, the Muslim leader replied courteously
that if he had to lose Jerusalem again he could not think of a better
and more upright ruler to entrust it to than Richard.20
The
courteous relations which developed in particular between Richard the
Lionheart and Saladin (there was talk at one stage of marriage between
Richard’s sister and Saladin’s brother) reflects another new element in
the age: the rise of chivalry. Both the Germanic-Christian and
Arabic-Muslim civilizations at the time of the Crusades embodied the
same paradox : they were warrior cultures with a nominally pacifist
religion. Just as the Gospel of love had been spread with the sword by
Charlemagne in Germany,
so Islam too exhibited the paradox of a religion of benevolent
principles – preaching humane conduct, kindness and self-denial – which
inspired vast campaigns of military conquest. Islamic power, even more
than Christian power, was spread by war, and like Christendom it
observed no geographic limits to its reach. In the scriptures of both
religions verses could be found justifying war, and were eagerly seized
on by the warrior elite. But the inherent contradiction between a
religion of peace or good will and the warrior culture of the people
who professed it eventually led to a curious compromise in the heart of
both civilizations. The warrior castes were gradually impregnated with
the gentle, humane message of their religion to the point of trying to
civilize and soften the worst brutalities of their military vocation.
Hence the cult of chivalry, which was given an explicit form in both
cultures at around the same time.
At the end of the 12th century the Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad, Nasir al-Din, instituted an order of knighthood governed by the notion of futuwwa,
a moral code of self-denial, selflessness, and humanity towards others,
linked both to military training and Sufi mysticism. Among Christians
the notion of knighthood had been given a new spiritual significance
earlier in the century with the founding of the military religious
orders, the Knights Hospitallers in 1113 and the Knights Templars in
1119, with the mission of taking care of poor pilgrims and protecting
the pilgrim routes to Jerusalem
from bandits. More generally, the notion of knighthood as a profession
requiring the Christian virtues not only of courage, loyalty, honour,
and the spirit of fair combat, but also of justice, defence of the
weak, respect for women and children, generosity of spirit, mercy,
self-control, etc, spread rapidly as a moral ideal in the period.
Knighthood was romanticized in the course of the 12th
century in the Arthurian romances, the legend of the Knights of the
Round Table, and the myth of the quest for the Grail, which saw
chivalry almost as a spiritual path towards enlightenment. Without any
apparent sense of contradiction, it was also linked in the same period
to courtly love, in the poems of Marie de France and Chrétien de
Troyes. The knight was expected to be inspired to do brave deeds by his
love for some lady – a convention observed in knightly jousts where the
contestants wore the favours of their lady-loves. This was a practice
followed even in war, which led to bitter personal rivalries in the
Hundred Years’ War, where French knights on opposing sides sometimes
wore the same lady’s tokens. Chaucer even anachronistically puts the
custom into his Troilus and Criseyde, in Troilus’s bitter jealousy of Diomede, after he finds Criseyde’s broach on his captured cloak.
Behind
the development of chivalry, which included the all-important notion of
knightly honour, there may have been a certain number of practical
causes at work. The business of war, for professionals, required such
things as the respect of treaties, of terms of surrender or terms of
ransom for it to be profitable. This required a code of honourable
conduct common to all parties, which became the basis for the rules of
war (the so-called “law of arms”) and international relations.
Honourable surrender and the custom of ransom were only possible if
promises of humane treatment could be trusted. Noble prisoners thus
came to be treated as honoured guests by their captors, since promises
given not to escape were generally respected with great scruple. A man
was sometimes released on parole – a mere promise to pay a
ransom – or even a promise to reconstitute himself prisoner at a later
date. When the Black Prince captured King Jean II of France
in the Hundred Years’ War he treated him with the utmost courtesy as
his superior in rank, even waiting on him at table. When King Jean was
released from captivity in England
to try to raise his ransom money, his son was held in his place among
other hostages. When the son escaped, breaking his father’s word of
honour, Jean returned to England voluntarily – which won him the
highest praise from the English.21 But beyond the practical
reasons for developing a cult of honour among professional knights (who
sometimes lived from ransom money), there was a genuine desire to
restrain the worst instincts of bloodlust and make the warrior
profession into something higher than mere butchers of men. Respect for
women, a contempt for cruelty, and magnanimity to enemies (especially
those who showed courage and honour) came to be seen as marks of
nobility, deserving of universal admiration. The cult of chivalry
therefore had a widespread moral and civilizing influence, because it
attached a certain number of moral and humane virtues to the prestige
of military prowess.
This
cult of chivalry was particularly developed during the Crusades partly
perhaps because of the influence of the personality of Saladin (Salah
al-Din), the Kurd who seized the Sultanate of Egypt and became the
Crusaders’ most effective enemy. Though he did not hesitate to crucify
conspirators against him, and beheaded one Crusader prisoner of
treacherous character on the spot, he was a general of unusual humanity
for his time. He was seen as embodying the virtues of futuwwa
promoted by the Caliph Nasir during Saladin’s last years. The following
incidents were typical of his behaviour, which was greatly admired by
the Crusaders. When Saladin was on the point of attacking Jerusalem, a
local Frankish lord, Balian of Ibelin, asked him permission to go
through his lines to the city in order to get his wife (a Byzantine
princess and Queen of Jerusalem) and children and take them away to
safety. Saladin granted permission, on condition Balian gave his word
only to stay one night there. When he got to Jerusalem,
Balian was begged on all sides by the terrified Christian townsfolk to
stay and organize their defences against Saladin. Moved by their plight
he wrote to Saladin explaining, with apologies, that he would have to
break his word and take up arms against him. Saladin at once offered to
send an escort for Balian’s wife and children to take them away to
safety before he began the attack, an offer which the Frank gratefully
accepted. Balian later negotiated the surrender of the city on
relatively generous terms, and many of those who could not pay the
agreed ransom to avoid slavery were set free anyway by Saladin and his
brother (who marvelled that some of the richer Christian knights did
not pay to free them.)22 Among the captives was a Frankish
countess, Stephanie of Oultrejourdain, who obtained the release of her
son by a promise to surrender her two castles to Saladin. When her
castle garrisons refused her order to surrender, she sent her son back
into captivity. Saladin rewarded her honourable action by setting her
son free some months later.23
They had already crossed paths. Four years before, during the wedding of Stephanie’s son in her fief, the Templar castle of Kerak,
Saladin had launched a surprise attack. As the battle raged, the Franks
coolly continued their wedding feast and merry-making inside, and from
time to time Lady Stephanie sent out choice dishes from the banquet to
Saladin. In return Saladin asked where the bridal couple were lodged
and ordered his siege engines not to attack that tower. (The siege was
finally lifted by an army of knights riding to the rescue.)24
Incidents like this, in which Saladin seemed to epitomize Western
notions of chivalry, so impressed the Crusaders that stories circulated
that he had secretly been dubbed a Christian knight. His reputation in
the West grew to astounding heights. Dante placed him among his
honourable pagans. The Muslim military leader became, improbably, the
hero of a host of European folktales, recounted by authors such as
Boccaccio, which always centred on his humane and gentlemanly conduct,
in contrast to most of the Christian characters of the story. Thus was
launched the long tradition among European writers of denouncing the
vices of their own society by praising the superior moral character of
their enemies – which was to take us through Montaigne and his
idealization of the Aztecs, Rousseau’s cult of the noble savage,
Cooper’s romanticization of the American Indians, and on to the
politically correct cultural self-flagellation of our own day – all of
it, ironically, an expression of the European attitude of respect for
enemies, which derives from medieval chivalry.
5) CHIVALRY IN THE HUNDRED YEARS’ WAR
But
the spread of the ideals of chivalry did not hide from anybody the
generally brutal nature of war as a whole – though the ideals did
perhaps lead people to condemn this brutality more and more. The
massacre of the inhabitants of Jerusalem
by the First Crusade was not an isolated incident; nor did it show any
particular cruelty towards unbelievers which was not also shown at
times towards fellow-Christians. The threat of general massacre was, as
we have seen, one of the weapons by which besieging armies forced the
inhabitants of a walled city to surrender, thus saving lives among the
attackers. It was practised in the Hundred Years’ War by the English,
notably at the taking of Limoges in 1370. This city, near the borders of the English territory of Aquitaine,
had been in English hands, but had gone over to the French side through
treachery. The Black Prince (heir to King Edward III, who claimed the
French throne by descent) was determined to punish it. After he
captured it through a mining operation under the walls, he deliberately
massacred the inhabitants. The contemporary historian, Jean Froissart,
though sympathetic to the English, tells the tale with some distress in
his Chronicles :
There
were pitiful scenes. Men, women and children flung themselves on their
knees before the Prince, crying: “Have mercy on us, gentle sir!” But he
was so inflamed with anger that he would not listen. Neither man nor
woman was heeded, but all who could be found were put to the sword,
including many who were in no way to blame. I do not understand how
they could have failed to take pity on people who were too unimportant
to have committed treason. Yet they paid for it and paid more dearly
than the leaders who had committed it.
There is no man so hard-hearted that, if he had been in Limoges
on that day, and had remembered God, he would not have wept bitterly at
the fearful slaughter which took place. More than three thousand
persons, men, women and children, were dragged out to have their
throats cut. May God receive their souls, for they were true martyrs. 25
This
is an emotive moral condemnation from a chronicler normally sparing in
his judgements. There is pity and compassion as well as indignation in
his account. But it is not so much the slaughter itself but its lack of
justice which upset Froissart. These were the innocent being killed. By
contrast, the “leaders who had committed the treason” were treated
differently. The three chief knights who had held Limoges
for the French put up a stout fight in a square with their backs
against a wall. Their supporting soldiers having been dispatched by the
English, the three knights were attacked by three of the English
commanders, each in single combat.
There
was a long hand-to-hand combat between the Duke of Lancaster and Sir
Jean de Villemur, who was a fine knight, strong and of superb physique;
also between the Earl of Cambridge and Sir Hugues de la Roche, and
between the Earl of Pembroke and Roger de Beaufort. Those three against
three gave a masterly display of skilful fighting.… Presently the
Prince came .... and watched them with keen interest, until he grew
calmer and his anger ebbed away at the sight of them. At
length the three Frenchmen stopped fighting with one accord and said,
giving up their swords: “Sirs, we are yours, you have beaten us. Treat
us according to the law of arms.” “By God, Sir Jean,” said the Duke of
Lancaster, “we would never dream of doing anything else. We accept you
as our prisoners.” That, as I was informed later, was how the three
Frenchmen were captured.
But there was no respite elsewhere. The city of Limoges was pillaged and sacked without mercy, then burnt and utterly destroyed. 26
Froissart
does not hammer home the obvious paradox that these men, who were
leaders in the resistance of the town and instrumental in its
treacherous change of sides, were spared because they put up a
spirited, entertaining fight, while innocent civilians were massacred
as collective punishment. This shows a terrible picture of the class
nature of chivalry: honourable surrender for the knights (who could be
ransomed), death for the ordinary people. Froissart is here a severe
critic of this injustice. This does not make him a social
revolutionary, however. When describing the Jacqueries, or peasant
revolts in France
twelve years earlier, he is entirely on the side of the nobility
against the brutal murders, rapes and atrocities carried out by the
mob. He happily describes how a handful of knights led by the Count of
Foix put up a fight against the “Jacks” or peasant anarchists,
massacred seven thousand of them and threw their bodies into the Marne.
Anarchy is for Froissart the supreme evil – especially when it risks
overthrowing the established rule of the educated class he
belongs to. But his obvious class perspective, which makes him see the
lower orders as especially prone to brutal violence, does not blind him
to the brutal acts of the upper class, and their ruthlessness in war.
He
describes how at the Battle of Crécy in 1346, when the English archers
decimated the ranks of the Genoese crossbowmen on the French side, and
the latter began to break and run, the French king ordered his mounted
knights to kill the crossbowmen to clear them out of the way.
Froissart, without directly condemning it, shows how this ruthless and
treacherous behaviour by the knights increased the confusion on the
French side and led to their defeat. But then he goes on to describe
the atrocities committed by the popular auxiliary forces. At the end of
the battle, the irregulars move in on the wounded.
However
among the English there were pillagers and irregulars, Welsh and
Cornishmen armed with long knives, who went out after the French (their
own men-at-arms and archers making way for them) and when they found
any in difficulty, whether they were counts, barons, knights or
squires, they killed them without mercy. Because of this, many were
slaughtered that evening regardless of their rank. It was a great
misfortune and the King of England was afterwards very angry that none
had been taken for ransom. 28
It
is clear that for Froissart there was something particularly nasty
about lower class irregulars killing wounded barons and counts (their
natural betters) with long knives. But of course the English knights
made way for them to do so, and therefore tacitly approved it.
Froissart would like to show this butchery as a reflection of the
natural lack of chivalry of the lower orders, but he can’t avoid
mentioning the fact that the class of knights connived in it. What we
have in these two accounts, of the sack of Limoges
and the massacre of the wounded after Crécy, is a composite moral
attitude. There is a condemnation of cold-blooded butchery of
defenceless people, but mixed in with it are a number of other moral
considerations – that it was unjust to kill the innocent, or that
killing the wounded was a nasty piece of lower class brutality and
cowardice, or a terrible waste of a chance for obtaining ransoms, etc.
But despite this somewhat mixed moral message, we get the feeling that
Froissart is not all that far away from our own moral attitudes to
cold-blooded butchery, whether of civilian prisoners or of the wounded.
This becomes clear when he talks of the siege of Calais, another town threatened with punitive massacre, this time by the Black Prince’s father, Edward III.
After
a long siege to starve the inhabitants into submission, and after
successfully blocking a French army come to raise the siege, the King
of England had Calais
at his mercy. He let it be known to the defenders that he would accept
nothing but unconditional surrender, in which they put their lives into
his hands to do with as he pleased. This led the inhabitants to
determine to hold out till they starved to death. The English barons
who conducted the negotiations with the French pleaded with King Edward
to change his tactics and show clemency, using the shrewdest arguments
they could muster:
“Suppose
one day you send us to defend one of your fortresses, we should go less
cheerfully if you have these people put to death, for then they would
do the same to us if they had the chance.” This argument did much to soften the King’s heart, especially when most of his barons supported it. 29
This argument from self-interest is still used on battlefields today, as recently as the war in Iraq.
Soldiers know that if they are captured they will probably be treated
as they have treated enemy prisoners, so they have an interest in
treating them well. This argument convinced King Edward.
“My
lords, I do not want to be alone against you all. Walter, go back to
Calais and tell the commander that this is the limit of my clemency:
six of the principal citizens are to come out, with their heads and
their feet bare, halters round their necks, and the keys of the town
and castle in their hands. With these six I shall do as I please, and
the rest I shall spare.” 30
This message dismayed the inhabitants of Calais,
who had to choose sacrificial victims from among their ranks. But at
last their richest citizen stood up as a volunteer, and soon five more
leading men followed. These men (later immortalized by Rodin) walked
out barefoot as requested and knelt before the King of England, saying:
“We pray you by your generous heart to have mercy on us.” The King at
once ordered them to be executed. His barons and knights protested that
this would be dishonourable, that “the world will say it was a cruel
deed, and that it was too harsh of you to put to death these honourable
citizens who have voluntarily thrown themselves on your mercy to save
the others.” Edward was furious and insisted that his mind was made up. “The people of Calais have killed so many of my men that it is right that these should die in their turn.” But the burghers of Calais had an even more powerful advocate. As Froissart tells it:
Then
the noble Queen of England, pregnant as she was, humbly threw herself
on her knees before the King and said, weeping: “Ah, my dear lord,
since I crossed the sea at great danger to myself, you know that I have
never asked a single favour from you. But now I ask
you in all humility, in the name of the Son of the Blessed Mary, and by
the love you bear me, to have mercy on these six men.”
The
King remained silent for a time, looking at his gentle wife as she
knelt in tears before him. His heart was softened, for he would not
willingly have distressed her in the state she was in, and at last he
said: “My lady, I could wish you were anywhere else but here. Your
appeal has so touched me that I cannot refuse it. So although I do this
against my will, here, take them.” 31
The Queen at once took the burghers of Calais
into her apartment, gave them new clothes and an ample dinner, and
filled their pockets with money. They were then set free, and the town
was spared.
This account is interesting because it leads to the opposite conclusion from the later sacking of Limoges
by the Black Prince. And Froissart is clearly much happier with the
outcome and proud of the queen’s success in saving the hostages (since
he came from the same county of Hainaut in the Low Countries
as she did, and he was particularly devoted to her.) Here we see the
notion of chivalry, of ideals of clemency and magnanimity (and even a
king feeling obliged to grant his lady’s request) beginning to have an
effect on how war was waged. Though medieval warfare, with massacres
like that of Jerusalem or Limoges, might seem to us as horrific as
anything in recent memory, a scene like this should make us pause,
because of its utter impossibility at any time for the last hundred
years. You have only to imagine a Nazi commander being prevailed on by
his wife to spare the hostages about to be shot in reprisal for the
killing of a German officer, or imagine Bomber Harris’s wife persuading
him not to carpet-bomb Dresden and roast alive tens of thousands of
women and children, or General Mladic’s wife getting him to spare the
men of Srebrinica – and you can at once measure the distance between
medieval attitudes to war and those of our own age. And the comparison
is not in our favour. At least medieval commanders, though moved by
human rages, could also be touched by human sentiments. And their wives
were not, as they would be today, excluded from all such decisions.
What is important is that the moral judgements of the chronicler, the
journalist of the time, are not so far from ours. He too hates
cold-blooded butchery, admires clemency, goes teary-eyed at the sight
of a pregnant queen on her knees begging for the lives of enemy
hostages, and rejoices at her success. Despite the slaughter of
civilians that often characterized war in that age, the general
European attitudes to that butchery were at least as humane as ours
are. War may have been cruel, but its cruelty was already widely
condemned. The words of Edward’s barons: “The world will say it was a
cruel deed….” are already signs of an educated popular opinion that
could act as a deterrent to harsh reprisals. We are a world away from
Roman times when the Roman army crucified entire towns for resisting (a
kind of mass atrocity still engaged in routinely by the Mongols, and
often enough by the Ottoman Turks in the years that followed.) In the
age of chivalry, pity and clemency had become respectable in Europe,
and even an expected part of civilized behaviour in war. If they were
not yet the norm, they were already widely admired, and their absence
was indignantly condemned.
The
cult of chivalry, for all the fashionable tendency today to deride it,
is the beginning of the notion of the rules of war which would lead to
the Red Cross – after the Swiss Henri Dunant saw wounded Frenchmen and
Austrians left to die at the battle of Solferino – and later the Geneva
Conventions. Chivalry, because it is an attempt to make war more
civilized, has often been deplored by pacifists for making it more
palatable. Dunant’s logic was more practical : by working to make war
less horrible and cruel, you will gradually instil the notion that it
shouldn’t be happening at all.
In
the cult of chivalry, Christianity thus had a civilizing effect on war,
though it had no power to prevent it. A two-thousand year old Germanic
culture of warfare could not be erased by a few hundred years of
preaching by unarmed monks and priests. Today’s partisans of political
correctness, with a peculiar blindness to the origins of their own
moral self-righteousness, tend to blame Christianity for the cruelties
of European history. But religion was never more than one element in a
composite culture, and feudal society was essentially a society
organized for war. It was rule by a warrior class in a world given over
to violence, where priests had a limited role. Of course there were
situations, such as Spain
with its notorious Inquisition, where Christianity showed itself in a
harsh, intolerant light. But the Spaniards after the Reconquista were
faced with a unique problem. Their race had been bastardized and
hybridized by seven hundred years of Arab occupation, characterized by
mass enslavement and the rape or forced marriage of hundreds of
thousands of their women. After their victory in the long, bloody war
of liberation, the Spaniards thus had to redefine who belonged to the
liberated nation and who did not. As is generally the case after enemy
occupations, a purge was launched against those seen as members of the
occupying nation or collaborators with them. But how were they to
identify their enemies? How could they distinguish them from true
Spaniards? Race, skin-colour and language were no longer a useful guide
in such a mixed-race, polyglot population. So they had to do it by
religion – by the cultural allegiance people felt in their souls. A
Spaniard was defined as a Christian; a non-Christian was a
non-Spaniard. Religion thus became national identity. Conversion became
the only proof of loyalty to the nation. And since people may lie about
their religious allegiance, or convert just for show, a sharp watch had
to be kept for hypocrites, secret infidels and backsliders – meaning
secret traitors to the culture and the nation. Hence the Inquisition,
and the expulsion of adherents of alien religions – no doubt
regrettable, but also understandable. When one compares it with the
now-forgotten purge at the end of the six-year Nazi occupation of
Eastern Europe – the lynching in the street of tens of thousands of
ethnic Germans who had lived there peaceably since the Middle Ages and
the expulsion, by means of this terror, of over ten million Germans
from Poland and Czechoslovakia – the relatively small-scale Spanish
expulsion of Muslims and Jews after a brutal seven-hundred year
occupation is a curious choice of target for our own moral indignation.
Elsewhere
in Europe Christianity had a mixed effect on attitudes to war and
violence. There were both popular messianic movements characterized by
extreme violence and bloodletting (a succession of miscellaneous
crusades against Jews, the corrupt clergy and the landowners swept France in the 13th
century) and also movements which rejected all violence and war.
Anabaptists and other sects were militantly pacifist, starting a
dissenting tradition of pacifism that leads on to the Quakers. But up
until the early 16th century, the Christian-inspired code of
chivalry exerted an important moderating influence on war – reinforced
by the fact that there was little hatred between European nations, who
all shared the same religion, respected the same law of arms, and the
same concept of honour – at least among the knightly class. Peasant
revolts were a different matter, because the fear of mob rule led to
special savagery in their repression. So were religious heresies, with
their potential for social divisions and their challenge to authority –
as the violent repression of the Cathars in the 13th century showed. But by the 15th
century the code of chivalry was becoming something of an artifice,
entertained in courts like that of Philip of Burgundy, where elaborate
jousts were organized and the knightly Order of the Golden Fleece
established, as a kind of theatrical re-enactment of what was already a
dying tradition. For the nature of warfare was changing, and the knight
was no longer at the centre of it. The charges by armoured cavalry
which had been decisive in earlier battles and had made the knights the
elite force of any army could now be countered by skilled infantrymen
using the pike tactics developed by the Swiss. Crossbowmen, already
regarded by some as treacherous fighters, because killing from a
distance while not in danger themselves, were soon supplemented and
then replaced by hand-gunners and musketeers. These men had a skill
that could be taught in a matter of weeks, as opposed to the years of
rigorous training of the knight, the pikeman or the archer – yet they
could kill knights with ease, from a hundred yards away, and without
running any risk. “What is the use, any more,” lamented one
contemporary observer, “of the skill-at-arms of the knights, their
strength, their hardihood, their discipline and their desire for honour
when such weapons may be used in war?” Another lamented that with “this
cursed engine… so many valiant men have been slain for the most part by
the most pitiful fellows and the greatest cowards.” 32 If
war was no longer dominated by an elite warrior class trained in the
moral virtues of knighthood, then it became a purely pragmatic business
of massacring the largest number by any means. And the means used were
soon mechanical – cannon and musket – and more and more impersonal, and
indifferent to the qualities of the enemy they were mowing down. Chivalry had become irrelevant.
Another change came in the early 16th century with the Reformation: the destruction of the religious unity of Europe, the notion of a single Christendom. Once religious wars broke out in Europe,
then much of the mob hatred and indiscriminate slaughter that
characterized peasant revolts and peasant armies began to pervade war
in general. These religious wars were not carried on between
professional soldiers alone. As international armies swept back and
forth across Europe, civilian populations bore the brunt of the violence. The religious wars that tore Europe apart in the 16th and 17th centuries were the bloodiest ever fought on the continent between the fall of Rome and the 20th century. The Thirty Years’ War, involving most of the powers of Europe but fought largely over Germany,
may well have surpassed even the later Napoleonic wars in numbers of
dead. It killed (as far as historians can agree on the tally) around
eight million people, or a third of the German population. One cannot
help suspecting that the violence of religious hatred, which saw whole
populations, not merely kings or armies, as the enemy, was partly
responsible for this new savagery. With the exception of the mob
element in the Crusades, and the bloody suppression of the Cathar
heresy, Christianity had generally been a humanizing and restraining
influence on war for the part it played in the cult of chivalry – and
the sense that all sides in Christendom shared the same moral and
spiritual values. But once the faith splintered, religious fanaticism
undermined chivalry and became a force for extreme ruthlessness and
cruelty in war. This new image of war is mirrored in the literature of
the age.
Three writers of the late 16th
century, Cervantes, Christopher Marlowe, and Shakespeare, reflect in
different ways the changes in warfare in their time. Cervantes laments
through his comic parody the disappearance of old-style knighthood,
creating the ageing but immortal figure of Don Quixote who lives in a
past of chivalric romance that is gone forever. As we have seen, the
invention of the musket, whereby a brave, highly-skilled knight could
be killed from a distance by “the most pitiful fellows and the greatest
cowards”, sounded the death knell of the old chivalric ideal. With it
went the entire knightly code of honour, magnanimity, fairness and
moral restraint. Cervantes, while making fun of his ageing hero, was
lamenting the passing of an age, the passing of a world-view, which
seemed somehow finer than the pragmatic, cynical, mechanical age of war
by machines and technicians that they were now entering upon. If war
was no longer a matter of honour and reputation, then any means became
acceptable for victory, including the most barbaric. Shakespeare stands
at this crossroads, reflecting a variety of views of war, from the
heroic and romantic vision of Othello or the patriotic campaigns of
Henry V, to the earthy reality of armies of vagabonds, wastrels,
corrupt recruiters and lying braggarts which we see in the Falstaff
plays. It is Christopher Marlowe, however, who portrays most
graphically the new cruelty of war as it increasingly involved mass
civilian casualties. In the world of war he depicts, the slaughter of
civilians is no longer exceptional: it is routine. It is also Marlowe
who explores the new association between war and religious fanaticism.
6) WAR AS MAD ATROCITY : CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE
In Marlowe’s first play we already see war depicted in a new light. His description of the fall of Troy in The Tragedy of Dido Queen of Carthage is very different in mood and intent from that of his classical source, Virgil’s Aeneid. It is interesting to compare the two versions. In each case Aeneas, having fled Troy and been shipwrecked at Carthage, tries to win the sympathy of Queen Dido (whose help he needs for his mission to found a new city in Italy) by telling her, with maximum pathos, the story of the fall of Troy.
But the nature of the pathos is very different in Marlowe and Virgil.
As the city is captured, Virgil’s Aeneas is woken by a dream of his
slain brother, Hector, whose ghost tells him that the grandeur of Troy
is finished and that he must flee. Aeneas climbs on the roof, sees the
fires of the invaders, and at once arms and leads a force of comrades
into the thick of the fight. They have some success, disguising
themselves with Greek shields to take the Greeks by surprise. They make
for the King’s palace, climb on the roof and begin hurling tiles and
stone turrets down at the Greeks besieging it. But the Greeks break in
and Pyrrhus, Achilles’ son, kills King Priam at the altar of the
temple, after first killing his son in front of his eyes. Aeneas,
sickened by this sight and abandoned by his demoralised comrades,
descends into the street and there chances upon Helen, cause of the
whole war, and is tempted to kill her. But his mother, the goddess
Venus, appears to him, tells him it is not Helen (her protégée) but the
gods who have brought down Troy,
and urges him to flee the doomed city with his family. He makes his way
home and leads his wife, child and father toward a hill outside Troy.
On the way, his wife Creusa falls behind in the darkness and
disappears. Frantic, Aeneas goes back into the city looking for her,
calling out her name from street to street, at risk of discovery by the
looting Greeks. Finally her ghost appears to him and tells him to flee
with their child to another land. “There happiness and a kingdom are in
store for you, with a queen for you to marry. Dispel your tears for the
Creusa whom you loved.” Grief-stricken, he goes back to where the
others are waiting and leads a little band of refugees up to the
mountains. There after some time they build ships and take to the sea,
on the mission to found a new Troy, Rome – which is of course the Roman Virgil’s main focus of interest.
Here is Christopher Marlowe’s version of the same events:
By this the camp was come unto the walls
And through the breech did march into the streets,
Where, meeting with the rest, Kill, kill, they cried.
Frighted with this confused noise I rose
And looking from a turret might behold
Young infants swimming in their parents’ blood,
Headless carcasses piled up in heaps,
Virgins half dead dragged by their golden hair,
And with main force flung on a ring of pikes;
Old men with swords thrust through their aged sides
Kneeling for mercy to a Greekish lad,
Who with steel poleaxes dashed out their brains. 33
None
of these gory details are in Virgil, whose hero from the rooftop sees
only fires and hears the noise of battle. The dominant tone in Virgil,
apart from the excitement and panic of battle, is grief at loss, not
horror at atrocities. The menace to the Trojan women in Virgil is only
briefly evoked – a grim future compounded of exile, slavery,
humiliation as the servants of Greek ladies – but being slaughtered by being “flung on a ring of pikes” is not part of it.
Then
we have the killing of the Trojan king Priam. Virgil’s Priam upbraids
Pyrrhus for killing his son in front of his father’s eyes, and weakly
flings his spear at him, which sticks in the Greek’s shield. Pyrrhus
drags the old man to the altar and shoves his sword into his side and
then decapitates him. By contrast, Marlowe’s Priam, instead of showing
defiance, begs Pyrrhus for mercy on his knees, enumerating all his woes
and all that he has lost:
“Yet who so wretched but desires to live?
Oh let me live, great Neoptolemus!”
Not moved at all, but smiling at his tears,
This butcher, whilst his hands were yet held up,
Treading upon his breast, strook off his hands. 34
Priam’s
wife Hecuba throws herself on Pyrrhus and is then swung by her heels
“howling through the air”, before Priam is ripped open from navel to
throat – that is, disembowelled. Pyrrhus then dips his father’s flag in
Priam’s blood and runs into the street with it.
Now
these horrific details are all added by Marlowe. Why? Anyone familiar
with the history of the period will recognize them as allusions to the
massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day in Paris in 1572, some fifteen years before Marlowe’s play. Marlowe wrote another play about this event, called The Massacre at Paris, which we have in apparently mangled form. The key event in this massacre (in which thousands of Protestants gathered in Paris
to celebrate a royal wedding were treacherously killed) was the murder
of Admiral Coligny, venerable leader of the Protestant party.
Notoriously, his hands were cut off and sent to the Pope as a present.
In some accounts he was disembowelled and the Duke of Guise, who
ordered the crime, wiped his bloody face with a cloth in order to
identify the body and then trampled on him. The cutting off of the
hands and the trampling occur in Marlowe’s play The Massacre.35
Every gory detail that Marlowe has added to the murder of Priam
occurred in the murder of Coligny, according to the Huguenot
pamphleteers: the amputated hands, the trampling, the bloody cloth, the
disembowelling. Now these details would have been familiar to every
Protestant Englishman watching the play. The murder of Coligny, the
foremost old soldier of France and a Protestant respected by both
sides, had almost the same shock effect on the age as the assassination
of Kennedy 400 years later. It was a spark to the powder-keg of
religious hatred all over Europe. These allusions mean that the sack of Troy in Dido is being described in terms clearly designed to evoke the massacre at Paris.
This explains the emphasis on the indiscriminate slaughter of
civilians, which Virgil does not mention. It also explains the mood of
Marlowe’s text, which is not one of sombre cosmic doom as in Virgil,
but of violent moral indignation. He is describing not the fall of a
great nation, but a sectarian atrocity, over which he feels indignation
out of religious sympathy with the victims. It is this that fuels a
kind of anti-war spirit in Marlowe’s text – an emphasis on gratuitous
cruelty against civilians that is absent in Virgil. The Huguenot
pamphleteers after the massacre spoke of indiscriminate slaughter,
without distinction of sex, age or condition. The event became
notorious as marking a new degree of savagery – perhaps something
contemporaries thought had been left behind in the past, but in reality
the opening salvo in a war of a new kind. In a few decades this sort of
civilian butchery would come to be seen as almost “normal” in the
Thirty Years War, but at the time it shocked deeply – just as Guernica was a shocking first in what was to become the new 20th century “norm” of bombing defenceless cities from the air.
In the rest of Marlowe’s account of Troy
we find a note of true tragedy, a panic flight (curiously to the ships
not to the hills) of a very different kind from the orderly retreat of
Aeneas’s little band in Virgil.
O, there I lost my wife! And, had not we
Fought manfully, I had not told this tale.
Yet manhood would not serve; of force we fled. 36
He
saw Cassandra captured, but failed to rescue her. As the boats left, he
swam back to get Polyxena, standing on the shore, but she was taken by
the Greeks before his eyes, and later sacrificed by Pyrrhus. Dido, who
is listening to this story, begs him to stop. This is a tale of war as
pure horror. There is no heroism because their fight was ineffective:
“manhood would not serve”. The hero failed in every rescue attempt, and
the three women he tried to save perished. He breaks off his narrative,
saying wretchedly: “Sorrow hath tired me quite.”
The general effect of the tale of Troy
in Marlowe is one of “the pity of war”, to quote a later anti-war poet.
The warrior hero is tired and sickened by war, a refugee from a
genocidal bloodbath. The play fails as a play precisely because of
this: Marlowe’s attitude to war is at variance with the requirements of
the play. The theme is a conflict between love and patriotic duty.
Aeneas has to choose between the love of Dido and his heroic mission –
embarking for Italy, where the gods have told him he will found a new Troy, Rome.
But the Queen of Carthage is portrayed by Marlowe as such a
tender-hearted, generous woman, so deeply in love with the hero, and
the Trojan war is shown as such a monstrous bloodbath, that we feel
Aeneas is being a complete fool to abandon this woman for his warrior
destiny. This is in contrast to Virgil, who makes Aeneas more heroic
and Dido’s passion far more egotistical and violent. As Aeneas sails
treacherously away, abandoning his doting mistress, Virgil’s Dido
curses him, hopes that the rocks will sink his ship, and prays as she
kills herself in despair that one of her race will later avenge her – a
reference to Hannibal’s war on Rome.
This revelation of her violent nature makes Aeneas’ choice seem somehow
right. The savage, possessive fury of her love makes her appear a
dangerous option, and he seems wise to have given her the slip.
Marlowe’s Dido, on the other hand, is all sweetness and goodness.
Watching her lover’s ship sail away, she prays that it will escape the
dangerous rocks and only regrets she does not have Icarus’ wings to fly
after him. Her generosity and gentleness of character make his
abandonment of her seem foolish and cruel, and we are left unsatisfied
as she kills herself. She is a mere victim of circumstances and has
done nothing to deserve this fate. She is less tragic than pathetic.
She does not have the stature of her terrible destiny, and is
unconvincing as a suicide, because she lacks aggressive rage. Marlowe’s
Dido is simply too nice, too sweet, too forgiving. But while we like
and pity Marlowe’s heroine, it is Virgil’s that we identify with, as we
identify with souls in hell. Virgil makes her death feel inevitable,
the natural outcome of a violent passion, which turns to self-hatred
for being such a fool when her lover betrays her. Marlowe’s gentle Dido
belongs in a romance not a tragedy; we want to see her with her husband
and children living happily ever after. In short, we want to see the
war-weary and rather half-heartedly heroic Aeneas settle down and stay
with her. Marlowe fails in the play because he portrays war as
detestable butchery. He makes love seem a far more attractive option
than the heroic mission of the warrior, and the plot demands the
opposite.
It
is almost as if in answer to this very criticism that Marlowe in his
next play creates the warrior Tamburlaine (based loosely on the
Turkish-Mongol conqueror Timur Lang.) Here he makes a soldier of such
overpowering aggressiveness, pride and ambition, with such grandiose
rhetoric and unquenchable faith in his destiny, that to doubt his
heroic mission for a minute isn’t an option. The Scythian hero is
introduced to us capturing a party of travellers, including a young
lady, Zenocrate, the daughter of the Soldan of Egypt, whom he soon
persuades he is more than a simple brigand:
But lady, this fair face and heavenly hue
Must grace his bed that conquers Asia,
And means to be a terror to the world…. 37
Tamburlaine,
unlike Aeneas, is not going to have to choose between love and his
conqueror’s destiny: he’s going to have them both. He simply takes the
woman he wants, by a demonstration of irresistible will and force of
character. Of course he dazzles her with poetic rhetoric (an upmarket
version of the “Passionate Shepherd to his Love”, promising her various
exotic delights: “A hundred Tartars shall attend on thee”.) 38
But it is his absolute belief in his heroic destiny that sweeps her off
her feet. The captain of a cavalry force sent to crush him is also won
over by his eloquence. Thus begins Tamburlaine’s meteoric rise, winning
battle after battle, by persuasion, treachery or force, taking kings
and emperors prisoner, until he becomes in fact the master of central Asia.
The grandiose rhetoric carries him forward irresistibly: he is
portrayed as a demi-god. But at the same time he is clearly shown as a
megalomaniac warrior with an almost pathological bloodlust. When he
besieges a city, he starts by camping before the walls in a white tent,
signifying his readiness to show mercy; then changes to red, and
finally to black, which means he will put all defenders to the sword.
When Zenocrate’s own city holds out against him until the colour black,
he does not hesitate to slaughter the deputation of girls who come out
to beg for mercy – making it a point of honour not to be swayed from
his implacable resolve by his wife’s tears (unlike King Edward III at
Calais, who listened to his wife’s pleas.) This sadistic act is then
followed by a poetic speech about beauty, which appears in rather
sickening contrast to it (perhaps it is meant to show the hypocrisy of
chivalry.) This is followed in turn by the cruel baiting of a captive
emperor, whom he keeps in a cage. The play ends with the coronation of
the gentle Zenocrate as queen, a sort of parody of the coronation of
the Virgin. She is addressed as divine and compared to Juno. By then
the hero is saying things like:
The god of war resigns his room to me,
Meaning to make me general of the world.
Jove, viewing me in arms looks pale and wan,
Fearing my power should pull him from his throne.
Where’er I come, the Fatal sisters sweat….
Millions of souls sit on the banks of Styx
Hell and Elysium swarm with ghosts of men
That I have sent from sundry foughten fields 39
The
hero is now not just the scourge of God, but the rival of God. The
effect of these outrageous claims of divine stature is one of sheer
God-defying blasphemy, which can still make us shudder even in a
post-Christian age. It is a device of “atheists” in the Renaissance to
aim their blasphemies at Mahomet or Jove, thus protecting themselves
from prosecution, while evoking the same fearful reactions in a
superstitious audience. Now war itself might appear to be glorified in
this play, but the emphasis is not on the morality of war but on a sort
of camp hero blaspheming his head off, and showing a close connection
between a cult of war and a mad religious mission. Given the context in
which Marlowe lived, where all the current wars were primarily
motivated by religious fanaticism – with the Papacy widely viewed as the instigator both of the war on the Protestants of France and of the Spanish attack on England expected in the year of the play – this
is a highly subversive association of ideas. Marlowe is basically
saying religion is the cause of war, and at the same time undercutting
religion by showing a hero blaspheming with impunity. He
is already walking the fine line that will lead to accusations of
atheism and a premature violent death, probably at the hands of
government agents.
In his sequel to Tamburlaine
(one of the earliest Hollywood-style sequels) Marlowe extends his
dangerous themes. There is in the second play an even greater dwelling
on gore and bloodshed. Here is Tamburlaine talking to his sons about
their destiny as his heirs. One of them expresses a desire to stay with
his mother rather than follow the wars, and his father curses him as a
bastard and threatens to cast him off if he does not have “a mind
courageous and invincible”:
For in a field, whose superficies
Is covered with a liquid purple veil,
And sprinkled with the brains of slaughtered men,
My royal chair of state shall be advanc’d;
And he that means to place himself therein,
Must armed wade up to the chin in blood.
ZENOCRATE: My lord, such speeches to our princely sons
Dismays their minds before they come to prove
The wounding troubles angry war affords.
His two dutiful sons, however, are made of sterner stuff than their gentle mother.
CELIBINUS: No, madam, these are speeches fit for us;
For, if his chair were in a sea of blood,
I would prepare a ship and sail to it,
Ere I would lose the title of a king.
AMYRUS: And I would strive to swim through pools of blood
Or make a bridge of murdered carcasses,
Whose arches should be framed with bones of Turks,
Ere I would lose the title of a king. 40
Tamburlaine
duly applauds the juvenile homicidal mania of his two “good” sons. Now
the psychopathic bloodlust of these speeches, which are typical of the
second play, has posed a critical problem. What is the author’s
attitude? Is he glorifying war and slaughter or seeking to disgust us
with it? The childish treble voices of the two “good” sons dutifully
imitating their father’s genocidal tirades must seem like parody; but
there are no clear indications by dramatic incident of a condemnation
of this revelling in gore. Tamburlaine’s renegade pacifist son, who
during the next battle prefers to play cards, is given one or two good
lines, such as “What a coil they keep! I believe there will be some
hurt done anon amongst them.” But he is not given a chance to talk back
when his father drags him out and stabs him to death for his “sloth”.
Nobody protests against this murder except Tamburlaine’s impotent
captive enemies. There is no credible moral opposition to Tamburlaine
in the play, and this has led some critics to conclude that Marlowe
approves this behaviour, that he is a kind of adolescent fascist,
filled with blood-thirsty warmongering fantasies.
There
is another explanation. Marlowe translated the Roman poet Lucan, a
satirist whose technique of satire was unusually subtle. Lucan lived
under the tyrannical rule of the emperor Nero, who demanded extravagant
praise from all poets. Lucan was in fact a republican, who detested the
emperor and blamed his ancestor Julius Caesar for founding the imperial
dynasty. In the First Book of his Pharsalia, his long poem
about the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, he is careful to show
his sympathies only by indirect means. He speaks of the horrors of the
civil war, the bloody battles of Pharsalia, Carthage
and Munda, but then gracefully bows in the direction of his patron,
Nero. Marlowe’s translation brings out all the subtlety of the
technique:
But if for Nero (then unborn) the Fates
Would find no other means (and gods not slightly
Purchase immortal thrones…)
We plain not heaven but gladly bear these evils
For Nero’s sake : Pharsalia groan with slaughter,
And Carthage souls be glutted with our bloods;
At Munda let the dreadful battles join ….
Yet Rome is much bound to these civil arms
Which made thee emperor, thee (seeing thou, being old
Must shine a star) shall heaven (who thou lovest)
Receive with shouts, where thou shalt reign as king,
Or mount the sun’s flame-bearing chariot,
And with bright restless fire compass the earth …
Nature and every power shall give thee place …..41
Now
the grotesque flattery of these lines – the horrors of the civil war
launched by Caesar were all worth it since they gave us Nero as a
result, and Nero is a god waiting to ascend to heaven and take over the
sun’s chariot – can be read in the first degree only by the obtuse. Any
perceptive mind must see it as satire. The lines ram home the point
that this bloody civil war only produced a dynasty of megalomaniac
tyrants demanding sycophantic praise. Yet the irony is very indirect;
it must be, if Lucan is to live. (As it happened, Nero was not so
obtuse and put an end to the poet’s life at 26 – using the method of
“suicide on command” used by Tamburlaine.) This is a technique of
satire by grotesque exaggeration, and Marlowe, as his superb
translation shows, mastered it perfectly. Now this seems to be the
technique he is using throughout Tamburlaine II. The imagery of
Lucan, comparing Nero to a god, and especially the sun-god Phoebus, is
strikingly similar to that used throughout Tamburlaine II,
where the hero compares himself repeatedly to the sun-god. Marlowe
never criticizes, by any overt dramatic incident, the megalomania or
psychopathic bloodlust of Tamburlaine. The grotesque violence and
hubristic excess of his language speaks for itself, as it does in
Lucan. But a poet able to render so perfectly all the subtleties of
Lucan’s satire cannot be writing here in the first degree. Just as
Lucan the republican detests Julius Caesar for starting the civil war
and seizing absolute power, while appearing to treat him as the hero,
so Marlowe detests the ever victorious Tamburlaine: he is a symbol of
eternally triumphant evil. But to be eternally triumphant means to be
without credible opposition, or that opposition would appear to speak
for a moral order that is destined one day to overthrow him. This is
precisely what is not going to happen. Only Tamburlaine’s captive
enemies denounce him for the murder of his own son;
none of his loyal followers dares utter a word. There is no moral order
waiting in the wings. Critics like J.B. Steane complain that Marlowe
does nothing to undercut this monster, to discomfit him or bring him
low, and therefore concludes the author sincerely admires him.42
But why undercut a tyrant if your point is to show that the world is
ruled by this kind of monster, that the God in control of things (if
there is one) is evil? That is the position,
objectively, that the play presents. And it violates all the rules of
tragedy, which insist that good must be triumphant at the end, that the
normal moral order must be restored after the hero’s death. Marlowe
doesn’t believe good is triumphant in this world, any more than Lucan
does. They are both dealing with a world ruled by evil: in Lucan’s case
an imperial tyranny founded by a megalomaniac general, in Marlowe’s
case a state of fanatical religious warfare across Europe,
which glorifies slaughter and creates paranoid totalitarian regimes
that keep writers in a state of fear. (Marlowe’s fellow-playwright Kyd
was charged with “atheism” and threatened with torture, and he himself
was probably murdered by a government agent – in striking parallel to
Lucan.) Why show this triumphant evil order as being in any way
threatened by a moral opposition when you don’t think it will be?
Now in the play The Massacre at Paris we get another angle on this. This is a nastily sectarian work which ends with calls for war against Rome. The dying French King swears:
To ruinate that wicked Church of Rome,
That hatcheth up such bloody practices; 43
and with his last earthly breath:
Bids thee whet thy sword on Sixtus’ bones
That it may keenly slice the Catholics. 44
Sixtus
V in fact only became Pope in 1585, thirteen years after the Massacre,
but in time to finance the Armada – he was Pope at the time of the
play. This is therefore a politically engaged pro-war play, anxious to
underscore the Papist plot behind the Spanish threat. (The equivalent
today would be a play showing the hand of Al Qua’ida or of Iran
behind every conflict.) Marlowe rams home the patriotic rabble-rousing
with a direct reference to Queen Elizabeth, as the king greets her
envoy:
And here protest eternal love to thee,
And to the Queen of England specially,
Whom God hath bless’d for hating papistry. 45
What
are we to make of this? Is this Marlowe’s work? Is it an attempt to
prove his orthodoxy by producing a slavishly chauvinistic work,
anti-Papist, flattering those in power? Or is it again in the second
degree – a sort of Lucan-like fawning intended to disgust by
exaggeration?
Marlowe grew up in Canterbury. When he was eight years old the town was suddenly flooded with French Huguenot refugees on their way from Dover to London
after fleeing the Massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day. The tales of horror
they brought with them seem to have made a lasting impression on him.
That his imagination is full of horrific images of slaughter is
undeniable. We may imagine the effect on an eight-year old boy of
hearing these refugee tales as every Huguenot dined out on his horror
story. This may have given him the sectarian hatred of Catholics shown
in the lines above, assuming that The Massacre at Paris is
entirely his. But it also makes him associate religious fanaticism with
mass-murdering warfare. There are signs that the figure of Tamburlaine
may be meant to evoke the warrior pope Pius V, who organised the league
that defeated the Turks at Lepanto the year before the Massacre, and
instigated the Massacre itself. In Tamburlaine II, there is a
crucial passage where the Christians are debating whether they are
bound to keep a treaty sworn on oath to the Muslim Turks. Some of them
think they should, till one produces the trump card:
Assure your grace ’tis superstition
To stand so strictly on dispensive faith.
And, should we lose the opportunity
That God hath given to venge our Christians’ death,
And scourge their foul blasphemous paganism,
As fell to Saul, to Balaam and the rest,
That would not kill and curse at God’s command,
So surely will the vengeance of the highest…
Be poured with rigour on our sinful heads
If we neglect this offered victory. 46
Now
this argument was notorious to Marlowe’s Protestant audience. It was
the argument used by Pope Pius V in a letter to the French King,
Charles IX, in 1569, urging him to exterminate the Huguenots, shortly
after his victory over them at Jarnac.
The
more the lord has treated you and me with kindness, the more you ought
to take advantage of the opportunity this victory offers to you, for
pursuing and destroying all the enemies that still remain …. Let your
majesty take for example and never lose sight of what happened to Saul,
King of Israel. He had received the orders of God, by the mouth of the
prophet Samuel, to fight and exterminate the infidel Amelekites, in
such a way that he should not spare one in any case, or under any
pretext. But he did not obey the voice of God …. and therefore he was
deprived of his throne and his life…. By this example he has wished to
teach all kings that to neglect the vengeance of outrages done to him
is to provoke his wrath and indignation against themselves. 47
For
Samuel we are to read Pope Pius V, for Saul King Charles IX, and for
the Amelekites the Huguenots. Pope Pius demands the “entire
extermination of heretics” in a letter to Catherine de Medici,
Charles’s mother, the same year. These letters, though not officially
published till 1640 in Antwerp
by the Spanish Secretary, were leaked after the massacre and widely
cited by Protestant pamphleteers in the propaganda war in Marlowe’s
time. The fact that Marlowe cites the same text about Saul and uses the
same argument shows he was familiar with the Pope’s letters. This would
mean that the Christian-Muslim subplot of this play is meant also to
allude to the religious wars in France
and the use of the bible to justify a treacherous massacre. But there
is a double edge here. It also shows the Christians as morally worse
than the Muslims. When the Christians break an oath they have sworn to
Christ, it is the Muslims who are genuinely shocked.
Can there be such deceit in Christians? …
Then if there be a Christ as Christians say
But in their deeds deny him for their Christ
If he be son to everlasting Jove ….
Thou Christ, thou art esteemed omnipotent,
If thou wilt prove thyself a perfect God
Be now revenged upon this traitor’s soul. …
To arms, my lord, on Christ now let us cry.
If there be Christ we shall have victory. 48
In
the next scene the Muslims indeed have victory, and the Christians
blame their own “accursed and hateful perjury.” The Muslim leader
decides to honour Christ thenceforth, “not doing Mahomet an injury”,
because of his just act of retribution. Now this is both orthodox and
subversive. It is orthodox because the Christians are punished by
Christ for betraying their oath, when Christ is appealed to by the
Muslims. But the whole procedure is blasphemous. Christ in the desert
forbade Satan to “put the lord to the test”. This is what the play is
doing. Secondly, the Muslims are shown as morally superior to the
Christians, suggesting their own god may be more powerful. Christ and
Mahomet are put on the same footing, and it is not clear who is
responsible for this victory. The equation of the two religious leaders
suggests dangerous corollaries. If belief in Mahomet is a superstition,
then why not belief in Christ as well? And if one is truly a power
active in history, then why not the other? This kind of subversive
question had already been asked when the French King Saint Louis was
taken prisoner during the Seventh Crusade: did this not prove Mahomet’s
greater power? But there is a third point. If, as
the events of this scene show, history is the acting out of God’s
judgement on men, then what are we to make of the perpetual victories
of Tamburlaine? Are these also, as he pretends, a sign of God’s favour?
Though it is not him who uses the reference to Saul as a justification
for slaughter of enemies, the evocation is enough to give his title
“the scourge of God” an even greater contemporary resonance: Tambulaine,
like Saul, like Charles IX, like Pius V, is a man who is carrying out
God’s mission of exterminating the infidel. The scene, and the entire
play, opens a theological can of worms. It is again on the very edge of
blasphemy. Even today this scene would provoke controversy in the
theatre, and neither Christian nor Muslim would like it. In Marlowe’s
own day it was dynamite, but dynamite even more carefully buried under
layers of paradox and apparent orthodoxy than Lucan’s outrageous satire.
The Tamburlaine plays
are therefore highly charged with political-theological ideas that are
deeply subversive. It is probably because of this intellectual richness
and complexity, full of politically-loaded references to the current
events of the time, that they are not great pieces of timeless theatre.
The ideas and contemporary allusions seem of more interest to the
writer than consistent characterization or plot. And we must admit that
the technique of Lucan does not really work in the theatre. Tamburlaine
fails dramatically precisely because we lack the clear guide to our
sympathies provided by a technique of dramatic counterpoint of the type
Shakespeare has got us used to. Such shocking
juxtapositions as do occur – as when Tamburlaine orders the massacre of
the young women and then launches into a sublime poetic speech on
beauty – only sicken us. It looks like sadism. The grotesque
contradiction between the words and actions of the hero – while it
mirrors the very real contradiction of a cult of chivalry in war, or of
Nazi SS commanders listening to Mozart – leaves us perplexed because
there is no explicit comment upon it. The audience therefore doesn’t
know what to feel. They have no clear guidance that they are meant to
hiss the hero here. Drama is a cruder, more time-bound medium than
poetry. Lucan can make the reader reflect long and carefully about what
he really means, but the dramatist must make us feel it instantly and
react with our emotions in real time. If the emotional response
elicited is contradictory, mixing sympathy and repulsion all at once,
then we are profoundly uncomfortable. Marlowe may in fact want us to
feel uncomfortable with the portrait of triumphant militarism he gives
us. But the limits on freedom of speech in his time do not permit him
to make his moral point more clearly and openly denounce the religious
warmongering of his age. The denunciation must remain implicit – and
therefore ambiguous and dramatically awkward.
Whatever
the confusion, ambiguities, and unresolved problems of this play, in
which the 23-year old playwright seems to be trying to do too many
things at once, its graphic representation of the bloody horrors of war
is of great historical significance for the way war was perceived. In
the tradition of Senecan tragedy developed by Kyd there was already a
sensational taste for gore in the portrayal of cruel murders. It is
Marlowe who transferred this cult of cruelty and gore into the
depiction of war, and underlined the link between cruel wars and
religious fanaticism, the divine mission to kill. His work stands as a
milestone in the representation of war in literature as a hate-filled,
megalomaniac, pathological obsession. And it is an exact mirror of what
was happening in Europe in his time, and of the great religious war
soon to break out in Germany – which was to go on for over thirty years and kill more people than all the European wars since Charlemagne put together.
7) CLASSICAL SATIRE, ROMANTIC PROTEST
A
year before Marlowe was murdered by government agents, a Frenchman died
who had lived through the religious civil wars at even closer quarters,
and had become even more disgusted by human cruelty. Michel de
Montaigne, a man steeped in the works of classical writers, denounced
both the cruelty of torture and contemporary methods of execution,
which he saw as pathological, and also the destructive wars waged by
his own civilization. He attacked the Spanish conquest of the Americas
as based on treachery, and denounced the genocidal massacres carried
out by the Conquistadors. He is the first in a long line of European
writers who inveighed against the commercial impulse of their own
civilization as the cause of the most destructive wars:
So
many cities destroyed, so many nations exterminated, so many millions
put to the sword, and the richest and fairest portion of the world
turned toypsy-turvy to obtain pearls and pepper – victories of
commerce! Never did ambition, never did national enmities, impel men to
such horrible hostility towards others. 49
His
denunciations of the Spanish Conquistadors were based on the published
protests of their own priests who accompanied the expeditions.
Dominicans like Montesinos and Bartolomeo de las Casas denounced the
Conquistadors to their faces for their treatment of the Indians. The
sermon preached by Fr Montesinos to the Conquistadors on Christmas day
1511 in Hispaniola: “By what right or
justice do you keep the Indians in such horrible servitude? Are they
not men? Have they not rational souls? Are you not bound to love them
as you love yourselves?” is unique in history.64 Never
before or since have brutal conquerors been condemned so publicly to
their faces by the moral and humane conscience of their age. The moral
protests against slavery as well as against the wars of colonial
conquest began almost from the outset of the European imperial
adventure. While slavery was a universal institution as old as time,
the subjection to it of the newly discovered populations of the New
World (even though it was among their own practices) became a subject
of bitter contention from the first.
As
a hundred years of religious warfare drew to an end and the
Enlightenment began to dawn, the propensity of man to make war came
under attack from satirists – steeped equally in the moral outrage of
certain classical poets and in the new humanism of a more rational age.
But this humanism itself had Christian roots in the doctrine of
brotherly love, and certain Christian ideas on man’s wickedness played
their role in the growing critique of war. The satire of Swift is not
aimed at particular war-mongers but at man’s own depraved nature, his
cruelty and his tendency to pervert his intelligence to serve his pride
and greed. Gulliver, among the giant Brobdingnags, proposes to instruct
the King in how to make cannon. He gleefully describes the
cannon-balls, which would “rip up the pavements, tear the houses to
pieces, burst and throw splinters on every side, dashing out the brains
of all who came near.”
The
King was struck with horror at the description I had given of those
terrible engines …. He was amazed how so impotent and grovelling an
insect ….could entertain such inhuman ideas and in so familiar a manner
as to appear wholly unmoved at all the scenes of blood and desolation
which I had painted as the common effects of those destructive machines. 50
The
king informs him that he would rather lose half his kingdom than learn
how to make such weapons and forbids him ever to divulge their secret.
“A strange effect of narrow principles and short views!” comments
Gulliver, and points out what an advantage over his enemies this
foolish king was giving up. The Christian moralist in Swift is
indignant at the use of human intelligence to further the slaughter of
war. This represents a certain advance on the attitudes of an earlier
age, where a genius like Leonardo Da Vinci (sufficiently sensitive to
suggest that eating meat will one day be regarded as a form of
cannibalism) could design ingenious machines of war to further the
sanguinary ambitions of any princely patron willing to pay for them.
In
fact by Swift’s time the mechanization of warfare had taken another
important step. With the musket came musket drill, the need to
concentrate firepower by training all the men to fire together in a
series of automated movements. The soldiers became like robots,
deprived of the individual initiative shown by the 16th
century warrior. As a symbol of this, they began to wear uniform, taken
over from the livery of servants. A soldier was now a sort of slave,
subject to ferocious disciplinary punishments. One military historian
compares the new eighteenth century European soldier to the Turkish
janissaries, a class of slave-soldiers created by forcibly seizing the
children of Christian subjects. 51 From this period dates a certain current of contempt for the soldier, especially in Britain.
It is true that this professionalization of armies was accompanied by a
new Enlightenment concern to minimize civilian casualties. But this did
not last long. With the rise of the notion of a people’s army, animated
by nationalist sentiment, put forward by the French military theorist
Guibert even before the Revolution, this squeamishness about civilian
casualties was brushed aside. The new army was to live off the land, by
forceful requisition, giving it more mobility. Guibert’s vision was put
into practice by Napoleon. With the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars
came mass conscript armies and a new cult of the citizen-soldier,
enshrining the notion of military service as the sacred duty of
citizenship. This new militarization of the nation itself accompanied
the rise of nationalism as the 19th century advanced.
The French revolutionary wars were an inspiration to many liberals throughout Europe
who saw the revolutionary armies as a force to smash the old
reactionary order of the absolute monarchs and aristocracies. War thus
became momentarily linked to human progress, and Napoleon enjoyed a
remarkable cult even among liberals like Beethoven and intellectuals
like Goethe. After his fall he was given an even more romantic aura by
novelists like Stendhal (one of the few writers who actually fought in
the wars.) Yet the romantic period brought some anti-war protest from
poets, notably Blake, Shelley, and Byron. Blake and Shelley detested
war as evil personified, one of the obstacles to human moral progress.
Blake famously quarrelled with a passing soldier over the front gate
and was charged with making seditious statements. This anti-war
sentiment was strongest when Britain was engaged in a war against revolutionary France,
with which the English romantics of the younger generation sympathized.
However, there was a split in the romantic perception of war, depending
on whether it was a war of repression or of liberation. Byron was
eloquent against the violence of wars of repression, as when he paints
Castlereigh “dabbling his sleek young hands in Erin’s
gore” as he crushed the Irish rebellion of Wolfe Tone. But he was
sufficiently in favour of wars of national liberation to take part in
the Greek one, which cost him his life. The desire to support
revolution and wars of liberation limited the romantics’ hostility to
war as such. Such causes as Italian liberation from Austrian rule led
many later romantics such as Verdi to a whole-hearted commitment to
patriotic war, which they romanticized and glorified. Garibaldi’s
campaign became an inspiration to romantic lovers of liberty
everywhere, and reinforced the association of struggles for freedom
with war. Decades later the same association occurred in the Irish
struggle for national independence, where nationalist revolutionaries
like Patrick Pearce became advocates of war and bloodshed.
Bloodshed
is a cleansing and sanctifying thing, and the nation that regards it as
the final horror has lost its manhood.… The old heart of the earth
needed to be warmed with the red wine of the battlefields…. Without
shedding of blood there is no redemption. 52
It tends to be forgotten to what extent the enthusiasm for war at the dawn of the 20th
century was fed not only by “reactionary” jingoistic traditions, those
of imperial great power rivalries, but also by revolutionary movements
of national liberation, which were anti-reactionary and “progressive”
in political tendency. Movements of national liberation, from the Irish
to the Poles or the Serbs, wrapped themselves in sanguinary visions of
salvation through violence and terrorism. Terrorism was far more rife
in that period than it is today. Even the beautiful Empress “Sissi” of Austria was killed by an Italian terrorist on the staid, peaceful streets of Geneva
before the turn of the century. The assassination of her nephew by a
Serb anarchist sixteen years later started the First World War. This
strain of violent, anarchist nationalism would lead on to the anarchist
poet Gabriele D’Annunzio’s seizure of Rijeka or Fiume for Italy,
and a certain current of Fascism. The romantic myth of the oppressed
nation rising up to overthrow its oppressors entered powerfully into
the appeal of both Fascism and Nazism. The cult of aggression and
violence was fed equally from other intellectual sources. Marx’s
writings seethed with the violence of revolution, apocalyptic visions
of class revenge, just as Darwinism justified the brutality of colonial
conquest and proclaimed war to be the natural condition of existence.
But this growing cult of war, which accompanied the growth of European
rivalries and the rise of conscript armies in the latter part of the 19th century, was not unopposed. It was countered by a current of Christian-humanist pacifism. The greatest writer of the 19th
century to treat the horror of war as a theme in itself was Tolstoy –
one of the few major writers of the period to have actually fought in a
war. His first book, The Sebastopol Sketches, is about the Crimean War, which he took part in, and his great masterpiece, War and Peace,
deals with the Napoleonic wars. Tolstoy’s life overlaps the beginning
of what we have termed the masculine century. His humanist pacifism
might be regarded as the starting point of civilized Western humanity
before it became progressively brutalized by a century of militarism
and war.
8) THE HUMANIST VISION: TOLSTOY
In
order to see where we are going we might as well state our argument at
the outset. From Tolstoy through to the Vietnam war we see an evolution
in the literary representation of war of a quite striking linear kind.
The attitudes to war we have looked at so far range from the doom-laden
tragic-heroic atmosphere of classical and Germanic literature, to moral
indignation and repulsion at mass slaughter in Marlowe and Swift. This
moral indignation becomes an eloquent emotional protest against war in
Tolstoy and in the First World War poets such as Wilfred Owen, and in a
more complex way in Eric Maria Remarque. Then attitudes harden: first
we have realistic, cynical, resigned descriptions of war as a kind of
unstoppable madness by veterans who choose hardboiled recounting of the
facts rather than protest. Then comes tough-guy stoicism, then sadistic
enjoyment, and finally a hallucinatory recording of vivid sensations of
battle and killing without any emotional response at all. We will
examine these phases with reference respectively to Tolstoy, Wilfred
Owen, Remarque, Robert Graves, Ernest Hemingway, Norman Mailer and
Stephen Wright (author of Meditations in Green.) All
seven of these men went to war at about the age of twenty, and wrote of
it soon afterwards. They cover among them the Crimean war, the First
World War, the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, and the Vietnam
War.
The
striking characteristics of Tolstoy’s depiction of war are humanity,
compassion and a rational sense that war is madness. There is a total
lack of animosity towards the enemy, the French (though he disliked
Napoleon, precisely because he embodied the cult of military glory.)
Instead, there is a sense of the inhumanity and horror of war for all
the people involved. For Tolstoy war is a fundamentally unnatural
phenomenon, and this is the constant theme of his descriptions of it.
Here is how War and Peace
describes a young soldier under fire for the first time. He has had his
horse shot from under him and is confused about where he is.
“Can
they be the French?” He looked at the approaching Frenchmen, and in
spite of the fact that only a moment before he had been dashing forward
solely for the purpose of getting at these same Frenchmen to hack them
to pieces, their proximity now seemed so awful that he could not
believe his eyes. “Who are they? Are they coming at me? Can they be
running at me? And why? To kill me? Me, whom everyone is so
fond of?” He thought of his mother’s love for him, of his family’s and
his friends’, and the enemy’s intention of killing him seemed
impossible. 53
Tolstoy
measures the unnaturalness of war against the yardstick of normal life,
where for anyone to kill this charming, good-natured young man would be
monstrous. He is forever portraying normal human reactions to the
abnormal circumstances of war. His characters suddenly become aware of
the utter unnaturalness of what they are required to do in battle, and
through them we are made to feel the unbridgeable gulf between normal
life and the collective insanity of war.
Tolstoy,
of all the writers on war, is the greatest in his ability to place the
madness of war in a larger human perspective, instead of allowing war
to drown out all else. In his account of the Crimean war, in which he
fought as a volunteer, he describes an incident of fraternization
between French and Russian officers during a truce to clear away the
dead and wounded. He describes their polite and eager conversation
(since Russian officers all spoke French), their exchange of courtesies
and compliments. One Russian officer is curious about the design of a
Frenchman’s tobacco pouch and cigarette holder, which the latter at
once offers him as a souvenir. They commiserate on the dirty job they
have to do, on the dreadful slaughter of the day before, compliment
each other on their bravery, ask after mutual acquaintances. Tolstoy
momentarily shifts his camera to a young boy who has gone to pick
flowers among the dead, and is suddenly terrified by the apparent
movement of a corpse he has touched. Then his camera pans over the
whole scene and he comments:
Yes,
white flags have been raised on the bastion, and all along the trench
the flowering valley is filled with stinking corpses, the resplendent
sun is descending towards the dark blue sea, and the sea’s blue swell
is gleaming in the sun’s golden rays. Thousands of men are crowding
together, studying one another, speaking to one another, smiling at one
another. It might be supposed that when these men – Christians,
recognizing the same great law of love – see what they have done, they
will instantly fall to their knees in order to repent before Him who,
when he gave them life, placed in the soul of each, together with the
fear of death, a love of the good and the beautiful, and that they will
embrace one another with tears of joy and happiness like brothers. Not
a bit of it! The scraps of white cloth will be put away – and once
again the engines of death and suffering will start their whistling;
once again the blood of the innocent will flow and the air will be
filled with their groans and cursing. 54
The
power of this passage comes not merely from the Christian humanist
idealism but from the reasonableness of the tone in which he describes
an act of collective madness. The fraternizing officers are behaving
normally and naturally; it is the war which then resumes which is a
shocking violation of this human normality.
Tolstoy
volunteered for the Crimean war in an élan of nationalistic and
patriotic fervour. The Russians saw themselves as liberators of
Christian Slavic lands which had been for centuries under the Turkish
yoke, and they could not understand the outrageous decision of the
French and British to side with the Turks and the continued Muslim
oppression of Ukrainian Christians. But Tolstoy’s exposure to war led
him to see a huge paradox: no matter how much a war might seem
justified in geo-political terms or even moral terms, as a human fact
it is an abomination, something utterly wrong and insupportable. The
mass slaughter of men who have no reason to hate each other, who have
the same ideas, dreams, beliefs and values, the same fundamental human
decency, is simply unacceptable. It is that terrible contradiction
which Tolstoy constantly tries to show us. Yet, as an ex-soldier
himself, who wrote in much of his work about soldiers, he was not in
fact for most of his life a pacifist. He believed that Napoleon’s
invasion had to be resisted. He is simply appalled by the human fact of
war and how unnatural it is, and he despises the glorification of it in
the hero-worship of Napoleon, who to him was merely a butcher. In
trying to show the gap between whatever beliefs might lead us to
support a war and the appalling nature of war itself, the absolute
contradiction between normal human decency and the savage mayhem of the
battlefield, Tolstoy lays the basis of what will be the whole approach
of the British poets who protested from the trenches against the First
World War.
They
too had started out with enthusiasm, believing in the cause. Most of
the great war poets were volunteers. And they too came up against the
appalling reality gap between their patriotic ideals and the actual
nature of war. The one poet who died so early in the
war that he was unable to record his disillusionment with his initial
enthusiasm left a poem, The Soldier, which still embarrasses
for the naivety of its patriotic feeling. This does not make Rupert
Brooke a worse poet than the others. It simply means he missed out on
the key insight and learning experience which characterized his
generation. But the overwhelming horror of the reality of war as it was
experienced in the trenches creates a shift in emphasis from what we
find in Tolstoy. The British war poets also try to contrast normal life
with the abnormal madness of war. But while for Tolstoy normality is
still self-evident and the madness of war a clear violation of human
normality, to the British war poets normal life increasingly seems an
unreal dream and the horror of war the unending everyday norm. This
comes out in the descriptions of fraternization in the First World War:
they stand in marked contrast to the scene of fraternization described
by Tolstoy.
What
is different about the scenes of fraternization during truces in the
First World War is the emotions of those who took part and described
events afterwards. During the Christmas day truce in 1914 the British
and Germans not only exchanged gifts, photographs and addresses, but
according to one soldier they sang “everything from Good King Wencelas
to the ordinary Tommy’s song, and ended up with Auld Lang Syne, which
we all, English, Scots, Irish, Prussians, Wurtemburgers, etc joined in.
It was absolutely astounding…” 55 Why was it astounding?
What was astounding? The normal behaviour of men singing songs together
is now seen as astounding. The fact that they will afterwards run
bayonets through each other’s bellies is the normal way of behaving:
singing songs together is the miracle, the unnatural thing. This is the
massive shift in perspective that occurs between the Crimean War and
the First World War. In the Crimean War, the inhumanity of the
participants in fighting again after they have just been chatting with
one another is what astounds Tolstoy. In the First World War, it is the
residue of humanity of the participants, their capacity for normal
human behaviour, singing and chatting together when they have the
chance, that now astounds. War is no longer the absurd, insane
exception but the rule; it is ordinary human decency that now seems
exceptional, absurd, unbelievable. Tolstoy describes war as an episode
of madness in a larger sane world. In the First World War there are now
only episodes of bizarre sanity amidst generalized madness. This is the
process of “normalization” of war that takes place in the 20th century.
The scale of the First World War is so massive and overwhelming that it
imposes its reality on the participants as a new normality.
9) WAR AS UNIVERSAL MADNESS: THE GREAT WAR
Some
of the universality of the unreal atmosphere of war was the result of
the ferocious war propaganda, the racist caricaturing of the enemy,
which the British press in particular fed their people. This is in
contrast to the situation in the Crimean War where the upper classes
back in St Petersburg continued to speak French and admire the culture of their main enemy. With the press in London
pouring out hate campaigns against “the Hun” throughout the First World
War, the madness of war was no longer contrasted with some peaceful
normality and rationality back home. The atmosphere at home was often
so sickeningly jingoistic that officers on leave longed to get back to
the comparative sanity of the trenches. There was, in short, no let-up
from the hate-filled unreality of war. It is this that made close
encounters with the enemy strangely disturbing, because they were
almost the only reality check. One British officer reported of the
Germans during the Christmas 1914 truce: “They were really magnificent
in the whole thing and jolly good sorts. I now have a very different
opinion of the Germans.” 56 The ordinary human decency of
the enemy comes to him as a revelation. This leads at times to a sort
of confused cynicism. The difficulty in adjusting mentally to the fact
that the enemy were not what they were made out to be, that moral
convictions were being enlisted in the service of an enormous lie,
leads to a sense of absurdity, a refusal to draw logical conclusions
from anything, a switching off of the mind. Philip Gibbs tells how,
during a pause in the savage fighting at Loos, a British Guards
Battalion gave a concert in the front-line trenches with mouth organs,
combs and paper, and penny whistles. The Germans in the trenches
opposite applauded each number and at one stage a voice shouted across
in English: “Play Annie Laurie and I will sing it.” They did and a
German officer stood on the parapet and sang the song. There was
applause on both sides. The next day battle was resumed “and the young
officers of the Guards told the story as an amusing anecdote with loud
laughter.” 57
There
seems to be an uneasy edge to their laughter. This episode of human
normality and decency is recounted as an absurd prank. Normality has
become a form of truancy. But the whole thing must not be taken too
seriously. It doesn’t do to go too far down this path, which might lead
to mutiny and a court martial for cowardice or treason. That way
madness lies. Better not to think too much about it – treat it all as a
joke, a proof of the absurdity of life. The high command, of course,
feared the breakdown of morale and were deeply suspicious of all
fraternization, which they soon forbade. During the second Christmas of
the war, the British high command insisted on slow shelling of the
Germans all day to discourage any attempts to fraternize like the year
before.
It
is difficult to keep one’s moral bearings in this madness, and the
sense of the absurd and the intolerable leads to complex reactions:
there is moral protest, but there is also much nihilistic cynicism.
Since the wider world has authorized and supports this madness – even the Christian churches, the “universal law of love”, being dragooned into the service of mass-murder – writers
at the front have to cling on to a very personal sense of values in
order to protest against the madness they are living through. Many are
eloquent in their denunciation of the cult of death. Wilfred Owen’s
poems are full of an indignant, bitter sense of wrong, of a tragic
waste of life. Owen’s moral vision is based on constant reference to a
system of values belonging to normal life and normal humanity, an alien
forgotten world which he still believes in and insists on contrasting
with the evil of war. Here is a poem, “Arms and the Boy”, the title a
glance at the first line of Virgil’s Aeneid: traditionally (and poorly) rendered as: “Of arms and the man I sing”:
Let the boy try along this bayonet blade
How cold steel is, and keen with hunger of blood;….
Lend him to stroke these blind, blunt bullet-heads
Which long to nuzzle in the hearts of lads. 58
His
appeal to the ordinary innocence of youth as a silent condemnation of
what this youth will be perverted into – a killer or a mangled corpse –
and his comparison of the bullet to a little pet animal which longs to
nuzzle against a boy’s chest are striking ways of contrasting
normality, youthful vitality and innocence with the sinister cult of
death. The boy’s romantic infatuation with weaponry is seen as a fatal
fascination, a perverse fixation with death, whose true horror he does
not understand. Owen is determined to bring home that horror – to show
the ugliness of death in war, in contrast with the beautiful patriotic
clichés that seduce adolescents:
Gas! Gas! Quick, boys! – An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time,
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling,
And floundering like a man in fire or lime.
Dim through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
In all my dreams before my helpless sight
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin….
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old lie – Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori. 59
Owen
bitterly condemns the Edwardian ethical, educational tradition that has
complacently glorified death in war as the expression of love of one’s
country – ennobling, idealistic, beautiful – when in reality it is a
vile degradation of a human being into a beast and a thing. Owen
rejects the romanticization of war all the more bitterly as a lie and a
betrayal because it appeals so insidiously to youth’s idealism and
thirst for self-sacrifice. Idealism is being used to seduce youth into
its very opposite – a horrific destruction of all ideals in a sordid
mass butchery. For Owen the ultimate nightmare is to imagine that in
carrying out his patriotic soldier’s duty he will kill a poet like
himself on the other side:
Whatever hope is yours
Was my life also……
I am the enemy you killed, my friend.
I knew you in this dark; for so you frowned
Yesterday through me as you jabbed and killed.
“Strange Meeting” 60
The
possibility that he may unwittingly kill all that he values – youthful
idealism, nobility, wisdom, generosity, the worship of beauty –
embodied in another human being in the ranks of the enemy strikes him
as a kind of sacrilege against life that terrifies him. This is to him
the horrific meaning of the war: the slaughter of youth by youth, poet
by poet, idealist by idealist. Owen remains an idealist and a romantic
right up to his death a few days before the armistice in November 1918.
It
is important to see that Owen is a romantic, because there has been a
tendency for a certain strain in the modernist movement to try to see
the war poets as “realists” rebelling against Victorian “romanticism”
and “idealism”. The difference between Owen and Rupert Brooke, who died
before he could write of the full horror of the war and left a
patriotic poem behind (“There is a corner of some foreign field/ That
is forever England.”) is not nearly as great as it might seem. What
Owen rejects is not romanticism and idealism but the lying exploitation
of these things through the misuse of the patriotic poetry of another
age, written long before war became a mechanized holocaust. What he
revolts against is the betrayal of idealism by a system of colossal,
futile and senseless mass murder that has nothing to do with the values
of patriotism and self-sacrifice for freedom that are invoked to keep
it going. But this does not lead him to reject romanticism itself. His
whole frame of reference is 19th century romanticism, no
different from Tennyson’s or Rupert Brooke’s. It is not so much
Tolstoy’s Christianity, “the great law of love”, that he invokes to
condemn the slaughter but romantic idealism, the cult of youth, beauty,
art, poetry, friendship, comradeship, the love of life, and simple
human decency. It is this personal set of human values, which he
manages to make the universal values of humanism and civilization, that
gives his protest the power it has.
But
many other poets do not have the moral idealism of Owen. The war has
destroyed their idealism and left a cynical nihilism behind. There are
elements of this bitter cynicism in Siegfried Sassoon, who writes
biting satirical poems which expose the ignorance and complacency of
the establishment back home which has sent the young men to war.
The Bishop tells us: When the boys come back
They will not be the same; for they’ll have fought
In a just cause: they lead the last attack
On Anti-Christ…..
“We’re none of us the same!” the boys reply.
“For George lost both his legs and Bill’s stone blind.
Poor Jim’s shot through the lungs and like to die;
And Bert’s gone syphilitic : you’ll not find
A chap who’s served that hasn’t found some change!”
And the bishop said: “The ways of God are strange!” 61
Sassoon
became involved with pacifist movements, and was at one point (after a
period of hospitalization) tempted to refuse to return to the trenches,
as a protest against the prolongation of the war by the British refusal
to negotiate a settlement, despite German diplomatic feelers. Sassoon’s
friend and fellow officer Robert Graves dissuaded him from this
protest, as it would allow the authorities to brand him a coward. The
officers who wanted to oppose the war were caught in a moral trap. They
wanted to save the lives of brave men by trying to end the war, but to
protest by refusing to serve was to be branded a coward by the high
command and the press and lose the respect of the very comrades they
wanted to save. Keeping the respect of their fellow-soldiers was the
most important thing to them, and this was the lever the high command
used to force them to submit in silence. They were victims of the very
ethos of bravery and stoicism the war had created. The soldiers had a
code of silence, and of suffering and dying in silence, like prisoners.
Protest wasn’t the done thing. But this extraordinary difficulty of
protest, the insoluble moral imbroglio of the whole issue, led to moral
nihilism and finally in some cases to a kind of moral drift.
Sassoon
was a contradictory figure; before he veered towards pacifism he had
shown at the front a vengeful desire to kill as many Germans as
possible. Every time he lost a friend he wanted to kill more Germans.
Yet he was the one who later wanted to protest publicly by refusing to
go back to the front. After the war he returned to the class milieu that he came from (evoked in the title of his book Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man)
and ended up dining with the very people who had supported the war or
given the orders. He distanced himself from the pacifist camp, which
had become identified with the left and social revolution, even though
they were the ones who had hailed his poems. In short, even moral
protest could not remain pure. Everything became muddied with the
complexities of politics. This led some writers after the war to
refrain from taking any moral view at all. They simply described what
they had lived through, without protest or denunciation. They no longer
seemed to know what to make of it themselves, or what lessons to draw.
What they wanted to do above all was break through the barrier of
obtuse incomprehension as to the nature of war. They seemed to see
civilians themselves as almost the enemy, the uncomprehending fools.
The only people they respected were other soldiers. Robert Graves in
his memoir Goodbye to All That avoids any emotional, rhetorical
denunciation of the war. Instead there is a cold realism, a meticulous
description of daily life at the Front, in an utterly unemotional tone.
The very detachment of the descriptions of shocking events becomes
callous. The shock effect comes from the absence of moral or human
judgement on what is happening. This callousness becomes a means of
rubbing the noses of the complacent pro-war civilians in what it was
like, without exposing the author to the criticism of being an anti-war
bleeding heart. It becomes the preferred mode of anti-war writing of
the twentieth century.
The bitterness of Graves
is so deep that it becomes almost a point of honour not to seem moved
at all by the horrors he is describing, to portray it all as utterly
normal, in a matter-of-fact, seemingly unfeeling way. Instead of
Tolstoy’s attempt to shock you emotionally with the total immorality of
war, there is a studied emphasis on not being shocked at all. It
appears that the conventions of prose writing, though not of poetry,
have moved on to the point where a poignant rhetorical appeal like
Tolstoy’s is no longer possible. Prose has become controlled by the
stiff upper lip, the doctrine of not making an unseemly emotional fuss.
Hemingway’s influence can already be felt (Graves does not publish his
memoir till 1928, when Hemingway is already a dominant literary
figure.) It is essentially the attitude of the trenches, a stoical
spirit of suffering without complaint, which has entered the mainstream
of literary style.
What
we get as a result is sometimes a kind of cool, matter-of-fact
reporting of the brutality of life at the front, without any moral
comment or emotional reaction, a telling of gruesome events in an
understated way, as though they were normal. Perhaps the hope is that
they will shock the reader through the very fact that they do not seem
to shock the writer.
The
most important information that a patrol could bring back was to what
regiment and division the troops opposite belonged. So if it were
impossible to get a wounded enemy back without danger to oneself, he
had to be stripped of his badges. To do that quickly and silently, it
might be necessary first to cut his throat or beat in his skull. 62
This brutality was not only shown towards the enemy. Graves
describes a moment in the middle of a battle, as “hundreds of wounded
streamed by” and the company fixed their bayonets, waiting to attack.
At
that moment the storeman arrived, without rifle or equipment, hugging
the rum-bottle, red-faced and retching. He staggered up to the Actor (the officer in charge)
and said: “There you are, sir!” then fell on his face in the thick mud
of a sump-pit at the junction of the trench and the siding. The stopper
of the bottle flew out and what remained of the three gallons bubbled
on the ground. The Actor made no reply. This was a crime that deserved
the death penalty. He put one foot on the storeman’s neck, the other in
the small of his back, and trod him into the mud. Then he gave the
order “Company forward!” The company advanced with a clatter of steel
and that was the last I ever heard of the storeman. 63
The
author’s evident approval of what seems to have been a summary
execution by drowning in mud of a frightened man drunk on duty is
passed over as one more minor incident in a day of butchery. One man’s
sordid death is a mere detail. The only interesting thing is the
officer’s admirable presence of mind in avoiding the rigmarole of a
court martial by trampling him into the mud on the spot. We are left
with a feeling of appreciation and respect for a no-nonsense leader.
Tolstoy could not have written this. Compassion and humanity have
disappeared from this conception of life.
The carnage is such that it gives rise to a grim, macabre humour. A fellow officer tells Graves of an attack he had led, by platoon rushes with supporting fire.
When
his platoon had gone about twenty yards he signalled them to lie down
and open covering fire. The din was tremendous. He saw the platoon on
his left flopping down too, so he whistled the advance again. Nobody
seemed to hear. He jumped up from his shell-hole, waved and signalled
“Forward!”
Nobody stirred.
He shouted: “You bloody cowards, are you leaving me to go on alone?”
His
platoon sergeant, groaning with a broken shoulder gasped: “Not cowards,
sir. Willing enough. But they’re all f---ing dead.” The Pope’s Nose
machine gun, traversing, had caught them as they rose to the whistle. 64
This
is almost told as an elaborate joke, as black humour. The insidious
efficiency of the Pope’s Nose machine gun of the enemy is almost
admired. This is a kind of insider’s joke, to share with other
insiders, or make outsiders feel how beyond their ken all this is. The
callousness of tone is essential to this. This callousness of manner is
provoked to excess by the presence of ignorant civilians. Here is
Graves back in London on leave.
Some
friends of the family came in one night, and began telling me of the
Zeppelin air-raids, of bombs dropped only three streets off.
“Well,
do you know,” I said, “the other day I was asleep in a house and in the
early morning a bomb dropped next door and killed three soldiers who
were billeted there, a woman and child.”
“Good gracious,” they cried, “what did you do then?”
“It
was at a place called Beuvry, about four miles behind the trenches,” I
explained, “and I was tired out so I went to sleep again.”
“Oh,” they said, “but that happened in France!” and the look of interest faded from their faces, as if I had taken them in with a stupid catch. 65
It is as though the civilians back home did not take seriously the slaughter happening in France – as though
it were on a different planet, an unreal place where such things were
normal, only to be expected, and therefore not worth relating. There is
in the writing of the First World War veterans both a weariness and a
frustration in their attempt to make others understand what it was
like, and to what extent this carnage violated their sense of normal
human feelings. This translates into a blasé callousness, a casual
acceptance of killing, a deliberate lack of any reaction to the
slaughter, an attempt to shock by not themselves being shocked. He went
back to sleep. Five neighbours butchered in their beds was a normal
average night. No emotions were called for. It did not even keep him
awake.
The
First World war veterans’ emotional exhaustion in the face of the
horrors of war has percolated into the entire mentality of twentieth
century Western man. Never before had slaughter been presented so
matter-of-factly, as a thing evoking no sense of shock or horror.
This attitude of callousness becomes part of the modern mind; it is
part of the definition of what we mean by modernity. If you had to date
a dozen passages about war written in various periods of history (in
modern translation, so that the style was of no help), you would look
for this element as determining that a passage belonged to the
twentieth century.
The
Great War saw the greatest numbers of men killed in a day’s battle that
had ever been seen. Men were required to go over the top and run toward
machine-guns which mowed them down like firing squads. Casualty rates
in such charges could be as high as fifty per cent. How did these men
feel as they did this? One described it in these terms:
In
an attack such as this, under deadly fire, one is as powerless as a man
gripping strongly charged electrodes, powerless to do anything but go
mechanically on; the final shield from death removed, the will is fixed
like the last thought taken into an anaesthetic, which is the first
thought taken out of it. Only safety or the shock of a wound will
destroy such auto hypnosis. At the same time all normal emotion is
utterly numbed. 66
Another described his experience in the third person:
It
seemed to him that he was alone in a pelting storm of machine gun
bullets, shell fragments and clods of earth. Alone because the other
men were like figures on a cinematograph screen – an old film that
flickered violently…. He could recognize some of the figures in an
uninterested way. Some of them stopped and fell down slowly. The fact
that they had been killed did not penetrate his intelligence….. They
were unreal to him. His mind was numbed by noise, the smoke, the dust. 67
Another reported :
I
grew into a state of not-thinking, not-feeling, not-seeing. I moved
past trees, past other things. Men passed by me, carrying other men,
some crying, some cursing, some silent. They were all shadows, and I
was no greater than they. Living or dead, all were unreal.… 68
What
is striking in all these accounts is the emphasis on numbness, on not
feeling, on an utter absence of emotional reactions. Emotion was the
first casualty of the Great War. And the survivors of these suicidal
charges had to do it again and again. It was not just one supreme test
of mad courage in a single afternoon’s battle, but a test that repeated
itself over and over, sometimes daily, sometimes weekly, for four
years, if you were lucky enough to live that long. The effect of this
repeated numbing of all emotional response can only be guessed at. It
is certain that men came out of it utterly changed. The tone of those
writing about it even several years afterwards, like Robert Graves, is
one of emotional exhaustion, even a kind of permanent emotional
anaesthesia. The overwhelming nature of this experience shaped the
character and behaviour not only of the participants but of all Western
men in a hundred ways. All men had to measure themselves from now on
against this experience. At some deep level of the collective psyche,
of unconscious fear, they all knew that this experience is what awaited
them, this is what they had to prepare themselves for, because this is
what being a man now meant. The war permeated every aspect of the
culture of the next half-century. Men’s haircuts, styles of clothes,
ways of walking, talking, joking and above all feeling (or rather not
feeling) were altered for fifty years by the Great War. The sense of
humour of the trenches, a quiet irony in the face of generalized
madness and death, has become the quintessential modern sense of
humour. The tendency to understate, to minimize horrors, to be
matter-of-fact about appalling things, to deprecate emotion, are all
products of the trenches. The war produced a generalized callousness,
an inability to feel, even among those (like Graves) who began finally to oppose it as a senseless waste. Witness this exchange between Graves and Bertrand Russell. The ardent pacifist Russell asked him suddenly:
“Tell
me, if a company of your men were brought along to break a strike of
munition makers, and the munition makers refuse to go back to work,
would you order your men to fire?”
“Yes, if everything else failed. It would be no worse than shooting Germans.”
He asked in surprise. “Would your men obey you?”
“They
loathe munition workers and they would be only too glad of a chance to
shoot a few. They think that they’re all skrim-shankers.”
“But they realize that the war’s all wicked nonsense?”
“Yes, as well as I do.”
He could not understand my attitude. 69
One sympathizes with Russell. What this suggests in Graves is that the numbing of all emotions has created
a moral indifference. It is the deadened response of the shell-shocked.
He no longer feels that shooting strikers would be a big deal. He has
seen too many men shot for it to matter. This suggests that morality is
a to a large degree dependent on emotion: if we do not feel an
emotional response of indignation or pity or revulsion, if these
reactions have been deadened, then we do not make a moral judgement –
or at least it remains without effect on our behaviour. The callousness
is all the more remarkable because Graves
shares the anti-war convictions of Russell and the putative strikers.
What little capacity for human sympathy still survives is confined to
the other members of the company, those who have shared the experience
of the front. The strikers are not part of the brotherhood of sufferers
and have no right to their pity. They have avoided serving and are
therefore suspected cowards and shirkers, fitting objects of
retribution. In the pages preceding this dialogue Graves
makes clear his contempt for all fit men of military age who avoided
serving in the war, even though he is himself against it. How can we
explain this? That the brotherhood of sufferers at the front have
become the only worthwhile human beings? That the sufferers respond
with a collective aggression against the rest of the world, which does
not understand what they have endured? That those who have suffered
direct their resentment and hatred against all those who have not, like
prisoners released from an atrocious prison? This goes a long way
towards explaining the psychology of the violent fascist movements
which arose among the veterans in most of the countries of Europe in the years following the war.
Graves’ detestation of the militaristic, patriotic hysteria of England
makes him cut short his leave to return to the front as soon as
possible, even though he is suffering from severe nervous strain. He
hates both the militarists and the pacifists back home. He is revolted
by the new army training sergeants, who urge recruits in bayonet
practice to rip open German bellies with maximum cruelty. He hates all
those who are not actually at the front, sharing in this ultimate
experience, which strips men of whatever illusions – patriotic,
militarist, religious, pacifist – they may have. His
institutionalization, subordination to the system, in which he has been
raised since his public school days, makes any public protest against
the war, such as his friend Siegfried Sassoon wished to make, out of
the question. He is terrified that Sassoon, by publicly refusing orders
to return to duty, will be accused of cowardice. This to him is the one
unacceptable fate. The only way you can prove you are not a coward is
by going back to the trenches. Anything else would expose you to the
contempt of your suffering comrades. That he is playing the game of the
cynical military authorities in accepting this barbaric code does not
sway him. He is trapped by his own soldier’s pride. He is a prisoner of
a public school code of silence, which is similar to the code of common
prisoners. You do not squeal and you do not make a fuss, whatever the
atrocious punishment being meted out. (You simply take the opportunity
to do the same to somebody else, e.g. the enemy or the striking
munitions workers.) You go silently to your death keeping the rules of
the institution which is destroying you. It is increasingly this code
which becomes the code of twentieth century manhood. It is strikingly
similar to the code of a prison population. One might call it the code
of honour of cannon-fodder. It was first diffused from the trenches of
the First World War, and gradually spread throughout an entire
civilization.
This
is not to suggest that all men of the twentieth century absorbed the
sufferings of the First World War soldiers by some mystical process of
osmosis. But the men who fought in that war were numerous (65 million)
and the 56 million survivors lived a further half century and had an
overwhelming influence on those younger. In each of the major
belligerent countries there were nearly ten million role models, men
who had been to hell and back. Their attitude of having seen it all, of
being men whom nothing can any longer faze, became for those growing up
under their shadow a mere pose, it is true, but also an essential and
expected style of behaviour. Men for the next half-century had to
measure themselves against the war veterans, to try to give themselves
and others the impression that they too could have endured the
trenches. That became the measure of manhood. And so the style of the
veteran of the trenches: short hair, suntan, dangling cigarette, the
taciturn, unfeeling, nonchalant pose which does not flinch when someone
a few yards away gets shot, becomes the male style of the twentieth
century. It is essentially a style that advertises its insensitivity,
its ability to endure punishment, to support shocks and shells and
blood and horrors without batting an eyelid. It develops in a direct
line to the casual heartlessness of the Nazi SS soldier, able to shoot
a child in the back of the head without blenching.
In
our general argument at the outset we suggested that signs of a new
callousness and indifference towards bloodshed, death and the suffering
of others are likely to be evidence of a shift in men’s character
towards a new extreme of masculinity. This is what we find throughout
accounts of the First World War: a new capacity not to feel or show
emotion in the face of sickening horrors. This capacity is closely
correlated to levels of testosterone; the more feminine you are, the
more likely you are to vomit or be upset at the sight of someone being
tortured, mutilated, cut open or killed, because you empathize more
with suffering. Autism (which often makes people unable to empathize
with others’ emotions) is an overwhelmingly male condition and has now
been shown to be male-hormone related. Our ability not to react
emotionally to things that should inspire emotion is a key sign of the
over-masculinization of Western man in the twentieth century, largely
as a result of the overwhelming effect of war on the human psyche. The
psychopathic behaviour of the German SS battalions was not an
inexplicable aberration, a perverse flying off at a tangent of the
human personality. It was merely going a little further down the same
path of “hardening” of the sensibilities that most “normal” Western men
travelled in the twentieth century. In battle they learned to see their
mates killed without blenching as they walked through a hail of machine
gun fire. They learned to throw the corpses of dead friends onto carts
like so many sacks of rubbish. They learned to cut the throats of enemy
wounded in order to take back their regimental badges as evidence of
the units they were fighting. In a later war, they learned to firebomb
cities from the air, knowing that thousands of women and children would
be burnt alive. And in the SS they learned to shoot little girls in the
back of the head, or lock people in barns and burn them. These are not
different types of behaviour; they are different degrees of the same
thing. They are all different stages along the same continuum, of
hardening your heart till you are capable of every form of brutality,
which became the essence of 20th century manhood. When Germans in Police Battalions in Nazi-occupied Poland,
assigned to shoot Jewish women and children, were asked after the war
why they did not accept the offers of their superiors to be excused if
they could not handle it, they replied that they did not want to be
considered cowards. 70 They saw the shooting of women and
children as one more virility test. The only question was: did they
have the balls for it or not? Most of them wanted it to be thought that
they had.
In
the Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang, in the country where I grew up, the
initiation ceremony was to screw a sheep, gouge its eyes out, douse it
with petrol and set it on fire. Cruelty was a central part of the test
of toughness. This is merely an extreme form of the virility test that
men as a whole were subject to in the 20th century. What it was testing was the ability to suppress the normal human impulses of pity and revulsion. For the 20th century that is what manhood often came to mean.
The
founders of Nazism and fascism were before all else war veterans. They
formed what Mussolini called the trenchocracy: the elite who had lived
with death in the trenches. These were men who had seen slaughter at
such an insanely high rate that human life meant nothing to them. If
the poet Graves after this experience could relish the idea of shooting
striking munitions workers, how much more easily could a fanatical,
half-educated misfit like corporal Hitler relish shooting anyone who
opposed his messianic beliefs. The idea of killing millions no longer
appals if you have already seen millions killed. If you have seen close
friends decapitated by your side and had to go on as if nothing had
happened, then you can sentence your enemies to be shot without giving
it a second thought. The morality of Nazism was born in the trenches.
Nazism was merely the German version of “bringing the war home” –
frustrated ex-soldiers, embittered at their “betrayal”, deciding to
bring the ethos of the battlefield, the appalling cheapness of life,
into the political arena. Auschwitz was merely Verdun
inflicted deliberately on those you hate. Murder them mechanically by
the thousand. It is what the soldiers had had done to them. The entire
mass-murdering ethos of twentieth century totalitarianism grew out of
the unprecedented mass-murder of the First World War. Not to have
called off that war when it became a stalemate, to have prosecuted it
to the bitter end, was the original sin of the twentieth century for
which close to two hundred million lives had finally to pay. And one
must consider whether the Allies bear the greater share of that guilt
through their moral fanaticism in considering the Kaiser’s Germany “evil” and not fit to be negotiated with when a truce was on offer.
Hitler
was a product of the trenches. He merely carried out the soldiers’
revolution that many a veteran on the Allied side dreamed of. His
attitudes are strikingly similar to those of Graves in contemplating the cowardice of those who had stayed home.
The
front was unknown to the whole parliamentary political rabble. Only a
small fraction of the Parliamentarian gentlemen could be seen where all
decent Germans with sound limbs left were sojourning at that time. 71
When Eric Maria Remarque in All Quiet On The Western Front
contemplates defeat by “too many fresh English and American regiments
.… too much corned beef and white wheaten bread. Too many new guns. Too
many aeroplanes”, he too draws the bitter lesson of betrayal.
But
we are emaciated and starved. Our food is bad and mixed up with so much
substitute stuff that it makes us ill. The factory owners in Germany have grown wealthy; dysentery dissolves our bowels. 72
Nazism
was partly the revenge of those who had fought in hell on those who
hadn’t, of the soldiers on the skiving politicians and businessmen who
had stayed home. And as one might expect in a veterans’ revolt, it was
irrational, bloody and fanatical in the extreme. The wonder was not
that Nazism succeeded in Germany, but that the same kind of movement of hate-filled, revengeful veterans did not succeed throughout Europe
as fifty million of them returned home. This revolt could have gone in
any political direction. Eric Maria Remarque speaks of the enormous
energy of revolt generated by the war, and how the German soldiers, at
a certain moment, after feeling their invincibility in battle, could
have marched back from the front and overthrown the whole established
order. “Had we returned home in 1916, out of the suffering and strength
of our experiences we might have unleashed a storm. Now if we go back
we will be weary, broken, burnt out, rootless, and without hope.” 73
Such a revolt might well have been more socialist and pacifist than
fascist. But the displacement of the anger of the veteran from those
who had caused and supported the war to those who had tried to end it,
Hitler’s fury at the treason of the munitions workers’ strike in 1917
(which he, like Graves, would have broken by force), meant that the
greatest resentment was felt against those pacifist-socialist scum who
had prevented the suffering soldier reaching his only salvation and
redemption : victory. That is why it was two of the great losers of the
war, Germany and Italy
(which got an unexpected thrashing from the Austrians) where the
veterans’ revolt succeeded, and that is why that revolt turned fascist
and nationalistic. It was their soldiers who had been deprived of the
psychological rewards of the superhuman efforts they had made. The
veterans on the winning side were in a sense bought off by the fanfare
and hoax of victory. They wore their tin medals and endured the charade
of their triumph in bitter silence. Those on the losing side had
nothing to assuage their fury and despair.
The
whole tragic complexity of tormented emotion of the First World War is
expressed at the highest level of art in one novel that we have already
cited: Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front. This is a novel in the German tradition of the bildungsroman,
the novel of growing up, of youth becoming man. Perhaps because of the
German tradition of introspection, of uninhibited description of
youthful passions, thoughts and sensations, the novel reaches a level
of psychological depth and emotional intensity that no other war novel
comes close to. The author tells the story of a handful of young
eighteen-year-olds persuaded to enlist by their patriotic teacher –
who, by an irony, is later conscripted to join them, and whom they
delight in tormenting by quoting his own fulsome patriotic phrases back
at him as they drill him into the ground. It is a novel of bitter
experience destroying youthful illusions, of youth being separated by
the experience of war from all that it has known and valued. What is
remarkable is the extreme swings of mood and emotion, from the most
hard-bitten to the most moving. It starts off with a good-humoured
quarrel over a field kitchen meal where the men cheerfully insist on
being fed the full quota of 150 portions for their company, even though
only eighty of them have survived the last battle. Then the narrator
Paul has to watch an old school-friend whose leg has been amputated die
of gangrene, crying quietly for the waste of his life. At nineteen they
are already battle-hardened veterans who train the new recruits brought
in to replace the casualties.
The
scenes of battle have a fury and a madness that suggest men transported
out of themselves by the terror of death and the blind determination to
kill to avoid it. Here is a scene where they have been cooped up for
days in the dug-out without food under a shell barrage so ferocious and
so interminable that several of the new recruits go mad and have to be
beaten unconscious to stop them running out of the dug-out to their
deaths. At one point the dug-out is invaded by a swarm of maddened rats
and they engage in a frenzy of slaughter which only just stops short of
killing each other. Then they take a deafening direct hit which shakes
the dug-out. One of the shell-shocked recruits makes a dash to the door
and as the narrator runs after him there is a second blinding explosion
and bits of the recruit are plastered all over the walls. They then try
and play a card game but can’t concentrate and have to give up. They
are starving. The shelling goes on.
Night
again. We are deadened by the strain – a deadly tension that scrapes
along one’s spine like a gapped knife. Our legs refuse to move, our
hands tremble, our bodies are a thin skin stretched painfully over
repressed madness, over an almost irresistible bursting roar. We have
neither flesh nor muscles any longer, we dare not look at one another
for fear of some incalculable thing. So we shut our teeth – it will end
– it will end – perhaps we will come through. 74
Then
the shell barrage shifts from the line of their trenches to a hundred
yards behind them and they realize the moment has come for the enemy
charge. They race out of the dug-out to prepare their defences. They
begin hurling grenades at the oncoming troops.
We
recognize the smooth distorted faces, the helmets: they are French.
They have already suffered heavily when they reach the remnants of the
barbed wire entanglements. A whole line has gone down before our
machine guns…. I see one of them, his face upturned,
fall into a wire cradle. His body collapses, his hands remain suspended
as though he were praying. Then his body drops clean away and only his
hands with the stumps of his arms, shot off, now hang in the wire. 75
The defenders are forced to retreat from their trenches, fighting as they go.
We
have become wild beasts. We do not fight, we defend ourselves against
annihilation. It is not against men that we fling our bombs, what do we
know of men in this moment when Death is hunting us down – now, for the
first time in three days we can see his face, now for the first time in
three days we can oppose him; we feel a mad anger.
No longer do we lie helpless, waiting on the scaffold; we can destroy
and kill, to save ourselves, to save ourselves and to be revenged. We
crouch behind every corner, behind every barrier of barbed wire and
hurl heaps of explosives at the feet of the advancing army before we
run. The blast of the hand grenades impinges powerfully on our arms and
legs; crouching like cats we run on, overwhelmed by this wave that
bears us along, that fills us with ferocity, turns us into thugs, into
murderers, into God only knows what devils; this wave that multiplies
our strength with fear and madness and greed of life, seeking and
fighting for nothing but our deliverance. If your own father came over
with them you would not hesitate to fling a bomb at him. 76
As they retreat, the enemy pursuing them suddenly falters and begins to fall back. At once they turn for the counter-attack.
The
lines behind us stop. They can advance no further. The attack is
crushed by our artillery. We watch. The fire lifts a hundred yards and
we break forward. Beside me a lance corporal has his head torn off. He runs a few steps more while the blood spouts from his neck like a fountain. 77
They charge back to their own front-line trenches and then beyond them on the heels of the retreating enemy.
We
have lost all feeling for one another. We can hardly control ourselves
when our glance lights on the form of some other man. We are insensible
dead men, who through some trick, some dreadful magic, are still able
to run and kill. A young Frenchman lags behind, he is overtaken, he
puts up his hands, in one he still holds his revolver – does he mean to
shoot or to give himself up! – a blow from a spade cleaves through his
face. A second sees it and tries to run farther; a bayonet jabs into
his back. He leaps in the air, his arms thrown wide, his mouth wide
open, yelling; he staggers, in his back the bayonet quivers.…
Suddenly
in the pursuit we reach the enemy line….A machine guns barks but is
silenced by a bomb. Nevertheless the couple of seconds has sufficed to
give us five stomach wounds. With the butt of his rifle Kat smashes to
pulp the face of one of the unwounded machine gunners. We bayonet the
others before they have time to get out their bombs. Then thirstily we
drink the water they have for cooling the gun.
We
jump through the narrow entrances into the trenches .… Haie strikes his
spade though the neck of a gigantic Frenchman and throws the first
hand-grenade.…... We stumble over slippery lumps of flesh, over
yielding bodies; I fall into an open belly on which lies a clean new
officer’s cap.
The
fight ceases. We lose touch with the enemy.…..We must retire .… we dive
into the nearest dug-outs and with the utmost haste seize on whatever
provisions we can see, especially the tins of corned beef and butter,
before we clear out.
We
get back pretty well.…. We lie for an hour panting and resting before
anyone speaks. We are so completely played out that in spite of our
great hunger we do not think of the provisions. Then gradually we
become something like men again.
The
corned beef over there is famous along the whole front. Occasionally it
has been the chief reason for a flying raid on our part, for our
nourishment is very bad. We have a constant hunger. 78
The
transformation of men into wild beasts is told so vividly, so
precisely, in such an onward surge of delirious excitement, that we
enter the minds of the men being so transformed, we relive the
experience of frenzied mass homicide that made twentieth century man
what he became. The genius is in the detail: after bayoneting the
machine gun crew, they gulp down the water used to cool the gun barrel.
Both killing and drinking are blind physical reflexes. They have become
starving animals desperate to survive. But despite this transformation,
these men remain in touch with what they were, with the human world,
though it is now only like a strange dream that comes to them when they
rest. A few lines later, after the men feast on their booty, we have
this:
The
evening benediction begins. Night comes, out of the craters rise the
mists…. I am on sentry and stare into the darkness….. The parachute
lights soar upwards and I see a picture – a summer evening, I am in the
cathedral cloister and look at the tall rose trees that bloom in the
middle of the little cloister garden where the monks lie buried. Around
the walls are the stone carvings of the Stations of the Cross. No one
is there. A great quietness rules ….
And I stand there and wonder whether, when I am twenty, I shall have experienced the bewildering emotions of love. 79
Coming
after the scene of slaughter this poetic interlude is surreal; and yet
precisely because of this, it carries the ring of truth. We are
reminded suddenly that this veteran of slaughter is not yet twenty.
Next he remembers the line of poplars along a stream near his town
where he played as a child – the idyllic place he had evoked to his
childhood friend dying of gangrene. He tries to analyse why he thinks
of these images now.
It
is strange that all the memories that come have these two qualities.
They are always completely calm …. They are quiet in this way because
quietness is so unattainable for us now. At the front there is no
quietness .… the muffled noise of shelling is always in our ears…. But
these last few days it has been unbearable.
Their
stillness is the reason why these memories of former times do not
awaken desire so much as sorrow – a vast inapprehensible melancholy…..
They are past, they belong to another world that is gone from us….. we
are dead and they stand remote on the horizon.
And
even if these scenes of our youth were given back to us we would hardly
know what to do. The secret tender influence that passed from them into
us could not rise again. Today we would pass through the scenes of our
youth like travellers. We are burnt up by hard facts; like tradesmen we
understand distinctions and like butchers necessities. We are no longer
untroubled – we are indifferent. We might exist there ; but should we
really live there? We are forlorn like children, and experienced like
old men, we are crude and sorrowful and superficial – I believe we are
lost. 80
This
is the theme of the novel: a generation’s sense of being lost. In his
foreword Remarque claims it is “neither an accusation nor a confession,
and least of all an adventure. It will simply try to tell of a
generation of men, who, even though they may have escaped its shells,
were destroyed by the war.” 81
The
hero feels this destruction of his identity when he returns home to
visit his mother, who is sick with cancer. His feelings are so confused
and inexpressible that he breaks down in helpless tears as he arrives.
But he has to pretend all is well at the front to calm his mother’s
worries, he realizes that just when he needs her comfort most he can
never have it. There will never be communication, he can never bury his
face in her breast and weep for his lost boyhood, even though his short
pants are still hanging in the wardrobe. He must show no feeling that
will upset her. He is no longer himself in this house he has grown up
in. He sits in his room among his prized books and
tries to think himself back to who he used to be. He feels how utterly
alien and unreachable the world of his youth now is. He wishes he had
not come home, that he had stayed in the mood of indifference of the
front. He has to face the mother of his friend who died of gangrene,
and he insists to her that he died of a bullet in the heart. She makes
him swear to it on all that is sacred to him, and he asks himself if
anything is sacred. His father asks endless stupid questions, he wants
to know all the prurient details of war. Has he had a hand-to-hand
fight yet? “I realize he does not know that a man cannot talk of such
things…..it is too dangerous for me to put these things into words. I
am afraid they might then become gigantic and I will no longer be able
to master them. What would become of us if everything that happens out
there were quite clear to us?” 82
Remarque
manages to convey in his superb narrative the schizophrenia that weighs
on war poets like Owen: the huge, unspeakable contrast between the
innocence and idealism of youth and the horror of the war. What Owen
evokes through his contrasting images, the boy and the bayonet, the
bullets that long to nuzzle in the hearts of lads like young pet
animals, Remarque conveys through the narrative of his young soldier
going home to the normal life that used to be his, and discovering it
is no longer his life but someone else’s.
His
young fellow-soldiers themselves often remark that the war has
destroyed them for anything but war. They cannot imagine civilian life,
since they have never worked yet; they enlisted straight from school.
In the course of their discussions the soldiers show nothing but
cynicism concerning the politicians who have made this war, mixed with
resentment of the profiteering which has left them so bereft of decent
food and supplies. Conventional patriotism means nothing to them. They
are fighting for survival and for their comrades. The middle-aged
civilians Paul meets on leave complacently discuss which bits of Belgium and France
should be annexed. He feels nothing but contempt for them. Later when
he is stuck all night in no man’s land in a shell hole with a Frenchman
whom he has bayoneted by reflex, mortally wounding him, he tries to
dress his wounds, he begs his forgiveness. He tells him how much he
would like to be his friend, and how similar they are, and how wrong
the war is that they should be killing each other. The Frenchman cannot
understand German and remains terrified of him. Paul cannot stand the
interminable gurgling the dying man makes as his life leaks away. Even
after he dies he keeps talking to him, as hunger has made him
delirious. He promises to write to his wife, finds the photographs of
wife and child in his pocket, learns his name and profession:
type-setter. He promises in his madness that if he survives he will
fight against all wars.
But
the hero too is animated by the same brutal soldiers’ morality as the
generals, which consists of contempt for cowards and anyone trying to
shirk battle. He catches his former hated NCO, now of the same rank,
skulking in a dug-out pretending to be wounded, and he beats and kicks
him till he forces him to go out and join the attack. He laments the
greenness of the new young teenage recruits, who are so lacking in
training that they die like flies, unable to fend for themselves. “It
brings a lump to the throat to see how they go over and run and fall. A
man would like to spank them they are so stupid, and to take them by
the arm and lead them away from here where they have no business to
be.” 83 They are so young they are too small for their
uniforms: “no uniform was ever made to these childish measurements.” He
finds a whole dug-out full of them dead from a gas attack “with blue
heads and black lips” because of their ignorance. Then he reflects: “we
are weary to death; when the attack comes we shall have to strike many
of the men with our fists to waken them and make them come with us.” 84 The
iron necessity of war forces him to be harsh and brutal towards his
fellow soldiers. It is the price of collective survival in the mad
world they are in, and there is no way out of it.
But
Remarque never glories in this brutality. He simply states it. He never
supposes that the men who have hardened themselves in this mad world
have achieved some superior status to those who haven’t. He sees them
as men who have had violence done to them, who have lost their
innocence and humanity, who have been distorted and “destroyed” by the
war. Nor is there any merit in survival. They are down to thirty-two
out of a company of a hundred and fifty after two years. The best
soldier of all, their beloved company leader Kat, or Katczinsky, the
one with the sixth sense for finding food, who can find his way through
any barrage, is killed at last. Paul carries him all the way to the
dressing station with a leg wound, but he catches a splinter of
shrapnel in the head on the way. He is thunderstruck to be told on
arrival that Kat is dead.
Do
I walk? Have I feet still? I raise my eyes, I let them move round, and
turn myself with them, one circle, one circle, and I stand in the
midst. All is as usual. Only the Militiaman Stanislaus Katczinsky has
died. 85
He
has already concluded that Chance rules all. There is no survival on
merit. “Over us Chance hovers. If a shot comes, we can duck, that is
all; we neither know nor can determine where it will fall….. It is this
Chance that makes us indifferent.” 86 He describes
extraordinary pieces of chance that happened to him, when he left a
dug-out to go to visit some friends and found it destroyed by a shell a
minute later. And in the last lines, he himself is killed on a day so
still “that the army report confined itself to a single sentence: All
quiet on the Western front.” 87
There
is heroism in Remarque’s novel, but it is not primarily the bravery of
men under fire. It is the heroism of the survival of humanity and human
emotions – love, friendship, generosity, idealism, compassion – in the midst of a mad, hellish world where they must behave like animals to survive. Of
all the First World War veterans who wrote of their experiences,
Remarque comes over as the most human, the least callous, the least
deformed by war. He tells of extreme experiences with the most
intensity, the most vividness, the most sensitivity and emotional
expressiveness. He is that rarity: the man writing of utterly
dehumanizing experiences without having been dehumanized. Perhaps the
romantic traditions of German writing have something to do with this:
he was not under the bleak spell of Hemingway, which many English war
veterans were by the time they wrote their memoirs. After Remarque the
autobiographical narratives of war become more subdued, blasé,
hardened; they lose any capacity to recreate the hysterical frenzy of
battle, the inner state of young men out of their skins with fear and
aggression. What predominates from then on is numbness, callous
indifference or the sleepwalker’s detached suspension of feeling, which
as we have seen are the major indicators of the ultra-masculine
viewpoint. But there are new attitudes added, particularly by American
veterans. The first is a note of grim stoicism, the acceptance of war’s
horrors as normal, and the implication that this acceptance is a sign
of toughness of mind. This is something Remarque never falls into for
long, because his young schoolboy soldiers remain convinced that what
they are living through is collective madness, which will ruin them for
normal life. And on the heels of that American “normalization” of
barbarity comes a second attitude: an insidious moralization of death
or survival in war as merited, as a reward or punishment for courage or
cowardice, by writers who see war not as an unnatural state but as a
paradigm of life itself, a Darwinian jungle in which only the strong
survive. This attitude is carried over into civilian life afterwards as
if there is no difference between the two states, war and peace. The
two writers who typify these two new attitudes are Ernest Hemingway
(largely the first attitude) and Norman Mailer (both of them.)
10) WAR AS A PARADIGM OF LIFE : HEMINGWAY
Hemingway is one of the most influential authors of the 20th
century; his way of writing about the wars and barbarism of the age
left their mark on all who came after him. This is partly because he is
an excellent narrator, with a spare style, an eye for detail, and an
art of making you intuit feelings behind a minimalist description. But
it is not so much in his technique that his influence resides as in his
mental attitude. Here he is in his great novel about the Spanish Civil
War, For Whom The Bell Tolls, describing matter-of-factly how
the dead are treated. The fascists have just wiped out a group of
partisans on a hill-top and the officer is inspecting the dead.
“Take
that one too,” he said. “The one with his hands on the automatic rifle.
That should be Sordo. He is the oldest and it was he with the gun. No.
Cut the head off and wrap it in a poncho.” He considered a minute. “You
might as well take all the heads. And of the others below on the slope
and where we first found them….”
Then
he walked down to where the lieutenant lay who had been killed in the
first assault. He looked down at him but did not touch him. “Que cosa
mas mala es la guerra,” he said to himself, which meant, “What a bad
thing war is.”
Then
he made the sign of the cross again and as he walked down the hill he
said five Our Fathers and five Hail Marys for the repose of the soul of
his dead comrade. He did not wish to stay to see his orders being
carried out. 88
It
is the mixture of delicacy of feeling, sadness, silent grief, with the
brutality of the hacking off of the heads of the dead enemies which is
striking here. Firstly, it makes their barbaric actions seem more
plausible, more human, not in the least an opponent’s caricature of the
fascists. Secondly, it makes these brutal actions seem all the more
commonplace, since they can be done by somebody possessed of delicacy
of feeling. It is another technique for indicating the barbarity of
war, how brutality is normalized. So that at first sight it looks to be
similar to what Remarque is doing in his frenzied, violent narrative,
or what Graves is doing in his
laconic report on everyday atrocities – emphasizing the utter brutality
and inhumanity of war, that it is a separate state ruled by a different
moral order. But when you look more carefully, Hemingway is really
doing something quite different from Graves and Remarque.
For
these authors are writing about war as such – war as a special
condition, a different moral planet from normal life, in stark contrast
to it. Hemingway is writing about war as simply part of life, life at a
more intense level. The normality, the complexity of Hemingway’s
characters (even the sketchily drawn fascist officer), makes this a
novel essentially about life, not about war. The explicit purpose of Graves
and Remarque is to expose what the Great War was like, and how it
affected the men who fought. Their work is more or less anti-war
protest, however much Graves
disguises this as simply providing an historical record of how it was.
Hemingway is doing something different. On one level he is simply
telling a story, an action story set in war-time, like hundreds of
other popular war novels that followed. The story is about the attempt
to blow up a bridge by some Republican partisans behind fascist lines,
and the dramatic interaction of the characters in this group, including
a love plot. It is not all that different in shape from a popular
adventure-war-story like The Guns of Navarone. But the climax
is not the success of their action (and the botching of the larger
attack) but the death of the hero. The novel is about death, about
inflicting death and facing death, universal themes. And war in this
context becomes not the unnatural hell exposed by the weary,
shell-shocked veterans of the trenches. War is merely a more intense
state of life itself.
When the fascist lieutenant says “what a bad thing war is”, he really means “what a bad thing life is”. These
are not men behaving in some especially brutal way because of war.
These are men behaving normally, dealing with the normal events of life
according to their characters, and they happen to be in a war. Remarque or Graves would have been eager to show us (by under-statement or simply letting the appalling facts speak for themselves) the
monstrousness of what these men are doing because of the unnatural
condition of war. They show how monstrousness has been made normal by
war – how an officer will trample a man to death in the mud, or a
comrade will cleave a man’s face in half with a spade, because they are
in some special state where normal human rules do not apply. Hemingway
shows us, by contrast, the typical human nature of his characters’
actions, even when they do inhuman things. This is human nature in its
normal state, not an unnatural or monstrous state at all. Or so he
tries to convince us.
In
this novel there are relatively few scenes of battle. The most graphic
descriptions of killing are civilian atrocities. Strikingly, for a man
whose sympathies are clearly with the Republican side, Hemingway
describes in most vivid detail the atrocities committed by Republican
villagers against the local fascists. He does this by a clever
narrative technique. It is all told through the recollections of Pilar,
a Republican fighter whose boyfriend Pablo organized the massacre. She
at first supports it and then is gradually sickened by it. We see it
therefore through the eyes of someone at first detached, objective, or
at least with mixed feelings, whose growing disgust keeps pace with
ours. Pablo is holding prisoner the local fascists (landowners,
shopkeepers, mayor, priest) in the government building, and has lined
up the peasants outside in two ranks, armed with flails, clubs and
pitchforks. They form a gauntlet through which the fascists will be
forced to walk, so that they will be beaten to death by the whole
community and then thrown into the river.
The
first fascist notable who comes out the door is the Mayor. An
instinctive respect for him seems to prevent the crowd hitting him as
he walks through the lines. They cannot bring themselves to commit acts
of cold-blooded violence. Then he comes abreast of a tenant of his with
a grudge against him, who screams “Cabron!” and lashes out at him in
fury. This releases the crowd’s inhibitions and they beat the mayor to
death and throw him over the cliff. The vengeful tenant continues to
shout “Cabron!” even as the body falls into the river below. With the
second victim they are already more at ease in their task. The third
victim provokes the peasants with insults and is thrashed to death with
gusto. The crowd is now getting into the swing of things. It is the
mood of the crowd which interests the observer, as it shifts from a
reluctant participation in this necessary purge of the local class
enemy to an uncontrollable sadistic rage. But the people are not
demonized as an anonymous mass; they are sharply differentiated into a
dozen or more colourful characters. The evolution of their feelings,
including the growing disgust of some of them with the butchery, is
detailed minute by minute. A young man called Don Faustino, a cowardly
playboy who tried to be a bullfighter and failed, is so terrified
walking between the lines that the crowd, in contempt and mockery,
refuses to hit him, and he is thrown over the cliff alive. Pilar
comments: “It was then that I knew the lines had become cruel and it
was first the insults of Don Ricardo and then the cowardice of Don
Faustino that had made them so.” 89 The next man, Don
Guillermo, is the store–owner, a man considered decent apart from his
politics, who under normal circumstances might have been let go by the
crowd. But they are now on a roll, fuelled by drink and bloodlust, and
are in the mood to mock their victims. They joke about his
short-sightedness and the fact that the weapons they are using came
from his store. His wife begins screaming his name from a nearby
balcony, and they mock her screams. This provokes the old man to hit
one and he is beaten to death under the eyes of his family.
Some
peasants leave the lines in disgust at this and are replaced by
riffraff. The gauntlet has degenerated now into a drunken mob. After
killing one more they try to storm the building where the other
fascists are still waiting, praying with the priest. Pilar, now full of
horror at what is happening, looks through the window at the scene of
desperation within. Pablo at last opens the door and lets the mob in to
butcher the lot of them.
The
whole event is described with such apparent objectivity, with such a
sharp eye not only for detail but for human psychology, the crowd are
represented as so “all-too-human” that we are left with a portrait not
of a raging mob in a civil war but of ordinary humanity, a little out
of control, but not all that different from their normal selves. It is
the lack of overt moral condemnation, the very humanism and
understanding of the author, which makes the scene so disturbing. His
shrewd insight into the impulses behind these horrible acts and how
they gradually build up and get out of control makes them seem not the
acts of a special time of social collapse but the acts typical of human
beings in any age. And it is this clear-eyed depiction of human
cruelty, not as a repulsive pathology, or the product of special
circumstances, but as something universal, comprehensible, inherent in
man’s nature, that is Hemingway’s hallmark and perhaps his biggest
influence on the spirit of the century. In his Nobel Prize citation he
was praised as “one of those who, honestly and undauntedly, reproduce
the genuine features of the hard countenance of the age.” But this determination to reproduce the hard countenance of the age can become a sickness of another sort.
Let
us fast-forward for a moment to another war, and land in the pages of
the great Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz as he describes, in The Captive Mind, a young communist writer he calls Beta who was in Auschwitz,
and who “read Hemingway avidly”. Death camp survivors, like the
survivors of a terrible war, find that the sheer quantity of horror
they must describe exhausts their capacity for emotional reaction.
Hence they often adopt a tone of cold detachment which is like
callousness. Beta goes to the extreme. He relates his experiences in
terms that are utterly devoid of any emotions or moral viewpoint. His
deliberate callousness is meant to rub in the totally dehumanized world
of the camps, in the manner of Graves
writing of life at the front, only much more so. The narrator makes
himself out to be a self-serving, profiteering, gloating, servile
collaborator with the kapos and the camp guards, because this was the
only way of surviving, of getting the cushy jobs that provided enough
to eat. He is obsessed with demonstrating man’s utter depravity,
through displaying his own. Here is one incident where a furious camp
officer orders the killing of some Greek prisoners who are too weak to
walk properly.
“Why are you standing there like a dumb dog?” the kapo screamed at me. “Tell Andrej to settle with them. Los!”
I ran down the path.
“Andrej, finish them off! Kapo’s orders!”
Andrej
seized a stick and struck with all his might. The Greek shielded
himself with his arm, howled, and fell. Andrej put the stick across his
throat, stepped on it and rocked himself. I went on my way quickly. 90
The
execution was carried out by Andrej, a Russian, obeying an order
relayed by the Polish narrator, and given by a kapo whose nationality
we are not told. The prisoners who wanted to survive became part of the
chain of mass murder, automatically, without reflecting, as though
everyone prefers to be with the killers than the killed. Such
collaboration with the Nazi death machine seems to carry no shame, no
remorse, no guilt. But the narrator goes further: he exults in the
cleverness of his survival techniques. He triumphs over his less
fortunate fellow inmates. “They keep moving to avoid a beating; they
eat grass and slimy mud so they won’t feel hungry; they walk
dejectedly, still living corpses.” But he is different, he reflects
with satisfaction. “It’s good to work after one has eaten a breakfast
of a rasher of bacon with bread and garlic and washed it down with a
can of condensed milk.” 91 His collaboration has given him
a host of privileges. He flaunts the fact that he still has a silk
shirt which he keeps spotlessly clean amid the rags and filth of the
others. He is a prisoner of another class, one of the survivors. In
this way he relentlessly rams home his own viciousness of character, as
a demonstration that in this world only the cruel and heartless
survive. Selfishness is universal. He describes a young Jewish woman
arriving at the camp who realizes the mothers of children are being
loaded into trucks to be taken away and gassed along with their useless
offspring. She hurries away to try to leave her child behind, but it
runs crying after her. When challenged by the guard Andrej, she denies
the child is hers. Andrej beats her to the ground and throws her into
the truck with her child, reviling her as an unnatural mother. A
watching Nazi officer approves the morality of this stern punishment of
a reprobate parent. Beta also describes a scene where some Greek
prisoners at the camp station are worried about the approach of a
train, fearing that they may have to unload iron rails or planks. The
heavy hauling worries them. They ask the guard if it will be heavy
work.
“Niks. Transport kommen, alles krematorium, compris?”
“Alles
verstehen,” they answer in crematorium esperanto. They calm down; they
won’t be loading rails on trucks or carrying planks. 92
The prisoners are relieved that their task will simply be herding Jews into the gas chambers. Mass murder is a cushy job. Milosz comments after a number of these vignettes:
But
the concentration universe also contained many human beings who spurred
themselves to the noblest acts. None of them figure in Beta’s stories.
His attention is fixed not on man – man is simply an animal that wants
to live – but on “concentration society”. Prisoners are ruled by a
special ethic ….. every man saves himself as best he can. The truth
about his behaviour in Auschwitz,
according to his fellow prisoners, is utterly different from what his
stories would lead one to suppose; he acted heroically and was a model
of comradeship. But he wants to be tough and he does not spare himself
in his desire to observe soberly and impartially. He is afraid of lies.
93
Milosz,
after mentioning Beta’s fondness for Hemingway, analyses Beta’s
psychology as that of the disappointed lover. Disillusioned with the
depravity, cowardice and cruelty of man, he is utterly determined
henceforth to see in mankind only those characteristics. All idealism
is hypocrisy. Human goodness lasts only so long as civilized law
prevails. He has seen philosophers fighting over scraps of garbage. The
only hope for him becomes Marxist-Leninism. There at last is realism, a
system that recognizes that man is not governed by his good intentions
but by the laws of the social order in which he is placed. Changing the
social order becomes everything. So Beta returns to Poland
and becomes the most fanatical and abject propagandist for the
Communist Party. Thus the cynicism of disillusionment becomes the
motive force for the worship of an iron tyranny, bent on
world-conquest. Like Hobbes, his very contempt for human nature leads
him to support absolute dictatorship. His disillusionment is above all
with the values of civilization. He lumps capitalism, Christianity and
Hitlerism all together in the same basket. Milosz sums up the tone of
his later book, The Stony World, in the following sentence: “You told me about culture, about religion, about morality, and look what they led to!” 94
This disillusionment is an even stronger version of what some writers
and artists felt after the First World War – blaming civilization for
its destruction by savagery. But this disgust with
mankind ultimately becomes a self-disgust; or it becomes at any rate
unendurable. Beta’s embittered love affair with humanity finally pushes
him to gas himself in his kitchen at the age of thirty. 95
Despite
the similarity of their ends, this is a very different trajectory from
Hemingway’s. But we can see how one path branches off from the other.
Hemingway is far from blind to human virtues and idealism. For Whom the Bell Tolls
contains love, tenderness, loyalty and selflessness. It is a meditation
on death and human solidarity. But he sees these virtues as existing in
a harsh world where viciousness and cowardice predominate, and death
overshadows all. Milosz’s Beta sees the death camp as a paradigm of
life, which reveals the truth of human nature. Hemingway sees war the
same way. He treats the particular circumstances of war as though they
were universal, as though they represented life at its most essential
and most characteristic. When his hero Robert Jordan is wounded at the
end and decides to say good-bye to the others and lie and wait with his
machine gun for the fascists to come up the hill and find him, he is
facing death not as one faces death in war, but simply as one faces
death. As his wounded leg becomes unbearably painful, he asks himself
whether he should hang on till the fascists come so that he can shoot a
few and help the cause, or whether he should kill himself in case he
faints first and is then captured and tortured for information. But
this is not presented merely as a dilemma of war, but as a dilemma of
life. It is a paradigm of any life where a man suffers and asks himself
whether he should go on or end it now. His deliberations are meant to
be those of every man facing death, as if death always comes with a
choice: suicide or toughing it out and risking unbearable pain. There
is nothing in his situation itself which is exceptional. Everything is
presented as normal, as he looks out over the beautiful landscape, the
hills, the pine trees, the heather and the gorse, towards the plain,
stretching away to Madrid
invisible in the distance. The charms of nature make him feel all the
seductive attractions of staying alive. He reflects on his life: “You
had a lot of luck, he told himself, to have had such
a good life. You had just as good a life as grandfather’s, though not
as long.” 96 In his balance of gratitude and regret for
life, he is Everyman waiting for this premature, unexpected misfortune
to finish him off. It happens to have been caused by a bullet in a war,
but it could have been anything: an accident, a sudden illness. We have
to see the difference between this and Remarque’s hero spending the
night in a shell-hole with an enemy whom he has bayoneted and then
tries desperately to keep alive. This is a scene from nightmare,
leading to a moralistic and humanistic conclusion: Remarque’s young
German soldier begins babbling to the uncomprehending, dying Frenchman
that if he lives he will preach against war forever, that war is an
unnatural hell. For Hemingway war is merely life itself, a circumstance
that intensifies life, but does not negate it. He spends his own life
seeking exactly these extreme situations where life is balanced
delicately against death, where the imminence of death concentrates the
mind on life. Only in this state of tension is he fully alive. And he
ends up killing himself to prevent a slow decline into the humiliation
and helplessness of old age. One can only imagine that that act of
suicide must have been the emotional highpoint of his life.
We have moved then in Hemingway from a representation of war as hell (which we saw in Graves
and Remarque) to a representation of war as life writ large. He
conceives the cruelties and atrocities that people are capable of,
whether in war or revolutionary anarchy, as simply human nature at its
most typical, not something to arouse disgust and indignation, but
something to be observed and understood. This leads on to far more
extreme cynics of human nature, such as Milosz’s communist Beta, who
see man as nothing but a vile animal. But this view of war as the
epitome of life leads to other conclusions too. The values of war –
ruthlessness, cruelty and callousness – become in this logic the values
of life in general. They are no longer the values of an exceptional
state, where normal morality has been suspended. They are normal
morality. This is the step taken by a writer who spent all his life
obsessed with following in Hemingway’s footsteps, however crudely he
caricatured his views: Norman Mailer.
11) LIFE AS WAR : MAILER
Mailer’s best-selling war novel, The Naked and the Dead, was
written in his mid-twenties shortly after he served in the war in the
Pacific. It is about a platoon that takes part in the invasion of an
island occupied by the Japanese. They repel a Japanese counter-attack
and then the platoon has to make a patrol across the island to
reconnoitre the Japanese rear. The first thing that strikes you in the
novel is the absence of any real human bond among the men in the
platoon. Their level of aggression and hatred of one another is
astonishing. They are forever on the brink of fistfights. Anyone who
tries to approach another man with overtures of friendship is seen as a
neurotic weakling, and is rudely rebuffed. They occasionally have
sessions of ribald joking together, but this seems to impart no
permanent warmth to their relations. Though all of them seem to be
constantly afraid, they give each other little encouragement even in
the direst circumstances. There is none of that sense of comradeship
and loyalty to one another which inspires Remarque’s German boys to see
it through together, even after they have stopped believing in victory
or their commanders. Mailer’s soldiers have no compassion for one
another’s weakness, no admiration for one another’s strength. Weakness
inspires contempt, and strength provokes jealousy and resentment.
Though they are suffering the same discomforts, often imposed by a
mean-minded and callous military command, they feel no common cause in
their resentment, but turn it against one another, as though each
suspects the other of a different attitude to authority than his own.
Their dominant urges are competition, mutual hatred and spitefulness.
Each of the men is carefully drawn as a character and given a neat,
schematic history by means of flashbacks to his childhood and youth.
But the characters are portrayed without sympathy. The author appears
to like none of them and nor do we.
Red
is a drifter, driven by an aggressive spirit of rebellion against
everyone and everything, from the moment when he walked out on the
family that depended on him after his father’s death in the mine. He
hates the army and picks endless quarrels, though he never quite goes
through with the fights. Gallagher is a man consumed by a bitter sense
of injustice, a conviction that he has always been hard done by. Martinez
labours under a deep inferiority complex as a Mexican, as well as
suffering from nerves shot to pieces by too much combat. Brown is
obsessed with the fear of being cuckolded by his wife back home and
pours out non-stop invective against women. Goldstein is convinced that
everybody else is an ignorant, vulgar anti-Semite. Like the frail,
wimpish Roth he thinks nobody likes him, and makes pathetic and clumsy
attempts to find “buddies”, which always fail. Lieutenant Hearn has the
same problem, an awkward well-meaning man who dislikes the privileges
of the officers but is unable to get on with the men he wants so badly
to be accepted by. Hennessey is a mooncalf wet behind the ears, who
should never have been allowed out of the house, much less into the
army. Wilson
is perhaps the most likeable soldier, a huge southern redneck obsessed
with women and whisky, but at least with a sense of fun. But the
dominant character is Sergeant Croft, the man with ice in his veins. He
is a natural leader, the one who drives the patrol onward across the
mountain, and quells mutiny at gunpoint. He is seen as a man consumed
by hatred but with the steel nerves and total aggression that Red
lacks. The author explains that “he is that way because the devil has
claimed him for one of his own”, and then evokes a tough Texas
childhood, during which he never accepted defeat in a fight. He is of
tough pioneer stock and worked as a cowboy, before serving a stint in
the National Guard, during which he shot dead a striker. He then
married an unfaithful woman, which drove him to enlist.
The lack of sympathy generated for the novel’s characters, their vicious, quarrelsome and disagreeable
nature, might tempt one to believe that the author is presenting a
deliberately negative image of war and what it does to men. But, like
Hemingway, Mailer makes little distinction between war and life itself.
This is merely a cross-section of American manhood reacting in their
own individual ways to the great virility test of war, and the more
brutal and callous they become, the more successfully they have passed
the test. Mailer seems to defend himself against the charge that this
novel is brutal, heartless and full of despicable characters in the
foreword to the 50th anniversary edition. He tells us in this
introduction that Tolstoy was his inspiration in writing it, and that
what Tolstoy taught was compassion combined with severity.
For
that is the genius of the old man – Tolstoy teaches us that compassion
is of value and enriches our life only when compassion is severe, which
is to say when we can perceive everything that is good and bad about a
character but are still able to feel that the sum of us as human beings
is probably a little more good than awful. In any case, good or bad, it
reminds us that life is like a gladiator’s arena for the soul and so we
can feel strengthened by those who endure, and feel awe and pity for
those who do not. 97
One
might consider this a curious reading of Tolstoy, who, however sharp
his irony, appears ultimately tolerant of all human foibles except
cruelty. The notion of life as a Darwinian gladiator’s arena also seems
rather removed from Tolstoy’s vision. The words “arena for the soul”
appear a little disingenuous, since for Mailer physical survival alone
counts, whatever the spiritual or moral condition of the survivor. But
taking it on its own terms, let us see how well Mailer has learned the
master’s lesson in “severe compassion”, by comparing a passage from The Sebastopol Sketches with one from The Naked and the Dead.
Both books were written by young men who had gone to war in their early
twenties, and these accounts of their experiences, written in their
mid-twenties, made the reputation of both writers.
Here
is Tolstoy describing a soldier being killed in a mortar attack. First
we have the man’s thoughts as the mortar shell hovers above the
soldiers and they don’t know which one is going to be killed.
“Who’s
it going to kill? Mikhailov or me?……But perhaps it will only be
Mikhailov who’s killed. Then I’ll be able to tell the story of how we
were walking side by side when he was suddenly killed and spurted blood
all over me. No, it’s closer to me. I’m the one who’s for it.”
It
was at this point that he remembered the twelve roubles he owed
Mikhailov as well as another debt he owed to someone in St Petersburg,
one he should have paid a long time ago; the gypsy melody he had sung
earlier that evening came into his head; the woman he loved appeared in
his thoughts wearing a hood adorned with lilac ribbons; he remembered a
man who five years earlier had insulted him and on whom he had never
got his own back….. 98
A few seconds later, after the mortar shell falls:
He
could feel something wet in the region of his chest – this wet
sensation made him think of water and he would have drunk whatever it
was his chest was wet with. “I must be bleeding from that fall,” he
thought, and becoming more and more obsessed with the fear that the
soldiers who were continuing to flicker past were about to trample on
him, he mustered all his strength and tried to shout: “Take me with
you!” Instead, however, he began to groan so horribly that he grew
terrified at the sounds he was making. Then red lights began to dance
in front of his eyes and he had the impression that the soldiers were
piling stones on top of him. The lights grew more and more sparse and
the stones being placed on top of him seemed to weigh more and more
heavily on him. He made an effort to heave them aside, straightened
himself up, and then neither saw nor heard nor thought nor felt
anything more. He had been killed on the spot by a shell-splinter that
had struck him in the middle of the chest. 99
What
we note here is indeed the compassion of Tolstoy, even though he sees
clearly the vanity and selfishness of many of the soldier’s thoughts.
But as the man dies, victim of the sheer lottery of
death in a mortar attack, he enters on a process of disintegration of
his consciousness which transcends any personal faults or pettiness of
character. There is a tragic dignity in this struggle of a human life
against the enclosing darkness, irrespective of the qualities of the
individual man.
Here
is Mailer, describing a similar incident of a soldier being killed in a
mortar attack. Hennessey is a naive, scatter-brained kid who has never
seen action before, and when the first mortars explode above his
foxhole he panics.
He
heard an awful exploding sound which seemed to fill every corner of his
mind, and the earth shook and quivered underneath him in the hole…. The
explosion came again, and the dirt and the shock, and then another and
another blast. He found himself sobbing in the hole, terrified and
resentful. When another mortar landed, he screamed out like a child,
“That’s enough, that’s enough!”
His
thighs felt hot and wet and at first he thought, I’m wounded….He moved
his hand back and realized with both revulsion and mirth that he had
emptied his bowels…. He began to get the giggles.…. 100
At
first he worried about whether he would have to pay the army for a new
pair of trousers. Then he began to get the giggles again. “What a story
this would make to tell Pop.” But then he looked out of his foxhole,
saw no heads in the other foxholes, and began to think they had all
gone.
Hennessey
began to suspect he had been left alone. “Toglio, Corporal Toglio,” he
called, but it came out a hoarse croaking whisper. There was no
answer….He was alone…. He had never seen combat before and it was
unfair to leave him alone; Hennessey began to feel bitter at being
deserted. Suddenly he knew he couldn’t stay here any longer. He got out
of his hole. ….
“Hennessey, where are you going?” Toglio shouted. His head had suddenly appeared from the hole.
Hennessey started, then began to babble. “I’m going to get the others. It’s important, I got my pants dirty.” He began to laugh.
“Come back,” Toglio shouted.
The
boy looked at his foxhole and knew it was impossible to return to it.
The beach seemed so pure and open. “No, I got to go,” he said and began
to run. He heard Toglio shout once more, and then he was conscious only
of the sound of his breathing. Abruptly he realized that something was
sliding about in the pocket his pants made as they bellied over his
leggings. In a little frenzy he pulled his trousers loose, let the
stool fall out, and then began to run again. ……
Abruptly he heard the mortars again, and then right after it a machine gun firing. A
couple of grenades exploded with the loud empty sound that paper bags
make when they burst. He thought for an instant, “There’s some soldiers
after them Japs with the mortar.” Then he heard the terrible siren of
the mortar shell coming down on him. He pirouetted
in a little circle and threw himself to the ground. Perhaps he felt the
explosion before a piece of shrapnel tore his brain in half. 101
This passage has many points in common with Tolstoy’s but compassion, even of a severe kind, is not one of them. What Mailer
has added is a note of contempt for the soldier being killed which is
completely alien to Tolstoy. The boy is made despicable by his sobbing,
by his childishly self-pitying thoughts: “It was unfair to leave him
alone.” Finally his silly excuse: “I got my pants dirty” makes him seem
almost mentally retarded. He is made ridiculous by having lost control
of his bowels. Having to empty the turd from his trouser leg as he runs
is a cruel touch. It reduces him even more to childlike status. He is
clearly the impossible recruit, the addle-brained kid who never gets
anything right. He remains that in death; it confers on him neither
dignity nor tragedy. And what is most disturbing is the implication
that this recruit, the greenest, most muddle-headed, panic-stricken and
ignorant, somehow deserved to be singled out by the mortar bomb.
Breaking and running in a moment of confusion and loss of nerve, he has
got what was coming to him. There is a Darwinian element in this scene:
war is somehow a way of killing off the weak, sorting out those fit to
survive and those unfit. The tough, ruthless platoon sergeant Croft had
already sensed Hennessey’s unfitness just before the action, as he
watched him nervously scratching his knee.
Croft
gazed at the white flesh with its blond hairs, noticed the pains with
which Hennessey replaced his trouser in the legging….. That boy is too
careful, Croft told himself.....And then with a passionate certainty he
thought: “Hennessey’s going to get killed today.” He felt like laughing
to release the ferment in him. This time he was sure. 102
The
glee of a sergeant at the prospect of one of his own men (a harmless,
naive kid) being killed is something peculiarly sick, but we never
quite believe that Mailer himself sees it as sick. Croft has a Darwinian philosophy of an extreme kind.
Croft
always saw an order in death. Whenever a man in the platoon or company
had been killed he would feel a grim and quiet satisfaction as though
the death was inevitably just…. Croft had none of the particular blend
of pessimism and fatalism that Red and Brown felt. Croft did not
believe that the longer he was in combat the poorer his chances became.
Croft believed a man was destined to be killed or not killed and
automatically he had always considered himself exempt. 103
Now Croft’s thoughts are not necessarily Mailer’s, but the trouble is Croft’s ruthless Darwinian
philosophy is entirely borne out by the novel. All those in the platoon
who die are somehow weak, unfit or cowardly specimens. There is
Hennessey, who is mentally and emotionally unfit. Then there is Roth,
who is physically unfit – a slightly built youth who cannot take the
rigours of the long march across the mountain, and who is also a social
misfit, unable to make friends with the tough, experienced soldiers in
the unit he has just joined. Sheer exhaustion makes his nerve fail as
they all have to jump across a gap in a ledge above a precipice. At
first he refuses to jump, and then, goaded by the others, forces
himself to. He misses his footing and plunges to his death. “The
Platoon was shattered,” writes Mailer, “too stricken, too terrified to
move on.” 104 This seems a little improbable, after the
death of a man to whom they had never shown a shred of decency while he
was alive. Croft had only hours before killed his pet bird, and even
though Red stood up to Croft over it, when Roth tried to thank him
later he brushed him gruffly aside, seeing him as a “mongrel dog” who
if he gave him a scrap of food would follow him for days:
Roth
would latch on to anyone who was friendly to him. He couldn’t afford
it; Roth was the kind of man who would stop a bullet soon….There was
something nasty, unclean about the emotion Roth was showing. Red always
curdled before emotion. 105
Gallagher
at least has the honesty to blame himself for Roth’s death, recalling
“the momentary power and contempt he had felt as he bawled at Roth to
jump.” 106 A short time before on the trail Gallagher had
tried to lift Roth, collapsed from exhaustion, and “had clouted him
across the back of his head”, shouting “Get up, you Jew bastard!” The
insult had hurt Roth more than the blow. It confirmed him in his
general view of the unfairness of the world, since he didn’t even
believe in Judaism. “Hitlerism, race theories” is all he can mutter to
himself in his sense of outrage. 107 While our sympathies
are with him as a victim of brutality and bigotry, his meekness, his
social ineptitude (unable to adapt his preppy language or spaniel
manner to the hard men around him), combined with his silent complaint
about the world’s unfairness, reinforces our sense of him as a wimp, a
man who just doesn’t have what it takes. When he dies, we are not meant
to be surprised. Like Hennessey, he has only got what was coming to him.
Lieutenant Hearn, who is killed when Croft leads him into a Japanese ambush by not telling him that his scout Martinez
has killed an enemy sentry just up the track, is another ineffectual
misfit. His weakness is both his paralysis when under fire and his
confused social attitudes. He is a member of the upper class who has
adopted liberal views. He is angered by the officers’ callous treatment
of the men, and by the racist and fascist views expressed by the senior
brass. He gets offside with most of them and is generally disliked. He
is the aide of General Cummings, who treats him with a mixture of
friendliness and playful cruelty, poking fun at his view of the world.
Hearn lacks the sycophancy necessary for a successful career as an
officer, and anyway detests the established order. But when assigned to
lead the platoon, despite all his good will and eagerness to win the
men’s friendship, he is resented by them. They see him as an
inexperienced, “ninety-day wonder” upper-class officer, supplanting the
tough sergeant Croft, whose brutal authority they prefer. Under fire
for the first time, Hearn is paralysed and does not know what orders to
give. His death, engineered by Croft, appears again as the strong
snuffing out the weak.
Even
the powerfully-built, hard-drinking, bragging womanizer Wilson, who
takes a Japanese bullet in the stomach and eventually dies of his
wound, has been singled out for death by a prolonged bout of diarrhoea
which has weakened him. He confesses to suffering already from some
long-term stomach illness needing an operation, which he is afraid of.
The bullet has mercifully selected a man doomed by disease anyway.
Croft, looking at Wilson,
actually formulates the conclusion the book seems to bear out: “If a
man gets wounded, it’s his own goddamn fault, Croft thought.” 108 And the same goes for when a man gets killed.
Now
this Darwinian elimination of the unfit deserving death contrasts
starkly with the way death is portrayed by the other war veteran
writers we have seen. Tolstoy, Owen, Graves and Remarque all see death in battle as a matter of pure chance. Both Graves
and Remarque saw the best soldiers in their units killed by chance
bullets. They would have been outraged by Mailer’s Darwinian view, that
death in war is proof that a man was an inferior specimen. They would
have seen this as an insult to dead comrades. To return to Graves for a moment, here is an incident where the fateful god that rules death in war is evoked. At one point an adjutant remarks to Graves
and some fellow-officers on the extraordinary fact that they “have had
five hundred casualties in the ranks since Loos and not a single
officer.”
Then he suddenly realized that his words were unlucky.
“Touch wood,” David shouted.
Everybody
jumped to touch wood but it was a French trench and unriveted. I pulled
a pencil out of my pocket, that was wood enough for me. Richardson said: “I’m not superstitious anyway.” 109
David
looked a bit worried that evening, and confessed to being fed up and
having a cold. He was shot through the neck by a sniper a short time
afterwards. At first Graves was
pleased because a wound would mean his friend being sent home.
Unfortunately he died in the dressing station, choking on his own
blood. Richardson died a few minutes later. The adjutant was just telling Graves
how deeply he regretted his unlucky remark when a shell killed the
fourth officer who had been present. The hecatomb of men who had heard
the unlucky remark is related as one of those eerie coincidences that
feed the superstition of soldiers. But the superstition is absolutely
impersonal. Bad luck is a demon with no regard for persons, whether fit
or unfit. Death does not select unfit specimens, only unlucky ones.
There is not a hint of Darwinism here, as there is in Mailer. Death in
war has no rhyme or reason, which is what makes its operation tragic.
It strikes down the brave and the cowardly, the good and the bad, with
perfect indifference. The tragic world-view itself was the product of a
warrior culture, that of ancient Greece
which saw war as a chaos without any moral order. It is the world-view
largely shared by Hemingway. But Mailer’s view is very different.
In Mailer’s novel there are no brave men killed, and therefore no real tragedies. The apparent exception, Wilson,
was in fact a fool and a drunkard, suffering from some stomach disease
which mysteriously attracted the Japanese bullet. All those who were
killed deserved it. They were all, in their different ways, cowards and
weaklings. Courage protects a man like an amulet. This peculiar
combination of Darwinian “survival of the fittest” beliefs and
Calvinist notions of divine election and predestination is echoed in
Mailer’s later books, set in peacetime. Certain passages in An American Dream
suggest a curious notion of a deity who tests men’s courage, rewards
risk-takers and destroys cowards. Courage is to Mailer the only
important human virtue. Certainly compassion and humanity can’t hold a
candle to it. Those who place compassion and kindness high on their
list of virtues (Roth, Hearn) are killed. Those who believe in courage
and ruthlessness, Croft and General Cummings, come out winners. The
ordinary soldiers, in preferring Croft’s harsh style of command to
Hearn’s humane methods and attempts to win them over, make clear the
book’s moral judgement. Even when Croft goes to extremes in his
slave-driving leadership, he successfully faces down an attempted
mutiny. Only an attack of hornets, a terror more powerful than him, is
finally able to break his iron hold over his men as they panic and run.
But even this does not undercut him – it only shows up the poor human
material he is trying to lead. There is irony in the novel’s ending,
especially towards the army commanders, but it is never directed at
Croft. He remains the exemplar of courage and iron willpower in
carrying out the hard and often pointless missions of war – the unsung,
undecorated American hero.
Croft
is presented to us with all the insignia of the American hero from the
beginning. We first see him on board the troop ship, in a midnight
poker game: when a soldier trying to sleep tells them to keep the noise
down, Croft, described as “a lean man of medium height”, challenges him
quietly to a fight and the soldier backs down. Once ashore, they have
to push some anti-tank guns through the jungle to reinforce their line,
and Croft shows himself the toughest and most tireless in this
exhausting task. When the Japanese try and attack by night across the
river, Croft is the hero of his sector, keeping his nerve and repulsing
the attack while a number of his men go to pieces. A few days later
comes an even more revealing incident. Croft, Red and Gallagher are out
on patrol when they come across four Japanese soldiers resting in a
hollow. Croft takes them out with a grenade. He then tells Red to
finish them off as they lie motionless, either dead or stunned. Red,
though resenting Croft’s order, shoots three of the enemy soldiers in
the back of the head. His rifle jams as he is about to shoot the fourth, who
leaps up and draws a bayonet. Red runs, and Croft masters the situation
by forcing the Japanese to surrender at gunpoint. Red is ashamed of
having panicked, and Croft tells him to go ahead up the track and they
will take care of the prisoner. The prisoner, fearing what is to come,
pleads for his life. Croft plays a little game with him, giving him a
cigarette and a bar of chocolate. The Japanese soldier calms down and
they have a rudimentary conversation in sign language in which the
prisoner shows them photos of his wife and children. Gallagher mimes
that his wife is about to have a baby and the prisoner smiles. Croft
gives the Japanese another cigarette, and then, as he puffs at it and
smiles dreamily, shoots him in the head.
The
prisoner did not even have time to change his expression before the
shot crashed into his skull. He slumped forward and then rolled on his
side. He was still smiling but he looked silly now.
Croft
stared for almost a minute at the Jap. His pulse was slowing and he
felt the tension ease in his throat and mouth…. He felt quite blank
now. The smile on the dead man’s lips amused him and a trivial rill of
laughter emitted from his lips.…. “Goddam,” he said, “that Jap sure
died happy.” The laughter swelled more strongly inside him. 110
There
is no further comment on the incident. Croft is in no way diminished by
the act of murder, or the sadistic game he played. It is thought of as
part of his hard man’s character. It in no way leads
anyone in his platoon to respect him less, but rather the contrary. The
jungle law of Mailer’s world means the most brutal, violent man is
necessarily the dominant male whom all look up to. This act of murder
is therefore one more proof of his dominant virile status. What is
troubling in this scene is the author’s attitude: there is none of
Tolstoy’s irony to make us see other perspectives on this. We seem
invited to enjoy Croft’s action, or be impressed by it rather than
condemn it. Graves also tells stories
of men killing prisoners out of laziness, revenge, or jealousy of their
being sent to a cushy, safe prison camp. It is considered a nasty piece
of spite, a dirty trick and nothing more. Graves
sees it perhaps as one more testimony to the corrupting effect of war
on man’s moral sense. In Remarque enemies trying to surrender are
killed during the frenzy of a charge where men can no longer control
their homicidal urge. What is disturbing in Mailer is the
cold-bloodedness of the act, and the author’s apparent lack of
distance, his lack of awareness of the moral issue. He seems to
identify emotionally with Croft. The dwelling on the killer’s physical
sensations, his tense throat, his racing heart, suggests that we are
meant to view the act of killing as a heroic overcoming of nerves, a
challenge to his courage which he has successfully faced. The act of
murder of a Jap is presented as a sort of achievement, a mastery of
oneself, a demonstration of mental toughness.
At
the end of the novel, after the American offensive has broken the
Japanese resistance on the island, there is a mopping up operation
where the scattered remnants of the enemy are hunted down and killed.
General Cummings reviews with satisfaction the numbers of dead:
Sixth day: 347 Japanese – 1 American.
Seventh day: 502 Japanese – 4 Americans.
This
is not fighting but massacre. The half-starved Japanese, out of
ammunition, are not fighting, they are being hunted down in a turkey
shoot. Mailer emphasizes how little this affects the men:
It
was simple, a lark. After months of standing guard at night, of
patrolling up trails which could explode into ambush at any moment, the
mopping up was comparatively pleasant, almost exciting. The killing
lost all dimension, bothered the men far less than discovering some
ants in their bedding.
Certain things were SOP (Standard Operating Procedure.)
The Japanese had set up many small hospitals in the last weeks of the
campaign, and in retreating they had killed many of their wounded. The
Americans who came in would finish off whatever wounded men were left,
smashing their heads with rifle butts or shooting them point blank. 111
There
is a gloating approval in these lines that is morally disturbing. The
remark that these killings caused less disgust than finding ants in the
bedding recalls other comparisons of dead Japanese to insects or
animals. Martinez
after he stabs a Japanese sentry feels “the mixture of relief and
revulsion a man feels after chasing a cockroach across a wall and
finally squashing him. It affected him exactly that way and not much
more intensely.” 112 Mailer repeatedly
emphasizes how little killing affects men, how unimportant it is to
them. Even the German SS commanders in the East were not this blasé: as
we shall see later, they constantly worried whether all the massacres
were making their men psychopaths, unfit for human company.
Mailer
goes on to describe the “other more distinctive ways” of killing:
waking Japanese soldiers at dawn and shooting them in their sleeping
ponchos. The sadism of the authorial attitude (we are not seeing things
through any character’s eyes here) is not justified by any reference to
Japanese atrocities, which were, of course, far worse. These acts are
not even seen as hate-filled revenge but as mere standard procedure, a
question of convenience.
Occasionally
they would take prisoners, but if this was late in the day and the
patrol was hurrying to get back before dark it was better if the
prisoners did not slow them. 113
Mailer describes one incident where a squad was taking three sick prisoners back who were holding them up.
The platoon leader looked at his watch at last and sighed: “We’re going to have to dump them.” 114
With this mild expression of regret, they were shot without ceremony.
Now these are, of course, war crimes. When the Germans did the same thing after the Normandy landing, shooting some Allied prisoners because they no longer had the manpower or logistics to guard them or ship them to Germany,
this was held up as one more proof of the barbarity of the Nazi regime.
The Americans were doing it (and though this is a fictional work this
behaviour was widely reported) in circumstances where nothing prevented
them shipping these prisoners to America or Australia.
This is not meant to rake up old questions of equivalence between the
war crimes of the Allies and their enemies: the vast disproportion in
cruelty between the two sides is beyond any doubt. But one would expect
an intelligent American writer to be at least aware that the concept of
a war crime exists. And it is extremely doubtful whether Mailer has
this moral awareness. Graves reports
(with a certain sanctimony) that the stories of killing prisoners in
the First World War were mostly told by and about Canadians and
Australians. “At all events, most overseas men, and some British
troops, made atrocities against prisoners a boast, not a confession.” 115 We are left in no doubt that for Graves
it is not something to boast of. In Mailer we have an enormous doubt
about his attitude, because what has entered into the equation is this
new Hemingway-style cult of toughness, and the Darwinian idea that life
is a jungle. If a man like Croft is a genuine hero, a man who
understands the laws of life, then the turkey shoot of Japanese
prisoners and wounded is simply an expression of the tough values that
lead to victory. What Mailer seems to be doing in describing these acts
is not exposing them as atrocities, nor showing how war debases human
beings, but rather shoving them in the face of the naive, hypocritical,
namby-pamby liberal who might foolishly believe that victory in war is
possible without these atrocities. You cannot win a war, he seems to be
saying, without creating the kind of soldiers who will kill prisoners
in cold blood without a qualm. Their brutality is essential to victory.
Mailer is rubbing our noses in this fact: wars are won by brutality,
not by chivalry. This is a very different view from what we saw in
Remarque or Graves. It shows a
complete turnaround in the moral perspective. The earlier war writers
saw that the realities of war did not conform to the Christian-humanist
morality they believed in, and on balance they rejected war. Mailer, in
contrast, rejects the Christian-humanist morality. If war is necessary
(if you are defending your country), then you must have a morality
which conforms to the harsh realities of war – which accepts brutality
and cold-blooded murder as facts of life. Or to put it more subtly, the
earlier writers saw war as a tragedy because it requires the temporary
suspension of the humanist morality for the sake of which it is
supposedly being fought. Mailer sees war as proving that the humanist
morality is unrealistic, namby-pamby drivel and should be suspended for
good.
Mailer
shares with the Nazis a Darwinian conception of war, which is not
different from the conception they both have of life. For Mailer, as
for the Social Darwinist Nazis, war is merely life on a more intense
level and it obeys the same laws. And the basic law is the law of
courage and mastery of oneself. The reluctance to kill is merely a
nervous weakness to be overcome. Mailer’s later fiction demonstrates
the peculiar nastiness that arises from seeing war as a paradigm of
life itself, and the brutal values of war as the essential values of
life. For he carries these sadistic attitudes, this gloating
representation of murder as a moral achievement, a mastery of oneself,
into an obsession with violence and killing in all his subsequent
fiction, which is not about war but supposedly normal life. His later
novels are filled with the notion of murder as a liberating act, just
as Croft’s murder of the Japanese prisoner seems to release all his
tension. One of Mailer’s heroine’s sees a murderer
as someone “painted with magic”, somebody with an extraordinary glamour
– and irresistibly attractive to women. Because Mailer does not see war
as an abnormal or exceptional state, he transfers the amorality of
killing in war into a disturbing sense of the amorality of killing in
general. And this amorality begins to infect the whole cult of fantasy
violence that dominates the imagination of our age. All the ruthless
killer-heroes who sadistically murder people in popular action movies
today, while remaining the cool, collected, dominant, sexy hero, are
cut from the same cloth as Croft. And the calculated ambiguity of the
figure of Croft, not explicitly approved by the author, but shown to be
life’s winner, is the same ambiguity we find in the killer-heroes of
these films. It allows filmmakers to pretend they are not really
glorifying pathological violence, when in fact they are.
It
often seems an unfair invasion of privacy to look at the relation
between an author’s work and his life, but in Mailer’s case it is
enlightening. The brainy Jewish kid from Brooklyn who went to Harvard
at sixteen and went to war just after his degree, serving in a Texas
reconnaissance regiment, could not have had an easy time being accepted
by the hard cowboys of the south. The scenes of the green, well-meaning
Roth, the middle class Jewish city boy, being scornfully rebuffed by
experienced, knockabout soldiers like Red must have had a real-life
basis in Mailer’s own beginnings in the regiment. But unlike the
wimpish Roth, Mailer managed to transform himself at least partly into
a hard man – otherwise he wouldn’t have been made sergeant, or boxed
for his regiment. One may surmise he ended the war somewhat closer to
the tough Texas
cowboy, Sergeant Croft, than to the wimpish Roth. The transformation
was not complete, however, or we wouldn’t find him at thirty-two still
talking about trying to get more nerve and become more of a man. You
couldn’t imagine Croft talking that way. But the brainy Jewish boy
seems to have been marked for life by his youthful hero-worship of the Texas
tough guys and his efforts to transform himself into one of them. And
the character he worshipped would have contained much of the
thoughtless cruelty and brutality which men who grow up herding
animals, hunting, drinking and fighting are prone to. Mailer’s own
story is one of failure to integrate this rough and violent experience
with the more civilized tradition of life he came from. It is a story
of self-rejection, or rather self-transformation from what most people
would consider a higher (or at least more intelligent and sensitive)
state of being to a lower and more brutal one. So we end up with a
highly educated writer who seems seriously to believe that
fist-fighting, proving one’s toughness, and aggressive,
performance-driven sex are the most important things in life. He
embodies the cultural problem posed by modern America: a great scientific, intellectually advanced civilization with the emotional immaturity of a Texas
cowboy. This moral and emotional primitivization of American society in
an era of extraordinary scientific advances is largely due to the world
wars themselves. It is above all due to the curious atavism they
triggered, by which certain American intellectuals began to worship the
rough brutality of the country’s pioneer past and cowboy way of life,
as though it represented some moral and human ideal. What the war did
to Mailer you might argue it did to the intellectual, educated class in
general. Instead of that class trying to lift the less-educated
majority up towards a higher ideal of civilized, enlightened behaviour,
the war dragged the intelligentsia down to imitate the ignorant
tough-guy brutality of the rural redneck. Tom Wolfe in The Bonfire of the Vanities has a scene where New York
lawyers, graduates of top universities, sit around with their knees
splayed like football jocks talking black street slang and acting like
tough-guy hoodlums. This is the cultural effect of the democratization
operated by the world wars: the crudest and most brutal expressions of
masculinity were imposed on all men in the name of the new virility
cult. That process shaped the peculiar culture of what we have called
the masculine century.
12) WAR AS HALLUCINATION: VIETNAM
One
of the curiosities of Mailer’s war novel is that his characters spend
more time challenging each other to fist fights or threatening to shoot
one another than they do fighting the Japanese. There is little here of
the famous sense of comradeship that makes a platoon fight as one man,
which we find among Remarque’s Germans. Rather it is their constant
in-fighting for dominance in their own group which fuels the
aggressiveness needed for survival. The lack of solidarity among the
soldiers is even more noticeable in later American wars in Asia.
The bitter moral and political conflicts that tore American society
apart during the Vietnam war are reflected in the war itself and the
behaviour of soldiers towards one another. In the Vietnam war, the
practice of “fragging”, or using a fragmentation grenade to kill one’s
own officer during a firefight, formed the subject of many a veteran’s
yarn. The number of second lieutenants killed by their own men was, if
one were to believe the anecdotes, legion. As a student in the last
years of the war I heard an African-American anti-war activist at a
peace rally at a Canadian university give an explanation of “fragging”,
calling it the ultimate act of protest. The student audience greeted
his account with a spontaneous burst of applause – an enthusiastic
moral tribute to the political virtue of murdering one’s own officer.
Now, how much of all this was myth and legend? Or a dozen incidents
endlessly recounted and embellished by veterans eager to impress their
fascinated listeners? The fact remains that an atmosphere existed where
these treasonous acts seemed plausible. Not only were human lives cheap
but many of them, even on one’s own side, were lost without regret. In
an atmosphere of violent controversy over the war itself, of varying
degrees of faith and cynicism towards the military leadership, there
seems to have been an astonishing lack of solidarity and trust among
soldiers. This is reflected in one of the most impressive novels
written about the Vietnam war, Stephen Wright’s Meditations in Green.
In this novel we see a universal egotism, an amoral lack of loyalty, a
growing sense of war as totally impersonal if not unreal, a mad,
drug-induced sense of detachment from events, and descriptions of
firefights utterly devoid of emotion, as though the whole thing were a
sensational comic strip and the deaths occurring were not those of
human beings.
The climactic battle of this extraordinary novel, as the Vietcong attack the US
camp, is watched from the guard tower by a soldier (appropriately named
Vegetable) stoned on hashish. It becomes a surreal spectacle. He is
utterly detached from the human reality of what is happening. The
violent battle-scene is described as though it were a bizarre fantasy,
a film with fantastic special effects:
He
seemed to be so high the action down there seemed unreal, kitchen match
fires, plastic toy soldiers. When the photo lab blew up, he saw a
little man pop into the sky and separate into little pieces that fell
flaming back to the ground. That was the best so far….. What a time
they were going to have smoking and joking and talking about this
night. Privileged with such a good view, he was trying hard to collect
interesting impressions. 117
This
detached, purely aesthetic enjoyment of the battle is taken a step
further by another character, Wendell, the army film-maker, as he tries
to film a hand-to-hand fight.
Wendell
couldn’t believe his luck: Captain Raleigh and a genuine VC in black
shorts locked in a lover’s clench on the gravel outside the O club and
stabbing one another at intervals with long knives. Wendell circled
them carefully tracking the angry movement of arms and blades.
He
squatted in the shadows, attempting to backlight his protagonists
against the bonfire consuming Chief Winkly’s hooch. Beautiful. Through
the viewfinder Cain and Abel grappled in some bizarre biblical epic. 118
The
idea of intervening to help his officer never crosses Wendell’s mind. A
minute later he gets hit by a shell and before he dies presses the
camera into the hands of his buddy Griffin, begging him to continue
filming the battle, “the war in Vietnam: the Final Hours.”
Griffin
put his hand into Wendell’s remaining good one and squeezed and got a
squeeze in return. He was trying hard to manage the first emotion he’d
felt in months when he realized he didn’t have to..…. Now he wanted to
miss nothing. He leaned in closer. Yes, those were Wendell’s eyes, that
was Wendell’s face, but Wendell was gone. Something else occupied his
spacesuit. 119
The
curious, slightly mad detachment of this makes the fascist lieutenant
in Hemingway, muttering a prayer as he orders heads to be hacked off,
seem down-to-earth and normal. This is the fascinated reaction of a boy
watching a farm animal killed for the first time and wanting to see the
light go out in its eyes. That he should take the time to do this in
the midst of a desperate battle is surreal, a striking testimony to a
mind out for lunch and wandering along its own bizarre byways. The
ultimate emotional distancing from the butchery of war comes through
drugs, which give the whole thing a hallucinatory unreality in which
dazzling, overwhelming sensations are unaccompanied by any recognizable
human emotion. Finally Griffin
cannot distinguish between reality and hallucination. He seems to
remember bayoneting a VC. “In fact, he couldn’t be sure whether this
incident was an actual occurrence or simply hallucinated desire.” 120 Delirium and madness are his final refuge. He ends up back home in hospital, a mental basket case.
Is
it going too far to read into this series of extracts a progressive
growth of callousness, of numbness, of incapacity to respond
emotionally to these horrors, as the twentieth century advances? From
war to war do we not see a creeping emotional anaesthesia, a paralysis
of the moral and human faculties in which the abnormal state of mind of
the warrior is no longer subject to any rational, human reality check?
Is there not a clear line of evolution from the passionate humanist
protest of Wilfred Owen, the adrenaline-charged emotional high of
Remarque, the matter-of-fact grimness of Graves, detailing war’s
horrors with cool exactness, the stoicism of Hemingway, seeing war as
merely life writ large, to the gloating sadism of Mailer (every act of
killing a proof of virility, an assertion of dominance) and finally the
delirium and hallucinatory madness of Wright, where the Vietnam war has
pushed the mind over the edge till it no longer grasps the reality of
what is happening and sees it all as cinematic fiction? And is not this
final state a sort of endgame, after which the mind has got to recoil
and go in the other direction and shake off the whole legacy of this
century of war and carnage?
But
of course the mind does not recoil and go in the opposite direction. It
keeps going in the same direction in the entire industry of cinematic
violence that has swept over our world in the past thirty years since
the Vietnam war ended. The chief characteristic of violent films is now
their utter amorality – the representation of violence as a purely
aesthetic spectacle, a sequence of interesting and picturesque deaths,
appreciated for their pictorial originality, and triggering no
emotional or moral responses. Wright’s “he saw a little man pop into
the sky and separate into little pieces that fell flaming back to the
ground. That was the best so far…..” is now exactly the way violent
deaths are appreciated in the cinema. George Orwell in 1984
depicts such a scene in a war film as a helicopter bombs a boat full of
refugees: “the boat went all to matchwood; then there was a wonderful
shot of a child’s arm going up up up right up into the air … and there
was a lot of applause from the party seats…” 121 He meant
it as a horrific vision of the utter depravity of a society. It is
exactly what happens in any cinema today. Picturesque scenes of human
beings being blown to pieces are greeted with guffaws of admiration.
They are shown in films for family audiences. The image of men being
blown apart by explosives – perhaps the single most recurrent image of
modern action movies – seems to have haunted the human imagination ever
since gunpowder was invented. Swift has an image of men being blown up
by ship’s cannon very similar to Orwell’s, and describes how “the dead
bodies drop down in pieces from the clouds, to the great diversion of
all the spectators.” 122 Perhaps Orwell even takes it from Swift, though he had seen enough of the real thing in Spain. It is a curious coincidence that Stephen Wright uses it again, though
here it seems to be a case of life imitating art. In all these cases
what is significant is the lack of moral or human reaction. We do not
even ask ourselves whether the people being blown up are ours or
theirs, good or evil, guilty or innocent: we see it as mere spectacle.
Orwell has a revealing passage in Homage to Catalonia where he
remarks that when you are watching artillery firing, you always want it
to hit its target, even when the target contains your friends or your
dinner. This is the eye of the soldier appreciating marksmanship coming
to prevail over the eye of the human being. It has become the eye of
Everyman in the century of war, appreciating the aesthetics of
mass-murder. It was given its greatest expression in the first Gulf
War, where the murder of Iraqis from the air became no more than a
nightly video-game, with rounds of spectator applause for direct
strikes.
13) WAR AS AFTER-IMAGE: WAR IN THE MIND OF THE 20TH CENTURY
What
was the effect of war not on those who fought it but on those for whom
it was an offstage presence? Orwell is an interesting representative of
the generation that lived through the First World War but were just too
young to fight. He was born in Bengal and was at Eton during the war. Afterwards he returned to the East as a policeman in Burma.
Kipling and Conrad had written about the East and colonialism as grand
adventure, full of colourful dramas. Orwell writes about colonial Burma
as a quiet ongoing disaster, filled with bureaucratic pettiness and
outmoded snobberies of rank, like the Great War itself. Orwell writes
all his life as though there is an unmentioned tragedy going on all the
time in the background; we are meant to infer what it is, but it would
be uncool to state it. Everything happens against the background of
this unexplained horror. Is it colonialism? The class system?
Capitalism? Perhaps it is the war, which he missed out on fighting by a
couple of years, but in which so many Eton
old boys died while he was there. The awareness of this enormous human
tragedy that had occurred just offstage in his life seems to cast a
shadow over all his writing, as if everything must be written with
other people’s searing grief constantly in mind. It is as though he
spent all his life at a funeral without ever mentioning the corpse. No
matter what circumstances he is writing about, there is no satisfaction
or fulfilment possible. Life is somehow not worth it from the start. He
seems to have been haunted all his life by a nameless sense of guilt,
which drove him first to become a tramp and then to volunteer to fight
in Spain.
Was this a kind of survivor guilt (such as drove some death camp
survivors to commit suicide?) Someone once said, provocatively and
shallowly: “After Auschwitz there can be no poetry.” (This statement was quoted approvingly by George Steiner in a lecture at Cambridge,
in the presence of a head of department who had been tortured by the
Japanese. The professor stalked out and Steiner blamed this incident
for not being given the Cambridge post he wanted.) 123
But though the statement is shallow, many writers of the post-First
World War period seem to have felt something similar. The poetry had
gone out of existence, a pall had been flung over the whole business of
living, and henceforth all joys must be subdued, tinged with gloom,
with a dark sense of the obscenity and horror of life. The great
modernist authors of the twenties all adopted a pessimistic as well as
a reactionary standpoint. The modern world was to be rejected, and
various versions of the past were erected into ideals – whether the
epics of Homer, the civilization of Byzantium,
the Italian Renaissance or the ancient Etruscans. For the younger
generation who came after them, the poets of the depressed thirties,
Auden, Spender, Day-Lewis, Isherwood and co, the rejection of the
modern world swung the opposite way, against the past as well. The
obligation was to move forward out of the rotten present by embracing
communism, the creed of the future. But apart from occasional Marxist
rant, their poetry too seemed under an obligation to take account of
the horrors the world had just lived through. The repression of
feeling, the elaborate strategies of indirectness of emotion were for
the poets who came of age after the war the only way of acknowledging
the unspeakable. If the expression of emotion cannot be adequate to the
vast scale of collective experience, then better not try to express it:
better keep it all under wraps, taken as read but never stated. Poets
become like men in the front line: never expressing directly the great
emotions – fear, despair, horror, pity – that dominate their minds.
They make a virtue of not saying what they are feeling. That becomes
the way of saying it. The grim understatement of the trenches becomes
the paradigm of male communication in the twentieth century, even for
the poets.
Those
rare writers who did tackle the subject of the war head-on, and
attempted to express some emotion commensurate with the enormity of the
event, failed rather dismally in their endeavour. Ezra Pound, who did
not take part in the war, made one such attempt in Hugh Selwyn Mauberley
– and his lines, because of the very rarity of this kind of summing up,
have unfortunately become a favourite quote for those trying to evoke
the war. He sees young men as having died
For an old bitch gone in the teeth,
For a botched civilisation…..
For two gross of broken statues,
For a few thousand battered books. 124
The bitterness here is second-hand. It is also wrong-headed. This was not a war to save old Europe’s
venerable culture (which existed in equal measure on both sides.) It
was a war to destroy it, waged by new forces of nationalistic mass
hatred, whipped up by a vicious populist press and wrapped in bigoted,
moral self-righteousness, which was at the opposite pole from the old
cosmopolitan literary and artistic traditions of Europe.
What Englishman of any previous age would have referred to Goethe or
Beethoven or Dürer as “Huns”? Men were not killed for the sake of “high
culture”. They were killed for a hate-ridden militarist ideology spewed
out by the gutter press on both sides, which kept the war going. These
lines of Pound are cheap journalism. They have nothing like the depth
of real feeling of his Pisan Cantos at the end of another war in which
he chose the wrong side. But their very feebleness illustrates the
impotence of the poets to express what had happened. Pound’s attempt
rings so false that other writers probably feared having the same
effect. An enormous pudeur thus descended upon the world about
speaking of the horror that had just happened. At first it was too
obvious to mention, like a decaying corpse in the corner of the room,
and then gradually the presence faded, until those who came after could
find almost no trace of the monstrous thing that had weighed so heavily
on the minds of those before them. Not-saying, not expressing emotion,
had by then become a habit, a morbid self-repression that only deepened
the neurosis. The decades following the war were an age in spiritual
convalescence from a disease which its sufferers seemed unable to
diagnose.
The
non-saying of the horrors of our century continued after the Second
World War. While popular novels and films depicted the war as a subject
of thrillers or adventure sagas, serious art made little attempt to
come to terms with it. In a century of the most dramatic and extreme
events of the whole of human history, the arts of painting, sculpture,
and supposedly serious music degenerated steadily into a stuttering
inexpressive cult of non-communication. This became the
quintessentially modern mode for all the arts. The scale of the
tragedy was too big for small minds, and they took refuge in saying
nothing and pretending that nothing was everything. The blank canvas
became the characteristic expression of the last age of avant-garde
painting before it disappeared into the cheery, in-your-face
charlatanism of “conceptual art”. “Highbrow” music degenerated into a
deliberate cacophony, a careful combination of noises designed to set
the teeth on edge. Not only was it utterly unrelated to the way human
brains process sound or human emotions respond to it, but it seemed
totally indifferent to the expression of any emotion whatever except
tormented madness. Most music-lovers deserted it in favour of popular
music, which became the only outlet for musical talent in the age, and
vastly expanded its range and vitality in the sixties. Theatre showed
signs of following the same sterile path as the plastic arts and
“serious” music. Becket’s cult of non-saying, laced with nihilism,
became the intellectual theatrical fashion of the fifties. In Waiting for Godot,
his vague evocation of self-pitying, pessimistic emotions without
attaching them to anything precise – the very definition of
sentimentality, where an emotion does not arise from a concrete
situation, but is assumed as a general, stock world-view – seemed the
only adequate emotional response to a disaster too big to depict or
even mention. A man who spent his sterile life cultivating depression –
living over a prison in the most beautiful of cities – became suddenly,
by accident, the voice of an age. His last work, heavy breathing and a cry followed by
silence, almost achieves the sublime emptiness of the more egregious
pieces of charlatan installation art – the crumpled sheet of paper, the
pickled fish, the dirty bedsheets, the rows of bricks, the cans of shit.
The
effect of the world wars on artists and writers was therefore a sort of
emotional castration, a seeming loss of the capacity to express
emotion, to believe in its importance, to take emotion seriously. What
we see in nearly all modern art (above all the plastic arts and serial music) is a numbing of the mind, a numbing of
the sensibility, a numbing of a capacity for emotional reaction, a
progressive anaesthesia, a fleeing of any vision, a
terror of committing oneself to any statement whatever, for fear of
being thought inadequate to the immense scale of the horrors of the
age. Instead of deep reflection, or compassion on a deep enough level to comprehend the enormity of what had happened, we get numbness, silence, a retreat into infantile doodling, or eruptions of mindless violence, neurotic screams, a quest for some ultimate sensational expression of hatred, rejection of the world, self-hatred. And this psychosis in art was symptomatic of a growing psychosis of violence in human beings in general.
14) THE AGE OF MASS-MURDER
The
most immediate effect of the mass slaughter of the trenches was both a
numbing of human sensibility and a blurring of the moral sense in the
face of violence and killing. The effect of sending wave after wave of
young men to their deaths not in a single decisive battle of an
afternoon, but in an ongoing, routine process for four long years, with
65 million men participating, and 9 million losing their lives (plus as
many civilians) was to make mass killing seem a more normal thing than
it had seemed for at least a hundred years. A number of men suddenly
appeared on the stage of history for whom the murder of millions of
human beings seemed a perfectly conceivable solution to intractable
problems. The mass murder of the death camps and gulags of the 20th
century was certainly born in the trenches of the First World War. It
is when men see friends and comrades killed as an everyday mishap that
they can envisage the killing of unarmed strangers as a routine
solution. Life was made cheap on the battlefield, and its taking away
on a huge scale could be viewed with complete indifference. It was no
more, in Mailer’s phrase, than killing insects. Genocide was born of
modern warfare.
The
Turks started it by killing a million and a half Armenians during the
First World War itself, convinced that this turbulent minority, whose
sympathies could only be with the Christian Russian enemy, posed a
security threat to a nation fighting for its life. As though encouraged
by the world’s indifference to this massacre, the Russian communists,
after the warm-up of their civil war, got to work in earnest. In the
thirties they killed about seven million Ukrainian farmers, either by
shooting or deliberate starvation, by requisitioning at gunpoint every
grain of corn, even the seeds needed to sow next year’s harvest, in
order to break the resistance of the peasant class to the policy of
collectivization. Starving Ukrainian women begged strangers at the
windows of transiting trains to take their emaciated babies, knowing it
was their only chance of survival. The Stalinist gulag system began its
immense work of doing to death tens of millions of men and women in the
vast wastes of Siberia and the Arctic circle,
where starvation, cold, disease and exhaustion were the cheap, silent
weapons of extermination. But the most spectacular climax of mass
murder (because of its speed and industrialized scale) was of course
provided by the death camps of the Nazis, where somewhere around six
million Jews and millions of others (Russian POWs, gypsies, Polish
intellectuals and political dissidents from all over Europe) are
generally thought to have perished during the war. But this was merely
the beginning for Hitler. He planned a far greater extermination of the
inhabitants of Ukraine and Western Russia,
to make room for German settlers. Tens of millions of deaths through
systematic starvation were envisaged by Hitler as a necessary clearing
of living-space for the new German empire to the east. In
the event, between twenty and twenty-five million Soviet citizens are
thought to have died, as a result of military action, starvation in
besieged cities, deliberate massacre and a scorched earth policy. In
Asia the Japanese army carried out unspeakable atrocities in China
and elsewhere. And in all theatres of war, the carpet bombing of
cities, with the aim of killing a maximum number of civilians, was
practised by all sides, culminating in the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan. After the Communists took power in China,
they killed tens of millions of their opponents in a gulag system
similar to that of the Russians, and starved millions more. The macabre
accounting remains approximate and disputed, but present estimates
suggest that somewhere approaching two hundred million human beings
were killed in the 20th century either by war, massacre or
being worked or starved to death in prison camps, or by famine
deliberately engineered for the purposes of extermination by
totalitarian governments. 125
Of
course, these killings are generally viewed among the Western Allied
nations with horror (except for our bombing of enemy cities, which is
frequently still defended, even though it was for the most part
militarily pointless as well as immoral.) But the
knowledge of these horrors did not lead to a sudden moral rejection of
this kind of barbarism: it usually led to similar kinds of cruelty
towards the people held responsible. German POW’s probably suffered a
good part of their privations (tens of thousands were deliberately
starved to death in American and French POW camps in the years after
the war) because of the vengeful hatred inspired by the discovery of
the German death camps by the Allied troops. 126 The
discovery of the other side’s atrocities often provoked a response in
kind, or was used to justify one’s own barbarity. British bomber pilots
who had problems of conscience firebombing cities which they knew were
full of German women and children were given pep talks by refugees like
Arthur Koestler about the mass extermination of the Jews being carried
out by the Nazis. This was supposed to ease their conscience about
frying women and children alive. In an exact mirror image, the German
police battalions in the East charged with the task of shooting Jewish
women and children in the back of the head were urged to think about
the German women and children being burned alive by Allied bombing. 127
The killing of women and children on one side was thought to justify
the killing of women and children on the other, in one of those
perverse pieces of wartime logic whereby pity for their own victims
gives people the moral force to commit atrocities against the enemy. On
the Nazi side the logic connecting Jewish civilians with the Allied
bombing can only be understood as a kind of superstition akin to a
belief in witchcraft. It seemed to be based on a mad conviction that
the Jews in a remote Polish village had some occult connection with the
international Jewish conspiracy thought to be behind the Allied war
effort – so that humble village tailors (and their wives and children)
could be killed as foot-soldiers of a worldwide enemy army. On the
Allied side the civilian bombing followed a perverse logic that the
German people had elected Hitler and must therefore have wanted this
war, and their will to fight had to be broken. This is an argument so
wilfully ignorant of the realities of a ruthless dictatorship that it
can only be understood as a racist hatred of the Germans by an Allied
high command that still believed its own anti-Hun propaganda of the
First World War. The man in charge of the RAF bombing of Germany,
“Bomber” Harris, was a fanatical Hun-hater, whose deliberate
carpet-bombing of cities of no military significance can only be seen
as a gigantic war crime.
The Nazi genocide of the Jews was a crime so unprecedented in Western European history, in
its methodical, meticulously organized character, that it has provoked
long analyses and heated debates over how it was possible. It is beyond
the scope of this work to go into these in any detail, but the subject
cannot be avoided because of its bearing on our general theme – the
brutalization of man in the 20th century. A recent book, Daniel
Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners, has argued that the
German nation’s long history of anti-Semitism was the key to the Nazis’
ability to carry out the extermination, which required the active
participation of larger numbers of Germans than has been supposed.
Goldhagen believes that the willingness of German police battalions
(which were full of fairly ordinary Germans who did not undergo the
intense indoctrination of the SS) to carry out the extermination of
Jews in occupied Poland
can only be explained by their deep-rooted racist belief that Jews were
subhuman. It is not always clear whether he means this as evidence of
the power of Nazi propaganda, or whether he is convinced that the
Germans were so deeply anti-Semitic they did not even need this Nazi
propaganda in order to start murdering Jews. Though the first scenario
is rather more plausible than the second, this aspect of things seems
only partly to explain the genocide. Theoretical beliefs alone are
seldom enough to motivate action. There is a very long step between
being racist and being personally willing to kill those of another
race. Similarly, one may believe that another religion is false and
that its misguided adherents are maliciously
disposed towards those of one’s own faith, without being ready to
exterminate them. To explain fully why these men actually performed
this horrendous task it is necessary to look at other aspects of the
psychology and mood of the regime they lived under.
The
Nazis not only promoted a supernatural theory of Jewish evil and
malice; they also promoted a new brutalization of life, a conscious
rejection of humane and civilized standards of behaviour, which made
their regime an atavism, a throw-back to a pre-humanist moral order.
They rejected that entire humane moral code, derived from an
enlightened reading of Christianity – what Tolstoy called “the law of
love” – which had gradually been adopted over the
previous hundred years by all Western nations: abolishing torture,
public executions, judicial floggings, slavery, and serfdom, and
accepting that we had a duty to help our weaker fellow citizens
suffering from poverty, hunger or illness. All of this was despised by
the Nazis as bourgeois decadence, a weak, debilitating mental poison
which was against nature’s stern laws and would threaten the survival
of the strongest race, whose vocation was to rule the others. What the
Nazis revolted against was bourgeois morality – that humane milksop
morality gradually introduced by the rising middle classes in the 19th
century, with all its stuffiness, sentimentality and squeamishness
about blood and pain. The Nazi attitude had something of the vigorous
revivalism of certain fundamentalist Muslim regimes of more recent
years, with their return to medieval punishments. The Nazi revival of
public executions with the axe, the revival of torture, the beatings
and shootings in the street, the creation of hundreds of concentration
camps where millions would be imprisoned, brutalized, used as slaves
and finally done to death, was a deliberate step back into the past –
and a past that was the product of a lurid and cruel imagination. The
first large-scale act of mass murder undertaken by the regime was the
extermination of the mentally retarded and the insane in October 1939,
as a way of strengthening the German nation for the war that had just
been launched. This was done in order to eliminate useless mouths to
feed and at the same time to prevent the sick, unfit specimens from
contaminating and weakening the race in a time of crisis. There was
nothing anti-Semitic about this programme, yet it seemed to find no
shortage of willing executioners. A certain number of camp guards must
have been readily convinced that the elimination of the weak was a
thoroughly moral programme. It was the first step in the application of
that callous Darwinian theory which lay behind Hitler’s entire vision
of life.
Brutality
was an essential part of this vision. Germans were to be inured to
slaughter and cruelty and encouraged to practise it upon their enemies,
the inferior races of the East. In preparing the army for the war
against Russia,
Hitler specifically prescribed cruelty as a sacred duty, however
unpleasant the soldiers might find it. He told his generals this, in
terms which shocked and outraged some of them:
The war against Russia
will be such that it cannot be conducted in a chivalrous fashion. This
struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to
be conducted with unprecedented, merciless and unrelenting harshness.
All officers will have to rid themselves of obsolete ideologies. I know
that the necessity of such means of waging war is beyond the
comprehension of you generals but I insist absolutely that my orders be
executed without contradiction. The commissars are the bearers of an
ideology directly opposed to National Socialism. Therefore the
commissars will be liquidated. 128
Part of his plan was deliberate starvation of the Russians. Their agriculture was to be requisitioned to supply Germany,
and too bad for their own population. “Many tens of millions of people
in the industrial areas will become redundant and will either die or
have to emigrate to Siberia.” 129
As for the great cities, Leningrad and Moscow, they were to be totally destroyed. In a directive to his commanders of 29 September 1941 he orders this:
The Fuehrer has decided to have St Petersburg
wiped off the face of the earth. The further existence of this large
city is of no interest …. The intention is to close in on this city and
raze it to the ground by artillery and by continuous air attack….
Requests that the city be taken over will be turned down, for the
problem of the survival of the population and of supplying it with food
is one which cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war for
existence we have no interest in keeping even part of this great city’s
population. 130
The
phrase “no interest in keeping” means, of course, no interest in
keeping alive: they are to be left to starve to death. The Darwinian
language is clear in the phrase “the war for existence” (the struggle
for survival): one race, the German, was quite simply going to wipe out
a less adapted race, the Slav, by war and deliberate starvation, in
accordance with nature’s cruel process of selection of the fittest. The
goal was a German-ruled area as far as the Urals: “no foreign army must
ever be allowed again between Germany and the Urals.” The Russians had to disappear or migrate into Asia.
In order to carry out this great reordering of the human population,
the Germans had to be taught to harden their hearts against pity. They
must be trained in brutality and be capable of mass slaughter. It is
clear that this cult of cruelty also played a crucial role in the
process of exterminating the Jews in the conquered territories, even if
that was simply the first part of this gigantic reshaping of the human
species in Europe. Some Nazis engaged in the extermination work spoke
of their own cruelty as though it represented a sort of triumph over
human weakness, an act of self-abnegation in denying their own
instincts of pity, in pursuit of the grand purpose. Major Wilhelm
Trapp, the commander of Police Battalion 101 charged with exterminating
Jews in occupied Poland,
was apparently a fatherly figure (nicknamed “Papa” by the troops) who
saw this unpleasant task as imposed by an iron necessity that he must
bow to, despite being himself deeply disturbed by it. 131
But
the Nazis were not unaware that this transformation of their men into
mass killers might not be easy and might come at a psychological cost.
Among Nazi officers there was worry that the systematic killing of
civilians, especially women and children, might harden the men to the
point of making them psychopaths. “Oehlendorf …. and other
Einsatzgruppe commanders were leery that their men would not have the
stomach to carry out such gruesome orders, and that the deed would also
brutalize them, rendering them unfit for human society.” 132
That is why various schemes were devised to lessen the amount of direct
killing the men had to do. One such scheme was to employ local thugs
(Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians) to kill the Jews for them. Another
was to employ gas, so the act of killing could be distanced from the
perpetrators – and so that prisoners or foreign auxiliaries could again
be used as much as possible in the dirty process of disposing of the
bodies. According to Goldhagen, “the move to gassing whether
in mobile or fixed installations – contrary to the widely accepted
belief – was prompted not by considerations of efficiency but by the
search for a method that would ease the psychological burden of killing
for the Germans.” 133 He stresses that gassing was not necessarily more efficient and that mass shootings of Jews also continued throughout the war.
That
the Nazi field officers were concerned about the human effect on the
men suggests that although the moral taboo against killing Jews had
been lifted by the ceaseless brainwashing in racial theories, the
physical taboo against killing itself was still something that had to
be reckoned with. But this problem seems often to have been resolved by
the simple process of habituation. Whenever possible the troops were at
first ordered to kill only men. Only once they had got used to this
were they then ordered to kill women and children as well. This was
combined with an appeal to the men’s sense of manhood and pride as
soldiers. It is this notion of manly courage, of hardness of heart as a
heroic virtue, which succeeded in overcoming the social taboo against
killing, and the natural squeamishness of the human stomach.
In
one police battalion Goldhagen studies, the men were at first subdued
and silent after their day of killing, and had no appetite, but they
were soon making jokes and laughing about the gruesome aspects of the
whole business. The process of killing involved each policeman of the
killing squad selecting an individual Jew (who might be a woman or a
child), walking beside them to a place in the woods, telling them to
lie down and shooting them in the back of the head. The brains and gore
often spattered the killers’ clothes. Many found this disturbing. Their
commanders, far from forcing the men to do it with threats of a firing
squad, often gave the men, especially the older ones (who might be
fathers), the option of not participating if they did not feel capable
of this gruesome work. A few members of the battalion asked to be
excused and they were transferred to other missions without being
punished for it. But most went ahead and took part. One of the men,
when asked after the war why he had not taken the option of being
excused from this work, gave this reply:
“When
the question is put to me why did I participate at all in the
shootings, I must say that one does not want to be considered a
coward.” 134
This speaks volumes of the ability of military institutions to present the committing of atrocities as a virility test for the men – a
test they were eager to pass, to prove their courage and toughness both
to their comrades and their superiors. One can imagine that those who
asked to be excused from this work, while not subject to reprisals or
official sanctions, were the objects of a certain amount of macho
contempt by their fellow-soldiers. They were softies who had admitted
they didn’t have what it takes. They were leaving this dirty job to
others because they couldn’t handle it themselves. This would
undoubtedly entail a loss of respect. It is this masculine sense of
pride in their own hardness and self-control, the fear of looking like
wimps in the eyes of their comrades, which appears to have counted most in motivating men to take part willingly in the executions even of women and children.
The
scene in Mailer of Croft shooting the Japanese prisoner in cold blood,
the reports of widespread summary executions of wounded or captured
Japanese soldiers by the American army in the Pacific war, are not a
separate category of experience from the Nazi police battalions’ murder
of Jewish women and children, or the Japanese army’s use of Chinese
civilians for bayonet practice. They are all the same category of
experience, but simply at different points along the continuum of what
men can persuade themselves to do. And the driving force behind them is
the soldier’s pride in his own brutality, his sense that to be unable
to kill is a failure of courage, his contempt for the sensitivity which
might make his hand tremble or drop the gun rather than fire into the
helpless head before him. Human beings regard the overcoming of the
taboo against killing as a sort of initiation into toughness and total
self-control. Medical students must learn to steel themselves when
wielding the surgeon’s scalpel on a human body. British veterinary
students are initiated into the killing of animals by being made to
kill a cow in an abattoir. Both these experiences are nerve-racking,
stomach-churning ordeals for the students, and afterwards they feel
they have overcome some weakness in themselves. So it is when a soldier
kills his first enemy. The violation of the taboo against killing is
seen as a progress of the spirit and the nerve towards a new hardness
and capacity of self-control.
Lawrence
of Arabia relates his sense of horror as he had to execute two thieves
among his Arab troops by shooting them in the head as they knelt before
him. He had to close his eyes as he fired his revolver – a confession
that certain commentators have found wimpish. Robert Graves recounts a
fellow officer’s complaint about his cowardly company: “In both the
last two shows I had to shoot a man of my company to get the rest out
of the trench. It was so bloody awful I couldn’t stand it.” 135 Graves
sees him as a brave man deserving sympathy. His distress showed his
humane, sensitive feelings, but the important thing is that he was able
to overcome these feelings and shoot a couple of men to get the others
to go into battle. The overcoming of taboos, of biological instincts
not to take life, are so many milestones in the development of a man’s
sense of courage, firmness of purpose and mastery of himself.
But
the removal of physical taboos against killing also loosens the moral
taboos which are so closely tied up with them. The man’s preparedness
to kill is not merely a physical but a moral state. When his physical
revulsion against killing has been deadened, his moral revulsion often
has as well. After his years at the front, the 22-year old Graves
told Bertrand Russell he would quite willingly order his men to shoot
striking munitions workers: “It would be no worse than shooting
Germans.” 136 Soldiers slide easily from shooting armed enemies to shooting prisoners or torturing them (as the French army showed in Algeria.)
And the pushing of the soldier’s hardness to an extreme during a
prolonged war goes a long way towards explaining the vast programmes of
atrocity and mass murder that the twentieth century produced.
Some
Greek philosophers opposed the eating of meat because the practice of
killing animals makes men more capable of killing each other. In
medieval Italy
the butchers’ guilds were employed as hired killers. The assumption was
that the main requirement for killing is the overcoming of physical
squeamishness and sensitivity: once the psychological barrier goes, the moral
barrier falls more easily. And it is above all a question of habit.
Armies understand this. The Japanese reportedly trained their infantry
in Nanking with live bayonet practice
on Chinese civilians tied to posts. On a less extreme level, the US
Marine corps till recently used to toughen its recruits by screaming at
them: “Kill the girl in you!”
When men “kill the girl” in them completely, they become capable of killing little girls with a bullet in the back of the head.
The
deep-rooted anti-Semitism of the Germans which Goldhagen sees as the
fundamental cause of the Holocaust is part of the picture, but the Nazi
cult of toughness and brutality was just as important in making these
crimes possible. Anti-Semitism alone does not explain Nazism or account
for Hitler’s wider goals: the annihilation of Western Russia
and the expansion of the German nation to the Urals. Only a primitive
Darwinistic vision of some ultimate survival struggle between the
German and Slav races can explain his plans. We must look at the young,
embittered Austrian German, one of a minority “ruling race” which had
lost its rightful dominance in an increasingly democratic,
Slav-majority empire, to find the seeds of this obsession. The Jews
were to be only a first step in a wider plan to reshape the European
race – to wipe out the non-Germans from central and eastern Europe.
Hitler’s anti-Semitism was not the motive force of his whole
exterminationist impulse, which had an altogether wider scope. It is a
serious distortion of history to try to reduce Nazism merely to
anti-Semitism.
Goldhagen
seems to be arguing that without deep-seated German anti-Semitism,
predating Hitler’s regime, the Nazis would not have been able to carry
out their programme of extermination of the Jews, which required the
willing complicity of thousands of ordinary Germans. Though he may be
right about the deep roots of anti-Semitism in 19th century German
culture, the prior existence of a widespread prejudice against certain
people does not seem to be indispensable for totalitarian regimes to be
able to exterminate them. There is no evidence Soviet soldiers had a
deep prior hatred of Ukrainian farmers, other than what the regime
instilled in them by labelling these people profiteers. Yet they still
killed millions of them, men, women and children. The example of
certain communist countries shows how easily state propaganda can
foment hatred for social groups which have been virtually invented by
the regime. Imperialist Running Dogs, Capitalist-Roaders and
Revisionist Backsliders are categories of human being that few Chinese
people had heard of before the communists came to power. Yet there was
considerable success in fomenting popular hatred of these fictive human
groups, to the point of inciting displays of mass hostility against any
individuals presented as belonging to them. The behaviour of prison
guards and others charged with the punishment or elimination of these
miscreants suggests the same process of dehumanisation at work as in
the case of the Jews. Vicious brutality towards such depraved beings
became a positive virtue, something the guards felt good about. Chinese
prison personnel were capable of killing millions of human beings in
order to wipe out a fictive evil invented only a decade or two before.
The mass torture and murder of the Falun Gong sect in China
today again shows how regimes can demonize even new religious
minorities, against whom there can be no deep-seated cultural
prejudice. It is doubtful whether the Japanese military had any deep
ideological reasons for their treatment of Western prisoners of war as
subhumans, who may be tortured for fun, or experimented on surgically
while conscious (“logs” was the euphemism used by Japanese medical
personnel for the Western prisoners of war subjected to surgical
experimentation without anaesthetic.) It would be interesting to
invest-igate whether the Japanese personnel of biological
experimentation Unit 731 harboured a deep racist hatred of Westerners
long before the war, but it is quite probable that they did not. The
categorization of certain people as subhuman, and the indoctrination of
whole classes and even nations to treat them as such, can be achieved
with extraordinary rapidity by totalitarian regimes, and does not seem
to require any previous prejudice to build upon. The Khmer Rouge
managed to incite their followers and security forces to a murderous
hatred and cruelty against teachers, doctors and all those with an
education – people who had previously been looked up to, not despised
or resented. In the Nazi concentration camp system, prisoners of very
diverse nationalities became kapos or collaborators charged with the
brutalizing and killing of other prisoners, including many Jews. It
would be pointless to study the national origins of the worst brutes in
this system to see if their national traditions of anti-Semitism can
explain their behaviour. It is clear that the ideological, political or
racial beliefs that allow one to treat others as subhuman are mere
pretexts, adopted without reflection by people keen to enjoy the
absolute sadistic power which these beliefs confer. What counts is not
how deeply these beliefs are held, but the fact that they permit one to
give full rein to one’s cruelty and lust to dominate. Once one has
enjoyed torturing another human being, belief in his inferiority or
viciousness, however contrary to common sense, becomes axiomatic as a
justification of one’s own acts. Cruelty then becomes, with habit, a
compulsion, and its practitioners, like drug addicts, go further and
further in their atrocious acts as they need stronger doses of the
stimulus to feel pleasure. It is probable that an essential part of the
pleasure of extreme cruelty, in addition to the exercise of power over
another, is the exercise of power over oneself. The torturer is
demonstrating his own hardness, his lack of squeamishness, his ability
not to empathize with suffering, not to be disgusted by screams or
blood or gore or unimaginable things done to another living, sentient
being. And this suppression of humane instincts seems a proof of
supreme self-control, of triumph over weakness, which it gives him
pleasure to demonstrate again and again, to himself and to others.
It
is therefore not primarily by combatting racism or anti-Semitism that
we can prevent these evils recurring, but above all by combatting the
hardening of the human heart, the enjoyment of cruelty (even in films
or fiction), the enjoyment of violence against others, the dehumanizing
of another person by hatred (whether for political, racial, religious
or any other reasons), and the moral self-righteousness that allows
people to believe that their cruelty to others is a just punishment of
vicious beings. The notion of brutality as a demonstration of
toughness, the association of cruelty with the moral virtue of
inflexible determination – these are the real enemies of humane values.
And along with this is the nihilism that sees life as worthless and
contemptible, something that may be taken from somebody
as a joke (in the way Mailer’s Croft takes it from the Japanese
prisoner.) Ironically (given their present canonization) it is this nihilism that was spread between the wars by a generation of
modernist artists, who like Samuel Beckett saw life as shit and human
beings as deluded trash waiting for a meaningless death. It is Beckett-style
nihilism and contempt for life rather than any deep racist or political convictions that ruled the minds of the Nazi or Soviet camp guards as they casually shot a prisoner for looking sideways at them. It appears that
the horrors of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes have taught us nothing.
We have continued to inculcate cruelty and violence through the popular
art of the cinema, and nihilism and contempt for life through the supposedly serious plastic arts over
the past half century. We have developed a popular culture where
violence and cruelty are the staple entertainment, disseminated in
every second film in every cinema across the planet. There is scarcely a
single action film that does not feature the savage murder of at least
one human being, presented to us either as a good thing to do or a piece of casual comedy. A Nazi-style conditioning of people in brutality
and contempt for human life goes on in our societies on a daily basis.
Popular entertainment has not focused to this extent on violence and
cruelty against human beings since the days of public executions by
means of gruesome tortures in the 18th century. No public entertainment
for the past two hundred years – not even cock-fights, dog-fights or
bear-baiting – compares in bloodshed, violence and sadism with the
popular “action” films of the last thirty years. We have got so used to
the violence of our cinema that we scarcely notice how unnatural and
depraved it is. If all the victims of brutal and violent acts in the
cinema were of one race, and if all the perpetrators were of another
race, we would at once understand that this is racist propaganda,
inciting violence against another race, and we would put an end to it.
As it is, it is inciting violence against the human race in general,
and we pretend that it is not happening, or that it is doing no harm.
15) TOTALITARIANISM AND REVOLUTION
When
contemplating the horrors of the 20th century, compared with the
steadily increasing (even if relative) decency of the 19th century (a
century in which Europe made unprecedented moral and humane progress by
abolishing such age-old, universal evils as slavery, torture and public
executions for the first time anywhere on earth), we are struck by the
sense of an enormous step backward in man’s moral sense. All the
progress of the 19th century was suddenly reversed, and we went back to
the worst medieval horrors. In the 1930’s half the governments in Europe
practised torture and arbitrary imprisonment. In the early 1940’s,
nine-tenths of them did. But the totalitarian movements of the 20th
century that carried out appalling acts of mass killing, torture and
enslavement did not see themselves as sliding backward but as moving
forward. Both the Fascists and the Communists saw themselves as
creating a New Man, a man fitted to the new industrial age, and the new
era of state power – a human type that was to be harder, more
disciplined, and more determined than any before, and would ruthlessly
clear away the rubble of the decadent bourgeois civilization to make
way for a glorious future. Both these ideologies can only be understood
in terms of a cult of revolution, a cult of starting history again from
zero, a cult of abolition of the past, a cult of modernism and the
modern age as something unprecedented and utterly different from
anything that had gone before. It is the notion of total revolution
which lies at the root of all the great events as well as the greatest
evils of the twentieth century. The First World War, by sweeping away
so many of the structures of the old order, and above all by
concentrating enormous power in the hands of the state for the
industrial war-effort, inspired hopes for a systematic rebuilding of
society on completely new lines. Even liberal democrats like Prime
Minister Lloyd George were enthralled by the prospect of total change
which the war offered: “No such opportunity has ever been given to any
nation before – not even by the French Revolution. The nation is now in
a molten state …. We cannot return to the old days, the old abuses, the
old stupidities.” 137 The notion that everything must be
reshaped from zero according to a ruthlessly rational plan, sweeping
away all the accumulated rubbish of the past, underlay the grandiose
schemes for a new society of both the Soviet Communists and the Nazis.
But
this cult of revolution, the cult of the abolition of the past, had
already been expressed in another domain before the First World War
broke out. This was the domain of art. The cult of modernism, the idea
that the new century had brought a totally new perspective on
existence, and that the whole superstructure of existing civilization
could and should be swept away as a dead, bourgeois, fossilized relic,
was not primarily a political but a cultural phenomenon. As the new
century dawned, the revolutionary theories of Marx, the growing unrest
of the workers’ movements, even the occasional shocking violence of the
anarchists, were nothing compared to the violent lust for change that
ran through the artistic world. It is to the notion of revolution in
the arts and in human thought that we must turn in order to understand
how the cult of revolution took hold of so many minds that it could
propel to power the worst revolutionary dictatorships in an age of
burgeoning democracy.
CHAPTER THREE : MODERNISM
1) THE ZEITGEIST
To
examine the movement called Modernism in any detail would of course
take a long book just for itself, but we cannot avoid looking at some
aspects of it – those that connect most closely to our theme of the
masculinization and brutalization of culture in the 20th century. In
the course of this brief analysis we will stress the contradictions of
Modernism. As a counter to the usual reverential consecration of
Modernism in all the arts as some wonderful brave adventure in
liberation, an intellectual expression of freedom and democracy, we
will see it instead as a fundamental part of that same obsession with
violently abolishing the past which gave rise to totalitarian utopias,
and made the 20th century, in much of Europe and Asia, the most cruel,
bloody and oppressive age in human history.
By
Modernism we mean of course the 20th century artistic movement that
began in around 1909 with Futurism. Discussions of Modernism and
Postmodernism often bizarrely confuse Modernism, the 20th century
artistic movement, with Modernity, the period of Western civilization
generally thought to have begun in the late 17th century with the first
scientific societies, and which of course we are still part of. There
is no way we will ever get beyond Modernity unless there is a nuclear
war or other planetary catastrophe (or the cultural collapse of the
West) which annihilates the technological, science-based society. But
Modernism, the artistic and literary movement, is one that is coming to
an end. It has arguably ended already in literature, which is now
largely anti-modernist, and it has reduced to gibbering imbecility the
visual arts and serious music, which can only be revived on an
anti-modernist basis. This appears confusing to some, because the
Modernist movement identified itself strongly with Modernity, that is,
with the scientific, technological society, which it believed had made
the 20th century unique in its advances and definitively
different from all the ages before. It should be clear that the end of
Modernism does not mean the end of Modernity, but only of a certain
artistic obsession with the machine age. There is, however, nothing
that can usefully be called Postmodernism, because the very people who
have invented this term and all the drivel that goes with it are simply
Modernists.
The
Modernist movement in art arose at the dawn of the 20th century in the
context of a general zeitgeist that included three main elements. First
was a growing aggressiveness and militarism, reflected in the new
colonial conquests in Africa and in
the increasing tensions between rival colonial powers. War was saluted
by thinkers as diverse as Nietzsche and Theodore Roosevelt as a
healthy, manly, revitalizing activity. Most nations began preparing
their people for it by military service, a cult of sport, as well as
quasi-militarist movements like the Boy Scouts (which grew out of the
Boer War.) Violent struggle was seen as the basic mechanism of
evolution, recently shown by Darwin
to be the driving force of all life. It was also seen as the path of
social progress, according to the revolutionary left. War, in short,
was the father of all things.1 Second, there was a new cult of science, industrial machinery and technological progress. The great exhibition of London
in 1851 set off a lasting, world-wide fascination with technology and
its evolution, leading to the notion that constant change and
revolution in techniques has somehow made the past obsolete. Trains,
cars, electric lighting, the telegraph, the telephone, the aeroplane,
soon to be followed by radically new scientific theories of matter and
the universe, were thought to have created a new world different from
anything that had ever existed before. Suddenly people believed that
the achievements of the past had been outdistanced and relegated to
some primitive pre-history of man: only now in the new “modern age” was
mankind coming into his own. The future stretched gloriously ahead and
there was nothing technology could not achieve. The third element was a
cult of social revolution which spread from the anarchist and socialist
groups into a generalized expectation of a cataclysmic social upheaval.
There was a widespread belief (especially among artists) in the
rottenness of what was known as “bourgeois society” with its rigid
class system, hypocritical morality, inherited injustices, and defunct
ideas. There was a conviction that the whole of civilization had to be
overthrown and a new start made, in which science and technology would
reshape the world. All three of these elements: the cult of aggression,
the cult of technological progress, and the cult of social revolution,
form the core of 20th century Fascist ideology. They also form the core
of the first great movement in Modernist art, Futurism, which burst on
the Paris literary scene in 1909.
The
founder of Futurism, Filippo Marinetti, worshipped speed, fast cars,
power and industrial machines and denounced all attachment to the past.
He exalted aggression, virility, patriotism and war (which he defined
as the “sole hygiene of the world” – in other words, a force for the
purification of the race, the essence of the Nazi concept of war.) He
urged the destruction of all libraries and art museums as reliquaries
of the dead past. His outlook seems to encompass the views of Henry
Ford (“History is bunk” – though Ford was a lot more intelligent than
the remark attributed to him), Adolf Hitler (war as racial hygiene) and
Mao Zedong (who really did destroy the art works of the past as part of
his perpetual revolution) all rolled into one. He
adored factories, motor cars, locomotives, steel bridges – everything
noisy, powerful, technological. He and his friends loved to drive cars
at full speed across the Lombard
countryside, and his ideal of beauty was a roaring machine: “a racing
car which seems to run on gunpowder is more beautiful than the Victory
of Samothrace.”2 This elevation of industrial products over
the great art of the past is typical of the whole tradition of modern
art which derives from Futurism. Marinetti became an ardent Fascist,
and saw Mussolini’s Fascism as the fulfilment of his visionary
programme. Mussolini reciprocated by promoting Modernist, Futurist
architecture in Italy
and its African colonies. Futurism became by and large the Fascist
style (though it had to compete with the revival of the Roman imperial
style.)
2) MODERNISM AND FASCISM
It
would of course be superficial to claim that Modernism is somehow
inherently “fascist” merely because one of its founding movements,
Futurism, identified itself with Italian Fascism. But the fact is that
all through its history Modernism has manifested the same elements that
are displayed in Fascist Futurism. The entire movement of perpetual
pseudo-revolution which has governed the art world for the past hundred
years (rather like the “Institutional Revolutionary Party” which
governed Mexico for much of the 20th century and kept proclaiming its
revolutionary nature as it grew more and more fossilized) – the cult of
innovation, novelty, originality, sensationalism, shock, which fills
museums like the Tate Modern with its bizarre objects even today – is a
direct descendant of Futurism. The whole abstract-conceptual tradition,
from Vorticism and Cubism onwards, with its geometrical forms,
machine-like shapes, its industrial feel, its use of ready-made
industrial objects, machinery, bits of manufactured junk, its contempt
for the ideas of art and beauty of past centuries, its rejection of
nature, its desire to shock with crude and brutal effects, to degrade,
insult and spit on everything traditionally respected (Manzoni’s cans
of shit, Duchamp’s urinal, lumps of used chewing gum, a pile of bricks,
a mutilated sheep carcass or dirty bedsheets as works of art) – all
this is in a direct line from Marinetti and Futurism. It also reflects
much of the underlying spirit of Fascism: its desire to shock and
violate sensibilities with a show of brutal violence and an abrupt
break with all conventions.
This
association of Modernism with Fascism goes against the whole grain of
academic criticism for the past fifty years. The tendency of
intellectuals since the Second World War (influenced by a Marxist view
of history) has been to ignore the revolutionary side of Fascism and
pretend that it was merely a defence of the old order, an essentially
conservative movement (as Franco’s regime in Spain largely was.) This
has made us forget the violent, revolutionary, collectivist,
anti-bourgeois nature of Nazism and Italian Fascism, their radical
break with the past, their obsession with new technology, their
ambition to create a New Man, which was as great as that of Soviet
communism. The Nazis not only shocked bourgeois sensibilities by their
reinstatement of public cruelty and violence in the beating up of Jews
in the street, the gunning down of their opponents, the public
executions. They also violated sexual taboos. There were of course
conflicting tendencies in Nazism – a puritanical and a pagan hedonistic
current. This led them briefly to ban nudist societies in 1933 before
authorizing them again a few months later. Those among their supporters
who looked forward to a restoration of moral decency after the
decadence of the gay cabaret scene of Weimar Berlin
were soon disappointed : the neo-paganism of many of the top leaders
led to the setting up of brothels for party members and the staging of
shows featuring naked women in Germanic mythological roles. Official
Nazi art, far from being prudish, glorified the nude. The 1960’s New
Left in Germany tried to justify its promotion of sexual liberation by depicting Nazism
as a sexually repressive society. This, it is now recognized, was a
falsification. The German Christian Democrats of the 1950’s based their
conservatism on the opposite perception: that Nazism had been a
sexually permissive society – and they remembered it a little more
accurately.3 Sexual liberation was part and parcel of the
Nazi ideology, along with the cult of youth. The Hitler Youth Movement,
with its camps of boys and girls side by side in the countryside, made
the Germans the most sexually precocious people in Europe,
with pre-marital sex the norm. Of the millions of teenage girls
enrolled in the League of German Maidens, a large number finished their
away-from-home Household Year or Countryside Year not only no longer
maidens but also pregnant. This, far from being disapproved of, was
welcomed by the Party as part of the necessary breeding of soldiers for
the Reich. The “Strength Through Joy” movement was gleefully
interpreted by the young as a licence for teen-age sex, which the Nazis
saw as a sign of the vitality of the race. Just after the outbreak of
war, Himmler announced that it was women’s sacred duty to bear children
to soldiers, even outside wedlock (a message the female youth leaders
had already been giving their charges.) Illegitimacy was to be no bar
to the replenishment of the ranks of the fighting men. 4
Himmler’s plan to release the SS of their marriage vows after the war
and get them to breed with specially selected women to create a new
master race illustrates the degree to which Nazism was a complete break
with traditional bourgeois norms of morality in matters of sex as well
as in attitudes to killing. In this it was part of the ongoing
revolution of modernist thinking, what we might call the desecrating,
the de-sacralising of all things, the systematic violation of moral
taboos and social conventions – and not, as the Left has tended to see
it, a conservative reaction defending the old bourgeois order.
Himmler’s lebensborn breeding plans, along with the mechanized
extermination camps, are an even more brutal moral break with the
bourgeois past than anything in Stalinism. They are far closer to the
Brave New World of a ruthless, scientific reduction of human beings to
the status of objects to be produced, used and disposed of. And in this
they closely follow the Modernist ideology of total revolution, the
cult of machine production, and the Modernist contempt for bourgeois
individualism, personal emotions, and for the Christian-humanist
superstition of the absolute value of the individual human being.
But,
you will answer, surely the Nazi attacks on Cubism and abstract art,
the closing of the Bauhaus, Hitler’s taste for neo-classical
architecture and Wagner’s operas, are proof that Nazism was a
reactionary movement from an artistic point of view, not a
revolutionary one? Surely Hitler would have preferred, in Marinetti’s
terms, the ancient Greek sculpture known as “The Victory of Samothrace”
to a racing car! It is not certain. Let us say he would have pretended
to prefer the Greek sculpture but in practice would have gone for the
racing car. We have already pointed out that Mussolini was a great
patron of Modernist architecture, and the Fascist expansion of Italy’s
African colonies led to a new crop of Futurist buildings, today hailed
as Modernist masterpieces, in the capital of Eritrea, Asmara. But even
though Hitler, unlike Mussolini, did not recognize the affinities of
Modernism with his own political movement, those affinities are there.
The Nazi regime in practice often moved in the opposite direction to
its own proclaimed beliefs. A movement which glorified the bucolic life
of the countryside was responsible for the industrialization of war and
death on a scale never seen before. And a movement which sought votes
by pretending to stand for traditional moral values in fact abolished
them more completely than any other. The whole ritualistic aspect of
Nazi parades, designer uniforms and visual symbols, while it pretended
to be a throwback to imperial ceremonial, was bathed in a Modernist
cult of style. A violent, vandalistic, collective will to raze and
destroy the recent (democratic, liberal, bourgeois) past is at the core
of both Nazism and Modernism. Both have a contempt for individual
liberty as a passé bourgeois delusion: the future belongs to collective
action, the subjection of the individual to the group (the party, the
collective art movement) and its doctrines. The Nazi faith in new
secret weapons, in victory through technological superiority, echoed
the Futurists’ cult of machines and technological progress. In many
ways Nazism was a revolution pretending to be a restoration of the
past. But in this very contradiction it was Modernist to the core: one
has only to remember the key place of primitivism in Modernist art, the
degree to which the artistic revolutionaries disguised their revolution
as a return to the forms of the remote past, while abolishing the more
recent past – that of bourgeois civilization. Nazism in its trumpeted
goal of abolishing bourgeois stuffiness, conventionality, weakness and
humanistic moral squeamishness in order to return to an era of past
grandeur of a brutal and primitive kind (worshipping Odin and Thor,
executing with the axe in public) is essentially the political and
ideological equivalent of Modernism in art. In both movements,
crudeness, violence and a cult of deliberate outrage are justified by a
belief in the greater vigour of primitive savagery over genteel
bourgeois convention. Nazism is to liberal bourgeois society what
Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring is to a Mozart symphony.
In
fact what unites Modernism and Nazism is essentially the one quality:
brutality. A cult of masculine values – of contempt for prettiness and
anything feminine or delicate – runs through both movements. (“Contempt
for women!” was a Futurist slogan.) What neither the Nazi nor the
Modernist must have is scruples or delicacy or sensitivity. For both
movements, the elegant, refined, rather feminine aesthetic values of
the old aristocratic civilization, which had dominated the West since
the Renaissance, were dead – and the carnage of the First World War
buried them. Henceforth no painting must be delicate. Hardness is the
nature of the age. Lines must be crudely and coarsely drawn, colours
applied with a ladle. Caricature replaces portraiture. Distortion
replaces naturalism. There is no longer a careful and loving
representation of the precise forms of nature – Constable’s or Monet’s
delicate reproduction of the exact impression of light on water or
fields. Modernism is crudeness. And Hitler, though he himself would
hardly have recognized the parallel, is doing the same in politics.
Henceforth the time for bourgeois drawing-room chatter has gone. The
machine gun must replace philosophical debate. The jackboot and the
firing squad will settle all essential questions. Nazism is to
parliamentary democracy what modern art is to a Constable landscape. A
faithful transcription of all the subtle complexities of nature, a
sensitivity to the most delicate impressions, a sense of proportion, a
civilized respect for norms, are replaced by an arbitrary act of force,
a crude redrawing of nature with bold, harsh strokes, a brutal
destruction of the traditions of the civilized past in the name of a
restoration of primitive vigour or the imposition of an ideological
abstraction. Both movements, Fascism and Modernism, represent violence
and brutality in power. Hitler’s personal attachment as an artist to
19th century artistic styles prevented him from seeing how closely his
own political movement paralleled the Modernist revolution in art (a
parallel which Mussolini saw far more clearly.) As an artist the young
Hitler remained a bourgeois; as a politician he violently destroyed
bourgeois civilization. But the fact that he could not see his
affinities to Modernism does not prevent us from seeing them. We are
not obliged to share his blindness. It is our job to see the paradoxes
he failed to see, and to place him more accurately in his cultural
context than he placed himself.
3) MODERNISM IN LITERATURE
Early
Modernist poets, more intellectual and self-aware than other artists,
recognized the deep contradictions and incoherence in their own
movement. They were quite openly both Modernists and reactionaries. The
most important thing to grasp is that the first generation of Modernist
poets in English, unlike the Futurists, hated the modern age. The major
figures of early twentieth century poetry, Yeats, Pound and Eliot, were
profoundly reactionary. They were all attracted to Fascism, but only
those aspects of it which seemed to promise a restoration of past
grandeur, and an abolition of the detested present – in other words
Fascism’s reactionary facade rather than its modernistic, brutally
revolutionary reality. They believed in orderly parades and stately
ceremony, not jackboots in faces and corpses in the streets. All of
these poets worshipped the art of the past and disliked most of the art
of the present, even to the point of half-lamenting the changes they
themselves were carrying forward. Yeats saw himself as the last
romantic and denounced modern poetry as “all out of shape from toe to
top”.5 Pound worshipped the Provençal
poetry of the 12th century, the Chinese classical poets, and
Renaissance Italy. Eliot admired the 17th century metaphysical poets,
and his oeuvre consisted largely of pastiches, quotations and allusions
to the literature of the past, expressing a nostalgic yearning for
bygone ages which he saw as more emotionally and spiritually intense
than the present. The art these first Modernists wanted to create had
become obsolete in the modern age and they struggled to bring it back.
All of them engaged in experiments to revive past forms – Eliot and
Yeats verse drama, Pound the classical epic (as revised by Renaissance
Italian poets.) They became Modernists almost in spite of themselves –
in their very attempt to go back to the past. But their successors (and
above all the academics who interpreted their work) looked back at the
first Modernists and acclaimed them as great technical innovators. They
were in love with Modernism and the modern age. It is their successors
who created the myth of Modernism as a triumphant rejection of the
past. Its founders would not have subscribed to this myth for one
moment. They would have seen themselves as rejecting the present, as a
catastrophic fall from a past they venerated and longed to return to.
4) THE MODERNISTS AS REACTIONARIES
Yeats began his career as a late romantic, lamenting the end of the romantic movement: “The woods of Arcady are dead.” 6
He spent his life idealizing a series of past ages: 18th century
aristocratic Ireland, the ancient heroic Ireland of Cuchulain,
Renaissance Italy, and in later life Byzantine civilization, whose art
he saw as embodying spiritual values in eternal, unchanging forms – a
bastion against the ephemeral tides of modernity. He even expressed the
wish to be reincarnated as a Byzantine work of art, a golden bird, to
be set upon a golden bough to sing “To lords and ladies of Byzantium/ Of what is past, or passing, or to come.” 7 In his last poetic testament, Under Ben Bulben, he heaped scorn on modern poetry:
Irish Poets, learn your trade,
Sing whatever is well made,
Scorn the sort now growing up
All out of shape from toe to top,
Their unremembering hearts and heads
Base-born products of base beds. 8
He
detested not only the formlessness of modern free verse but also the
break with the past, the loss of memory of the great traditions of
poetry. While he appreciated some of the contemporary styles and
fashions in other arts in his youth (especially dance), he felt deeply
alienated from much of what was happening in poetry and painting, and
was given to violent diatribes against contemporary artists (one of his
bêtes noires was Degas, whose dancers he found graceless and ugly,
precisely the qualities now admired.) He saw the modern age as
degenerate in almost every domain: artistic, cultural, social. His
later poetry, supposedly anchored more than his youthful work in the
harsh realities of modern times, in fact fed on a constant vision of
past ages of history (Byzantium, ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy or
eighteenth century Ireland), which he saw as ideal periods from which
the modern world had fatally declined. He classified all ages in a
cosmic system of his own, with the modern age as the very nadir of
history, a time of cultural catastrophe. It is clear that Yeats only
managed to endure the age he lived in through an imaginative dwelling
in the past and a mystical belief that past ages were somehow still in
existence on some cosmic plane. In so far as he expressed a political
vision it was deeply reactionary, sympathetic to Mussolini and
O’Duffy’s Irish Fascist movement. His deep if forlorn hope was for a
restoration of the aristocratic order of the past, which he saw as more
civilized than modern democracy. A Modernist more profoundly
anti-modern it is hard to imagine.
Ezra
Pound is a similar case of a man at odds with his age, who dwelt in the
past and longed to restore it. For him the temptation of Fascism was
its promise to restore a type of state modelled on Renaissance
Florence, ruled by a vigorous, paternalist dictator with a strong
interest in supporting the arts. He gives an account of his struggle to
produce art against the current of the times in Hugh Selwyn Mauberley (1920).
For three years, out of key with his time
He strove to resuscitate the dead art
Of poetry; to maintain “the sublime”
In the old sense. Wrong from the start – 9
He then goes on to tell us in what way his conception of art was out of key with his time:
The age demanded an image
Of its accelerated grimace,
Something for the modern stage,
Not, at any rate, an Attic grace;
Not, not certainly, the obscure reveries
Of the inward gaze;
Better mendacities
Than the classics in paraphrase!
The “age demanded” chiefly a mould in plaster
Made with no loss of time,
A prose kinema, not, not assuredly, alabaster
Or the sculpture of rhyme.
His
meticulous craftsmanship, his technical perfectionism, his use of
traditional rhyme, his contemplative themes, his imitations of the
classics, are some of the things the modern age did not accept. The
poem goes on to denounce the age in all its aspects, by ironic
juxtapositions with the grandeur of the past.
The tea-rose tea-gown etc
Supplants the mousseline of Cos,
The pianola replaces
Sappho’s barbitos.
The
modern age is contemptible even down to its vulgar, tasteless fashions
in clothes and music. The obscurity of the classical references (how
many readers know that a barbitos is a lyre?) is a frank declaration of
intellectual elitism, which illustrates the profound contempt he feels
for the vulgar, Philistine, mass-market democratic age.
All things are a flowing
Sage Heracleitus says;
But a tawdry cheapness
Shall outlast our days.
Faun’s flesh is not to us,
Nor the saint’s vision.
We have the press for wafer;
Franchise for circumcision.
Modern
political democracy, with its crude electioneering and vulgar mass
media, has replaced the spiritual and mystical rituals of religion. The
poem goes on in this way to pillory the whole modern age, not merely
the bourgeois Philistinism which had been a favourite whipping boy of
artists for fifty years, but every aspect of modern existence,
including democracy, the press, modern scepticism in matters religious,
and contemporary popular art forms.
Yet
Pound in this poem is also making a kind of mea culpa for his own
aesthetic neurasthenia in the pre-war years. He had “observed the
elegance of Circe’s hair/Rather than the mottoes on sundials.” He sees
the exquisite delicacy of his earlier art, the late romanticism of his
Provençal imitations, as a sort of culpable navel-gazing which
prevented him from facing the harsh realities of the age. After the
catastrophic war and economic depression, a new social realism of
subject matter is called for. So his poetry turns to harsher themes
than Provençal romances and the delicate complexions of young women. He
begins to rant and rave about Usury (his trope for modern capitalism),
writes a long, rambling verse history of civilization, in which Usury
plays a prominent role, and ends up in Italy
supporting Mussolini’s Fascist movement. He finishes the war in an
Allied prison camp facing a charge of treason for making radio
broadcasts for the enemy, which he dodges only by pleading insanity and
being locked away in a psychiatric hospital. This is an intellectual
career which might seem confused – but it is profoundly revealing of
the tensions and contradictions within Modernism as a whole, and its
love-hate relationship with the modern age. We could argue that Pound,
in going over openly to Fascism, follows the trajectory of early
Modernism (that of Marinetti) most faithfully. For Fascism too was full
of contradictions. It was a movement of violent rejection of the
present bourgeois civilization, in pursuit of a mad dream to reinstate
the lost grandeur of the past (the Roman empire)
– but it tried to achieve it through a Futuristic cult of technical
progress. Mussolini saw himself as a great modernizer, a bringer of
electricity to villages, determined to drag poor, backward Italy into the 20th century. At the same time his regime modelled itself on the ancient Roman empire.
On the one hand, the Fascist cult of war and violent methods led to a
primitivist glorification of savage instincts – a typical element of
early Modernism, from Stravinsky to Lawrence.
On the other hand, the movement was imbued with the worship of new
technologies and industrial progress. The rejection of bourgeois
civilization went both backwards and forwards: a vision of a more
natural, instinctive, passionate and vigorous pre-bourgeois past to be
restored through a Futurist cult of technical revolution. The paradox
of both Modernism and Fascism lies in a simultaneous cult of the future
and revival of the distant past. The ultimate
expression of Fascism (in its Nazi extreme) is the scientific
mechanization of death in the service of a dark, medieval superstition.
But this paradox is not alien to a Modernist movement which hailed as
futuristic progress a return to a level of primitive crudeness in art
not seen since the drawings of cave men. Both movements used a cult of
progress and revolution to go back to a crude, savage past which
genteel bourgeois society had condemned as barbaric. And both movements
found that their attempt to restore the remote past created instead a
new and unrecognizable reality.
T.S. Eliot’s greatest work, The Waste Land,
illustrates perfectly the paradoxical Modernist hatred of the present
and love of the past. Though its stylistic innovations announce its
modernity, its theme is a systematic attack on the modern world. It
weaves a web of allusions, pastiches and images from past periods,
whose spiritual values are evoked only to emphasize the decadence and
squalor of the present age. References to Petronius, Wagner, Ovid,
Shakespeare, Webster, Goldsmith, Dante, Verlaine, the Grail legend,
Saint Augustine, the Buddha, the Upanishads, etc., are all meant as
counterpoint to the sterility, emptiness, ugliness and depravity of
modern life. For those who do not have the poem at hand, and whose
memory of it is fading, a quote or two may illustrate the technique. He
takes the lines of Marvell in To his Coy Mistress :
But at my back I always hear
Time’s wingèd chariot hurrying near
and turns it into this:
But at my back from time to time I hear
The sounds of horns and motors, which shall bring
Sweeney to Mrs Porter in the spring. 10
The
poetic winged chariot of time (urging the lovers to get on with it)
becomes the ugly modern cacophony of motor-cars and their horns,
bringing his character Sweeney, a gross ape-like sexual omnivore, to
the sluttish Mrs Porter, of ribald drinking-song fame. Similarly, his
classical persona, the seer Tiresias, watches the soulless sexual
encounter of a pimpled house agent’s clerk with a secretary, and
comments afterwards in a parody of Goldsmith’s lament over a fond woman
betrayed by a faithless lover:
When lovely woman stoops to folly and
Paces about the room again, alone,
She smoothes her hair with automatic hand,
And puts a record on the gramophone. 11
The
bored indifference of the woman to her casual sexual exploitation, the
trivialization even of sin, drives the poet to despair. Every few lines
there is another allusion of the same sort, contrasting the depressing
vulgarity and sordidness of the present age with a nobler past. The
references pile up densely stanza after stanza, page after page, into
an overwhelming impression of decline, depravity and squalor. It is
clear that this is not merely an unhappy man writing about life. It is
an unhappy man writing about an age he hates – the modern age. In no
previous century did the poets write so obsessively about their own age
as a subject in itself – and an object of contempt and revulsion. A
romantic poet like Shelley was unhappy, but his quarrel was with
mankind, not with the age. He blamed his unhappiness on oppressive
political and religious systems, and he saw those systems stretching
back into the past and reflecting eternal human vices, so that past
ages were no better than his own. Even writers like Scott or Keats who
romanticized the Middle Ages did not do so to express loathing for the
present. For Eliot, in such works as The Waste Land or The Hollow Men,
the age he lives in becomes the dominant subject of his work. And he
detests that age like a disease and would willingly swap it for almost
any other. Images of the crowd flowing over London
bridge on the way to work, where “each man fixed his eyes before his
feet”, become Dantesque images of a modern hell of the walking damned.
Faced with the nightmare of what he calls “the dead land”, “cactus
land”, he can only evoke the end of the world, “falling towers”, the
collapse of civilization, as a merciful deliverance. What is
extraordinary is the degree to which this expression of one
individual’s neurosis and alienation struck a chord with so many others
in his time. Something called “the modern age” came to oppress the
imagination of thinking people in the early twentieth century with a
nightmarish intensity – and this horror at the modern world became one of the main elements in Modernism itself.
In
the novel we see the same thing. James Joyce is, like Eliot, a man
obsessed with certain aspects of the modern world which he loathes. And
he expresses that loathing by constructing a modern novel about
day-to-day humdrum existence inside a framework of allusions to Homer’s
epic, The Odyssey. Every comparison of an event in the lives of
the characters with an event in Ulysses’s life is an exposure of what
Pound calls the “tawdry cheapness” of the modern age. The Nausicaa
episode is typical: Ulysses’ seduction by an island nymph who makes him
forget the purpose of his journey is replaced by the henpecked,
cuckolded, middle-aged sad-sack Bloom masturbating at the sight of a
lame girl on the beach showing him her knickers. Here the sordidness
and sterility of modern sexual experience seems to be reinforced by the
detail of the girl’s lameness, which Bloom only notices as she walks
away, provoking a sudden post-orgasm depression.12 Even the
way the girl herself perceives this squalid sexual incident is
satirized by the tone in which her thoughts are expressed – a parody of
the rose-water style of popular “bodice-ripper” romances. The girl
interprets her prick-teasing exhibition of her knickers to a wanking
voyeur as a romantic flirtation of a delicate, unspoken kind with a
mysterious, distant admirer. Her every thought and feeling is a vulgar
cliché from the shallow popular trash her head is filled with. Even the
climax of the novel, the much admired Molly monologue, without
punctuation to emphasize her semi-literacy and scatter-brained
non-sequiturs of thought, is a send-up. Her reverie about her first
sexual experience with Bloom is a build-up to her own masturbation, and
the final repetitions of “Yes” at the end are the moment of her own
orgasm. The climax of the book is the climax of a wank. Romantic
memories are for jerking off to. There is no sadder send-up of love
than this (especially when the couple are no longer having sex) and yet
this passage has been considered a wonderful affirmation of life and
love by the sort of liberal American academic in desperate need of
philosophical uplift. One can only suppose that people who think this
also see the Nausicaa episode – a crippled teenager exhibiting her
knickers to a wanking voyeur, narrated in a parody of the lady-like
style of the spinster’s penny romance – as a wonderful love experience
showing the marvellous sexual vitality of the modern age.
The
basic structure of most of these early Modernist works is a form of
parody or satire of the present, by ironic counterpoint with an
idealized past. It is a form of satire where the rage of the artist is
directed exclusively against the modern world, not against the past,
for which he generally feels a deep reverence and nostalgia. This is
very different from the ridicule and desecration of the past which a
later generation of Modernist imitators went in for. In
short the perspective of the first generation of Modernist writers is
hatred of their own age and glorification of past ages. By a curious
paradox, the next generation, raised on Eliot, Pound, Yeats and Joyce,
come to reject the past world that these writers glorified, and instead
exalt the artistic styles of Modernism which these writers almost
accidentally produced. Their rage shifts from the modern age as a
decline from the past, to the past itself as a false and outmoded
ideal. This new generation of the depressed thirties, desperately
clutching at a communist dream of endless future happiness after a
period of suitably indiscriminate massacre, lumped past and present
together to be thrown into one enormous dustbin of history. Only after
they have fulfilled Marx’s favourite dictum : “Everything that is must
be destroyed!” (the words of Goethe’s devil) will the Brave New World
crawl out of the debris and the reign of the Saints begin. The
generation of the thirties therefore looked back at the great Modernist
poets of the previous decades as the demolition agents of the past,
whose new literary techniques cleared away the debris of history and
tradition so a new glorious future could be built. In contrast, those
first Modernist poets had seen their work as a desperate attempt to
preserve the past in the teeth of an age they hated (“These fragments I
have shored against my ruins.”)12 No greater
misunderstanding can be imagined. There is nothing more alien to the
vision of the first generation of Modernist poets than the myth of
Modernism built upon their work by the generations that came after.
This
myth that the great Modernists were rebels against the past is partly
due to their technical innovations. In the case of Joyce this is a very
free revamping of the whole structure of the novel, using parody and
pastiche in entire chapters, and a multiplicity of styles. T.S. Eliot
freely revamps the structure of the long poem in the same way,
switching styles, rhythms, voices and personae, and also using parody
and pastiche – to evoke the past, the touchstone of human values. But
in early Modernist poetry a good part of the sense of innovation lies
simply in an evolution of language – the rejection of a special poetic
diction. There is a common assumption nowadays (it is one of the
academic myths of Modernism) that poetry has always tended to use
archaic language, which must periodically be renewed and updated. This
has not generally been true in English. There have been individual
poets who used archaic diction, such as Spenser and Chatterton, but new
movements like Donne’s, Dryden’s or Wordsworth’s have represented
changes of style rather than renewals of language. There was nothing in
the poetry of Shakespeare or Milton which cried out for a renewal of
language; their respective successors Donne and Dryden simply chose to
write differently. But this notion of the renewal of language was
substantially true of the late 19th century, because of the major changes the language had gone through over previous decades. The older grammatical forms of thou, thee, hast and hath which disappeared from standard (southern) British speech in the early 19th
century (as part of a steadily increasing formality of speech among the
new prissy, Puritanical gentry, eliminating the equivalent of the
familiar tu form in French) were kept on by the poets because they sounded more personal and intimate – just as the church kept the thou
form in prayers. For the generation of Shelley and Byron, to say “I
love you” instead of “I love thee” would have sounded as stiff and
pompous as to say “je vous aime” to a Frenchwoman today. This new
formality and stiffness of language only gradually imposed itself with
Victorian Puritanism. There was a fashion among Victorian poets, in
revolt against their time, to affirm their allegiance to a more
passionate age by continuing to use its language – not only its more
intimate pronouns (Swinburne still wrote “thou” in 1866, long after
anybody actually said it, except in dialect), but also a certain number
of archaic words which they felt were more poetic than the modern
equivalents. This self-conscious archaism of diction expressed a
nostalgia for the past, and especially for an idealized pre-industrial
age where man was closer to nature and felt deeper emotions than in the
coarse, materialistic, brutalizing industrial world in which the poets
now found themselves. Though this poetic diction was disappearing by
the end of the century, elements of it still cropped up out of habit in
the work of some poets. Ezra Pound, after indulging himself in this
archaism and medievalism for much of his youth, writing Provençal
imitations as archaic in language as Spenser’s poems, became a great
advocate of modernizing language and getting rid of old-fashioned
diction just before the First World War. This is when he was associated
in the founding of Vorticism with Wyndham Lewis – a painter and writer
with a sharply observant but deeply schizophrenic attitude to the
modern age, both loathing it and embracing its fashions as the new
reality. Pound from then on became the guru of “making it new” in
poetry. Through the literary magazines he edited he had an influence on
Eliot and even Yeats in promoting a new consciousness of the need to
remain close to the way people now talked. But in none of them was this
modernization of language associated in any degree with a revolt
against the past. All three were profoundly reactionary in politics,
beliefs and cultural and artistic tastes (though they were the tastes
not of the previous generation but of a remoter past.) They adapted
their language to the age but not their souls.
Perhaps
a second element in the myth of Modernists as rebels against the past
came from the attempts by the state to censor some of their work. James
Joyce’s Ulysses was banned in Britain and America
for obscenity – it contained some of the swearwords and terms for
bodily functions that ordinary young Irish people actually used. D.H.
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover was banned for similar offences. Lawrence
was another reactionary who hated the modern industrial age and dreamed
of a return to some primitive natural simplicity, such as that of the
ancient Mexicans or the ancient Etruscans, worshipping dark and bloody
gods. But though he was in fact a proto-fascist, raving on about the
dark gods, the leadership principle and thinking with the blood, he was
attacked by the puritanical establishment not as a fascist but as a
threat to sexual propriety. He fought bitter battles against censorship
for obscenity, which made him a cult hero of the left. The liberties
taken by these early Modernists in crude language or open treatment of
sex and other bodily functions were enough to win them the badge of
progressives – rebels against convention, avatars of a new freedom of
expression – when in fact their entire worldview was profoundly
anti-modern, anti-democratic and reactionary.
The
next generation of English poets, Auden, Spender, MacNeice and Day
Lewis, reinterpreted this hatred of the modern industrial age as a
hatred of the capitalist system. They were mostly Marxists (for a time)
who looked forward eagerly to the revolutionary cataclysm and the year
zero, making a clean sweep of a corrupt civilization. Salvation for
them lay in the future, not the past, but they saw themselves as
carrying on to the next stage a poetic revolution begun by the
generation of Eliot. It is this second generation which established the
myth of Modernism as a revolution against the past. Critics talked much
of the technical innovation of their verse, of their break with
traditional forms. But their technical revolution
has been much exaggerated. Any innovation was confined to content,
attitude and style rather than verse technique – their
anti-romanticism, their rejection of Yeats’ emotional hyperbole and
grand poetic manner in favour of understatement, irony, a prosaic style
(not to be confused with a colloquial style, because it meant
introducing an academic and journalistic vocabulary) and in Auden’s
case a certain tendency to vacuous, abstract generalization. Auden
later recants the strident Marxist verse propaganda of his earlier
years and retreats into the boring platitudes of a country vicar. But
from a technical point of view (metre, rhyme, stanza forms), they
remained by and large very traditional poets to the end. Most of their
verse is in strictly traditional metres (far more conventional than
Eliot’s or Pound’s) and often rhymed. Even when they seem occasionally
to be writing “free verse” their lines can usually be scanned; they are
simply varying the length of them. And when they turn conservative, as
they do in middle age, the essential traditionalism of their verse
reflects more and more the tired disillusionment of their views. The
Modernist revolution in poetry is very largely an academic myth. Walt
Whitman in the mid-nineteenth century wrote far “freer” verse than
Eliot, Pound or Auden (let alone Yeats.) While Whitman had his modern
imitators, who wrote prose and called it poetry, all the major poets of
the 20th century (including the major Americans, Frost, Crane, Stevens,
Roethke and Lowell) wrote verse that remains by and large within
traditional metres. This goes so much against the grain of what is
often taught in universities by the mythmakers of Modernism that it is
perhaps worth looking at it for a moment to make the point.
5) THE REVOLUTION THAT NEVER HAPPENED
Eliot,
in an introduction to Pound’s poems, made clear the distinction between
the sort of modern verse he and Pound wrote, and the writing of what he
called the disciples of Walt Whitman. He repeats his earlier remark on vers libre that “no vers is libre
for the man who wants to do a good job.” He traces the notion of “free
verse” to Jules Laforgue, who wrote verse that was free “in much the
way that the later verse of Shakespeare, Webster, Tourneur, is free
verse; that is to say, it stretches, contracts and distorts the
traditional French measure as later Elizabethan and Jacobean poetry
stretches, contracts and distorts the blank verse measure.” 13
He sees his own verse as fitting into this tradition of stretching and
distorting the blank verse line (by adding or subtracting a few
syllables while keeping the same number of beats.) By contrast he
regards Whitman as “a great prose writer”. He distinguishes between
revolutionaries who “develop logically” and those who “innovate
illogically” – implying that Pound is the first and
Whitman the second. He regards Whitman’s work as “a logical development
of certain English prose.” But he saw it as “spurious in so far as
Whitman wrote in a way that asserted that his great prose was a new
form of verse.” 14
The
point Eliot seems to be making is that Whitman was writing lines
without any relation to the paradigm of verse, which consists of a
number of discernible beats in a line (not, of course, necessarily the
same number in each line.) These beats impose a musical rhythm on the
line which exists in a certain creative tension with the syntax of the
sentence, and modifies the way we say it. Whitman’s writing, in
contrast, has, in Eliot’s view, the natural, irregular rhythm of prose,
which simply follows the syntax and does not set up any secondary
formal rhythm in tension with it. Now what Eliot says is not in fact
always true of Whitman, but it is very often true, especially when he
gets carried away in his longer poems. And it is certainly true of his
disciples, such as Marianne Moore, who set out deliberately to ignore
and exclude the rhythm of verse, and by their choice of line-breaks
make it impossible to read their lines as verse – while insisting
bizarrely on calling it poetry. It is important to look at this
distinction between the Eliot-Pound current and the Whitmanites more
closely, because it is crucial in defining how far Modernism in poetry
constituted a technical revolution at all, and how far it was merely
one more stylistic development, comparable to the changes brought about
in their own generations by Donne, Dryden or Wordsworth.
6) ELIOT : THE CONSERVATIVE NIHILIST
In
what sense was Eliot an innovator? If, as he rightly claims, he kept to
a blank verse line not greatly altered since late Shakespeare, in what
way did he change the technique of poetry? In terms of metre he merely
pushed slightly further a development that had already been pioneered
by Matthew Arnold in Dover Beach
way back in 1851 – the changing of metre from one line to the next not
through a regular stanza scheme but through an organic following of the
shape of the thought. Here is Arnold, talking of the sea of faith:
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world. 15
This
is a mix of iambic pentameters and trimeters (five-beat and three-beat
lines), but the switch from one to another occurs irregularly,
following the pattern of thought, and there are long passages in this
poem where he sticks to one or the other. Eliot does the same:
Here I am, an old man in a dry month,
Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain.
I was neither at the hot gates
Nor fought in the warm rain
Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass,
Bitten by flies, fought. 16
This again is a mix of pentameters and trimeters, but as in Arnold
the switch from one to another is dictated by the shape of the thought,
not by a regular, repeated stanza scheme, as we would find in Shelley,
Tennyson or Hardy. So in verse forms Eliot is merely continuing Arnold’s Victorian innovation –
switching metres from one line to the next as the spirit moves him. He
is not modifying the metre within each line. The opening pentameter
above only displaces beats, stretches and distorts the blank verse
line, in the manner of late Shakespeare or Webster. As Eliot himself
said, he was not modifying the iambic line any more than they did three
hundred years before him.
What is utterly new in Eliot is the content, the mood, the attitude. Look at the famous opening of The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock:
Let us go then, you and I,
When the evening is spread out against the sky
Like a patient etherised upon a table. 17
What
is new in these two fairly regular, traditional iambic pentameters is
the incongruous image of the sunset as an operating theatre –
deliberately, outrageously, almost offensively anti-romantic. It
expresses a rejection of the natural world, a total alienation of man
from nature – that nature which the romantic poets had felt an
instinctive kinship with. The image of modern hospitals, of operations,
epitomizes the modern technical age which has broken man’s connection
with nature. But the image perfectly reflects the state of mind of the
neurotic, alienated narrator: even the evening sky shares his
psychological paralysis, his helplessness. The narrator, who is a
rounded character like Browning’s dramatic narrators, then invites us
to accompany him on his visit:
Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster shells:
The
squalid urban landscape is described not so much as a physical reality,
but as a psychological space, a state of mind of desolation and faint
patrician disgust for the sordid pleasures of the flesh. The journey
becomes even more a psychological one:
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question….
We
gradually pierce the mystery of the narrator’s neurotic state of mind.
He is a timid, balding intellectual pushed to propose marriage to a
woman acquaintance not out of passionate love but out of frustration,
depression, need, fear of loneliness – and dreading the moment of
truth, the social disaster of rejection, as if the room full of
tea-drinking women were as terrifying as a battle-field. This is what
sexual love – which had been seen by the romantic poets as a redemptive
force, the one thing that makes life worth living – has now been
reduced to in the modern age: a combination of tedium, neurosis, and
nightmarish fears.
What
is new is not any innovation in verse technique – these are solidly
conventional iambic pentameters and trimeters – but the new freedom of
the poet to range from physical to mental description, from concrete to
abstract vocabulary, in the construction of a Browning-style dramatic
persona. And what is new above all is the persona itself: a man full of
obscure psychological fears, a neurotic. This is modern, urban,
intellectual man: a shrunken, timid, lonely, balding, shy, sexually
inhibited, self-conscious, prudish, emotionally impotent man facing a
room full of arty, tea-drinking women. But though this figure seems at
first to be a self-deprecating joke, it gradually becomes the portrait
of a misfit, a psychological basket case. The poem becomes a quiet,
civilized scream of protest against the superficial, alien social world
he lives in:
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall
Then how should I begin
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways? 18
It
ends with an evocation of suicide — a complex image of drowning, but
also of a life of erotic reverie, dreaming of mermaids, from which the
human reality is a rude awakening :
We have lingered in the chambers of the sea
By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown
Till human voices wake us, and we drown. 19
The
final intensity of the poem wrenches it out of its dramatic framework.
It becomes all too clearly the personal cry of the poet. The poem is
about the death of the dream of romantic love – killed off by the
everyday reality of a superficial, boring social world of women who no
longer inspire or are interested in the passions of the romantic poet.
Real women, real relationships, he seems to be saying, are very
different from the romantic dream. On one level this is an embarrassing
confession of sexual failure – the lament of a man who is not getting
his end away, and, more important, no longer has much hope that he ever
will. Lots of romantic poets complain of solitude, but their dreams of
the beautiful lady who will finally save them from themselves remain
intact till death (it helps in these cases to die young.) What Eliot is
creating here is a character who is the very antithesis of the romantic
persona of the poet unconsciously copied from Keats and Shelley for a
century. These poets might be desperately lonely, but at least they
still have the dream that one day the gentle, understanding woman
will show up and make it all worthwhile. Eliot presents us with
anti-romantic man par excellence – a man who no longer believes in his
own seductive potential, and therefore his own chances of happiness.
For whatever psychological reasons, he can no longer see woman (and
love) as the solution to the problem of life.
We
have said that Eliot, like the other early Modernist poets, glorified
the past and detested the present. But it was not all of the past he
glorified. He glorified certain ages such as the Jacobean and the
neo-classical, while hating the romantic period, and especially the
late romanticism immediately preceding his own age. Why? Because for
him the romantic world-view was too optimistic, too naive, too much in
love with life. It worshipped the beauty of nature, it felt (with
Hamlet) that man was “infinite in faculty”, it believed paradise on
earth was possible in the love between man and woman – in short, it
forgot original sin and guilt, the inherent depravity and worthlessness
of human nature, which must poison everything. Eliot identified only
with those periods of the past that recognized man’s sin and depravity
– notably the 17th century of the metaphysical poets, with their
bizarre alternation between the themes of sexual indulgence and
desperate prayer. Eliot believed in original sin before he came to
believe in redemption. He was a Christian in his despair before he
became a Christian in his hope. His conversion was almost programmed by
his pessimism – it was that or suicide. Life was to him not a journey
through a fascinating landscape but a voyage of the damned, and he
wanted to rub our noses in the psychological horror of the modern
world. His writing, like that of Sartre and other later Modernists, is
dominated by disgust. Now disgust is not a romantic emotion. It is by
definition anti-romantic. The romantic on some profound level loves
life, whatever it does to him. Even if he is alone and abandoned, he
has a tree, a leaf, a birdsong to console him – a darkling thrush, a
heaven in a wild flower. Even his bitterest sadness is savoured in the
full belief that (as Ben Jonson, with classical rather than romantic
optimism, put it) “in short measures life may perfect be”. Or, as
Shelley put it, with a more mystical, romantic faith: “For love, and
beauty, and delight,/ There is no death nor change.” When you lose the
belief that life may be perfect (whether for short moments or for all
eternity), and come to believe that it is inherently corrupt beyond
remedy, because you hate who you are and have lost, like the Ancient
Mariner, your capacity to love, then you feel disgust, and you reject
every form of romantic illusion with a bitter, jeering hatred. This is
Eliot’s viewpoint and it is this that makes him seem “modern” more than
any merely technical innovation he introduced. His Modernism is his
disillusionment, his disgust with life – a characteristic still on
display in every late 20th century monstrosity in the Tate Modern
Gallery. This is where Modernism turns a psychological corner.
We
have described already how the leading early Modernists rejected the
modern age, and saw it as a falling off from past ages which had deeper
and more passionate beliefs. But Eliot in rejecting the modern age was
also expressing a rejection of life, a disillusionment, an alienation,
a neurosis, which came to epitomize the modern age itself. The opening lines of The Waste Land,
“April is the cruellest month, breeding /Lilacs out of the dead land”
express a state of mind where the faith in Nature of the romantic
poets, the cult of spring as the rebirth of life, no longer exists. The
whole poem is about the failure of life to return in spring (he points
to this in his footnote on Jesse L. Weston’s theory of the Grail legend
as originating in a nature cult.) This failure of spring to return and
bring new life to the Waste Land
– which the Fisher King is to blame for – is the cause of the anguish
and despair of the poem, its evocation of deserts, of desperate thirst,
of a failed redemption, and finally a collapse of civilization itself
in the falling towers and cities of the world. All of it, of course, is
an elaborate metaphor (or “objective correlative” to use his own term)
for a depression which a patient cannot recover from. Eliot wrote this
poem after a nervous breakdown, probably caused by some sexual or
emotional frustration (some have speculated about repressed
homosexuality.) The poem expresses his depressed inability to feel
life’s renewing, healing force within him. But Eliot’s age read the
poem as a reflection of the failure of life and hope to return after
the horrors and mass death of the First World War. The poet’s
depression becomes a mirror of the age’s depression – its sense of not
feeling any spiritual recovery from the catastrophe. The poem’s
anguished assertion that Nature has failed – that its healing force
does not work, that spring does not return – becomes a rejection of
romanticism, the most recent expression of the cult of Nature,
including the cult of love as the source of rebirth and redemption. The Waste Land
announces the Death of Nature in much the same way that Nietzsche
announced the Death of God. An anti-romantic rejection of faith in
Nature and faith in love becomes part of the modern world-view which
Eliot helped to shape.
Modernism
in poetry announces itself, therefore, not as a revolution but as a
nervous breakdown. It is the loss of nerve after a psychological
collapse – the inability to get back the love of life. Eliot’s two
major early poems, Prufrock and The Waste Land, reject
the faith in the redeeming force of sexual love and the redeeming force
of Nature, the eternal rebirth of spring. But this is not merely a
rejection of the romantic world-view. For this world-view is much older
than romanticism. It had ruled the Western poetic imagination ever
since Chaucer’s hopeful young lovers rode out in the merry month of
May. In fact this faith in Nature pre-dates Christianity (though the
latter was largely adapted to it – Coleridge Christianizes the
redemptive love of nature as a love of all God’s creatures, which
finally saves the Ancient Mariner.) It goes back to pagan nature cults,
celebrating spring, which Jesse L. Weston saw as the origin of the
Grail legend with its mysterious waste land. The Eleusinian mysteries,
the Greek nature cult celebrating rebirth (and probably including a
mystic marriage), lasted for fifteen hundred years as the dominant
religious ceremony of the classical world. Even when the official
ritual ceased, the human need that underlay it remained. The cult of
Nature is what has distinguished the Western worldview ever since it
began to express itself in art. Western art has always resisted
abstraction. From the naturalistic representation of beautiful bodies
of the Greeks and Romans, to the animals, birds and human
figures of early Romanesque cathedral sculptures, Western artists have
always depicted the real physical world, with a loving exactness that
suggests a worship of nature. When the Western nations took over the
Greek Byzantine tradition of religious art, they pushed it towards
naturalism. Instead of the stiff, stylized rows of identical saints,
expressing an abstract spirituality, Western artists began to give the
saints individual personalities – and to depict the biblical stories
with a far livelier interest in their human aspect. You can see this in
the mosaics of the 12th century Norman Cathedral of Monreale in Sicily,
as the Norman invaders (importing artists from all over the region)
give us their Western version of Byzantine art – a cinematic,
naturalistic portrayal of biblical stories. We see the building of the
ark, the bringing on board of the animals, the sending out of the dove,
we see camels drinking at water-troughs, and animals and birds depicted
no longer merely as religious symbols but as interesting and beautiful
creatures in their own right. The Westernization of religious art
consisted of nature taking over from abstraction, symbolism and
stylization – and within two hundred years European art had become a
riot of sensuality and naked flesh, devoted to a naturalistic
representation of the earthly passions of real people. The evolution of
Western art is a progressive rejection of the austere other-worldly
vision of the Eastern religion which Europeans had adopted – its
transformation into a cult of life in all its physicality. The love of
life, the joy in nature as a regenerative force, celebrated at spring
festivals like Mayday, is the ancestral European religion (originating
in the extreme variation of the northern seasons, which created an
obsession with spring as a rebirth of life after the cosmic death of
winter.) Christianity, despite periodic attempts to suppress its
predecessor, was largely adapted to it – whether the Easter spring
festival of eggs and rabbits, or the mid-winter pine-tree festival,
adapted to celebrate a divine baby born in a freezing stable as a
promise of life’s renewal. One does not need to be an adept of
neo-paganism to see the force of the concept of Nature in Western
culture, and how it gradually got the upper hand over an imported
Eastern religion of other-worldly inspiration. It is that age-old faith
in Nature’s constant renewal of life (celebrated most recently by
romanticism) which Eliot rejects in The Waste Land as something
defunct, discredited, no longer operative in man’s world. Man now
inhabits a dead land (the modern age) where spring does not return.
This rejection of the faith in Nature (and the faith in sexual love
that goes with it) becomes a lasting part of the cynicism and nihilism
which forms a major current of the Modernist movement. That is how a
poet whose starting-point is a rejection of the modern age as a
terrible decline from a nobler, more spiritual and artistic past comes
to embody a world-view that rejects romanticism, rejects Nature,
rejects love, rejects hope, rejects life. And this perspective of
negativity, disillusionment and nihilism ends up paradoxically (in a
later Modernist generation) in a jeering contempt for past ages and the
great art of the past that Eliot so admired. From Eliot’s rejection of
the modern age as a waste land we finally end up with a late Modernist
art movement which revels and wallows in this waste land – which in
fact produces waste, rubbish, garbage and calls it art: cans of shit
(Manzoni), old urinals (Duchamp), used chewing gum, blank canvases,
bricks, sacks of straw, shovels, coathooks, crumpled paper, dirty
sheets, dead fish, butchered sheep. And the perpetrators of this
rubbish are animated by a Philistine, illiterate contempt for
everything that early Modernists like Eliot valued.
Eliot’s
despair and rejection of life therefore sets in motion a movement that
finally turns against everything he himself believed in. He finds a
personal solution to his own despair by his conversion to Anglicanism
in his early forties (a path later followed by Auden, though many of
those who came after preferred to stay in the desert Eliot had led them
into.) His faith brings him a degree of consolation. He gives up
talking about sex (with that odd mixture of disgust and frustrated
envy), seems to feel less revulsion from life as he goes on, moralizes
about the age instead of hating it, abandons the dramatic characters he
inhabited, and becomes himself at last. He discovers his true identity
as a sage or secular bishop, pontificating quietly on life, and writing
poetry of excruciating boredom:
The world turns and the world changes
But one thing does not change.
In all of my years, one thing does not change.
However you disguise it, this thing does not change:
The perpetual struggle of Good and Evil. 20
This
reeks of bedpans and pre-chewed food, even though he is not yet fifty.
Eliot’s embrace of Christianity, while it reconciled him to living, did
not make him love life. There is none of that spontaneous joy in life
that religious faith gave Blake or Gerard Manley Hopkins. There is in
Eliot no vision of light; only a tedious argument with the dark. He
undergoes conversion, but he experiences no enlightenment. His new
affirmation of life seems to be purely intellectual, not emotional. The
shadowy figure of the “praying sister” who haunts his later poems
appears an inadequate and rather perfunctory Muse. He is not in love
with her, the way Dante is with Beatrice, or Petrarch with Laura – both
of these poets drawing inspiration from the idealization of a girl they
could not have. Eliot doesn’t have the ability to idealize a girl – to
make physical beauty into a spiritual ideal (as Yeats does, for
example.) The experience of St Theresa’s mystic marriage is beyond his
range – the transformation of sexual longing into a spiritual
transcendence of the self. Eliot remains trapped in Modernist nihilism
in his soul, whatever the change in his intellectual beliefs. He
remains a psychic invalid in lifelong convalescence. He is, as the
French say, mal dans sa peau, and there is no cure for it. He is a man suffering from eternal spiritual toothache.
It
is this despair and nihilism that remains Eliot’s main influence on the
age. The nihilist current in Modernism that springs partly from him
became a torrent after another world war had brought even more horror –
reaching a high point (if that is the best word) in the work of Samuel
Beckett, and the visual arts of the past fifty years. Modernism has had
three phases (roughly speaking): the fascist, communist, and nihilist
generations. In the twenties, the poets rejected the present and
glorified the past, in the thirties they rejected both past and present
and glorified the Marxist future, and in the fifties they rejected
past, present and future. We are still (despite the academic fiction of
something called post-modernism) living in the nihilistic phase of
Modernism – the cult of pickled fish and dirty bedsheets as works of
art. Given the third-phase Modernist viewpoint of total disgust for
life, it was inevitable that art should degenerate into incoherence,
ugliness, emptiness, stupidity and endless, tedious
attempts to shock and repel. The disgust for life became a spiteful
rejection of the public, a jeering contempt for their expectation that
art should express meaning or emotion, a reduction of art to hoax. It
culminates in Piero Manzoni exhibiting cans of his own shit, Robert
Rauschenberg painting blank white canvases with rollers, and his friend
John Cage “composing” four and a half minutes of silence, performed in New York by a concert pianist and in London by a full orchestra. Since then there has only been boring repetition of the same imbecilic drivel.
We
have suggested that technically Eliot (and Modernism in general in its
major poetic offerings) did not in fact represent a huge break with the
past. It was technically no more of a revolution than that initiated by
Donne, Dryden or Wordsworth. But ideologically, the current of
Modernism which Eliot in some sense began – nihilism – does represent a
total break with the past. It is a rejection of Nature and of faith in
life, and therefore an absolute break with the entire world-view that
underlies Western culture. We have analysed this sketchily as a
multifaceted Nature-worship, a tendency to represent Nature in art, a
faith in Nature’s powers of renewal (whether seen in religious terms or
sexual terms), and a related cult of love between the sexes (which has
been the main theme of Western literature ever since the 12th century.) The abandonment of the entire Western tradition of faith in Nature leads
Western artists to nihilism – typified in abstractionism, the rejection
of the natural world. But while this nihilist current took over the
visual arts and “serious” music, giving us piles of bricks and
concertos for scraping chair-legs, it did not take over literature for
very long. The visual arts and “serious” music have become so
marginalized they are now in danger of disappearing – replaced by the
cinema and popular music, which, however vulgar and debased in their
mass commercial forms, at least satisfy the human need for stories or
songs about love and a celebration of nature’s visual beauty.
Literature, on the other hand, is thriving – because it is also giving
people the traditional fare the human spirit needs. Twentieth century
literature as a whole did not succumb to Modernist nihilism. Only a
minor current of it, in figures like Beckett or some of the French
dadaist experimenters with automatic writing, continued down the
nihilist, experimental road which Joyce had pointed them in with Finnegan’s Wake,
written in a private incomprehensible language. But most major writers
resisted nihilism (and the disintegration of form it led to) because of
their own belief systems. Many of the thirties generation of poets
espoused Marxism and then Christianity, while Pound went over to
fascism. But the greatest poet of the 20th century, Yeats, was never
tempted by nihilism because he never gave up the “old religion” of the
romantic poets – the cult of Nature and the belief in love. He
developed his own new version of it – through a never-ending
exploration of esoteric cults, neo-paganism, and various mythologies
and literary and artistic traditions, from Celtic to Byzantine. And he
expressed this ancient faith in life and sexual love in largely
traditional verse forms, which he mastered to a degree that stands
comparison with the poets of any previous age.
7) YEATS : THE ANTI-MODERNIST
Yeats began as a late Victorian romantic, singing “the woods of Arcady”,
and adapted his extraordinary skill in traditional verse styles only
marginally to the new movement. If we see Modernism as a movement
rather than a period, it is debatable whether we can call Yeats a
Modernist at all. He himself, as we have seen, despised contemporary
poetic styles as “out of shape from toe to top”. He never wrote a line
that was not perfectly regular, in a metre that was used by poets of
previous centuries (and he mastered an extraordinary number of them.)
He also never adopted the nihilistic, anti-romantic viewpoint. The
conventional academic view is that Yeats started out as an
old-fashioned late romantic Tennysonian dreamer, using archaic
Victorian poetic diction and wallowing in Celtic mythology, and later
became a Modernist, using a strong, realistic, everyday, down-to-earth
vocabulary, and shaking off the outmoded mythological trappings of his
youth. Let us see if this is true. Is there anything obsolete, archaic,
or precious in this poem of 1904 (before Modernism was thought of)?
Sweetheart, do not love too long:
I loved long and long,
And grew to be out of fashion
Like an old song. 21
Which words would you change to “modernize” these lines? Or these :
When you are old and grey and full of sleep,
And nodding by the fire, take down this book, 22
How
exactly could we modernize the diction of this, dating from 1893, when
Eliot and Pound were just starting primary school? And what would you
want to update from The Lake Isle of Innisfree in the same year?
And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow,
Dropping from the veils of the morning, to where the cricket sings;
There midnight’s all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow,
And evening full of the linnet’s wings. 23
This
has an opulent sensuousness of sound, but every image is sharp-edged,
clearly defined, every word essential and perfectly chosen. There is
only one adjective in the stanza, the word purple; there is none of the
vague poetic diction, the straining for poetic effect, which made other
late Victorians seem archaic or precious or second-hand. There is
nothing to be updated or modernized here. He describes a vision of
rural peace, of escaping from the city, and he does it perfectly. Later
he chooses to do other things, and he does them perfectly as well. (The
modernist critics who dislike this phase of Yeats do so because they
hate poems about love and the beauty of nature, not because the
language is old-fashioned – it isn’t.) The truth is that Yeats wrote
with an extraordinary precision and economy of language from the
beginning. Naturally his style evolved as his interests and experiences
evolved, as he lived through a civil war, as he developed from a lonely
dreamer to a very active “public man”, and finally a senator. But there
is no revolution in Yeats’ work, no break between a romantic and a
modernist – merely a steady maturing. He never left behind his
mythological and esoteric interests: they simply shifted in nature. His
artistic tastes evolved from a youthful cultivation of sensuousness, as
he wrote mainly about love and Celtic myths, to a mature taste for
hard, cold, sculpted forms, as he began to see art as an eternal
repository of spiritual values, in the manner of Byzantine religious
art. The later hardness is just as rooted in traditional verse forms
and private mythology as the youthful lyricism.
There is no sharp break between them. And Yeats finds his way to a
graphic realism in his description of the horrors of the age without
any help from Pound or Eliot. A year before Pound’s Mauberley and three years before Eliot’s Waste Land
give their literary, pastiche-ridden take on the horrors of the modern
age, we have Yeats’ sober description of civil war – or rather the
British military repression by the Black and Tans, war veterans sent
into Ireland to put down the nationalist movement (somewhat like the
Serbs in Kosovo or the Russians in Chechnya) in his poem Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen:
Now days are dragon-ridden, the nightmare
Rides upon sleep; a drunken soldiery
Can leave the mother, murdered at her door,
To crawl in her own blood, and go scot-free.
The night can sweat with terror as before
We pieced our thoughts into philosophy,
And planned to bring the world under a rule,
Who are but weasels fighting in a hole. 24
This
is a somewhat more reality-based despair than the literary or
philosophical angst of Eliot and Pound. This is a man seeing his
country torn apart, terrorized by its neighbour, in the year of the
organization of the League of Nations.
Yet he expresses this horror with a sobriety, a restraint, that is
reinforced by the regularity of the traditional metre. Here his iambic
pentameters, closely resembling late Shakespeare’s in their straddling
of lines, have all the easy natural flow of everyday speech, while
making that speech powerful and memorable. The rhyme-scheme is
intricate, but never laboured; half-rhymes are casually used where full
rhymes can’t be found. Every line-ending sounds perfectly satisfying
without drawing attention to itself. In tone, what is notable here is
the restraint, the tact, the refusal of hysteria or hatred or
fanaticism, the refusal to point the finger, or even to mention the
nationality of the “drunken soldiery”. He wants only to talk of the
pain, the terror, the despair, as universals, common to all civil wars.
Yeats speaks to our age, to the people of Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, Serbia, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Lebanon, as no other poet in English does. As Ireland
went through something similar to what the Balkans recently went
through, a war of secession and then a civil war, Yeats had his own
political convictions, but he does not inflict them on us. He is never
tempted to give us his analysis, or even to get in a passing dig at his
enemies. He simply expresses the human tragedy, and even those who
disagreed strongly with the position he took (nationalist but later in
favour of the Free State
compromise) could love his poems. The lucidity, the sober narrative of
atrocity (a single striking image of a murdered mother, not an abstract
catalogue of wrongs), the disillusioned reflections, showing
bitterness, indignation, despair, but never spite; together with the
technical perfection, the rhythm natural but powerful, the intricate
rhyme-scheme unobtrusive, but making every line-ending sound perfect –
all this is unsurpassed in English, in any age. The
verse technique has not in fact changed much since Shakespeare; it is
the tone that stamps it with our age. This is some of the greatest
poetry ever written; it is absolutely modern and absolutely traditional.
Yet
in case you think this is somehow the “modernist” Yeats who has
undergone a conversion from his early romantic Celtic mythologizing, he
ends the same long poem with a curious apparition, after a storm, of
one of his early mythological characters:
That insolent fiend Robert Artisson
To whom the love-lorn Lady Kyteler brought
Bronzed peacock feathers, red combs of her cocks. 25
This
might seem bizarrely misplaced. But this evocation of an ancient love
affair from his own private Celtic mythology points to what underlies
Yeats’ invincible faith in life, despite the horrors and despair he
describes: his faith in love, the force of rebirth, and its eternal
presence in all ages. Yeats sticks to the old
traditional Western belief in Nature and love, and he evokes both
throughout his life, through his retelling of myths and legends and his
exploration of esoteric traditions which go back to the nature cults.
The “romantic” Yeats with his esoteric mythologizing and the “modern”
Yeats with his terse, passionate commentary on current events both
remain present and interwoven in his work to the very end of his life.
In the poem above the two elements may not seem entirely in harmony.
But they fuse perfectly in the poem that expresses most powerfully the
horrors of the age – a prediction of apocalypse, of a Second Coming but
this time of evil, which seemed only too horribly fulfilled in the war
that began nine months after he died. His image of the “gyres” – the
spiral shapes of historical eras – falling apart into chaos is superb:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre,
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.. 26
Here
he has made his private mythology into universal images that evoke the
horrors of the mid 20th century better than anything else in the
literature of the age. The poem was published in 1921 and relates more
to the British repression and then the collapse of Ireland
into civil war, but it seems to predict the horrors of world war,
genocide, and savage slaughter that were about to blast away fifty-five
million lives. Above all it expresses the sense of helplessness of the
individual human being as order and civilization collapse and bloodlust
gathers force, as though unleashed by occult powers. And nothing equals
for sinister horror the prediction of an apocalyptic era, a Second
Coming of violence, that ends the poem.
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
This
“vast image out of Spiritus Mundi”, the product of his own private
esoteric system, has stamped itself on the mind of the age. His quirky
private mythology suddenly becomes a universal vision of extraordinary
power. This mythological symbolism is what enables Yeats to represent
the apocalyptic horrors of our time. If we look at another great poem
about these events, Auden’s poem on the outbreak of the war, what we
notice is the inadequacy not of the language but of the imagery.
Waves of anger and fear
Circulate over the bright
And darkened lands of the earth,
Obsessing our private lives;
The unmentionable odour of death
Offends the September night. 27
This
is good, but it does not haunt the imagination like the rough beast or
the turning falcon or the blood-dimmed tide. The difference lies in the
whole visionary system of Yeats, this esoteric mythological dimension
so despised by modernist critics, but which gave Yeats the physical,
sensual images to express apocalypse. Auden does not have this
imaginative power because his language remains down-to-earth, rational,
everyday – in a word, modern. Yeats encapsulates the horrors of the
modern age precisely because he is not Modernist in either his language
or his visionary mythology – at least if we follow the usual concept of
Modernism – a progressive freeing of language of all its romantic,
emotive symbolism from past ages and its formal rhetorical rhythms.
Yeats is “adequate to the age” (in Matthew Arnold’s sense of being
capable of expressing the age) precisely because of those aspects of
his poetic power where he is not a Modernist – his imagery from past
mythologies, and his traditional cadenced rhythms.
This
is not meant to provoke a sterile semantic debate about what Modernism
is and whether Yeats fits into it. But it is meant to counter a certain
strain in academic treatment of Yeats which consists of respecting the
poet while dismissing the whole mythological-esoteric-mystical aspect
of his work as tiresome New Age rubbish. This mystical system is what
gave Yeats his extraordinary poetic, visionary power. Without it he is
just another verse journalist.
Throughout
his life he develops this private mythology in new directions. He
shifts from the Celtic myths of his youth that revolve around
love-stories, the spirit world and nature cults, to neo-Platonist
concepts of spirituality, which he associates with the stylized
religious art of Byzantium.
His preoccupation with immortality shifts from cults of rebirth to a
cult of art. He develops another way of dealing with the fear of old
age than the self-pity and despair of Prufrock – a strange and mystical
joy:
An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing
For every tatter in its mortal dress,
Nor is there singing school but studying
Monuments of its own magnificence;
And therefore I have sailed the seas and come
To the holy city of Byzantium. 28
He
calls on the Byzantine “sages standing in God’s holy fire” to “be the
singing masters of my soul.” He wishes to learn from them the
discipline of artistic perfection, which will burn away all petty
sentiments, all self-pity, all personal weaknesses, and will allow him
to express the truth in a way that will stand the test of time. The
last image of the poem, where he seeks rebirth as a golden bird, a work
of art (something many have interpreted literally and sneered at),
symbolizes what he now sees as the path of immortality for him:
dedication to beauty, to artistic perfection, to the creative
embodiment of eternal spiritual truths, which will inspire the love of
life of new generations. Even though in this poem he abandons the world
of the living (“That is no country for old men, the young/ In one
another’s arms, birds in the trees/ Those dying generations”) as no
longer for him, and voyages toward this world of spiritual art instead,
the two are complementary. The one inspires the other. His work of art
will sing not to priests but “to lords and ladies of Byzantium”,
the very same dying generations. Through his wayward, eccentric
intellectual paths he has achieved an extraordinary synthesis: the
austere, stylized, symbolic art of Byzantium
with the Western cult of Nature. The spiritual and the natural. Eastern
transcendence and Western Nature-worship. Art and life. This is a man
whose faith in life is absolute, even in the face of death – and even
in that very cult of art which he finally saw as the answer to death.
8) POUND: THE FASCIST INNOVATOR
If
Yeats was neither a Modernist in his poetic technique nor in his
world-view, surely (you might think) nobody can deny that Ezra Pound
was a Modernist? In his technique, yes. In his world-view, not
entirely. His sympathies were also with an idealized past, and his
answer to the nihilism of Eliot was to embrace an ideology
which was in some ways a crude caricature of Yeats’ neo-paganism and
nostalgia for a vanished aristocratic order. We have suggested (perhaps
flippantly) that the first generation of modernist poets were fascists.
Pound is the only one for whom this is literally true. For Yeats and
Eliot it is a question of sympathy for many of the ideas that were in
the air at the time and which were also shared by fascist parties. But
a whole cluster of ideas – the return to nature, to the soil, to
folkloric traditions, to national pride, to a nostalgia for the past, a
rejection of capitalist materialism, of urban alienation, of the
mediocrity of bourgeois workaday existence – circulated in the
twenties, and this common stock was dipped into equally by writers and
by extremist political parties. Writers as talented and famous in their
countries as Heidegger, Céline and Knut Hamsun thus found themselves in
agreement on many subjects with fascist regimes, and compromised
themselves by open support for them. The active espousal of Fascism by
Pound and these other writers appears incomprehensible to a generation
raised on neo-Marxism: how could these writers have ignored the
criminal violence of this movement? But it is best understood by
comparing it with the wilfully perverse espousal of Maoist communism by
so many young Western intellectuals in the 1960’s. The latter could not
claim Pound’s ignorance of the horrific mass-murder committed by the
regime they supported – information on Mao’s gigantic atrocities was
far more generally available in the West at that time than was
information about Mussolini’s more limited crimes in the Italy
where Pound lived. (This is not to underestimate the evil of Italian
Fascism, whose crimes in Africa and the Balkans were atrocious and have
been glossed over, but anything is dwarfed by the scale of Mao’s
seventy million victims – and the horrors of his regime were exposed in
popular publications like The Reader’s Digest throughout the
1960’s.) Spending the war (and the pre-war decade) in Fascist Italy no
doubt kept Pound from any hard news about Hitler’s genocide of the Jews
– even assuming he would have believed it was anything but Allied
propaganda. When we try to understand the commitment of people to mad
and evil systems of rule, we can only explain it by pointing to
parallels, and to the circumstances of their choice. This is not
justification; it is an attempt to see why and how these choices could
be made by intelligent, seemingly decent people, without evoking mental
illness. For both Pound and the Maoist radicals of the sixties the main
motive for supporting a totalitarian dictatorship was hatred of their
own society (and belief it was lying about the other side.) That hatred
was certainly more justified in the hungry, repressive 1930’s than in
the prosperous, liberal 1960’s. Nor were the
international-Jewish-conspiracy theories of the 1930’s all that far
removed mentally from the international-capitalist-conspiracy theories
that were the staple diet of 1960’s Maoist and Marxist thinking. But
because academia is still largely in the hands of neo-Marxists, our age
has not yet thoroughly examined how intellectual support for Maoism
(and Stalinism) in the West was possible, and we have not fully grasped
how evil that support was. Until we do we will not understand Pound’s
support for Fascism (or be able to judge its evil in perspective.) This
intellectual-political blockage has led to a certain decline in Pound’s
reputation, which is not merited on artistic grounds.
Pound
is generally seen not only as an innovator in Modernist poetry, but as
one of the prime driving-forces behind Modernism, with his incessant
call for “making it new”. He had an effect, as we have seen, on the
elimination of remnants of older poetic diction, which he himself had
indulged in to excess. This is not merely seen in the elimination of
dead words, but the introduction into poetry of a whole range of new
words, from conversational slang to academic abstractions, which he is
able, through perfect phrasing, to sculpt into superb poetry. The use
of abstract Latinate words often makes poets like Auden seem to clutter
their lines with academic counter-words which are opaque and
colourless. But Pound can take a word like “mendacities” or
“paraphrase” in the lines quoted above, and give it back all its Latin
or Greek sensuousness, simply by where he places it, and which other
sounds influence the way we hear it. By putting the word among new
neighbours that bring out key sounds by assonance or alliteration, he
gives it back its original, exotic flavour, and we savour it as though
for the first time.
But
what Pound brings to the technique of poetry is above all an uncanny
ear for phrasing which nobody else managed to imitate. Any of the
stanzas quoted above from Hugh Selwyn Mauberley illustrate it.
He has the phrasing of a jazz musician – an acute sense of the beat,
even when he is slightly behind it or in front of it. We are always
aware the beat is there, but we are sometimes unsure where it falls. He
plays with different possibilities. Is a line a trimeter or a dimeter?
A tetrameter or a pentameter? In many of the lines above, he leaves us
to interpret it as we like, by hanging between two alternatives. This
acute sense of beat is what gives him an ability to change speeds and
moods very rapidly in the course of a poem, to switch between
conversational and poetic mode in a flash. Let us look at one of his
superb translations of the ancient Chinese poet Rihaku: The Exile’s Letter.
After reminiscing at length about the good times he and his old friend
had together and their forced separation long years ago, because of the
failure of his civil service career, the narrator ends like this:
And once again, later, we met at the South bridge-head.
And then the crowd broke up, you went north to San palace,
And if you ask how I regret that parting:
It is like the flowers falling at Spring’s end
Confused, whirled in a tangle.
What is the use of talking, and there is no end of talking,
There is no end of things in the heart.
I call in the boy
Have him sit on his knees here
To seal this
And send it a thousand miles, thinking. 29
Let’s
try to see how he performs this magic. The first four lines are iambic
pentameters (five-beat lines.) The first two are loose or stretched,
each with three extra syllables (thirteen in all.) They are rather
flat, matter-of-fact, they go at a fairly quick walking pace – they
have to, to get the extra syllables in. Then he suddenly launches into
the superb, slow dance measure of the third and fourth lines, ending in
the sudden arrest of a trimeter in mid-pirouette. But how does he slow
down the lines in this way? By suddenly shortening them into classic
iambics with no extra syllables – eleven and ten. By making the lines
shorter but with the same number of beats, he slows them down, gives
each syllable its full weight, and puts an emotive charge into the
lines that brings out the superb image of the flowers falling (the
syncopated rhythm, the succession of heavy stresses in “flowers
falling” and Spring’s end” acts out the meaning of the words.) He then
breaks the tension, recovers from his sudden emotion, and returns to a
casual, conversational walking pace in the long hexameter. It is as if
he is dismissing his feeling, trying to talk it away, with a banal
cliché (what is the use of talking?) But the slackening of tension only
prepares for the next piercing thrust, an abrupt, curt tetrameter:
“There is no end of things in the heart.” And then he turns to the
practical business of getting the letter sealed, out of a kind of
pudeur, a looking away from his own emotion. It is a rare moment.
The
key to the emotional effect lies in the alternation of lines which
attempt to downplay the speaker’s feelings, to cover them up out of
politeness, to talk casually of other things, with lines where he lets
his feelings come through with sudden intensity. And this corresponds
to the interplay between lines with “loose rhythm” and “tight rhythm” –
between lines which have been stretched to accommodate extra syllables
so that the five-beat iambic metre fades into the background and
becomes almost unnoticeable, and lines where the rhythm is suddenly
tightened to an absolutely regular iambic pentameter, so that the beat
becomes paramount. This results in a sudden change of pace, like a walker
suddenly launching into a slow, formal dance. The switch to the
perfectly regular iambic pentameter is like putting an electric charge
through the line: it slows it down, makes the voice tremble, gives it
an intense burst of emotion. The resurgence of the regular metre to the
surface is the whole source of the power of the line.
There
is an enormous difference between playing with the resurgence and the
fading of regular metres, as many good 20th century poets do, and
having no basic metre in the lines at all. If you have a verse rhythm,
you can play tricks with it, hit the beats early or late, make them
obvious or subtle, make the metre dominant or scarcely perceptible. But
if you have no verse metre in the lines at all, like some of the “free
verse” disciples of Whitman we will come to later, then the lines have
no power, because the electric charge cannot be put through them. They
cannot shift from walking pace to dance.
It
is significant that Pound produced his best work in these Chinese
translations, just as Eliot produced his best work in dramatic
mono-logues. It is as if they both needed a persona to be themselves.
When they speak in their own voice they become all too often bores.
Eliot becomes a preaching, moralizing, philosophizing church elder, and
Pound a haranguing political tub-thumper. When Pound moves away from
his own miniaturist brilliance and attempts a large-scale architectural
work, as he does in The Cantos, he goes to pieces and
becomes largely unreadable. There are some good passages, but they are
interspersed among much that is boring, repetitive, obsessive, obscure,
carelessly written, and a waste of the reader’s time. It is not quite
as bad as Joyce’s private language in Finnegan’s Wake, but it
results from the same vices of self-indulgence, pedantry, arrogance,
and contempt for the reader. (There is also the effect of academia
itself and its new mania for interpreting the obscure – a groupie-like
fascination for the delphic, incomprehensible utterances of the new
literary idols. Finnegan’s Wake can be seen as a huge joke at
the expense of American academics – giving them something impenetrable
to waste their time making sense of. To be fair, it can also be seen as
an attempt to represent the chaotic thought-processes of senility –
just as Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man represented the lyricism of youth and Ulysses
the boring stream-of-consciousness of middle age.) In general by the
mid-1930’s the ideological obsessions of the age have overwhelmed the
poetic urge and turned many of the early Modernist poets into prolix,
tedious pontificators, their poetic skills forgotten as they decide
that what the world really needs is their thoughts. Only Yeats goes on
from strength to strength, his old-fashioned Victorian discipline of
traditional versific-ation (and his perfect ear) able to accommodate
his philosophical musings without any loss of poetic power – largely
because he gives us his thoughts in images rather than in arguments.
But by then other voices have arrived on the scene.
9) THE SECOND GENERATION
At
the start of the 1930’s along came another generation, that of Auden,
Spender, Day Lewis, and MacNeice. Now Auden benefits today from a
reputation that some might consider inflated; some critics do not
hesitate to call him the greatest poet in English of the 20th century,
a title which any sane human being could only give to Yeats. But he is
certainly, with Eliot, Pound, and Dylan Thomas in the top five – where
exactly you place him in the charts is a matter of taste. But his
reputation from the first was bound up with a myth of innovation,
poetic revolution, the cutting edge, “the very next phase” – in short,
a cult of modernism – which it is hard at this distance to comprehend.
The truth is that Auden is one of the most conservative poets since
Alexander Pope. That is no reflection on his technical skill, any more
than on Pope’s. His conservatism is both his strength and his weakness.
His strength is a cultivation of a wide range of regular metrical
forms, executed with great technical precision. Like Pope his technical
facility makes him an excellent “occasional” poet – he can churn out a
competent poem on any occasion and on any subject. He does a good line
in obituaries and commemorative verses: Freud, Yeats, Houseman,
Rimbaud, Edward Lear, Voltaire, Luther, Montaigne, Henry James,
Melville are all given the treatment – he can find the right
platitude to write about anyone, and even the occasional insight. The
weakness of his conservatism is that he is inclined to be an old
windbag. He has the air of a vicar in a living room visiting the widow,
or a professor lecturing a hall full of bored undergraduates, but
determined to keep on with his subject despite the murmur of
conversation and the paper darts flying. In his late poems he tends to
vacuous abstractions, and there are so many abstract nouns treated as
entities that one is tempted to capitalize them and turn them into 18th century
Personifications – Beauty, Justice, History, Love, Matter, Spirit,
Salvation, Success – something which he sometimes does himself. In
short his conservatism is so apparent that only an age of critics and
journalists pathologically obsessed with innovation, revolution and
“the modern” could have failed to see it.
Part
of the myth of the innovation of his generation is social and
political. Among the many critical notions that used to be kicked about
is one that Auden, in his first book, Poems, in 1930, somehow
killed off Georgian Poetry. Admittedly, English critics and journalists
love seeing writers and literary currents in antagonistic relationships
– winners and losers, the new and the old, the fashionable and the
outmoded, who’s in, who’s out. They love seeing one generation as
killing off the previous one; it has something to do with the Darwinist
cast of the modern British mind, and this tendency lent itself
perfectly to the myth of Modernism – the perpetual revolution against
what had gone before. This particular myth would make Auden a great
innovator who took a flame-thrower to the last straggling weeds of
pre-modernist verse. But what exactly anyone means by Georgian poetry
is not very clear. The Penguin collection of Georgian Poetry (1962)
includes war poets like Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon, the latter
technically just as proficient as Auden, considerably funnier, just as
free of 19th century poetic diction or attitudes, and with as cynical
and ironical a view of the world. It includes Robert Graves, who
outlived Auden, used looser, less traditional verse forms, and wrote
with rather more raw emotion about the affairs of the heart than the
obscure, inhibited, cryptic reflections of Auden in this domain. I
suspect what the literary journalists meant by Georgian poetry was
Rupert Brooke, the one war poet who got killed too soon to be able to
recant his naive patriotic idealism in the light of the grim experience
of war (and who, apart from that one notorious poem, The Soldier,
showed a maturity and a poetic skill at least equal to Auden’s at the
same age.) What they also meant is a generation of privately educated
young men who lived mostly in the country and believed in a certain
number of traditional virtues, and in their bucolic complacency were
ignorant of the necessity of the proletarian revolution and political
support for the mass-murderers Lenin and Stalin. This, in journalistic
eyes, obviously cast them into some pre-modernist limbo, infidels born
before the true faith was revealed; it disqualified them from being
true poets of the modern age – even if they survived the war, which
most of them didn’t. Those writers, on the other hand, who were born
too late to fight and threw themselves into the delights of Comintern
agit-prop, singing the praises of the Soviet workers’ paradise, were
clearly men with their fingers on the pulse of the age, deeply
responsive to the problems of humanity. In short, what seemed to count
for many critics in being “modern” was how violently poets rejected the
society that had given birth to them in favour of Marxist ideology.
Auden was judged modern and cutting edge because he represented,
briefly, the fashionable bigotry of the times.
It
is odd, in fact, that Auden should be thought to have done anything to
Georgian poetry, since whatever assassination that guileless body of
work merited had already been carried out by Eliot and Pound. These
poets were already established as the dominant influences in England
by the time Auden published anything, and he was not much more than a
foot-soldier in their poetic revolution. One might suspect a tendency
to exaggerate Auden’s originality and poetic abilities by a parochial
British critical school severely miffed by the dominance of two
American-born poets (not to mention the Irishman Yeats) and determined
to talk up one of their own instead. To this we may add a certain gay
chauvinism by a powerful academic lobby eager to see a homosexual poet
(by definition a martyr to prejudice and an avatar of liberation)
enshrined as the major poetic voice of the age. They see Auden’s
inhibition and cryptic obscurity, his vacuous generalizations, as a
kind of Queer Poetics: how to write about sexual love without actually mentioning it, or revealing the sex of the person sharing the bed.
However
(all this snarling and spitting aside – I confess to detesting Auden
from an early age for his grey anti-romanticism), what is surprising
when you compare Auden to the Georgian poets is how closely he
resembles them. He began with an enthusiasm for Edward Thomas, and they
speak with fairly similar voices. Here is the quintessential Georgian
poet Thomas, killed in 1917:
Rain, midnight rain, nothing but the wild rain
On this bleak hut, and solitude, and me
Remembering again that I shall die
And neither hear the rain nor give it thanks 30
Here is Auden, fifteen years later :
Earth has turned over; our side feels the cold,
And life sinks choking in the wells of trees,
A faint heart here and there stops ticking, killed,
Icing on ponds entrances village boys: 31
Now
these stanzas have not been chosen for any special similarities, but as
average samples of each poet’s work, in a similar despondent mood. The
point is, where is the revolution between them? Where even the
development? Where is the new language? Where the new technique (apart
from the half-rhymes of Auden, pioneered precisely by Georgian poets
like Wilfred Owen?) Which poem in fact has more regular metre, and more
deliberate poetic effects? In which poet do we find more old-fashioned
poetic diction? In Auden, in his use of “entrances” (a verb which has
now become so rare you tend to read it as a noun, and the line
initially baffles you.) This is a strange way to kill off Georgian
poetry. Apart from Auden’s more regular metre and more literary
descriptions, these lines could be by the same poet. If one had to
decide which poem came earlier in time, one would choose, if anything,
Auden’s. Revolutions are usually characterized by rather sharper
changes than this. If you compare Blake or Wordsworth with Alexander
Pope, or even with their contemporary Crabbe, there you see a
revolution.
You
may say, but you are arguing from one example. So let us take another
one to reinforce the point. Here is a piece of mild social satire of
the life of the wealthy and well-bred, from Auden in his Sonnets from China (around 1938):
As evening fell the day’s oppression lifted;
Tall peaks came into focus; it had rained;
Across wide lawns and cultured flowers drifted
The conversation of the highly trained. 32
Here is Siegfried Sassoon, another Georgian, over a decade earlier, at a concert of Stravinsky’s Sacre de Printemps,
where he hilariously contrasts the primitive savagery of the frenzied,
Dionysiac music with the staid, polite, ultra-civilized reactions of
the audience:
In the Grand Circle one observes no sign
Of riot: peace prevails along the line.
And in the Gallery, cargoed to capacity,
No tremor bodes eruptions and alarms.
They are listening to this not-quite-new audacity
As though it were by someone dead, – like Brahms. 33
Again,
it would be difficult to pass a blindfold test to tell the Modernist
from the Georgian, or which poem came first in time. You could easily
get confused as to which poet wrote which. It would be hard to confuse
Blake’s Songs of Innocence with The Dunciad.
The
truth is that Modernist poetry is not a revolution but a slow, step by
step development. The Georgians were part of that development; their
experiments in half-rhyme, their personal, emotional voice, indignant
exposure of the brutal horrors of the war, their savage social satire
of generals and bishops, their irony and self-mockery were already
largely modernist. But even they were simply building on the work of
Hardy, Kipling and Dowson before them. The fact is there was in late
19th century England no single, dominant fossilized style comparable
with Alexander Pope’s neo-classicism in the 18th century, to provoke a
revolt as sudden and extreme as the romantic movement. There was
already a plurality of evolving styles and influences, from Swinburne
and Rossetti on to Houseman, Hardy, Dowson, Kipling, De la Mare. The
Modernist movement in poetry, if we can detect a beginning, began with
the war poets, and their sudden breaking into anguished personal
outrage and furious satire, a new voice that was accompanied by a
series of new techniques, such as half-rhyme. They began a quickening
of the generally slow process of change, which others then took
further. Eliot, publishing in 1917, at the same time as many war poets,
represents a different and more striking input of novelty because of
his new dramatic voice, his revival in a new guise of Browning’s
dramatic monologues, as well as his liberal use of pastiche and
quotation designed for an intellectual readership. He loosens up stanza
forms, makes popular the long poem with a medley of different verse
forms, only loosely linked by theme. The next generation, that of
Auden, simply consolidated on this, and demonstrated greater metrical
variety. Auden used a vast range of metres, stanza forms and
rhyme-schemes, most of them fairly regular. His best and most memorable
poems are also his most traditional and regular in form. They
represent, if anything, a step back from the innovations of Eliot and
Pound into something tighter and more conventional, closer to the
Georgians, or even the Victorians. Listen to this:
In the nightmare of the dark
All the dogs of Europe bark,
And the living nations wait,
Each sequestered in its hate; 34
This is the same tight, clockwork metre as Ben Jonson’s :
Come, my Celia, let us prove
While we can, the sports of love;
Time will not be ours forever;
He at length our good will sever. 35
It is also the metre (with a different rhyme-scheme) of Shakespeare’s “Where the bee sucks, there suck I”, or Browning’s Soliloquy in a Spanish Cloister, or Tennyson’s The Lady of Shalot. Critics evoke
the influence of John Skelton, but it is a little pretentious to seek
an influence so far back in time when this metre is in fact one of the
commonest in English. Auden uses the same metre again (this time
without rhyme) for his own most celebrated love poem:
Lay your sleeping head, my love,
Human on my faithless arm;
Time and fevers burn away
Individual beauty from
Thoughtful children, and the grave
Proves the child ephemeral. 36
This
is not merely to say that Auden was capable of reproducing traditional
forms, in the manner of a technical demonstration, as well as creating
his own more “modern” stuff. This traditional verse is in fact his most
characteristic “modern” stuff. It is his best work and his most
typical. Where he very occasionally loosens up metre (again following
the experiments, oddly enough, of Edward Thomas in this regard), his
poems lack punch. Auden’s lifelong adherence to the strictest metrical
forms is his acknowledgement as a veteran practitioner that they are
the ones that work.
Where
Auden innovates it is not in verse forms but in tone. There is first of
all the smug complacency of the Marxist viewpoint of his youth, as in Spain 1937:
Yesterday the installation of dynamos and turbines,
The construction of railways in the colonial desert;
Yesterday the classic lecture
On the origin of mankind. But today the struggle. 37
He
had the good taste later on to drop this piece of tripe from his
collected poems. He also had the good taste to be shocked by the
closing of churches in Republican Spain, and he came back from his trip
there having changed his mind about fighting for “democracy” – somewhat
disillusioned (like Orwell) with what the Spanish Communists meant by
that term. (He abandoned Marxism for Anglicanism three years later.)
But the hollow rhythms of this poem, the tired rhetoric of the
political speech to the party faithful, seep into many others he wrote.
Even in the poem where he has the excellent lines quoted above about
the dogs of Europe, In Memory of W.B.Yeats, he has this sloppy passage in what can be called his modernist style:
But in the importance and noise of tomorrow
When the brokers are roaring like beasts on the floor of the Bourse,
And the poor have their sufferings to which they are fairly accustomed,
And each in the cell of himself is almost convinced of his freedom,
A few thousand will think of this day
As one thinks of a day when one did something slightly unusual.
What instruments we have agree
The day of his death was a cold dark day. 38
This
is dismal stuff, and for Yeats to be saluted with this on the day of
his death is something of an insult. What is wrong with it is not just
the flaccid rhythm, which ambles rather than flows. The iambics have
mostly slipped into anapaests, a metre which is almost inevitably
flabby, with the rollicking cadence of third rate oratory, unless it is
kept tight and bouncy, as it can be only by virtuosos like Tennyson or
Browning (and Auden, good though he is technically, is not in their
class.) But even more depressing is the sermonising tone : this is
poetry written to be read to a hall full of undergraduates in a bored
but hectoring drone. (Eliot commented that Auden had spent too long as
a teacher and it made his verse preachy.) And then there is the
self-righteous humility, the self-conscious understatement, an
anti-heroic, self-deprecatory posturing by avoiding any grand phrases
in the Yeats manner. We do have the grotesque image (straight out of
the cupboard of Marxist agit-prop) of the brokers roaring like beasts
on the floor of the Bourse, but the poor are denied any striking image
of their sufferings, with the patronizing, bored climb-down “to which
they are fairly accustomed”. There is a similar bored climb-down a few
lines later: we will think of this day as “a day when one did something
slightly unusual” (yawn). We mustn’t of course do any unseemly
emotional overreacting to the mere death of the greatest poet of the
century. And we must look to scientific instruments to tell us whether
it was a cold dark day, just to keep it all properly impersonal and
avoid any romantic subjective judgements. This is grey, grey poetry and
it is grey not because the poet is sad but because he is grey himself.
This is a hymn to emotional impotence, to suburban social reserve, to a
fear of expressing feelings of any kind. And this emotional inhibition
is displayed as though it were a virtue: there is this self-righteous,
Uriah Heep wriggle of anti-heroic, anti-romantic postur-ing, while at
the same time hectoring, through half-suppressed yawns, like a
clergyman giving the same sermon for the third time that day. This is
the language of the pulpit or the official podium, tired, weakly
sanctimonious, going through the motions of feeble rhetoric, but bored
with its own platitudes. As poetry it sucks.
This
is Auden’s modern side. These are his innovations, his contribution to
the “development” of poetry, whatever that might mean. The tone, the
attitude – bored, prosaic, inhibited, sanctimonious, self-deprecating,
preachy. Not the verse techniques, which remain astonishingly
conservative throughout his life, and which advance scarcely one jot on
the Georgian poets of his youth, or the Victorians. Anyone who thinks
Auden is a great innovator in verse technique has simply not read
Browning, Arnold or Tennyson – who used every single metrical form
Auden did, and generally wrote them far better. This is not meant as a
criticism. We can’t all be great poets. It is meant as a clarification.
Auden is a very good poet. But he is a very conservative one
technically, which is his strength, and his only innovation is in his
tone of voice, which is generally his weakness.
Auden
was not alone in his generation in sticking to traditional verse forms.
Here is one of his friends (and one-time lovers), Stephen Spender, in
his “Seascape”:
There are some days the happy ocean lies
Like an unfingered harp below the land.
Afternoon gilds all the silent wires
Into a burning music for the eyes.
On mirrors flashing between fine-strung fires
The shore, heaped up with roses, horses, spires,
Wanders on water, walking above ribbed sand. 39
The
first four lines of this are superb; they could have been written by
Shelley, Byron or Tennyson. Then the intricate rhyme scheme becomes
apparent, and the verse becomes a little laboured. The personal feeling
is swamped by complex images (which we try to understand intellectually
because we can no longer see them – he moves from romantic to
metaphysical mode.) As he struggles to follow the rigid rhyme scheme,
it loses clarity and fluidity. But the first four lines are
magnificent, and they could have been written at any time in the 19th century.
Modernism
in poetry (as represented by Eliot or Auden or Spender) is merely the
idiom of a new age, as was the movement of the Victorians before them,
and before that the romantics, the Augustans, the metaphysical poets.
All of these movements involved a degree of change and a degree of
continuity. Modernism, as defined by the major poets of the 20th
century, was not a bigger break or a more radical departure than any of
those others. It was certainly not as radical a change as romanticism.
10) THE MODERNIST ILLUSION
But,
you will say, what about those modern poets who use much freer forms?
Surely they constitute some kind of revolution? Let us look at some of
them. And let us look at exactly how free their verse really is. The
problem is that many readers don’t see how very regular many apparently
free-flowing verse forms are.
Let
us take Dylan Thomas. Now Dylan Thomas is a poet of exceptional energy,
and very different from Auden. In contrast to the rather staid,
platitudinous, philosophical homilies that Auden favours us with
(standing in his living room, at a lectern, or perhaps in a church),
Thomas is out on a Welsh sea-shore in a raging storm, yelling at the
sky, gesticulating at the waves, and generally behaving in that
unrestrained manner of the Celtic bard that Yeats had already prepared
us for. But this apparent Dionysiac abandon does not stop him having a
canny notion of how many beats there are in a line. If we take his
superb poem, Fern Hill, (something undergraduates learned off by heart in my day, along with Kubla Khan,
to recite at parties at four in the morning when everybody else was too
tired or drunk to stop them) some of the lines are so long they suggest
a kind of “free verse” flow, which is, however, purely illusory. It is
metrically extremely regular, which is what gives it its sweeping
energy, and incidentally makes it easy to learn by heart. Here’s the opening:
Now as I was young and easy under the apple boughs
About the lilting house and happy as the grass was green 40
Despite
the apparent spontaneity of this (the sudden rhapsody of a drunk
declaiming in a bar), it is a perfectly regular iambic hexameter
followed by a heptameter (seven beats). Now the latter is a rare and
difficult metre in English, yet it flows with an absolute
inevitability, and a naturalness that mimics the lilt of Welsh speech – and
the Welsh habit of running on a little longer than one expected. It
doesn’t just sound like a trimeter and tetrameter shoved back to back
onto the same line, because the forward rush of the line is too
powerful to admit of any division. But the basic rhythm of the poem is
that of these two metres, and he follows this gigantic line with a
tetrameter and two trimeters:
The night above the dingle starry,
Time let me hail and climb
Golden in the heyday of his eyes,
And
these short lines (two starting with trochees, hammering the first
syllable) enable you to draw breath for the next huge hexameter and
heptameter combination:
And honoured among wagons I was prince of the apple towns
And once below a time I lordly had the trees and leaves
Where all out of breath you throw yourself gasping on the next word
Trail with daisies and barley
And then he takes you by the hand and leads you gracefully out of the stanza with another trimeter as light as gossamer:
Down the rivers of the windfall light.
This
is the opposite of free verse. It is metrically the tightest verse you
can imagine, every beat regular, every syllable in place, every phrase
cranked up to rhythmic perfection. And it flows like a river rapids,
because it is carried forward by a rush of personal emotion that sweeps
us away with it. It is of course poetry at the opposite end of the
spectrum from the restrained, rather grey, suburban, visiting vicar
tones of Auden. But it is still absolutely regular in metre. The metres
developed over the past six hundred years are diverse and flexible
enough to accommodate these two extremes, suburban vicar and delirious
nature child. And they function perfectly in the poetry of each.
Now
the academics who write the history of poetry have tried to persuade us
for years that the use of “free verse” was one of the touchstones of
Modernism in poetry. Many of them never quite grasped what free verse
was, despite Eliot’s clear explanation that free verse must still keep
to a discernible metre, or it ceases to be verse at all. Most major
poets continued to use regular metres, simply varying them according to
the needs of the poem. It is only when all the underlying rhythm of a
traditional metre disappears that one can really speak of free verse,
and generally this is third rate. When Alan Ginsberg begins his poem Howl,
the memorable first two lines are in fact in traditional metre: he has
simply tacked a tetrameter and a pentameter together, and you could
easily cut the lines in two like this:
I saw the best minds of my generation
destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked
dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn
looking for an angry fix 41
This
is the way the voice naturally reads it: as tetrameter, pentameter,
pentameter, trimeter, each line almost perfectly regular, which is why
it flows with such a surge of energy. He has disguised this metre by
shoving these pairs of lines together, to create a nine-beat and an
eight-beat line, in an effort to give it more momentum. But he varies
the number of beats in every line, and they tend to get longer and
longer. While many still have the driving onward force and hammering
rhythm of verse, some of them become so overloaded they become to all
intents and purposes declamatory prose. Here is a long one:
Who chained themselves to subways for the endless ride from Battery to holy Bronx on benzedrine until the noise of wheels and children
brought them down shuddering mouth-wracked and battered bleak of brain all drained of brilliance in the drear light of Zoo. 42
This is just too long to keep up any verse rhythm, but it is good rhythmical prose in the same style as Jack Kerouac in The Subterraneans.
The fact that these lines are less memorable, in a quite literal sense,
than the first ones, because they have no rhythm that sticks in the
mind, is due to the loss of the underlying metre. Free verse is only
memorable when it is not really free but only seems to be.
The average “free verse” written today resembles these lines of Walt Whitman’s:
On the beach at night,
Stands a child with her father,
Watching the east, the autumn sky. 43
This
is not in fact free verse at all, it is two trimeters followed by a
tetrameter. Now Whitman when he gets carried away does not always keep
to any detectable verse rhythm – he loses the plot, so to speak, and
Eliot is right to claim that he often writes prose in the lay-out of
verse, in the same way as Ginsberg above. But many modernist poets are
simply masters at disguising the regular metres of their lines. The
verse rhythm is so internalized it is almost unconscious. They sound as
if they are using “free verse” when they are not. Listen to Lawrence’s The Snake.
A snake came to my water-trough
On a hot, hot day, and I in pyjamas for the heat,
To drink there. 44
This
is simply tetrameter, pentameter, dimeter, but he does it so
unobtrusively, you hardly notice that what makes these lines feel right
is their regular metre. Or look at these lines of Sylvia Plath’s :
On the stiff twig up there
Hunches a wet black rook
Arranging and rearranging his feathers in the rain.45
Again what some might imagine is “free verse” is two trimeters and a pentameter. Or look at Bukowski’s lines from the trash men:
They run out the trash bins
Roll them out to the fork lift
And then the truck grinds it upward
With far too much sound… 46
Again
this is easily scannable as trimeters with a tetrameter in the third
line (possibly the second as well.) Merely because you don’t beat out
the metre as you read these lines doesn’t mean you don’t hear that
metre (you don’t beat it out in reading Shakespeare either.) The metre
is still what determines your sense of satisfaction at the flow of the
words, and your sense of the rightness of the length of the line. It is
the metre that gives the lines their perfect timing. What seems like
free verse is, when it is good, not really free at all. If it really is
free it does not usually strike one as good: it may be interesting for
the content, but one is utterly indifferent to the form and above all
the sound of it. Here is some really free verse, Marianne Moore’s poem
“Poetry”, and it is simply prose chopped up.
I, too, dislike it: there are things that are important beyond all this fiddle.
Reading it, however, with a perfect contempt for it one discovers in
it after all a place for the genuine.
Hands that can grasp, eyes
that can dilate, hair that can rise
if it must, these things are important not because a
high-sounding interpretation can be put upon them but because they are
useful. When they become so derivative as to become unintelligible, 47
It
is hard to call this bad verse, because it is not verse. If someone
wants to call this poetry they can of course misuse the word, but it
has the rhythm of prose (and rather boring prose at that.) There seems
to be no point in setting this utterance on particular lines, as the
lines do not correspond to any rhythm or natural way of phrasing it –
the only point in the line breaks she has made is to prevent it being
read as verse. Here a poetic lay-out has become simply a means of
drawing attention to a passage of very indifferent prose, at most
emphasizing certain words, but not in order to bring out the music
contained in them (there is no music) or to improve
our understanding of the sense. Quite the contrary. It would be far
easier to understand if it was written as a continuous paragraph, since
the peculiar illogical line-breaks thwart not only any verse rhythm but
even the syntax of the sentence, so that we can scarcely grasp what is
being said. This really is free verse and it is not so much bad as
pointless.
We could of course change the line-breaks and turn this into verse without changing a word of it:
I, too, dislike it: there are things that are
important beyond all this fiddle.
Reading it, however, with a perfect contempt for it
one discovers in it after all
a place for the genuine.
Hands that can grasp, eyes that can dilate,
hair that can rise if it must,
these things are important
not because a high-sounding interpretation
can be put upon them
but because they are useful.
When they become so derivative
as to become unintelligible,
This
is now verse. It may not be great poetry, because it still has the same
crappy content, but at least it is now in lines that scan – or that
have a discernible beat. It is also easier to understand, because metre
helps the sense instead of working against it the way her line breaks
did.
Now Marianne Moore is often regarded as one of the “innovators” of 20th
century verse, as if what she was doing was revolutionary. I cannot
personally see what is revolutionary about writing prose. It has been
written for thousands of years. To write prose and pretend it is verse
is just silliness. It is taking a simpler form of utterance and
pretending it is a more complex form, one that matches a line to a
pattern of musical beats. Poetry gains its tension from the
relationship between the utterance itself, with its natural syntax, and
the pattern of beats that is driven through it by the electric charge
of metre. Now to announce one is going to put this electric charge
through the lines and then not do so is just irritating. To call this
“innovation” is almost comical pretentiousness. It is like saying: “I
am going to revolutionize singing, I’m going to sing every word on the
same note and without any musical beat as if I was merely saying it.”
How boring. How self-defeating. What is the point of pretending that
this is a new form of singing and not just an old form of saying?
Marianne Moore writes prose on unequal lines, broken at bizarrely
illogical points, which in no way impose a musical rhythm on the words.
That is all completely free verse is. A replacing of something
difficult by something easy, and pretending you are still doing the
difficult thing. This abandonment of rhythm is not just a pointless
search for some ludicrous idea of “freedom”. It is abandoning what
poetry is about, the ability to charge words with emotion by varying
the pace and rhythm of a line. It is reducing poetry to impotence,
leaving the line in a permanent state of detumescence. We will come to
this perverse abandonment of the power provided by disciplined
constraint when we look at the degeneration of Modernism in other arts.
This peculiar self-defeating impulse is one of the characteristics of
Modernism in the visual arts as well as in serial music.
But
the free-verse brigade did not in fact win the day. They produced no
major poets. The trendy academic following Moore acquired (largely with
her pretentious claim to be writing “syllabic poetry”, where syllables
are counted instead of stresses, something utterly nonsensical in a
non-syllabic language like English) got her a Pulitzer Prize, but I
doubt if her poetry is much read now and it certainly won’t be in fifty
years. And the flotillas of pretentious “innovators” that sailed in her
wake have sunk without trace. And though more of them keep popping up
every day and scribbling their prose in a verse lay-out (because it is
easy for the incompetent to do, like playing tennis without a net),
nobody rates it and they won’t survive. In poetry, even a fool can see
that what anybody can do has no value; the only value comes from a rare
skill at a difficult task. This is because writing verse is still a
widespread pastime among educated people (who hasn’t written a poem to
his or her sweetheart?) so those likely to read it know how hard it is
to do well. On a popular level, people value the lyrics of rock songs
when they express truths succinctly: great songwriters like Bob Dylan
have mass followings as well as intellectual followings. Educated
people throughout the English-speaking world still love poetry; it
gives them enormous pleasure. They recite their favourite lines to each
other. They remember whole poems. This in itself depends on regular
metre, which is a memory device. There is not a line of Marianne Moore
that is memorable – in a literal sense. Her work is almost impossible
to learn by heart because it lacks the rhythm designed to make it stick
in the mind. And poetry which people can’t remember they don’t value.
All the acknowledged great poets of the 20th century in the
English-speaking world wrote poetry based on traditional metres because
poetry remains a living art which people can judge for themselves. And
they know what’s good and what’s rubbish.
The typical verse form and style that predominates at the start of the 21st century is virtually unchanged from what it was two hundred years ago. Here is the most admired and best known living poet in the British Isles, Seamus Heaney :
Leaving the white glow of filling stations
And a few lonely streetlamps among fields 48
These
are regular iambic pentameters, and they could have been written by a
Georgian poet like Edward Thomas, by Eliot, by Auden, Spender, Larkin, Lowell, Roethke, Wilbur, Stevens, Crane. There is no decade in the 20th
century when these lines would have sounded out of place, and that is
the measure of the small amount that verse has evolved over the last
hundred years. But the lines would not be out of place in Wordsworth or
most 19th century poets (apart from the filling stations that didn’t exist then.) Here is Wordsworth rowing his boat in The Prelude:
Leaving behind her still, on either side,
Small circles glittering idly in the moon (lines 364-5)
Heaney’s
rhythm here is in no way different from that of Wordsworth. The iambic
pentameter has in fact evolved very little over four centuries: it
remains the work-horse of the poet today, as it has been ever since
Shakespeare, or even Chaucer, because it is the rhythm that English
speech falls into most naturally. It is also the most extraordinarily
flexible metre, lending itself to the full range of styles, tones of
voice, and moods. At the end of this same poem, Heaney gives us this,
as he brings down the hill the bloody corpse of his cousin murdered in
sectarian violence in Northern Ireland :
Then kneel in front of you in brimming grass
And gather up cold handfuls of the dew
To wash you, cousin. I dab you clean with moss
Fine as the drizzle out of a low cloud.
I lift you under the arms and lay you flat.
With rushes that shoot green again I plait
Green scapulars to wear over your shroud.
These
iambic lines are as regular as anything in Shakespeare. And there is a
reason for that. Whenever human beings want to express grief, they turn
naturally to the verse forms that seem to follow the contours of human
feeling itself. And since human feeling has been around a long time,
these forms tend to be very old. The poets of the 20th
century, who were doing something a little more important and more
personal than the bizarre dabbling of the practitioners of other arts –
that is to say, communicating such emotions as grief, horror, loss –
understood the need to preserve intact the superb instrument of
expression that had come down to them from the masters of four
centuries earlier.
Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life
And thou no breath at all? Thou’lt come no more,
Never, never, never, never, never. 49
There
is not much that can be done to better this metre, and that is why
contemporary poets have kept it, in the teeth of the Modernist academic
cult of sterile innovation.
I
remember when I was eighteen a pretty fellow-student stopped me in the
quad one day and said: “Here’s another one we’re not supposed to like,”
and she read me a poem of the early romantic Yeats (the Yeats our
modernist professor despised and dismissed):
Now as at all times I can see in the mind’s eye,
In their stiff, painted clothes the pale unsatisfied ones
Appear and disappear in the blue depths of the sky
With all their ancient faces like rain-beaten stones. 50
We
were taught by the academic commissars, brainwashed in the cult of
Modernism, that this was old-fashioned, outdated, mystical, romantic
rubbish. We read it in secret and we loved it. Lines like these will
continue to give adolescents goose-bumps for the next thousand years.
And even if some future trendy, nihilistic academic establishment bans
them, they’ll circulate in samizdat.
What
can we conclude? Poetry in English still has an historical unity, and
Modernism was merely one more movement, such as occurs every century or
so, to change the poetic idiom to bring it into line with changes in
speech and outlook. Modernism in poetry does not mark any definitive
break with all the past that has gone before, and it did not set in
motion any continuing revolution. It marked a far less extreme change
of direction than romanticism did. The innovations of technique of
Eliot and Pound, modest as they were, were not extended very much
further by the generations that followed. There was in fact a return by
most major poets to more traditional metres, because they are simply
more powerful in expressing emotion. Only a handful of “experimenters”
continued with an ideological determination to write “free verse” in
the manner of Marianne Moore, and nobody reads them. Lots of people
write this kind of “verse” as a diary of their personal feelings, an
internal monologue, and occasionally publish it to universal yawns.
What people read for pleasure is poetry with a discernible rhythm, like
Heaney’s, because rhythm appeals to our musical sense and to the way
our emotions work, as well as our memory. Rhythm is something we are
biologically programmed to respond to, the same as we are to melody.
Just as small children cry listening to a sad tune of Chopin or
Beethoven, they learn nursery rhymes by heart because their regular
rhythm makes them easy to memorize. Biology will always win out in the
long term over innovations that fly in the face of it. Traditional
poets understood how the human brain works, and it will always work in
the same way.
It
is the same with the novel. The experiments of Joyce were not continued
in the next generation by more extreme experiments (they petered out in
literary movements like dadaism, which failed to break out of the
incestuous little circle of half a dozen writers reading one another’s
work.) The need for writers to sell novels led them back towards the
Victorian novel of narrative, a good story with solid characters,
because that is what people want to read. “With a tale he cometh unto
you,” Sir Philip Sydney remarked of the writer four centuries ago,
“with a tale which holdeth children from play and old men from the
chimney corner.” 51 The Victorian novel already included
considerable complications in narrative technique (as in Emily Bronte,
for example) and these were extended by the great novelists of the 20th century,
from Conrad to Solzhynitsin to Milan Kundera. Some of Joyce’s
experimental methods, the stream of consciousness, the huge twenty-page
sentence, the absence of punctuation, the pastiche of styles, are used
here and there by his successors, but not on the same uncompromising
scale. In fact the novel today has become so conservative that whenever
any Modernist experimentation pops up again (as with Italo Calvino or
Umberto Eco), the academics have christened it “post-modern”, largely
because they have forgotten that Modernism had already pioneered all
these techniques. So-called “post-modernism” is merely an academic
invention and there is not a single characteristic attributed to it
that is not present in Modernists like Joyce or Borges or Eliot.
So-called “post-modernism” is merely third phase Modernism.
11) THE MYTH OF POSTMODERNISM
We
have already suggested that the first generation Modernists were
reactionaries, the second generation communists (for a time) and the
third generation – that of the fifties – nihilists. This includes the
sceptical, relativistic strain that developed as a school of criticism
and called itself “post-modernism”. Since academic critics by and large
created the myth of Modernism, in which they grossly exaggerated the
element of innovation in 20th century literature and made a
cult of it, like Marinetti’s Futurism, they became rather impatient
with the conservative turn that much writing took in the latter half of
the 20th century. Finally they gave up waiting for the “next
phase” in innovative literature and decided to invent it themselves. So
the critics launched their own literary movement, “Post-modernism”,
which consisted purely of critical theory. At last academic criticism
revealed its true ambition – to substitute itself for literature, to
take over the role of literature, to replace literature. The professors
who had been churning out reams of interpretative junk from university
presses for the last hundred years finally decided
to emancipate themselves from any dependence on the literary raw
material provided by creative writers – they invented creative
criticism. They decided that what a writer wrote is no longer
objectively out there: it exists merely in the minds of readers, in its
interpretation. In short, it is the critics who really create the work,
as a function of their own reality. There is no objective meaning any
longer – the critic actually gives the work meaning, infuses meaning
into this lifeless mess of words on paper. The work
becomes its interpretations, the writer only exists through the critic.
The critic is the writer. That is the basic meaning of Jacques
Derrida’s turgid, semi-literate theorizing – if one can continue to
talk of meaning at all. Derrida was the Marcel Duchamp of criticism – a
charlatan marketing his own obscurity, stupidity and pretentious
emptiness as something profound and original. He starts with a
misunderstanding of Saussure’s linguistic theory, which saw language as
a form of symbolism: words symbolize meanings with which they have no
inherent connection except by social convention. Derrida decided that
if the meanings of words are social conventions then they must be
arbitrary political acts, acts of class or colonial oppression, and
therefore everyone is entitled to challenge these meanings, to
reinterpret words in terms of his own lived reality. This is simply
undergraduate muddle, in which the social convention of language is
confused with the social conventions of political or other beliefs. But
Derrida pursued his error all the way to a position where any text
means whatever any reader wants it to mean, and nobody’s interpretation
is any more valid than anyone else’s. You can interpret the Bill of
Rights as a totalitarian document and Lenin as a libertarian, and no
evidence can be cited to prove you wrong, because the meaning of the
text cited can be disputed. Since no agreement can be reached on
meaning, anything can be said about any text and all opinions are
equally irrefutable. This makes all communication, including literary
criticism, impossible. It makes Derrida’s own work pointless, but this
did not stop him peddling his opinions, even if by his own reckoning
they were meaningless. The more he painted himself into a corner of
self-contradiction the more he pretended to be dealing in hidden
profundities. The very fact that he was taken seriously is an
indictment of the academic world – a proof that the universities are
ruled by third-rate minds, suckers to any politically trendy gimmick.
But underneath this gullibility lay also self-interest. There was a
real advantage for the academics in this theory – it allowed them to
interpret and reinterpret ad nauseam all the works ever written, in
function of their own zaniest ideas, without fear of contradiction. In
this way they could fill their time, which the latest generation of
writers were doing nothing to help them fill, because they were no
longer writing in the obscure modernist style that required academic
interpretation. Writing had gone simple and straightforward. The death
of obscurity meant the academic was in danger of becoming superfluous.
Post-modernism
was thus an attempt to prolong, or rather revive, through critical
theory, the failed literary revolution of Modernism. And the Modernist
revolution in literature largely failed because the people rejected it
and wanted to go back to something more reader-friendly than the
self-indulgent obscurities of Finnegan’s Wake or The Cantos
– which require an academic priesthood to interpret them. All that
survives of Modernism nowadays is the authors who resisted its more
extreme and sterile experimentation. The most popular Modernists with
today’s readers are the most conservative. Yeats and the early
(pre-experimental) Joyce of Dubliners remain the most widely
read of the great Modernists today. Because literature is still a
living art for which millions of people fork out hard-earned money,
they still have some control over it through their wallets. The people,
through their buying power, simply stopped the Modernist revolution in
literature from going any further, and brought it back to something a
bit more sensible. And they happily read Heaney’s iambic pentameters
and the Victorian-style novels of Solzhinitsyn, Vikram Seth, or Joanna
Trollope without any sense of reading something old-fashioned or
pre-modern or passé. Modernism in its more experimental forms has
simply sunk beneath the waves. Literature has recovered from its
excesses, and gone back to business as usual – the business of
expressing emotions, telling stories, creating characters, exploring
ideas. This is not “post-modernism” in the trendy sense of the academic
critics (some form of hyper-irony); it is essentially anti-Modernism,
sweeping away the trendy, obscure shit and getting back to normal – to
what literature has always done.
All
of this is in stark contrast with the trajectory of Modernism in the
visual arts and “serious” music. There the triumph of Modernism was
total and these arts have degenerated into a terminal state of idiocy.
It is worth asking why 20th century
poetry and literature did not go into the same nose-dive after the
first Modernist innovations – an infernal downward spiral into
formlessness and finally meaningless, the way these other arts did. We
do not see prizes being given to trendy poems which consist of three
words written vertically on the page, or a hundred repetitions of the
same word. (This kind of prank poem is written by the odd retarded
undergraduate, but nobody pays it any attention, because it doesn’t
move us, and we make the effort to read poems in order to have
emotions.) We do not see the Pulitzer or Booker Prize going to novels
that consist only of blank pages. Yet this is the kind of pretentious
nonsense that has gone on in the visual arts for the past fifty years –
a crumpled sheet of paper or a blank canvas being given prestigious
prizes and displayed in the great art museums of the world. Why the
difference? Why did Modernism in the visual arts go further and further till
it disintegrated into charlatanism and meaningless triviality, but not
Modernism in poetry or the novel? Is it because literature is
democratic and market-driven and depends on a lot of individuals buying
a book with their own money, and sitting and reading it, instead of
having the choices of some publicly-funded academic art establishment
imposed on them? Is it the power of the individual reader (and the
market) that prevented Modernist literature going to the dogs? Is the
suicidal course of Modernism in the visual arts an indictment of the
role of public money (controlled by institutionalized sects) in
destroying art?
The
story of Modernism in the visual arts (we will use this term to mean
the plastic arts, painting and sculpture, and excluding the cinema and
photography) is essentially a tragic one, though it started out in a
similar way to Modernism in literature. The equivalent in the visual
arts of the first generation of reactionary modernist poets, Yeats,
Eliot, Pound, were the great early modernist painters, Matisse and
Picasso (to whom we may add, with a slight telescoping of time, Dali –
who, though a generation younger, soon achieved the same mythic
status.) Like the three poets, these painters were masters of classical
technique. They could draw and paint with great skill, and were
inclined towards traditional, figurative, representational art, though
they also indulged in experiments with “freer” forms. Above all they
were steeped in the images of the art of the past and much of their
work, like that of Eliot, consisted of pastiche, parody and ironical
commentary on their predecessors. Matisse, after a classical training,
came under the influence of the Impressionists and of Gauguin, and does
not represent any sharp break with them (much as Yeats, his exact
contemporary, started as a late Victorian romantic, a successor of
Tennyson.) Matisse and Picasso spent much of their time reworking the
images of past painters, Matisse revisiting the Orientalism of Ingres,
Picasso running the full gamut of imitations, caricatures and parodies:
Goya, Velasquez, El Greco, Manet, Cezanne, with allusions to the
sculpture of ancient Greece, Africa
and Pre-Columbian America. Picasso was as full of pastiches of past
styles as Eliot. He had a brief semi-abstract spell in the Cubist years
of the First World War, but quickly recovered and shifted back to
figurative art. As for Dali, he remained entirely a figurative,
representational artist of great precision in drawing, with a satirical
wit and a fantastic, delirious imagination, combining a vast range of
allusions to past artists, philosophers, ideas, objects and people into
a personal vision of intense originality. While in later life he and
Picasso can be accused of becoming cynical, commercial exploiters of
their own quirky styles, churning out mechanical repetitions of
themselves to add to their millions, they remained painters of talent.
But after them came the deluge. The next generations (instead of
putting the brakes on and becoming a bit more conservative, as poets
like Auden and Lowell did) ran away with the shop and modern art
disappeared in a waste of garbage. What happened? It is to that painful
story we must now turn.
12) MODERNISM IN THE VISUAL ARTS
The academics and art journalists who give us the history of
modern art today, conscious that many of their readers dislike most abstract
paintings and despise conceptual art, try to present modernist artists as a
band of struggling revolutionaries, rather like the early Christians,
surrounded by a hostile and uncomprehending world, and persisting in their
brave new way of creating art and their brave rejection of the past until they
finally won through. They imagine that this heroic myth will elicit our
sympathy for works that we find ugly, meaningless and soulless. They compare
modern abstract or conceptual artists and their rejection by a Philistine
public to the similar fate of the Impressionists, as if rejection were
therefore a proof of talent. Monet’s landscapes were once rejected, and are now
universally loved, so the public must be making the same mistake with regard to
Duchamp’s urinal, Manzoni’s cans of shit, Emin’s bedsheets or Damien Hirst’s
pickled fish. Now in reality the public’s rejection of the Impressionists is
very largely a myth. It is often forgotten that the first Salon des Refusés, or
exhibition of the paintings refused by the Paris Salon in 1863, was ordered to
be set up by the Emperor Napoleon III himself in response to the public outcry
at so much good work being rejected by the narrow tastes of the Salon jury
(among the paintings exhibited was Manet’s Déjeuner
sur L’Herbe.) These alternative salons continued to be financed by the
state for nearly twenty years. Contrary to current myths, the first exhibition
of the Impressionists in 1874 was not greeted with universal derision by the
press, but by mixed reviews, including some highly positive ones (notably by
Ernest Chesneau in the Paris-Journal.)
Within a couple of years major collectors were snapping up Monets and Renoirs,
and both these painters, as well as Gauguin, were accepted in the Salon by
1880. Degas refused to exhibit there out of pique, but like Monet and Renoir he
died well-off and famous. Manet was accepted in the Salon by the time he was thirty.
Within twenty years of his scandalous “Olympia”
he was given the Légion d’Honneur. This fairly rapid acceptance by both the
public and the establishment contrasts with nearly a hundred years of popular
resistance to abstractionism and to the “found” or ready-made art and
installations pioneered by Marcel Duchamp before the First World War. The truth
is therefore more complex than the pious myths propagated by the art academics.
Rejection by the public for more than a short period has (with a few notable
exceptions) not generally been the lot of the great artists of the past. The
seven years of establishment rejection endured by Monet cannot be used to
prognosticate the eventual canonization by Western culture of the authors of
crumpled balls of paper, dirty bedsheets or pickled sheep. What characterizes
the art scene today is in fact the opposite of what happened to the
Impressionists: the instant acceptance by the Institutional Revolutionary Art
Party establishment (today’s equivalent of the Paris Salon) of every
attention-seeking, mindless novelty, every silly attempt to outrage common sense
or good taste—and the refusal of most of the educated public to see any of it
as anything but cynical, sensation-mongering garbage. Conceptual artists do not
suffer from official rejection: they suffer rather from indiscriminate official
approval of every imbecility they come up with. The only artists suffering from
official rejection today are paradoxically the brave few who have carried on
creating figurative, representational art. Pietro Annigoni, the greatest
portrait painter of the twentieth century, is not even mentioned in most
academic histories of art. Young painters like Jack Vettriano, who paints
interiors with a composition reminiscent of Vermeer and who sells more
reproductions than most pop stars sell posters, are today’s Robin Hood figures,
adored by the public and outlawed by the art establishment. The myth of the
persecuted avant garde artist needs to be updated. It is now the traditional,
figurative painter who is persecuted and rejected by the Institutional
Revolutionary Art establishment, though he is admired by ordinary people
whenever they can get to see his work. I
would like to propose another image of the modernist avant garde
artists, or at least the vast majority of them (leaving aside the early
classically trained figures Matisse, Picasso and Dali, who mastered all
the techniques of painting and drawing in the old style before
exploring some of the new, and in their obsession with the past
resembled the reactionaries Yeats, Eliot and Pound.) The image I would
like to propose of the mass of second-rate avant garde artists is that
of revolutionary fanatics, communists, anarchists, manifesto-scribbling
sects, determined to bring about their cataclysmic revolution, their
year zero of art, and failing abysmally for a hundred years to gain
acceptance by the public, in the same way that the Marxist
revolutionary fanatics failed abysmally for a hundred years to win an
election. And both these movements, Marxist revolutionary madmen and
the revolutionary art lunatics, have now missed history’s train for
good. They no longer have any reasonable hope of gaining acceptance by
the sane majority, and it is time we turned the page on both of them
and booted their commissars out of the positions they still occupy in
the universities, museums and art schools of the Western world. The
revolution has utterly failed in art as it utterly failed in politics.
Recent attempts to repackage this art as a trendy fashion product, or a
kind of zany goon show, have aroused little interest from a public
weary of the mindless gesticulations of the fashion world and the art
world alike. The only modernists that most people respect today are
those that resisted the revolutionary tide and produced art with all
the technical complexity and skill in drawing of the old 19th
century tradition: Matisse, Picasso, Dali – and above all the realists
like Edward Hopper, who are usually classified as outside the Modernist
tradition. Most of the abstractionists and conceptual artists are
either dismissed by the educated public as deranged cranks or at most
appreciated not as artists but as designers. The work of abstract
painters like Mondrian or Ryman is similar in purpose and competence to
that of a Guatemalan blanket weaver, and is appreciated in the same way
– as a pleasing pattern of shapes and colours rather than a vision of
human life. That is to say, as design rather than art. But in making
this very distinction we are going against one of the basic dogmas of
the revolutionary sects of modern art. It is to these dogmatists we
must now turn to see how things got to this point.
13) HISTORY OF A FAILED REVOLUTION
The multitude of art movements of the 20th
century at first sight seems a kind of impenetrable jungle, and in
order to try and find our way through them, it is useful to keep in
mind four main tendencies. Three of these are figurative (that is, they
depict recognisable things from the real world.) First, there is a
current of Realism, of which Hopper is the supreme representative, but
which takes in artists as diverse as Wood, Rockwell, Wyeth, Annigoni,
Hockney, Freud or Balthus on the one hand and the hyper-realists like
Estes on the other. Second, there is Surrealism, of which the great
genius is Dali, whose work is also figurative, but which distorts real
objects and puts them into impossible relationships, often to create an
effect of mystery, dream, humour or absurdity, or to provoke
intellectual reflection. Magritte, De Chirico, Carra, Delvaux are other
representatives of this trend. Third comes Expressionism, which takes
in Munch, Nolde, Pechstein, and later on Baselitz and Anselm Kiefer,
and which may be traced back partly to Van Gogh. This is a figurative
art which distorts and stylises the real appearance of objects and
people in order to express the most intense emotions of the painter. A
good example is Munch’s “The Scream” where an indistinct wraith-like
figure crossing a bridge gives vent to a cry whose violence is revealed
in the hysterical colours of the sunset. And finally there is
Abstraction, which rejects the representation of any real object or
natural form and in its pure version refuses the expression of any
personal emotion. The result is mostly geometric shapes, lines,
squares, or planes of colour, but also squiggles, meandering lines and
blobs. The great exponents of this are Mondrian, Delaunay, and Van
Doesberg, all part of the Dutch movement known as De Stijl, the Soviet
Constructivists and Suprematists such as Malevich, the painters of the
Bauhaus, including Klee and Kandinsky, and later on Americans such as
Ryman and Newman. Most art of the 20th century falls into
one of these four categories, or into several of them. The Abstract
Expressionists like Pollack and Rothko tried to combine (as the name
suggests) Abstraction with the expression of personal emotion. Pop art
often hovers between Realism and Surrealism. Klimt slides between
realism, expressionism and abstraction. And the two acknowledged
masters of the 20th century, Picasso and Matisse, sailed
happily from one movement to another – Picasso’s earliest phase is
Realist, his Cubist phase approaches Abstraction, and later phases have
elements of Realism, Expressionism and Surrealism. Matisse, a decade
older, is heavily influenced by Gauguin, Cézanne, Van Gogh and even the
Impressionists, and generally combines elements of Realism and
Expressionism. These four general tendencies should be seen not as
pigeon-holes but as points of the compass, among which many artists of
the 20th century navigated, and within which dozens of minor movements tried to chart their own individual course.
The current that interests us most here is Abstractionism. This is often presented as the essence of 20th
century art. There are academic books on modern art where Hopper and
Pietro Annigoni are not even found in the index, so little is Realism
considered “modern”. And this prejudice is correct in the sense that
Abstractionism represented something characteristic and unique to the 20th
century. If Hopper’s work had been looked at by Raphael or Vermeer,
they would have seen at once what he was doing and probably admired it.
They would not have admired Ryman’s or Rothko’s or Mondrian’s work.
They would not have understood what these painters were trying to do or
even considered it art. Their work represents a complete break with
anything that had gone before. It is not merely a new twist to the long
tradition of Western art. It is the end of the whole tradition, and
designed deliberately to be that. Klein in his monochrome canvases,
like Rodchenko earlier, was basically calling for the end of painting
as such, and urging a move into three dimensional constructivism and
installations. It is this major current of modern art as it moves from
the Abstractionism of the 1910’s to the Minimalism of the 1960’s and
the Conceptual Art of the 1990’s that reveals to us some of the traits
that lie at the heart of the 20th century’s collective psychosis – what we have called the over-masculinization of the 20th century mind.
14) ANATOMY OF A COLLECTIVE PSYCHOSIS
A) THE CULT OF THE MACHINE
If
one examines the development of abstract art from the 1910’s, there are
several striking elements that appear again and again in the whole
movement. First is the obsession with science, technology and the new
industrial age, and the attempt to adapt art to these new realities.
This showed itself in an experimental approach to painting itself.
Experiment has of course always played a role in painting, from Da
Vinci’s sfumato to the Impressionists’ study of the effects of
colour juxtaposition. But the concern in the past had always been to
find a way of representing the painter’s actual impressions of nature
more accurately. One thinks of Monet’s endless paintings of Rouen
cathedral to get the exact effect of light at each moment of the day –
this is an obsession with getting onto canvas an actual perception of a
scene, a real lived sensation. But the abstract painters studied colour
not as a means but as an end. Delaunay studied Chevreuil’s and Ogden
Rood’s treatises on colour juxtapositions before he began (in 1912) a
series of paintings that tried to apply these ideas in practice – but
as pure experiments with colour, with no aim at representing what is
seen in nature or the world at all. Kandinsky wrote his own treatise on
colour before he too launched into his first experimental abstract
paintings. The purely technical, scientific origin of their creative
urge is striking. But their conception of themselves as scientific
experimenters was part of a more general obsession
with the new technological age. Abstractionism was specifically
identified with the machine and with industry, and its forms had to be
mechanical. Both the Constructivists and the De Stijl movement produced
geometrical forms that were seen as reflecting this new mechanical,
industrial reality. Van Doesberg’s Art Concret movement rejected all
the forms of nature, as well as all sentimentality and sensuality, and
enunciated the dogma: “Technique should be mechanical, that is to say,
exact, anti-impressionistic.” 52 In his 1918 book “Après le
Cubisme” Le Corbusier affirmed that “art must always tend to
precision”, and called for an art that “would inoculate artists with
the new spirit of the age,” characterized above all by the “precision
of machinery.” 53 The Bauhaus movement in Germany,
which broke down the distinction between art and industrial design,
developed this cult of scientific precision even further – almost
attempting to make art into a science. This tendency culminated under
the directorship from 1928 to 1930 of the Marxist Hannes Meyer, who
decreed that “no aesthetic factor is involved in design”, and that
“form is a product of arithmetic”.54 Even those Bauhaus luminaries Klee and Kandinsky felt this was going too far.
B) ART AS IDEOLOGICAL DOGMA
The
second element, related to this worship of science and technology, is
the ideological obsession – the theoretical dogmatism. The painters
formed little groups, collectives, mini-movements, each producing a
manifesto or periodical putting forward its doctrines, in the manner of
political parties or fanatical sects. Soviet Suprematists and
Constructivists saw Abstraction as a revolutionary act, an abolition of
the past, part of the necessary destruction of civilization. When they
were not seeing themselves as scientists, the artists of this tendency
saw themselves as revolutionaries, plotting to overthrow the whole of
society with their manifestos. The groups quarrelled and bickered and
attacked one another in their pamphlets, like all revolutionary sects.
But they also visited one another in order to learn and to spread the
new ideas, as if art really were a collective enterprise, like science
or political theory, in which a new dogma promulgated by one group in Paris could influence others in Moscow or Berlin
and eventually revolutionize the world. This again shows an obsession
with technique and group ideology – to the exclusion of any personal
vision or self-expression – which would have
astonished the artists of any previous age. It also showed a contempt
for individual painting ability. Art was the product of the impersonal
application of dogmas, rules or new approaches, not of any personal
talent at drawing or painting. The borrowing of techniques and ideas
presupposed a sort of interchangeability of artists, in much the same
way that a scientific experiment, once the principle has been
understood, can be reproduced by any scientist anywhere in the world.
Art was a matter not of personal skill but of intellectual concepts,
which anyone can adopt and apply. This is a more impersonal conception
of art than had ever appeared before. The great Renaissance masters
formed schools, where pupils learned from them and imitated them. But
what they were learning was thought of as something personal to that
master, a unique set of complex skills which might be acquired, if at
all, after years of laborious apprenticeship. It was not simply a set
of dogmas that could be put into practice straight away by anyone.
C) IMPERSONALITY: THE DISAPPEARING ARTIST AND THE ARTIST AS GURU
This
leads to a third important aspect: impersonality. The whole personal
element in art was now largely rejected. The Constructivists of the
early Soviet period suppressed all trace of artistic individuality or
personal expressiveness. The Dutch movement De Stijl in the same years
saw the Great War as a watershed that had put a definitive end to the
“old individualistic world”, and replaced it by a new “universal”
society. The individualism of representation had to be transcended, and
replaced by simple mechanical abstraction: horizontal and vertical
lines and flat areas of primary colour, which bore no trace of
individual personality.55 At the Bauhaus in Germany, Laslo
Moholy-Nagy preached the use of machines to create works of art: “The
reality of our century is technology: the invention, construction and
maintenance of machines. To be a user of machines is to be of the
spirit of this century. It has replaced the transcendental spiritualism
of past eras.…. Everyone is equal before the machine.” 56
True to his doctrine, he actually ordered some of his “works of art”
from a factory. This practice would become current half a century later
with Minimalist artists like the box-maker (or rather box-orderer)
Judd. Moholy-Nagy claimed that art could even be ordered up from a
factory by telephone. There was no need for the artist to touch it or
even see it, merely to give precise verbal instructions. The bourgeois
notion of the individual artist expressing a personal vision was
abolished in favour of a new cult of machine production.
A
generation later in 1951, the American Rauschenberg exhibited his
monochrome White Paintings, which he had done with a roller in
house-paint. He accepted that they would have to be repainted
periodically to keep them fresh, and that this could be done equally
well by someone else. The individual artist’s touch had ceased to
matter. 57
Today’s
defenders of installation or conceptual art argue that it makes no
difference whatsoever that the conceptual artist does not even touch
his supposed work, but orders it from someone else with the sculpting
skills or craftsmanship that he lacks. One modern art critic, David
Lee, even had the dishonesty to compare this with the fact that
Tintoretto used apprentices to complete some of his massive frescos –
obscuring the crucial difference that Tintoretto’s motive was not a
lack of skill but a lack of time.58 What we have today is
self-proclaimed artists with a talent for self-promotion, but no
technical skill at all, ordering work from obscure real artists and
claiming it as their own – much as celebrities get their life-stories
(and even novels) written by impecunious ghost-writers and pretend the
work is theirs. Would one knowingly give a Pulitzer or Whitbread Prize
for a ghost-written novel, whose “author” did not compose a single
sentence – but merely gave instructions to another, anonymous writer
for the kind of novel he wanted? This happens regularly today in the
art world. And behind this of course lies the contempt for the mere
technical ability of the artist “which anyone could acquire if he had
time, but I have no time to learn because I am too busy thinking up
original art ideas.” When conceptual art is not technically incompetent
it is often hard to distinguish from plagiarism. A
good example is Damien Hirst taking his son’s toy anatomy figure (made
by the Humbrol toy company) and commission-ing a factory to make a copy
of it forty times bigger, and selling this for a million pounds to the
gullible collector Charles Saatchi. The Humbrol toy company promptly
sued for plagiarism and won a large settlement. This work (“Hymn”)
remained nonetheless on display at the Saatchi Gallery as one of
Hirst’s alleged masterpieces. What exactly, one could ask, was Hirst’s
input into this “work of art”? 59
More
to the point, if an “artist” is now just a commissioner of a work,
couldn’t you, dear reader, do the same thing: order a factory to make a
plastic Space Invader toy or Barbie doll thirty times bigger, and claim
to be the “creator” of this work? But no: your
effort in this line would not be accepted, it would not be worth a
million pounds to some rich gull, because you are not an “artist”. That
is, you have not promoted a media image of yourself as an “artist”, by
a career of progressively escalated outrage to common sense. You have
not been transformed by media hype into a figure of controversy, and
therefore a figure of fame, one of those media creatures famous for
being famous – even famous for being reviled as the author of the last
worst insult to human reason, and therefore an irresistible magnet to
fame groupies. And this public notoriety is now indispensable in order
to be taken seriously as an “artist” – in the absence of any technical
skills with brush or chisel to base this claim upon. As the personal
hand of the artist disappears, the personal hype takes its place. A
sort of media voodoo has replaced artistic skill. Just as the Marxist
attempt to downgrade the importance of individual personalities in
history led to the greatest and most despotic personality cults of all
time, so the modernist cult of the impersonality of art paradoxically
leads to a cult of the artist as media-hyped fashion guru of almost
mystical status. The artist’s delphic pronouncements, bohemian
lifestyle and fashionable poses become a free-standing substitute for
any actual skill at creation. The absence of visible skill, the fact
that he does not even touch the work with his own hands, is taken to be
the very proof of some ineffable and mysterious talent – the artist
becomes a high priest, channel of invisible powers. The archetype of
this new kind of charlatan was Marcel Duchamp, who exhibited a urinal
found in a junk yard, now one of the great icons of modern art. In the
fifties and sixties we had Piero Manzoni, who signed women’s bodies to
transform them into art-works and exhibited his own shit in cans (now
proudly displayed in leading British art museums.) Ultimately the
“impersonality” of the artist under modernist dogma leads to a cult of
personality more extreme than anything that has ever gone before. The
only thing that makes Duchamp’s urinal a “work of art” is that he chose
it. All the other identical urinals are worth nothing. Authorship
(limited here to pointing at something in a junk-yard) is far more
important for such a work than for a Renaissance painting of the
Virgin. Ultimately to know whether Raphael did this painting or one of
his more obscure contemporaries does not alter its artistic merit
(though it will of course change the price.) But to discover that a
given urinal was not the one “found” by Duchamp is to condemn it
instantly to utter worthlessness. A painting of the
Virgin not signed by Raphael still has artistic value; a urinal not
signed by Duchamp has none at all. In short, the cult of impersonality,
the downgrading of the artist’s personal skills in modernism, ends up
paradoxically at the opposite – a cult of the artist as a magus with
preternatural powers. He is a being capable of transubstantiating a
piece of junk (an old urinal, a shovel, a coathook) into a million
dollar art-work by a mere word, by signing his name to it – a power
beyond the wildest dreams of any medieval alchemist.
D) THE REJECTION OF NATURE
The
fourth element that is significant in the abstract-conceptual tradition
is the rejection of nature. Here is part of the manifesto of the Art Concret movement of Theo Van Doesberg in 1930:
Art is universal.
The
work of art should be entirely conceived and formed by the mind before
its execution. It should receive nothing from Nature’s formal
properties or from sensuality or sentimentality….
The picture should be constructed entirely from purely plastic elements, that is to say planes or colours. …
Technique should be mechanical, that is to say, exact, anti-impressionistic. 60
This
last point, the rejection of Impressionism, is significant.
Impressionism was both the last great cult of nature, and the movement
that made the artist’s personal impressions and emotions central to the
work of art. Abstract art utterly rejects both these notions – nature
and personal feeling – as the absolute enemy. Although Art Concret as a periodical was short-lived, its principles underlie a large proportion of the abstract art produced in the 20th
century. It became an article of faith of the more radical abstract
movement that nothing resembling a real object or a natural form must
appear in a painting. The French movement Abstraction-Création
of the 1930’s was so doctrinaire on this point that it refused to
exhibit work where the faintest trace of nature could be detected. 61
Now
the rejection of natural forms had occurred before in the history of
art – notably in Islamic religious art (though natural forms flourished
in secular art in Muslim countries like Persia
under less zealous regimes.) Here the representation of living beings
was seen as a form of idolatry, distracting us from the worship of God.
This view is generally associated with extreme asceticism, rejection of
the senses, rejection of pleasure in the world – something which the
Western tradition of art, highly sensual, imagistic and fascinated by
nature and people, has never much gone in for. Early Byzantine art had
seen a current of Islamic-style rejection of images (Iconoclasm), but
it had been defeated. The tendency raised its head again briefly during
the Puritan frenzy of Cromwell’s dictatorship in England.
Statues of saints were smashed as idolatrous, and churches were
vandalized up and down the country. This Maoist-style (or
Taliban-style) Cultural Revolution was short-lived, and did not get as
far as imposing a new abstract art to take the place of images. But
these episodes do make clear what kind of values lie behind the
rejection of images of the natural world. They are essentially ascetic
values, usually in the service of some fiercely puritanical religion.
But in the 20th century these ascetic values were not in the
service of any spiritual faith. Living forms were not rejected in
favour of some divine vision. They were rejected because of a hatred of
the natural world and a new cult of the machine and the industrial
world. This rejection was a form of hatred of life – a worship of the
machine and of abstraction so self-hating and anti-human that it can
only be seen today as a form of madness.
Madness
is not too strong a word for this. The rejection of everything in the
natural world and the insistence on a mechanical execution without a
trace of personal self-expression suggests a profound alienation from
the world and from oneself. It would be tempting to see it as a kind of
post-traumatic stress disorder after the horrors of the First World War
– if it had not in fact manifested itself a good five years before the
war broke out. Such a collective hatred of life and of the natural
world – that world so magnificently depicted by the Impressionists of
the previous generation – is hard to fathom except as an extreme form
of aggression. It is part of that pathological mounting of aggression
that led to the war itself. A good deal of that rising tide of
aggression took the form of hatred of femininity. “Contempt for women!”
was one of the slogans of Futurism, the first and most aggressive
current of modernist art, and the one which worshipped machines most
openly. Woman and nature are both seen as antithetical to the machine.
The machine represents masculine aggression and power. Abstraction also
represents masculine aggression and power. To relate this to the
central theme of this book, the shift from Impressionism to
Abstractionism is a striking shift from feminine to masculine art.
Impressionist art is feminine art: sensual, life-affirming, charming,
lyrical, nature-loving, it delights in the senses, in the beauty of the
human form, it expresses every fleeting emotion, every delicate
impression made by sunlight, shadow or breeze – like that Monet
landscape of young women and children walking through a field of
poppies. Abstract art is hard, cold, disciplined, repressing all
emotion, mathematical, mechanical, analytical, precise, dominating,
aggressive, violent and ideological. In short, all the male mental
vices which were about to unleash themselves in an orgy of death and
destruction on the battlefields of Europe.
Abstract, mechanical, geometrical art is the masculine art of an age of
war; just as nature-loving, sensual, impressionistic art was the
feminine art of an age of peace. The shift of Western culture at the dawn of the 20th
century from a feminine to a masculine ethos is demonstrated nowhere
more clearly than in the shift from Impressionism to Abstractionism.
Some
have been tempted to see abstractionism and this new cult of the
industrial and the mechanical as an expression of some kind of
alienation from the mechanized modern world, in the manner of poets
like Eliot. The Fort Worth Museum
website recently gave us this politically correct gloss on
abstractionism (since wisely removed from their website): “Pure
abstractionism ….was partially a protest against the dehumanizing
aspects of mechanization and the development of deadlier military
weapons, such as nerve gas in World War I.” Now this is either sheer
ignorance or a deliberate falsehood, and it is important to refute this
latest academic attempt to explain or justify abstractionism by
appealing to our own trendy political fads. The abstractionists of De
Stijl, Constructivism and the Bauhaus were not protesting against a
dehumanized, mechanized world. Like the Futurists they loved this new
mechanized world. They worshipped the industrial machine age. They were
at home in it. They glorified it. They couldn’t get enough of it. The
merest glance at their manifestos confirms it. There is not a trace of
satire, protest or rejection of the machine world in anything they
wrote or painted. On the contrary, it is the world of nature that they
rejected and despised. They saw nature painting as irrelevant,
outmoded, passé, sentimental, cloying, feminine, sissy, pretty-pretty,
a bourgeois fashion, something to be thrown out with all the other
“Pastist” rubbish. It is a grotesque falsification
of history to project backwards onto that age our own concerns today
with ecology, pollution, and the evils of industrialism. The generation
of artists of the 1910’s and 1920’s felt nothing of the sort – they
worshipped the new machine age. They hated nature. They despised the
romantics and the Impressionists who had rejected industrialism and
taken refuge in an extreme worship of nature. They did exactly the
opposite: they worshipped the machine. One can only explain this as a
transformation of sensibilities, a shift away from the feminine,
sensitive, sensual, happy and nature-loving sensibility of the
Impressionists, towards a hard, tough, aggressive, masculine, cynical,
domineering, urban, militaristic character – abstract, scientific and
intellectual in its orientation. This new mind, typified by the
Futurists, is not repelled by the machine age: it identifies with it,
wants to celebrate it, wants to celebrate its triumph over nature and
over the sensual world of the feminine. It sees the potential in this
machine world for power, the power to dominate and transform its
environment. Marinetti worships cars, trains, iron bridges, factories.
One recurring image is that of explosions: the
Russian Suprematist Malevich sees the symbol of the new movement as an
exploding bomb – and this was even after the First World War had shown
what exploding bombs were really like. This is a glorification of
destructive power that is peculiarly and pathologically masculine. The
world of abstract art is a masculine world, asserting a cult of violent
change and transformation, an expression of a will to power, a ruthless
urge to eliminate everything that would limit its power, and especially
all traces of sensitivity, sentiment or emotion. It is for that reason
it is not unjust to associate Abstractionism with those other
contemporary movements of destructive change, equally obsessed with the
transformation of the world, equally obsessed with a radical break with
the past, with the tearing down of bourgeois sentimentality and
personal sensitivities – namely, Fascism and Communism.
Now
the paradox, of course, is that both these totalitarian ideologies
finally turned against abstract art, after first embracing it. The
early days of the Soviet Union saw an
enthusiastic adoption of abstract art by the revolutionary regime. The
Constructivists and Suprematists were seen by the early Soviets as an
essential instrument of the destruction of bourgeois society. Pure
abstraction was seen as a triumph over the sentimental rubbish of the
past, a tool of demolition of a corrupt civilization. Malevich, the
perpetrator of a famous black square in 1915 which was hailed by
Russian leftists as an ideological breakthrough, preached in 1921 that
his fellow Soviet “art workers” had a duty to uproot consciousness, to
launch it into flight, to combine Einstein and Lenin to launch mankind
into “a new fourth dimension of motion”, so that “not a single grounded
structure will remain on earth.” He compared the necessary “action of
atomization” to an exploding bomb and painted an atomized airplane as a
symbol of the future. 62 In the heady atmosphere of a
revolution that was both social and scientific, artists and
revolutionary politicians saw their common goal clearly: the
destruction of all past values, past emotions, past depictions of
mankind, the making of a clean slate of human history. This fanatical
purity of destructiveness could not of course be maintained for long
after the revolution had succeeded. As the Soviets turned in the
thirties from destroying the old to constructing and celebrating the
new, they turned from Abstractionism to Socialist Realism, a monumental
art expressing the new pieties of the regime – the apotheosis of the
heroic worker. Abstract artists soon found themselves out of step with
the new directives of the Party. Abroad, communist artists such as
Picasso had an ambiguous and troubled relationship with a Party that
now regarded them as suspect. The Modernist art movement, which had at
first been hailed as a revolutionary sweeping away of bourgeois
decadence, now came to be seen as part of that decadence – the expression of a spiritual sickness which no longer existed in the new workers’ paradise.
The
same change of attitudes towards Modernism occurred with Fascism –
particularly with the rise of Nazism. Though Marinetti was a fanatical
Fascist and saw Fascism as the embodiment of Futurism’s cult of the
machine and of violent, masculine, aggressive values (as did Mussolini,
who promoted Modernist architecture), the coming to power of Hitler
changed things. Unlike Mussolini, who had promised a high-tech,
futuristic transformation of an impoverished, backward Italy,
Hitler had ridden to power on a sentimental glorification of
traditional German values – order, military parades, the countryside,
healthy and vigorous youth, sport, physical exercise, singing patriotic
songs round the campfire. (This difference reflects the power and
prestige of Germany in the late 19th century, a golden age now looked back on with nostalgia – something Italy
had not known for four hundred years.) The ugly gesticulations of the
expressionists, like the geometric imbecilities of the abstractionists,
were seen by the Nazis as signs of decadence, an alien-inspired
corruption of the German spirit which had undermined patriotism and
brought the nation down. This rubbish had to be cleaned out. Hitler’s
ideology, though revolutionary, disguised itself as a restoration of
the past, of that glorious past before bourgeois decadence and
humanistic democratic drivel had brought the nation to ruin. Art had to
be monumental and grandiose to give dignity and pride back to the
Germans : Wagner’s operas and neo-classical architecture on a colossal
scale. The grotesque self-hating buffoonery of Modernism had no place
in this grandiose scheme. It was a symbol of the sickness of which the
nation had to cure itself.
In America
meanwhile moderate socialism had identified itself with the portrayal
of the condition and way of life of the people. Social Realism of the
Norman Rockwell sort – pictures of working families in church or
engaged in innocent pastimes – was the way of showing human solidarity
with the ordinary people during hard times. Those few American artists
excited by the Abstractionism sweeping Europe had to struggle to
survive in America,
where Realism reigned supreme. Abstractionism was seen by the American
left as European capitalist decadence – until Nazism and the war drove
many of the German artists of the Bauhaus into exile in America.
The fact that these artists were “refugees” from Nazism suddenly
transformed them and their art into symbols of liberty. The final
rejection of Modernist art, and especially abstract art, by the
totalitarian states led to its gradual adoption by liberal democrats as
the art of “freedom”. This has obscured the common roots of Modernism
and totalitarianism at the start of the century – in the revolutionary
impulse, the impulse to make a clean slate of the past, to create a
year zero of human culture. Nihilistic revolutionary totalitarianism,
the urge to abolish the past, has obvious, deep connections with
artistic movements seeking to abolish the art of the past. This key
notion of an absolute break with the past had first entered the world
with the French revolution, whose adepts actually started the calendar
again at year one, equalized the months of the year and decimalized all
measurements. The revolutionary notion of putting the counter back to
zero and remaking mankind in the image of a new machine age is the
common driving force behind Fascism, Communism, and the Abstract art
movement that grew up with them.
E) ABSTRACTIONISM AS NIHILISM
The
rejection of nature and anything reminiscent of natural forms limits
the artist essentially to geometrical figures, lines, and blocks of
colour. Despite today’s pious academic doctrine that abstract art was a
liberation of man’s imagination from the narrow constraints of merely
imitating nature, the truth turned out to be the opposite. That the
human mind soon runs out of inspiration when it turns its back on
nature is shown by the extraordinary repetitiveness, banality and
emptiness of most abstract art. Some artists of the Minimalist period
repeated the same painting throughout their lives, shifting the
solitary stripe down the painting a few centimetres to the left or
right, or changing its colour, as an indication of profound and subtle
development. Mark Rothko, once he turned abstract, painted two or three
oblongs of colour, one above the other, for the rest of his life. If
one compares this with the rich variety of the oeuvre of Van Gogh,
Cézanne or Matisse, what strikes one is the lack of range, the lack of
imagination, the lack of invention of the abstract painter. Or compare
it with the incredible fecundity of Dali’s imagination – an imagination
nourished by the infinitude of real things in the real world, and the
possibility of modifying them and associating them in infinitely varied
and fantastical combinations. Nothing approaching this inventiveness is
found in abstract art. Even Kandinsky becomes extremely repetitive when
we see his work in large doses, as does Miro. Now you might argue that
Renaissance portraits are also repetitive. But the tiny variations in
the faces and expressions of portraits appear slightly more significant
to the human observer than the tiny variations in the shapeless blobs
in a Kandinsky, because faces express inner emotions. A difference of a
few millimetres in the curve of the lips on a portrait can change
amusement into scorn, or happiness into despair. A few millimetres
change in an abstract blob can never have this emotional impact. Above
all, the human eye is trained by survival instincts to observe faces
closely and read their exact expression. It is not trained to observe
abstract blobs closely or to care much about their variation. One might
say that all three major subjects of traditional art – portraits, nudes
and landscapes – correspond to centres of interest linked to our
biological survival needs. Human beings need to observe others’ faces
closely to predict their intentions towards them. They are drawn to
observe nude bodies in order to gauge the degree of sexual or aesthetic
interest they arouse. And they need to observe landscapes in order to
scan them for any threat or promise they may hold. Every castle and
fort in Europe is built on a hill and
our ancestors spent thousands of years scanning landscapes for movement
that might indicate an enemy. We have never needed to observe blobs,
squares or meandering lines with anything like this degree of
attention. Abstract shapes have never entered into human beings’
survival needs, and do not switch on any of our survival reflexes of
attention and observation. There is no biological reason why human
beings should look with intense concentration at an abstract painting,
compared with the profound biological reasons we have for closely
observing faces, nude bodies, and landscapes. It is this lack of any
instinctive interest in abstract shapes that seems also to limit the
inventiveness of their authors. Since these forms, if they are
completely abstract, have no emotional associations, arousing neither
fear nor desire, our imagination does not work on them. Does anybody
have abstract dreams?
The
sterility of the abstract painter’s imagination led him after a while
to enlist the help of chance. Jackson Pollock’s technique of dripping
paint onto a canvas on the floor and stirring it about with a stick in
a kind of frenzy was supposed to unleash the unconscious mind. This is
about as pretentious and sterile as the automatic writing of the
dadaists. The technique was soon mechanized and simplified by firing
cans of paint from an airgun at a canvas on the wall, which made it
more purely random. Other variants of this were to get nude models to
roll around in paint on a canvas on the floor, or to get various
animals to wallow in paint and smear themselves on canvases. Of course
Jung was there to tell us that nothing happens purely by chance. But
these techniques were difficult to take seriously as self-expression
without regressing to a belief in augury, tea-leaf reading, or voodoo.
All of this would seem to indicate that imagination and inspiration
were running dry in the huge vacuum left by the abandonment of nature.
The ultimate stage of abstract minimalism was the monochrome or blank
canvas, a tacit admission that the rejection of nature leaves nothing
more to be said.
This
is art as ideology, not art that expresses anything but art which
demonstrates a theory, which perversely exults in expressing nothing.
This is art that defines itself entirely by what it doesn’t do – that
is, by hatred and rejection of everything that has gone before. It is
an art of nihilism. It is no accident that it had its greatest
flowering under communist totalitarianism during the early, fanatical
years of the Soviet Union. Constructivism and Suprematism were seen as a triumph of the same revolutionary impulse to make a clean slate or tabula rasa
of past civilization which the Soviet revolutionaries were doing in the
political and social sphere. A few years later Stalin, like Hitler,
failed to understand the significance of abstract art – failed to see
how perfectly it reflected his own dehumanization of life, his system’s
attack on the human personality, the replacement of feeling and
individuality by impersonality, collective discipline and abstract
goals (production figures for pig-iron.) Above all, he failed to see
how it corresponded to his conception of human beings as mere
mathematical units to be subtracted from the world at will, even by the
million. Or perhaps, on the contrary, he realized that it represented
this reality only too plainly. Stalin’s demand for an art of Socialist
Realism was a retreat from pure communist fanaticism – the adepts of
year zero, the sweeping away of the past – into a new form of bourgeois
idealism by which he hoped to rally support for his regime, in the same
way that he revived patriotic Russian nationalism during the war. It is
an attempt to hide the soulless reality of his system behind an art
pretending to have soul, rather than one that openly proclaimed
soullessness as the new goal of life – that machine mentality that
Moholy-Nagy boasted had replaced the spiritual transcendentalism of the
past. But Stalin’s and Hitler’s misunder-standing of abstract art
should not lead us to misunderstand it. It is the perfect artistic
expression of 20th century totalitarianism in its attempt to
abolish the past, blot out nature, suppress the individual and
eliminate all personal human emotions.
The
impulse of destructiveness implicit in abstract art, its attempt to
annihilate a three thousand year old tradition of Western painting, is
wonderfully captured in a picture by the one great artist born since
the Second World War, Anselm Kiefer. In his masterpiece “The Quarrel of
Images” he depicts a modern war between tanks in a hollow valley which
is also an artist’s palette. The palette is decorated with the names of
the great iconoclasts or image-smashers of Byzantine Christendom (like
the Islamists, enemies of an art of images of the natural world.) To
these he adds the names of modern abstract art patrons like Charles
Saatchi. These are the forces aimed at destroying the art of images –
that is, figurative painting. It is a war by ideological fanatics to
end civiliz-ation, to utterly annihilate the earth. This complex
painting achieves a profound symbolic linking of the totalitarian wars
of the 20th century with the ideological war of abstract
life-denying art against figurative life-affirming art. The association
of the abstractionists with militarism and war is a perceptive one. A
hatred of the sensual images of the natural world is characteristic of
that over-masculine mind which also produced totalitarian fanaticism,
militarism and total war.
The
fact that abstract art has been persistently rejected by the wider
public suggests that it embodies a degree of neurosis, of mental
disorder, that normal human beings find repugnant and have no desire to
live with. Van Doesberg’s elaborate design of the interior of the Café
d’Aubette in Strasbourg in the late 1920’s had to be painted over, because the clientele violently objected to it.63
This sort of thing is deplored by the Institutionalized Revolutionary
Art establishment as an example of Philistine intolerance of the new.
It should be seen instead as an expression of a healthy popular revolt
against a life-hating, machine-worshipping ideology. Van Doesburg’s
designs were of a violent geometrical aggressiveness that projects
nothing but hatred, oppression and dehumanization. An art which
expresses this degree of alienation from life is not the sort of thing
normal people want to sit in a room with while they have a cup of
coffee and a chat. Van Doesberg proclaimed that art is universal – but
the fact that abstract geometrical forms (squares, triangles,
diagonals) are universal does not make them likeable. It is only when
abstract patterns begin to imitate the harmonious and irregular forms
of nature that most people find them agreeable. The most popular
Modernist architect and designer today, Antonio Gaudi, has not a single
straight line or regular geometrical form in his work: it is a work of
irregular curves, as in nature. This is the form of “abstract
naturalism”, imitating the natural contours of waves, seashores, dunes,
deserts, vegetation, flowers, that has been accepted and widely adopted
into daily life today in the form of design – on clothes, on carpets,
on wallpaper or wall-hangings. The problem of the abstract artists who
used geometrical shapes is that they ignored the emotive connotations
of these forms: sterility, harshness, aggressive-ness, violence,
oppression. There is no such thing as a purely intellectual response to
a shape: it is always emotive. Shapes which deny the sensual forms of
life are not perceived neutrally by the mind: they are perceived as
anti-life, as harsh and aggressive. Because of the appalling influence
of abstract artists like Le Corbusier on architecture in the modern
age, we spend our lives in an urban environment whose shapes express
aggression and the denial of life. It is no accident that the domes of
Renaissance architecture resemble a woman’s breast: this is the shape
that gives most pleasure, comfort and security to the human soul. It
is, in short, the architecture people want to live with, because it
puts them in a good mood (which is also why people love Gaudi.) Imagine
if the discordant, jarring tones of avant garde atonal “serial” music
were constantly blared out of loudspeakers all over the city. There
would be an immediate increase in mayhem and insanity. We should be
looking at what geometrical architecture already does to the human
soul, as part of the explanation of modern neurosis. Alienation may be
a valid theme of modern artists, but an art of alienation is not an art
to live in the midst of. Architecture has no right to express
alienation, impersonality and aggression, because we have to live in
the atmosphere it creates.
F) ABSTRACTIONISM AND TOTALITARIANISM
The
unpopularity of abstract art led to a fifth element in these movements:
their didactic and propagandist intent. These artists saw themselves as
trying to educate a Philistine public. They wrote and preached almost
as much as they painted. They had a missionary role. They saw
themselves as a kind of vanguard, endowed with a sensibility that they
must induce others to share. The idea that someone who appreciates all
the subtleties of Constable, Monet and Rembrandt might need his taste
educated to bring him to admire the sterile emptiness of Mondrian or
Malevich might seem an arrogant position, but these artists did not
shrink from it. The belief in their own superiority to the contemptible
masses, including those contemptible bourgeois souls who appreciated
the art of the past, is breath-taking. It is matched only by the
similar arrogance of revolutionary groups in the political sphere. 20th
century abstract artists suffered from that same deranged megalomania
which various writers (such as Conrad) chronicled among the revolutionary sects of
the time. The belief that mankind as a whole is a contemptible,
ignorant rabble and that only a tiny elite of minds possess
enlightenment is behind the totalitarianism both of the revolutionary
political movements and the revolutionary art movements. The latter,
when they took power in universities and art schools after the Second
World War, showed an intolerance of every other style of art, a
determination to root out all backsliding sympathies for past styles
and impose their own narrow ideas, which corresponds exactly to the
behaviour of the communists in power. It has had disastrous
consequences right up until our own day.
Revolution
is perhaps by its nature totalitarian. The impulse to wipe clean the
slate of human history and begin again is perhaps the most evil impulse
that has ever possessed the human mind. Whenever it succeeds, liberty
is at an end, and a process of cultural destruction gets under way.
What the Cultural Revolution did in China
in the sixties was happening equally in the West. The only difference
is that the Chinese totalitarians physically destroyed the art of the
past (including priceless ancient manuscripts.) Western academic
totalitarians merely decreed the art of the past dead and stopped
anyone from producing anything remotely like it again, by killing the
fragile living tradition by which age-old artistic skill is transmitted
from master to pupil. The abstractionist ideology promulgated by the
Revolutionary Art establish-ment in the West for the past fifty years
is not only indistinguishable from the nihilistic impulse at the root
of both communism and fascism. It has also shown the same totalitarian
spirit: a fanatical determination to suppress all
other forms, currents and styles of art as backsliding, outmoded,
bourgeois sentimentality.
The
compulsive glorification of revolutionaries, no matter what the nature
of the revolution they sought to carry out, is among the most
deep-rooted intellectual perversions of the past hundred years. The
defeat of Nazism and Communism and the revelation of their horrors does
not seem to have led to any widespread understanding of the
psychological impulses at the root of these ideologies. And those
impulses are very largely reflected in the intellectual traditions of
abstract art, which grew up in the same era as totalitarianism and were
so closely related to it. The abstract artists of the 20’s and 30’s
displayed all the psychological characteristics and aims common to both
fascists and communists. They were bent on the extinction of the past,
the radical remaking of mankind, the suppression of all natural human
emotions, and the creation of a new, hard, mechanical conception of man
as well as art. These were men in revolt against nature, against the
senses, against sensuality, against the individual personality, against
emotion, against the human soul, against life itself. What they were
for was the mechanical, the geometrical, the mathematical, the
impersonal, the collectivist, the soulless, the factory-made, the
machine-executed, the ideological. In short what they were really for
is Auschwitz and the Soviet gulags,
models of mechanistic dehumanization and annihilation. The Nazi and
Soviet states’ turning against this abstract art was a profound
misunderstanding. Abstract art embodied the Nazi and Soviet mentality
perfectly. It is not too much to say that the impulse of Abstractionism
– dehumanization, the abolition of the individual personality, the
suppression of nature, of human feelings and of all memory of the past
– lies at the root of all the evils of the 20th century.
15) THE REVOLUTION GOES CAPITALIST
But
over the last fifty years this totalitarian art, Abstractionism – the
artistic equivalent of the great totalitarian systems, even if they
ignorantly turned against it – has undergone an
extraordinary make-over. The cult of revolution in the arts has now
left behind its associations with totalitarian ideologies and become
part and parcel of American-style liberal capitalism. One of the
peculiar paradoxes of the last half-century is how an impulse born of
an anti-bourgeois revolutionary movement has merged so seamlessly into
a capitalist ideology of perpetual technological progress. This is only
an illustration of how closely-related Marxism and capitalism are as
ideologies. Both are products of that Protestantism which, as we shall
see elsewhere in this book, brought forward heaven into this life as a
material goal we move towards, either by a single revolution or by
constant progress. The same impulses that urge you to change your
car every three years for a newer, later model urge you to abandon the
art of the past as obsolete, something that has been done before, and
is therefore not nearly as good as the new. Capitalism’s obsession with
change and the perpetual revolution of techniques has intensified with
the mass consumer society. And the notion of eternal progress, so dear
to capitalist marketing men bent on furthering consumption, has slipped
into the discourse of all the modernist art critics and gurus. Last
year’s fashions, styles, forms are not merely obsolete; they are
inferior, worthless. Things have to move on. Nothing must be kept or
repeated. Something new must always be invented. The reduction of art
to fashion, something subject to an eternal quest for the new, original
and untried, has become more and more evident over the past forty years
as capitalist advertising has cranked up its propaganda machine to push
consumerism to new excesses. And the surrounding of art events with
many of the trappings of the fashion world, the reduction of art-works
to fashion objects, bought for their trendiness or sensationalism not
for their depth or timelessness, has contributed to a trivialization of
art, a sense of its ephemeral nature, its expendability, which has
finished off the work of degrading art and annihilating its value (replacing it by investor speculation) which
the earlier, more nihilistic revolutionary movements began.
Now
this whole analysis of abstractionism flies in the face of the pious
myths that have been erected over the past eighty years by the
Institutional Revolutionary Art Party, the totalitarian art
establishment, for which Abstractionism is the crowning achievement of
the history of art. Not only would they indignantly deny the connection
of the abstract art movements of the Constructivists and the Bauhaus
with revolutionary totalitarian ideas. They even see Abstractionism as
a moral force for human liberty, as the very spirit of that American
civilization which combated and defeated Nazism. This is of course a
falsification of history. At the time of the entry of America into the war, the dominant artistic style in the United States
was regional realism, the kind of apotheosis of small town virtues
represented by Norman Rockwell. This really was the moral spirit
underlying America’s
crusade for freedom. Rockwell’s paintings illustrating the Four
Freedoms of Roosevelt’s speech, for all their provincial
sentimentality, represent faithfully the spirit of grassroots America at that time – the
family pieties, the religious faith, the social conscience. To pretend,
by contrast, that Abstractionism had any moral or humanistic content
whatever is either self-delusion, or cynical
falsehood. The fact that the Bauhaus painters and other abstract
artists had to flee from Nazi Germany to America
in order to continue painting does not make them freedom-loving
humanists or in any way advocates of liberty except for themselves.
Hitler persecuted not only democrats but also communists. Victimization
by dictatorship is not a proof of libertarian values. But the
generation of German abstractionists who fled Nazism soon canonized
themselves as liberal humanist martyrs – even though these were the
people who had invented the most totalitarian, impersonal, collectivist, doctrinaire,
mechanistic and dehumanized art in history. And they sold
Abstractionism in America
under this libertarian label. The Institutional Revolutionary Art Party
establishment has ever since then nurtured this myth of the abstract
artists as brave voices for human liberty in dark repressive times.
This is partly because a new generation of American abstractionists in
the 1940’s saw European abstract painting as a technically
liberating relief from the constricting schools of provincial realism
and social realism that dominated America (an enormous paradox, since
this social realism in fact represented the humanist and democratic
traditions of reverence for the humblest human lives, something going
back to the paintings of peasants and workers by Courbet and Millais,
and before them to Dutch genre painting.) When these American abstract
artists such as Pollock and Rothko (re-exporting what they had learned
from the German Bauhaus refugees) exhibited in Europe
after the war and were hailed as the new mainstream of world art, this
was the subtext – that this style represented American “liberty”. In
fact recent research has suggested they were heavily backed in pushing
this libertarian myth by the CIA and the State Department of George
Kennan. The CIA saw apolitical abstract art as a way of countering the
political, social realist art of the post-war European left, which was
raising its head again.64 This new group of American
painters called themselves “Abstract Expressionists” and claimed to be
expressing personal emotions through abstract art. It is through what
amounts to a political con trick that Abstractionism – in its origins a
totalitarian negation of nature, emotion and the human personality in
order to glorify the machine, geometry and mechanical precision – came to be seen as symbolizing freedom
of expression and humanist values. It is the most extraordinary
distortion of the sense of an art movement that has ever occurred.
16) THE PARADOX: ABSTRACTION AS EMOTION
How
was this confidence trick – the selling of impersonal, mechanical,
totalitarian Abstractionism as emotional expression and liberty –
brought off? One of the ways in which this swindle was managed was
through a process of gross sentimentalization – by reading into
art-works emotions that are simply not there, or rather allowing
artists to pretend these emotions are there, and attempting to see them
by charitable auto-suggestion. This has been greatly helped by the
shifting of the centre of gravity of American art to the universities
and academic art schools. Academia came into existence and owes its
whole livelihood to reading into works things that are not there. The
origin of academia, if we may make a short digression, lies in the
interpretation of Scriptures. The Jewish and Christian scholars of the
Middle Ages both had a problem. They were sophisticated minds who had
inherited a book full of stories about a primitive desert tribe, which
were brutal, barbaric and for the most part devoid of any moral
sense. Yet this book, they were bound to believe, was the word of God.
It could clearly only be seen as the word of God through a symbolic,
allegorical interpretation of these barbaric stories until they meant
something quite different. Profound moral and philosophical ideas had
to be read into these primitive folk tales of tribal slaughter,
fratricide and adultery if they were to be given the smallest semblance
of divine inspiration. Both Jewish and Christian scholars thus
perfected an allegorical system of interpreting sacred scriptures, with
an impressive number of levels of symbolic meaning. As secularism
advanced, they then applied this approach to literature. From the 19th
century onward Shakespeare was analysed as deeply as the Bible – and
rival approaches to the reading of Shakespeare became the foundations of new schools of criticism. The academics’ need to have grist for their
interpretative mill had a deep effect on 20th century
writers like Eliot and Joyce. They began writing allusive and arcane
works with academic interpreters in mind (just as God apparently wrote
the bible with the scholastics in mind.) Eliot even added scholarly
footnotes to his poems to help out the academics. Now this academic
apparatus of elaborate symbolic interpretation came to the rescue of abstract art
in America
in the mid-century. Instead of being seen as the sterile, life-denying
nihilism it really was, this art began to be seen as an economical
expression of profound humanistic truths. It became possible to build a
whole philosophical vision on a line down the middle of an otherwise
monochrome painting. Barnett Newman’s “zip paintings”, a line of one
colour down a canvas of another colour, came to be seen as expressing
ideas such as atonement, the reconciliation of opposites, the ineffable
mystery of oneness out of duality (rather like the Trinity), or the
existential tragedy of a solitary being faced with the void. This might
seem rather a lot of meaning to be carried by one straight line down a
canvas, but the academics were satisfied: this was profoundly
humanistic, emotional and spiritual art.
But
the self-delusion soon went beyond even what the academics could
swallow. Mark Rothko, the neurotic and obsessive perpetrator of large
oblong slabs of two different colours, one above the other, claimed
that these works expressed profound emotions and spiritual experiences
– tragedy, ecstasy, destiny, mortality. His earlier work had shown an
interest in the Greek myths, notably as told by Aeschylus, whose
characters appeared sketchily in some of his paintings. After he went
entirely abstract in the 1940’s, he still insisted that the subject was
the most important thing in a work, not the form, even though it became
increasingly difficult to discern what the subject was. He denied to
the end that he was an abstract painter, and insisted that if all a
critic could see in his work was the relation of colours to each other,
then he was missing the essential part. He claimed that some spectators
burst into tears at the sight of his paintings, so they must clearly
have understood their spiritual depth. But it is doubtful if these
emotional reactions are more than simply the effect on the mood of
certain colours, especially painted on a huge scale and seen from close
up. Rothko’s paintings are like mood music which envelops the viewer,
and some of the dark ones can be profoundly depressing, and the bright
ones exhilarating. The power of a single colour, or of blankness
itself, to induce mood change, depression or even illumination is
well-known – and attested by the age-old use of the blank walls of
monks’ cells as an aid to meditation. But is it true, as his admirers
claim, that one can penetrate into these works and go for a walk inside
them? There seem to be too few features to encourage the sensation of
entering into a landscape, unless one is already stoned on a
psychedelic substance. In short, the abstract expressionists
increasingly found themselves laying claim to the expression of
emotions and spiritual meaning which even the academic critics, with
the best will in the world, had difficulty seeing in their work.
17) FORMALISM
The
great problem when abstract blocks of paint are said to embody a
spiritual vision is that this remains a totally subjective
interpretation. It depends entirely on the baggage you bring to the
painting rather than what it intrinsically contains. To claim that a
Leonardo painting of the Annunciation embodies spiritual values is
plausible, because the very subject is clearly spiritual. But when
Brice Marden used the title “Annunciation” for a series of abstract
blocks of various shades of grey, he was trying to import spiritual
associations into a work which did not generate these associations by
itself. He could equally well have called these paintings “The Trojan
War” or “Dusk in the Garden of Eden” and people would have accepted
those titles with the same credulity. When paintings have no content
one can pour into them whatever content one chooses. You can call them
a study in chromatic shading or a vision of the apocalypse, and no one
can challenge your view. One of the private jokes of painters for the
past hundred and fifty years has been their titles. Whistler called the
portrait of his mother “Arrangement in Grey and Black”. Marden might
with equal humour have called his grey squares “Whistler’s Mother”. The
inability to distinguish clearly what, if anything, was the subject of
abstract art, or whether it had any emotional or intellectual or
spiritual content at all, led to a trend in the 1960’s away from any
discussion of spiritual meaning. Instead there was to be a
concentration on the purely formal aspects of art.
The
influential critic Clement Greenberg had already formulated this idea
in an early essay: “Content is to be dissolved so completely into form
that the work of art or literature cannot be reduced in whole or part
to anything not itself….. subject matter or content becomes something
to be avoided like the plague.” 65 A painting was hence to
be reduced merely to pigment, the shape of the canvas and its
inevitable flatness. The abstract expressionist work of Barnett Newman
(despite his own claims to profound spiritual meaning) is described by
Greenberg as an “exploration of the tensions between different light
values of the same colour and between different colours of the same
light value.” His significance as a painter is that he “has enlarged
our sense of the capacities of colour." 66 While this seems
rather less far-fetched than the waffle about atonement and ineffable
dualism that Newman himself favoured, it does raise the question of why
anyone should actually bother painting at all, or what these paintings
bring to anybody else. One can hardly feel any emotional thrill from a
recognition of “different light values”. This is a return to a purely
technical conception of art that we saw already in the Bauhaus, where
form was reduced to arithmetic and specifically denied any aesthetic
value. Above all it is a focus upon a formal aspect of art that is
appreciated only by visual artists themselves, or those with a
similarly heightened sensibility to colour or form.
18) CONCEPTUAL ART
This
formalism consecrated the dominance of Minimalism, which as the name
suggests, meant doing as little as possible. One stripe down a canvas
seemed effort enough to these painters. That already appeared to be an
over-statement, and some preferred to eliminate any paint at all, or
merely slash the canvas with the odd razor cut, like Fontana.
The trouble is when you have reduced painting to its simplest form, a
blank or monochrome canvas, there seems little else to do with this
medium. After minimalism had reduced itself almost to invisibility
(disappeared up its own arsehole, so to speak), there was a logical
move away from painting and towards three-dimensional objects again
(exactly as there had been fifty years earlier with the
Constructivists.) The ready-made or “found object” of Marcel Duchamp –
that hoax-artist turned charlatan who exhibited a urinal found in a
junk-yard back at the beginning of the century – came into its own. So
did a form of “sculpture” which consisted in manufacturing objects to
order in a factory workshop. Donald Judd’s manufactured boxes are a
prime example, though we also had shelves (very popular perhaps because
of their mural quality, like paintings that jut out) and of course
things that lie on the floor: metal squares, rows of bricks, cloths,
tarpaulins, blankets, or the giant dog-turds of Joseph Beuys which he
entitled “The End of the Twentieth Century”. We have then the vacuity
of installation art of the Britpop artists : pickled
sheep, pickled fish, a dirty bed, lumps of used chewing gum, a crumpled
sheet of paper, culminating in the supreme inanity, an empty room with
“The Lights Going On and Off”– rewarded, as every supreme inanity must
be, by the Turner Prize, the ultimate accolade of The Institutional
Revolutionary Art Party for Mindlessness Beyond the Call of Duty.
What
is interesting in this regression of art into trivial, incompetent,
meaningless babble, is the persistence of the myth of progress in art,
so dear to the hearts of the fossilized Institutional Revolutionary Art
Party. Here is one of its critical spokesmen, the Britpop artist
Matthew Collings, on Donald Judd: “All this certainly looked different
to the old idea of sculpture but it only looked different because Judd
wanted to advance sculpture, or advance art, and make it better.”67
Exactly how Judd’s metal boxes were an advance on Michelangelo or Rodin
is something Collings does not reveal to us. He goes on:
Judd’s
mystery was just the mystery of any sculpture – the negative and
positive space of the sculptural experience. Except with him negative
space was massively foregrounded. It was almost positive negative
space. All sculptures by Michelangelo and Bernini articulate the space
around them because that is the nature of any three dimensional object.
But with them we don’t care about all that. It would be boring or
perverse or tediously academic to discuss them in that way. But with
minimalist boxes negative space was unavoidable. It was bouncing off
the Minimalist box’s metal plates like crazy …. Nothingness was never
so maximalized as it was with Minimalism. 68
Here,
despite the smart-alec style of self-conscious 90’s smirking
tongue-in-cheek trendiness, we have an interesting point made, perhaps
inadvertently. Negative space – the interaction of the object’s planes
with the emptiness around it – does not concern us in Michelangelo’s or
Bernini’s work because there are other more important things going on
in it. In Minimalist art nothing else is going on. We have to look at
the spatial relationship of the object with the air around it because
it presents us with nothing else. A friend of mine used to say, when we
found ourselves in a particularly dead bar or club late at night:
“There’s nothing going on here except the rent.” Imagine one goes into
an empty house where nothing is going on except the rent. We become
acutely conscious that the rent is being paid hour by hour for this
empty house because nothing else is happening there. The rent being
paid becomes a palpable presence only because of the absence of
anything else. I recommend this to any installation artist feeling
short of ideas as the next step after “The Empty Room with the Lights
Going On and Off” – “The Empty Room with the Rent Being Paid” (you’ll
save on electricity and you can even present this as an anti-capitalist
protest.) In other words we can give a pseudo-significance to the mere
existence of a thing by removing every characteristic from it, thus
focusing attention merely on its existence. But the question then
becomes : why should we bother giving our attention to that mere
existence? If the object is not inherently interesting, who cares if it
exists or not, or how it relates to what is around it? If, as Manzoni
claimed, “A picture has value in that it exists; there is no need to
say anything; being is all that matters”, then no picture is better
than any other; my doodle on the page is as good as the Mona Lisa. If
mere existence is what gives value, then everything that exists has the
same value. Every object is art and no object is art. And here we get
to the crux of the whole late modernist experiment in elimination.
This
is the determination to have art stripped of content, stripped of what
are thought to be the inessentials (narrative in literature, melody in
music, representation in painting or sculpture) because these distract
us from some essence of art which is bound up in the apprehension of a
purely technical, formal relationship: the relationship of object to
empty space, of sound to silence, or of one colour to another, one
plane to another, one note to another, one word to another – without
containing any images, ideas, emotions or life experiences which will
interfere with this purely technical apprehension. But the problem is
that the pure apprehension of this technical relationship can only be
done once and then becomes utterly repetitive and uninteresting.
Because it has no content it cannot be varied, the way portraits can be
varied because the face is different each time. How many times can we
rhapsodize over the relationship of a flat plane to the space around
it, without the plane being intrinsically interesting? It is a blind
alley. This is where all late modernist art (beyond the generation of
Picasso and Stravinsky) has quite simply gone wrong. This focus on a
technical or formal relationship between the work and what is outside
the work amounts to focusing on the grammar of a language rather than
on what the language is trying to convey. And grammar is sterile: if
there is nothing conveyed by it, it is inherently uninteresting. And it
is essentially the same in every work. If the work is stripped of
content, it is like a statement without meaning, whose only possible
meaning is its grammatical structure. It is as if one were to write a
poem merely as an exercise in the present perfect tense, with all its
words and sentences utterly meaningless. If a poet insisted that the
main focus of his work was the grammatical tense being used, and that
people should not look for meaning in it beyond the grammar of the
tenses, we would dismiss him as a fool. But artists
in the visual arts have been doing this for three generations and are
taken by the art establishment for profound and serious innovators.
Such is the peculiar mystique and mumbo-jumbo attached to the visual
arts among those who do not have a visual artist’s sensibility that
they are afraid to denounce the utterly trivial nature of concepts such
as “negative space”. The sensitivity to space is mythified as if it
were something infinitely more mysterious than the equivalent of a
writer’s sensitivity to grammar or a poet’s sensitivity to the sound of
various consonants. The entire abstraction-minimalist-conceptualist art
movement may be summed up as the substitution of grammar for meaning.
As
they went down this blind alley, certain artists began to imagine that
they were philosophers, on the brink of some profound break-through in
consciousness. Before he began canning his shit, Manzoni was already
writing shit. Not only did he write the supreme inanity: “A
picture has value in that it exists; there is no need to say anything;
being is all that matters” – which makes your childhood watercolours,
dear reader, as valuable as a Constable. 69 He also claimed
that his aim was “a totally white – or rather totally colourless –
surface removed from all pictorial phenomena – a white which is in no
sense a polar landscape, an evocation or even merely a beautiful
material, a sensation or a symbol, or anything else of the kind; a
white surface which is a white surface and nothing else…. being.” 70
Manzoni evidently imagined that he was grappling with a completely
original, almost mystical idea, and the academic groupies of Modernism
take him at his word. He was in fact repeating a banality which had
been around since the Constructivists, and had been carried out again
by Rauschenberg nine years before his statement. This illustrates that
most artists when they venture into the realm of ideas and concepts
have no knowledge of what has gone before them, or of how tiresome,
jaded and hackneyed their ideas are. Their audience of fame groupies
frequently have no idea either, and listen open-mouthed to a string of
stale, fifty-year old clichés. When you refuse to learn about the past,
you fail to learn what a hoary old chestnut your supposedly original
idea is. This idea was a stupid one when it was first put forward and
it hasn’t gained by repetition. If stripping a painting down to its
minimum, in order to be left with “pure being”, makes it a work of art,
then we can produce works of art not just by the score but by the
million. Rauschenberg’s plain white canvases painted with rollers in
house-paint can in fact be produced on an industrial scale and sold in
supermarkets for ten dollars apiece. Nothing would distinguish these
manufactured works from Rauschenberg’s – since he himself refused to
put any personal expression into the work, as a matter of principle.
Manzoni, in proposing to paint “pure being”, does not seem to grasp
that he is proposing to strip art of whatever it is that makes it art,
and separates it from a mass-manufactured product. But in this he is
only part of a long, long Modernist tradition where ignorance,
stupidity or perverseness masquerade as originality.
The
problem is that most painters are not philosophers; they are manual
people who generally have only the vaguest and most muddled
acquaintance with the history of ideas, or even the history of art.
Manzoni here is coming close to a philosophical idea, but being
semi-literate he gets the wrong end of the stick. The aim of an artist
may well be to focus attention on what Gerard Manley Hopkins called the
“whatness” of an object, the mystery of its unique identity in the
world. This is what a good deal of traditional painting has always
tried to do. Among painters who have excelled in this spiritual gift of
making us feel the unique existence, the “whatness”, perhaps the tragic
fleetingness of the scene depicted, are Pieter De Hooch, Van Gogh,
Alfred Sisley, and Edward Hopper. But you can direct attention to the
unique existence of the object or scene only by making it unique – that
is, full of particular characteristics. To try to obtain this sense of
uniqueness from a painting which you deprive of any particular
characteristics by leaving it blank is a foolish and self-defeating
enterprise. If you deny it content you deny it uniqueness, so how can
this be a way of concentrating our attention on its uniqueness as an
object? If any empty canvas has some profound existential meaning
merely because of its emptiness, then we will simply hang blank
canvases in their thousand. They would all have equal value as unique
existential objects and therefore as art-works. This is virtually what
Rauschenberg did, and it was a profoundly silly act. If you want to
emphasize the object-in-itself aspect of a painting, then you must make
it unique – not make it identical to hundreds of others.
The
great problem with artists is that most of them (with some spectacular
exceptions) are intellectually stupid. The triumph of Renaissance art
owes much to the fact that the artists were told what to create by men
with better brains than them – the Popes and Cardinals and Dukes, who
were interested in the treatment of a certain number of traditional
religious or mythological themes, or the celebration of battles or
coronations. This intellectual constraint upon artists, their lack of
freedom to think for themselves, produced the greatest art of all time.
It is a mistake to expect visual artists to be thinkers. They are at
their best when they bring a personal emotion or spiritual vision to a
traditional subject imposed upon them. The very idea of “conceptual
art” is placing a burden of intellectual originality on artists which
they cannot carry. If they were serious about an art of “concepts” then
their education should be in philosophy and the history of ideas, not
in art.
Abstractionism
(and its derivative, conceptual art) is therefore at root a
philosophical error, a mad heresy, which affected all the arts to some
extent in the 20th century, but which some arts (those
subject to the market and the choice of the customer, such as
literature and popular music) managed to fight off and sideline.
Abstractionism is a nihilistic revolutionary impulse to eliminate human
emotion, to eliminate personality, to reduce every art to some
quintessential pure form devoid of any subject matter or any vision of
life. It is an attempt to have the soul of art without the body, to
have the Cheshire cat’s smile without the Cheshire cat. To eliminate
narrative from literature, representation from painting and melody from
music was thought to be a liberation from the heavy bodily forms of art
so that some pure quintessence would remain. But the fact is once we
have emptied all content out of a work, nothing remains except the
bullshit of the artist. His bullshit becomes essential to tell us what
this emptiness is supposed to be about. So we get a kind of verbal
commentary by the artist (usually of staggering banality) as a
substitute for any presentation of an idea in the work itself. And
because most of these people are poorly educated and conceptually
semi-literate, the muddled and cranky ideas they come up with are
merely embarrassing. Many of them find it impossible to articulate any
idea at all that their bizarre installation is supposed to embody. Most
of them can’t even think of a name for their work: the ubiquitous
“Untitled” is a euphemism for “Dunno what it is” or “You tell me.”
Increasingly they and the museum curators fall back on the same stock
verbal commentary as a blanket explanation of every work. The artist is
trying to make us think: “What is art? What is it for? What are the
limits of art? How much can be eliminated and still have something we
can call art?” But the problem with this stock verbal commentary is
that it has now become so hackneyed it is a cliché. Contemporary
installation art has become kitsch – kitsch being defined as a work
that provokes a stock response which we have already been programmed
with in advance. The fact that Victorian kitsch involved a stock
response of pity for small children alone on the moors and our kitsch
involves the endlessly repeated questions: “what is art? what are its
limits?” does not make our kitsch any less kitsch than theirs. Both are
dealing in stock responses. We see a fish in
formaldehyde: “Yes, very interesting, makes you think: what is art,
what are its limits, doesn’t it?” We see a crumpled sheet of paper:
“Yes, very interesting, makes you think, doesn’t it, what is art, what
are its limits?” We see a can of shit: “Yes, very interesting, so
original, makes you ask yourself: what is art, what are its limits?”
How many more times can the question be asked? How many more times are
we going to be expected to think deeply about the limits of art? Now
that this has been done and done to death, can’t we move on?
But
we can’t move on. Because this is a movement in the final stages of
exhaustion and there is nowhere else for it to move on to. It has
painted itself (if one might still use that obsolete term) into a
corner. The generation of 90’s conceptual artists are the spoilt brats
of a revolution ensconced in absolute power for fifty years. It has
derided all past traditions of skill and technique as obsolete and
“over” and encouraged them to exercise their most absurd caprices and
anarchic impulses as the only true wellspring of art. They have been
taught to look down on the first modernist generation, who remained
figurative artists – Matisse, Picasso, and Dali – as incomplete
revolutionaries whom they have now surpassed. The fact that these three
great early Modernists had actually learnt how to draw and paint, that
they were not intimidated by a Velasquez or a Goya because they could
knock off an imitation of one without too much trouble – that they had
in some sense earned the right to clown about with the great tradition
of art because they had mastered it – is a point that seems to be lost
on their arrogant successors. The new conceptual artists, pig ignorant,
untaught and technically incompetent, think that all they need to do is
clown. The great tradition of art is a closed book to them. They have
been told by their teachers that it is not important, all of that is
finished now, because there is “no sense in repeating the past” (as if
Rembrandt was a mere repetition of Rafael, Renoir a repetition of
Rembrandt, and Hopper a repetition of Renoir.) Their mission is to
rebel against the past, to “change the way art is made”. But the
absence of any technical skill to actually create art of any kind has
somewhat handicapped them in that ambition. Since art is now a question
of finding an object or objects ready-made, or commissioning someone
else to build an installation, the only criterion of creativity is the
originality of the concept. And like every obsessive quest for
originality of ideas, particularly when undertaken by people who are
half-educated and conceptually limited, it degenerates quickly into the
eccentric, the cranky, the pointless, the trivial, the banal, the
repetitive, the perverse, the neurotic, the obscene and the downright
mad. But there is no way back for this movement because this generation
of artists no longer have the technical skills to do anything else.
They must persist in trying to grapple with ideas because ideas are
easier to fake than brushstrokes – even though they have no more been
trained to handle ideas than they have been trained to handle a
paintbrush. They have been persuaded that art is a kind of zen, a
matter of finding by a brilliant flash of inspiration a particular
absurdity (lumps of used chewing gum, a crumpled sheet of paper, a
coathook) which has a mysterious zany significance, even though nobody
quite knows what it is. Now zen is in fact a technique of cultivated
absurdity aimed at breaking down logic so that the way is clear for
non-rational enlightenment. Thus when asked what Buddha is, one monk
replies “three pounds of flax.” This is considered a good answer
because it is absurd, it blocks rational thought and this may trigger a
sudden mystic illumination. But there is no illumination in modern art.
The absurdity is perpetrated as if it really had an obscure, esoteric
meaning which we should try to work out. Various waffling explanations
are put forward (“he is trying to demonstrate the limits of art.”)
Conceptual art is zen for half-wits. It is for people who don’t
understand what zen is about. It is a cultivation of absurdity under
the illusion that it has a meaning. And “zen for half-wits” sums up the
entire teaching philosophy of the trendiest art colleges for the past
thirty years.
Along with the cultivation of a brilliant flash of absurdity, the other key concept in this kind of art is that of “revolt”.
The only thing many of the graduates of these art schools can grasp is
the simple idea that they must express revolt. Revolt has become for
them a reflex, a compulsive gesture, like the twitches of a dying
animal. Revolt against whom, revolt against what? Revolt against the
art of the past? It has been going on for a hundred years now and has
become somewhat dated. Revolt against Society? But what do they mean by
Society? The government bureaucracy that pays for their exhibitions?
The capitalists whom they hope will buy their work at absurdly inflated
prices? The older generation middle class that still finds the crude
depiction of sexual perversions and excretion offensive? The art
establishment which rewards their inanities? Who or what is the object
of this revolt, what cause does it serve? There is no answer. This is
revolt as instinctive gesture, as expression of self-assertion, of
contempt for the world. The insult, the spit in the face is the new
form of self-affirmation, the way of making a statement. This is part
of the culture of rudeness and casual aggression of contemporary urban Britain.
In the rap music world this aggressiveness is called “having attitude”
and is associated with violent street thugs. It is no longer linked to
any theory of art: it is like a public belch, a two fingered salute, a
punch in the face, a kick in the guts of an old lady on the street. It
is part of the new cult of irrational violence, rudeness and aggression
which is now the hallmark of a certain fashionable attitude to life.
And the dropping of loads of rubbish (literally, half a ton of twisted
bits of old metal or rubble) in a public space is now the standard form
of aggression against the public. “This is what I think of you: I’m
going to dump my rubbish in your space.” Art has become large-scale
littering, an assertion of contempt for the simplest rules of any
society: don’t litter, and don’t crap on the pavement. Whole rooms of
the trendy Saatchi Gallery last time I checked were literally rubbish tips, filled wall to
wall with garbage from skips. Given this official consecration of
massive littering as art, it is not surprising that London now has the filthiest streets of any capital in Europe.
19) ART AS HOAX
In
this context the word charlatan becomes inadequate. The word hoax loses
any meaning. Most art is now hoax. It is meant as a joke, but nobody
laughs. The original hoax of Marcel Duchamp’s found urinal was taken
seriously by the art world, so the artist, at first sheepish and
tongue-in-cheek, began to take it seriously too and play along with the
whole game. Even if he admitted he was a hoaxer, what difference would
it make? It would merely be seen as one more insult and outrage in a
cult of insult and outrage. It would increase his kudos even further.
So Duchamp gradually became the most cynical exploiter of the
gullibility of the arty crowd ever known. He used to instruct his
sister to buy certain cheap objects in junk shops and sign them with
his name so that he could sell them as his “ready-mades”. But these
were not meant as jokes. These ready-made “works of art” were meant as
statements. Obscure statements, statements imbued with a kind of zen
for half-wits, which the arty crowd then tried to interpret and
“understand”. His random ready-made objects, found mostly in junk shops
– a snow shovel, a typewriter cover, a bicycle wheel, a coathook – were
touted as significant statements, symbols of the time, embodying deep
meanings to be puzzled over by the cognoscenti. He created a female
persona, Rrose Sélavy (a schoolboyish pun on Eros c’est la vie),
by being photographed in drag, and the academic groupies began waffling
on about the profound theme of androgyny, transvestism and gender
change in Duchamp. The entire interaction of Duchamp with his
frivolous, fashionable, arty, pseudo-intellectual admirers was that of
a bored con-man with his dupes.
The
trouble is when parody becomes standard, when hoax becomes the norm,
then the power of genuine protest and parody against what is happening
is lost. It becomes absorbed into the thing itself. How do you revolt
against a system of institutionalized revolt? A group of students of a
leading London art school decided a few years ago to spend the money
allotted for their end-of-year art projects on a short holiday in
Greece, and present it to their professors as a piece of action art.
And why not? If Duchamp’s found urinal or coat-hook is a work of art,
then why not my found postcard of a windmill on Mykonos?
Why not my video of a shag on the beach? Even this send-up did not
shame the Institutional Revolutionary Art Party into a sense of their
own absurdity. Within a year they were admiring as art a sheet of A4
paper torn in little bits and placed in an envelope. This is the same
“zen for half-wits” that Duchamp was practising over eighty years ago
and it is still taught as the latest thing, the only way of ensuring
art “does not repeat the past”. A crumpled sheet of paper on a plinth
was then short-listed for the Turner Prize. The next year the same
“artist’s” “Empty Room with the Lights Going On and Off” actually won
the Turner prize. These people are beyond shame, beyond parody, beyond
laughter. Like Haile Selasse’s court, with courtiers vying to be peed
on by the royal poodle, like the convoluted paranoia of Stalin’s last
years, the IRAP is in a realm where absurdity can no longer be
apprehended as a concept. This is because absurdity is the very product
being sold. How can anything be too absurd when absurdity is the stock
in trade? And having created a world of madness, the IRAP then pretends
that this world of madness is the objective reality of the age, which
their own mad works are merely faithfully reflecting. If the art
museums of the world are full of the crazed gesticulations of buffoons,
how can you go back to landscapes and portraits – how can that reflect
the mad reality of the times? In such an atmosphere even an artist’s
most extreme protest against what is going on becomes merely part of
it. Piero Manzoni in the 1960’s was egged on by the credulity of the
art world after his blank white canvases to come up with one grotesque
stunt after another. He signed women’s bodies as art-works, and finally
canned his own shit. Even this was not too much for the art world dupes
to swallow. Manzoni’s cans of shit now fetch £30,000 a piece on the London art market and are bought with public money by state museums in Britain.
Who can tell at what point complicity with the joke-world and
hoax-world of modernist art turns into impotent rage at the sheer
trivialization of the artist’s role into that of buffoon? One is
reminded of a small boy desperately trying to provoke the disapproval
of his parents, to scandalize and shock them in order to reach at last
the limits of the permissible, and encountering instead an infinite
indulgence of all his idiotic caprices, which only makes him more
enraged, more impotent, and more lunatic in his aberrations. The
behaviour of artists today is essentially that of adolescent despots
like Caligula – spoilt brats who have been given absolute power to
impose their inanities and caprices on the world, and are provoked by
the frustration and boredom caused by absolute liberty to go to more
and more demented extremes.
The
disappearance of any effective training in the technical skills of
painting and sculpture is the most serious threat to the future of art
that has ever occurred. Age-old painting skills that have been handed
down for generations are being lost forever, because those that have
them no longer hold teaching positions in art schools but are
marginalized outsiders and will soon all be dead. But the disappearance
of the discipline of learning is itself a tragic loss. For the learning
of any physical skill to a high level, whether ballet-dancing,
piano-playing, karate or painting, is a form of mental and physical
discipline which has a spiritual effect. Karate instructors take it for
granted that the total mastery of the skill will result in a
psychological process of maturing which will make the adept less
mindlessly aggressive. Any quest for absolute perfection in a very
difficult skill matures, renders more humane and increases respect for
others. This is because it teaches humility, as the adept must
constantly measure himself against better masters and learn every day
how far he has to go. Now training in the skills of painting, learning
to reproduce exactly the effects of sunlight on cloud or water, to
reproduce the folds of clothes, or the wrinkles around the eyes of a
sitter, teaches, in a similar way, humility and discipline, and respect
for the craft. And this has a maturing effect on the mind, a moral
effect on the spirit, which leads to a more humane and broader vision
of life. Nihilism is rare in an artist who has passed through this
process, in the same way that mindless aggression is rare in a third
dan karate black belt. It is the abandonment of any serious technical
training of artists which reaffirms the cult of nihilism and mindless
revolt among them. The dropping of heaps of rubbish in an art gallery
as a “statement” is the action of minds that have never actually been
taught anything. They have been told instead that their very ignorance
is necessary to the spontaneity of true creativity. And their lack of
spiritual maturity, which can be achieved only through the rigorous
discipline of the learning process, has given them a permanently
jaundiced, twisted and hate-filled view of life (and a permanent
inferiority complex about their lack of skill, which leads them to rage
against the painters of former ages as belonging to the dustbin of
history.) And this jaundiced world-view is reflected in the squalor,
ugliness and perverseness of most of their “works”.
What
has accelerated the decay of the visual arts is the peculiar
relationship of these artists with the public, which is very different
from that of novelists, playwrights, songwriters or musical performers.
The latter are in a direct commercial relationship with their audience.
The public are their clients, who pay for their work, consecrate
several hours of their time to listening to it or reading it, and the
artist must win them over, entertain them, give them a moment of joy,
emotion, or insight into life, or they will simply not bother wasting
their time or money on it. The visual artists are not in a relationship
where they must win their audience over. Their work is selected not by
the public but by the academics of the Institutional Revolutionary Art
Party, to be exhibited in publicly funded galleries like the Tate,
which cost nothing to visit and where the public has no way of
expressing its opinions. The artists’ attitude to their audience is
thus one of open contempt for a herd of ignorant Philistines who must
make an effort to comprehend the ineffable mysteries being placed
before them. Since it is not the judgement of the public which pays
their rent, but the judgement of the commissars of the Institutional
Revolutionary Art Party, these are the ones whose taste must be
flattered. It is the art professors, curators of museums and galleries,
art council bureaucrats and critical “experts”, who organize the
exhibitions and award the prizes, whose approval is the artists’
passport to success. In many cases the IRAP
commissars (all in the same incestuous little network) will themselves
buy their work for a state gallery. Having selected the works that best
embody the esoteric precepts of the sect, they exhibit them and give
them prizes, and then use their own awards as objective evidence of the
“importance” of these works and buy them with public money for state
collections. In other cases, the praise of these “experts” will lead
some gullible ignorant businessman to pay a fortune for a hideous piece
of junk which he would never think of buying if he were not assured by
the experts that it will appreciate in value. And of course it will
appreciate in value, for a certain length of time, because the IRAP
commissars will keep praising it as a work of immense importance. This
will allow their friend the buyer to unload it at the peak of its value
on a more gullible fool than himself – before its creator, the artistic
genius of the moment, sinks back into obscurity and the price
collapses. The modern art market is the biggest rigged con market in
history. If these people were dealing in any other commodity in the
same way, they would all be in prison. But because value in art can be
manipulated by mere words, and lies and insincerity cannot be proved,
they get away with it. Nobody has ever been sued for saying that a
piece of old junk found in a skip – a urinal, a coathook, an old shoe –
is a masterpiece. They have managed to impose their insane world-view
even on the law.
The
relationship between the artist and the IRAP commissars is therefore
the key to the success of the artist. That relationship is inevitably
one of abject dependence. But in order to please the IRAP commissars
the artists must paradoxically shock and disgust the public. In order
to conform with IRAP dogma, they must “rebel” against “Society” and
despise the very people coming to look at their work. This is the one
art form where the artists still view their public not as a collection
of individual human beings to be won over, to be communicated with, but
as that monster “Society” – an abstract ideological enemy, an object of
hatred of the pseudo-Marxist imagination. Now the IRAP commissars of
course agree with their pupils’ hatred of Society. They are after all
the ones who inculcated it, who established it as an axiom of modern
art that Society is wicked, Philistine and ignorant, because it is
paying their salaries, but isn’t paying them as much as they deserve.
The IRAP cadres are thus the judges as to which expression of spite,
hatred, triviality, viciousness or obscenity is the most appropriate
way of insulting Society this month – a room full of garbage from a
skip, a turd on a pedestal, a cartoon of child
sodomy, or a close-up video of the artist’s genitals. They give the
impression that their role is that of a sort of social worker, pleading
for understanding of their unruly charges, standing between vicious
delinquents and a court which would dearly like to flog them. But in
reality they are the Fagins that have set these criminals on. They have
carefully nurtured a generation of psychotic vandals, whom they have
brainwashed with hatred of Society, and they then award prizes (paid
for out of tax-payers’ money) for the most original expression of
anti-social viciousness that their charges can come up with. The pupils
are thus licking the boots of their teachers, the IRAP commissars, even
as they posture histrionically as “rebels against Society”. This
contradiction – their revolt is what will be rewarded, they flatter
their teachers by producing anti-social junk – is what makes them all
psychotic. They are like children both provoked and confused by the
rewarding of their delinquency. (It is not too much to compare them to
the child captives of a paedophile ring, rewarded for their
perversions.) And their perpetual childish dependence on their teachers
accounts for the childishness of their revolt: can you think of
anything more school-boyish than a crumpled sheet of A4 paper offered
as a work of art? It is a fourth form prank, the blank exam paper
offered sheepishly to an indulgent master. The artist is a little
uncertain whether this particular hoax will fall within the category of
permitted and encouraged hoaxes, or is going a bit far. Will the nice
indulgent teacher defend him against the wicked board of governors (the
press, Society) who expect something intelligent for their money? Yes,
he will, because this gives the nice teacher the chance to thumb his
nose at the board of governors: “See, we’re still producing rubbish
with your money and there’s nothing you can do about it. We have the
academic jargon to defend this rubbish in respectable terms. And no
court will back you in calling us charlatans and frauds, even though
everyone knows we are. So up yours, suckers!”
The
art schools are the last bastion of the arrogant, pseudo-revolutionary,
neo-Marxist disease that has long infected Western academia. All over
the West we are finally beginning to get rid of the
Marxist cranks from the economics and political science departments.
They are incrusted in the art schools like gangrene. From their ivory
tower they stare out a Society still seen in the lurid terms of Zola or
Marx : a sink of hypocrisy, vulgarity and Philistinism which they must
insult, condemn, ridicule and degrade in every way possible. If they
could piss millions of gallons from the windows of their ivory tower
onto the bourgeois scum below they would. Getting their charges to put
turds on pedestals and forcing these into the art museums of the world
is the next best thing. But it would be a mistake to ascribe any
genuine social concerns, any principled opposition to capitalism, to
these academic scourges of bourgeois taste. They are happy to
manipulate the most corrupt, rigged capitalist market in the world –
the market for modern art. They are the ones who persuade the rich
gulls of this world to pay fortunes for the turds on pedestals, which
they guarantee to keep praising so the investment will appreciate. The
hatred of society characteristic of Marxism is not an ideology but a
pathology, which bears no necessary relation to any notions of social
justice. It is above all the academic’s rage at a society which does
not value enough the sterile, time-wasting masturbation of so many
academic pursuits outside the natural sciences.
The
art academic’s contempt for the ordinary person is partly intellectual
arrogance, on the part of those who believe they possess a specialized
knowledge and taste beyond that of the bourgeois Philistine herd. It is
akin to the contempt the Marxist revolutionaries always felt for the
masses ignorant of the arcane ideological mysteries they had mastered.
But it as also the arrogance of a sect of corrupt manipulators
possessed of far more power and wealth than any other academics.
Because
the contemporary art market is not a mass market, subject to popular
taste (or even the taste of an educated minority), the commissars of
the Institutional Revolutionary Art Party occupy a
dominant position within it. The market for modern art consists either
of themselves (in their function of museum directors, with the power to
spend millions in public money on some obscenity the public despises)
or of a handful of rich buyers who depend on them for advice. The rich
private buyers, who are interested in contemporary art as an investment
or to give themselves social kudos, are usually ignorant of art, and
they need somebody to guide them as to which works among the vast range
of bizarre objects on show will fulfil both purposes – financial
security and fashionable prestige. The IRAP academics are there to help
them. They can therefore use their role in the publicly funded
galleries to do a nice little business manipulating the private market.
It is by means of government-funded exhibitions and prizes that the
cynical commissars of the IRAP launch the careers of new favourites,
whose works they recommend to gullible rich buyers and collectors, on
the promise that the continued praise of the sect will keep up the
price. The modern art market is of course a continual bubble of
artificially inflated reputations – how else can the exhibitors of
dirty sheets or bits of used chewing gum be taken seriously – but they
cannot be sustained forever. The game is to buy and then resell before
the bubble bursts, and the most recent buyer of the work (at a cost of
millions) is left holding a piece of worthless junk found in a skip.
But the same applies of course to the galleries or museums operating
with public money, which also collect these works. They invest millions
of pounds of tax-payers’ money in works which will end up a decade
later hidden with embarrassment in basement storerooms, as the world
moves on from that particular fad. The scandal is that any public money
is available at all for these corrupt cynics to invest in this
ephemeral rubbish.
The
only possible way of saving art today is for all public money to be cut
off, and for modern art museums to be forced to operate as commercial
enterprises, like cinemas. They should be made to present the art that
people will pay money to see, and finance their exhibitions by selling
reproductions and posters. Well-meaning politicians who believe vaguely
that the people have the right to free access to “culture” do not grasp
that this view is restricting rather drastically the kind of culture
people are being given access to. Perhaps people would really like to
see Pietro Annigoni’s genuine modern masterpieces rather than dirty
bedsheets and crumpled bits of paper, but they are not being give the
opportunity under this subsidized system. Ending all subsidies for the
contemporary visual arts and subjecting them to the demands and tastes
of the mass market would lead to an infinitely richer offering in art
than leaving them under the control of a stale revolutionary sect. We
have only to see the relative creative richness of the arts subject to
the mass market, in which millions of individuals exercise choice in
buying a copy of a work – literature, popular music, cinema – and
compare it with the sterility of the subsidized arts (conceptual art
and “serious music”) to see the folly of public money being spent on
the contemporary arts. The subjection of the arts to the mass market
does not mean they become more commercial, conformist or less critical
of society. There has been a lot more intelligent social criticism in
the literature, cinema and popular music of the last fifty years than
in the sterile nihilism of the visual arts. Artists subject to the mass
commercial market, such as Bob Dylan or Ingmar Bergman or Tennessee
Williams or Aldous Huxley, have said far more critical things about our
society than the abstract-conceptual tradition of art throughout the
entire 20th century. Removing all state subsidies for the
visual arts can only strengthen them by diversifying the influences
upon them. As in the political sphere, no matter how debased the
choices of the majority may at times be, they are infinitely preferable
to the dictatorship of a fossilized revolutionary sect.
20) THE SORE ARSE TEST
However
commercial it may sound, the test of the mass market is a valid one
simply because it involves a work passing through many more
sensibilities, tastes and judgements than those of a narrow clique. The
reason why literature, theatre, cinema and pop music have not followed
the path of disintegration of the modern plastic arts is because they
are subject to what we might call the sore arse test. If you are forced
to sit on your arse and watch a play or read a book for two hours, and
if it doesn’t stimulate the brain or emotions attached to that arse,
then the arse becomes sore. It begins to protest and forces you to stop
watching that play or reading that book, no matter how trendy or
fashionable it may be. The arse does not lie. Snobbery cannot persuade
it to pretend to like something that makes it sore. Now there is no
such sore arse test involved with painting and sculpture. People are
not forced to sit and look at Duchamp’s urinal or Hirst’s pickled sheep
or Warhol’s soup can for two hours. Mostly the patrons of modern art
galleries look at the works for only a few seconds. They may find them
banal or silly but they do not resent them. They may end up feeling
vaguely that the whole tour was “interesting” because it has given them
a bit of physical exercise and a chance to check out the crumpet. When
asked, they pretend to like it because it is the done thing. If people
were forced to sit on hard seats and look at art-works for even half an
hour, their arses would soon tell them the difference between the
rubbish and the genuine art. And the rubbish would make them furious,
the way a bad play makes people furious, because it makes their arses
sore.
When
people hiss or boo at the end of a play, or walk out half way through,
their opinion may well lead the management to close the play as a
failure. The frowns and grimaces of the public before a particular
stupidity in a modern art museum are not recorded or taken any notice
of. It is not the done thing to hiss a painting or boo an
“installation” as people do a bad play. If anyone expresses loud
disapproval of a work in a modern art museum, the Institutional
Revolutionary Art Party has conditioned us to think it is because this
person is an ignorant Philistine who does not “understand” modern art.
The other patrons look at him with embarrassment or pity for his
display of artistic illiteracy. Everyone is allowed to express a
negative judgement about a play or a novel or a film, but not about a
painting, sculpture or installation. Implicit approval is obligatory,
if one is to demonstrate that one understands the ineffable mystery of
modern art. And by means of this cult of intellectual snobbery and
mumbo jumbo, the Institutional Revolutionary Art Party has imposed upon
a helpless public a form of art they detest, while persuading them they
have no right or capacity to pass any judgement upon it. This has led
to a vacuum of critical opinion. No work can be disapproved of, and
therefore none can be specially approved either. All shall have prizes.
The whole modern art circus must be bought as a package. We are not
allowed to say that Tracey Emin or Damien Hirst are crap, but that
Anselm Kiefer deserves a place alongside Van Gogh. If we do this we are
being subjective, expressing personal judgements, as if these were
somehow illegitimate. No, we must bow to the whole Institutional
Revolutionary Art Party programme, according to which all these
wonderful artists have their place, they are all equal in paradise, and
Kiefer must be cut down to size by catty remarks about his Teutonic
operatic atmospheres in order to prevent him from casting a shadow over
the others. Then we can put Kiefer’s “The Song of Wayland” and Hirst’s
pickled sheep on the same plane, as two pieces of “significant”
modern art – in a sort of paradise of equals in which Solzhinitsyn’s
“The First Circle” and Grisham’s “The Client” are equally valid and
important cultural artefacts, evoking different aspects of our time.
This is the ultimate fate of modern art: to fade into a collection of
nostalgic kitsch, each piece valued for its sentimental evocation of an
era, rather than judged as an expression of a vision of life, that is,
as a work of art. The most terrifying result of the collective
consecration of all the inanities that call themselves modern art is
the loss of any standards of judgement, the final reduction of all of
them to objects testifying to an epoch, of approximately equal
historical value, and therefore equal artistic value.
21) THE FAILURE OF THE TOTALITARIANS
The
dominance for nearly a century of the Institutional Revolutionary Art
Party shows the extraordinary staying power of entrenched academic
orthodoxies, especially when backed by powerful political currents.
Academia has in many ways the same self-selecting, self-perpetuating
structure as a totalitarian political system. You do not get to be
appointed a professor of art at a major art school, or the curator of a
modern art museum, unless you follow the party line with a convincing
display of enthusiasm. And you will never even get your foot on the
first rung of the ladder if you are spotted as a dissident. This makes
reform from within difficult, as the communists in Russia
discovered. It will require a Gorbachev figure, who has fought his way
to the top while concealing his deep doubts about the reigning
ideology, to dismantle the modern art establishment. Occasionally a
maverick outsider makes it to a prominent position, as when Ivan Massow
became chairman of London’s
Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA) in 2001, and called conceptual art
“pretentious, self-indulgent, craftless tat”, a mixture of con trick
and hype. He denounced Nicolas Serota, director of the Tate, as a
cultural czar “dominating the art scene from his crystal Kremlin,” and
compared his influence to that of the official art of Stalinism. He was
forced to resign two weeks later. 71 There are too many
vested interests in keeping the enormous scam going. Even a
well-established and respected newspaper art critic like Brian Sewell
could say the same thing without any apparent effect:
The
new priesthood, Nicolas Serota and his compliant minions at the Tate
Gallery and the officials of the Arts Council and its many subsidiary
quangos, a closely interwoven group all sitting on each other’s bodies;
their number very small and very powerful; their language deliberately
obscure and often meaningless, their orthodoxy narrow and intolerant,
are now the absolute arbiters of taste and patronage, the experts who
decide what shall be seen and subsidised…72
Instead
of this devastating indictment having any effect, Sewell was simply
caricatured as an old fogy and ignored. The establishment has its
well-oiled defences. They pour scorn on anyone who questions the
ineffable mystery of conceptual art as an outdated reactionary
Philistine, who wants to return to Victorian scenes of grazing cattle
or children lost on the moors. The idea of a return to anything done in
the past (such as learning to paint) is seen as an act of treason
against a progressive faith, a surrender to a diabolical combination of
fascism and Philistinism. Totalitarian regimes, once installed in
power, condition people to believe that the revolution is irreversible.
“Going back” becomes unthinkable. Their chief mission is to eradicate
in people’s minds all nostalgic longing for what existed before. Like
the campaigns of Mao or Castro against bourgeois backsliders, the aim
of the Institutional Revolutionary Art Party is to root out of people’s
minds all sneaking bourgeois sympathies for the works of Monet or Goya
or Titian, and prevent any student ever painting anything remotely like
that again. If they could, the Revolutionary Art Party would burn the
art of the past, as Mao did. Instead they merely prevent talented
artists from exhibiting, while rewarding the twisted perpetrators of
pickled sheep with fortunes like rockstars. And they constantly rub
people’s noses in the fact that the past has gone, that this is now
what art is – piles of bricks and dirty bedsheets and cans of shit, and
you’d better get used to it because that’s all you’re getting from now
on. Every new idiocy or outrage masquerading as art is a new jeering
demonstration that the coffin has been nailed shut on traditional art –
it is a victory dance on the graves of the artists of the past. It is a
rifle-butt in the face of the bourgeois backslider who secretly dreams
that art might still be possible “in the old sense”, as Pound put it.
Abstract-conceptual art exhibitions are essentially propaganda rallies
for the nihilistic totalitarianism of the Revolutionary Art
establishment. They are a way of saying: “We have won and art is dead.”
But
of course art isn’t dead. It has simply been forced underground,
marginalized, or it has gone elsewhere. One or two real artists have
infiltrated the world of the charlatans. Anselm Kiefer is a great
artist in the old tradition. Like Picasso or Matisse he uses some of
the techniques of avant garde art to do what great artists have always
done: to express a profound vision of human existence. His main themes
are the utter devastation of war (“Painting of the Scorched Earth”);
the tragedy of the German nationalist dream (“The Song of Wayland”,
named after the German Icarus whose metal wing lies broken on the
scorched battle-field); the blood-chilling gigantism of the Nazi
temples of human sacrifice (“Sulamith”). He can represent the horrors
mankind has lived through in the 20th century on a scale and
with an intensity of emotion that does them justice. He is, in Matthew
Arnold’s phrase, adequate to the age (in a way Arnold
judged Virgil to be inadequate to his age.) This is a great artist, in
the sense that Bosch or Goya were great artists. And to come across one
of Kiefer’s works in the freak show of the Tate Modern is like going
past a row of cages of shrieking, gesticulating monkeys and suddenly,
through the bars, coming face to face with an Indian sage, whose eyes
look right into your soul. It is a sobering, even a jolting experience.
Kiefer
has managed to break through because he conforms in manner to the
modernist fashion (in the various materials used, the semi-abstraction
of his landscapes and the “roughness” of his brushstrokes), while using
it to do something traditional – express an intensely emotional vision
of life. Other dissident artists are trying simply to return to the
figurative art tradition and the manner of painting of the past, and
ignoring the modernist dogmas. For this they have to overcome half a
century of indoctrination by the IRAP dominated art schools. The
favourite argument of the IRAP commissars is that we “cannot repeat the
art of the past.” This is a peculiar argument for a school of art which
has been repeating Du Champ’s found urinal, found shovel and found
coathook for the past ninety years, and is still fixated with the
monochrome canvas, or the square of one colour, which was first painted
by Malevitch in 1913 and then repeated every two or three decades by,
among others, Rauschenberg, Klein, Manzoni, and Ryman. Abstractionism
and conceptual art are the most repetitive art movements in history.
But more important, what really constitutes “repetition” depends
entirely on how much variation the thing in question admits of. How
many squares of one colour do we need? Similarly, Judd’s metal boxes
have been “done before” and are not worth repeating because they are
not capable of enough variation to inspire a different emotional
response each time. You can vary the boxes in size, shape and colour
but the response will be substantially the same. The portrait, on the
other hand, is capable of infinite variation: every portrait of a
different person inspires a different response. We hardly respond to a
Van Gogh self-portrait as we do to the Mona Lisa. Rembrandt, thank God,
did not consider that the portrait had been “done before” merely
because Titian had already done it. You might argue that Titian did it
better, and as well as it could be done, but who would want to be
without Rembrandt’s portraits on that account?
Convinced
of the silliness of the notion of “not repeating the art of the past”,
painters all over the world, with the stubborn persistence of true
vocation, continue to paint portraits, landscapes, nudes, and still
life studies, in a kind of underground resistance to the dictatorship
of the academic art schools with their cult of zen for half-wits. These
artists are excluded from the publicly-funded galleries controlled by
the sect, but they still persevere. There are a few outposts of
resistance springing up, such as the Portland Gallery in London,
where dissident artists get a showing. Thanks to this kind of exposure,
the wider public has already discovered a number of figurative painters
of talent. Most successful has been Jack Vettriano, who paints
realistic interior scenes of people, with all the narrative drama of
Hopper and with the careful composition of Vermeer. This includes the
typical Vermeer technique of mantelpieces, doorways and background
pictures to give a framework of horizontals and verticals against which
his human figures can be set. His painting “A Dancer for Money” is
constructed around the diagonal of the staircase leading to the stage,
from which the girl’s angular figure as she touches up her lipstick
forms a series of tangents. The entire painting pivots on the girl’s
backside leaning on a table, from which point of contact (and dynamic
weight) seven lines and planes radiate. The rod-like balustrade rising
upward just above her crotch, parallel with her raised thigh, the metal
uprights and the circles between them, all provide subtle sexual
symbols of the girl’s profession, in a typical Renaissance manner. His
painting “The Letter” (inspired by Victorian narrative paintings and by
Hopper) shows an elegant young woman lying in despair on a couch after
reading a letter. The picture hanging over the sofa seems to show a
couple together, and behind them a separated couple. Is this an
evocation of the content of the letter, one of amorous rejection? It is
not sure, as the couple in the overhead picture could also be standing
at a grave. You might say, these are simple effects, but, as Renoir
remarked, “it is the simplest themes which are immortal.” Half a
million reproductions of Vettriano’s work have been sold to date,
rivalling the poster-sales of major pop stars. Nick Botting, Mary Anne
Eytoun Ellis, George Devlin and various other artists displayed at the
Portland Gallery testify to the richness of figurative art in the new
generation, in revolt against the nihilism of the established order. As
Americans flock to rediscover the regional realism of Norman Rockwell,
and Edward Hopper breaks all records of attendance at every exhibition
of his work, it is clear that the art-loving public are voting with
their feet. And it is a vote for figurative, realistic art.
The
tragedy of course is that we don’t know how much of this art has been
lost forever during the dictatorship of the Institutional Revolutionary
Art Party. When the galleries are full of junk, the real artists cannot
exhibit and many have probably given up, or their work has been lost.
Pietro Annigoni, the greatest portrait painter of the 20th
century (regarded by the great art historian Bernard Berenson as the
equal of many Renaissance masters) is almost forgotten today. He is not
even mentioned in most surveys of modern art. The author of one of the
greatest portraits of a beautiful woman in the entire history of art
(“La Strega”, a portrait of the Indian Sharmini Tiruchelvam, the
nearest thing the 20th century produced to the Mona Lisa)
has become an “un-person” to the present regime. An important task of
the next decades will be to try to discover or rediscover who the major
artists of the 20th century were, and to salvage what is left of their work. In the process the entire image not only of 20th century art but also of 20th century life may well be changed. Because what is striking about the 20th
century rooms of any great art museum today is how few images we see of
what life in our times was like. We walk through the rooms of the
world’s great galleries and see images of life in every century until
we get to the 20th – and then we enter a kind of madhouse in
which we recognize nothing of life in our age at all. Even Matisse and
Picasso spent most of their fantastic energy on reworking the art of
the past, on pastiches and parodies of every artist from Velasquez to
Manet, or from African sculptors to those of ancient Greece.
They largely ignored the world outside their studios. (You will point
to “Guernica” – but even the naked, comic-strip, caricatural figures in
that painting could belong to any age; they are not specifically
Spanish people of the 1930’s, the way the figures in Goya’s “Third of
May” recognizably belong to his age.) As for the abstractionists, they
might as well have been painting their stuff on the moon for all it
shows us about our lives. The modernist creed has resulted in a vacuum
of images of our age.
Now
one of the dogmas of the abstractionists is that representational
painting is dead because the photograph and film can do it so much
better – it is to them we should look for images of life in our time.
This dogma is of almost comical stupidity. Imagine if someone said the
same thing about literature : “There is no point in writing fiction
about life in this age, because the newspaper now exists. If we want to
find out what real life is like we can read the newspapers, so the
novel should stop trying to mirror real life and confine itself instead
to sci-fi fantasy.” Would this argument be taken seriously? Does anyone
seriously imagine the newspaper gives us even a tiny sliver of the
vision of an age that a great novel can give us? So why should they
think a photograph can give us the vision of life that a great painting
gives us? Painting has the same superiority over photography in
representing reality as the novel has over the newspaper. Only through
fiction can we arrive at truth. Only through elaborate invention and
imagination can we construct a coherent vision of life in our age. All
that photography can give us is chance fragments of it. Every age must
be represented in painting, because painting presents images of an age
that are more profound, contemplative, ironical, emotional, complex,
ambiguous, paradoxical, more full of observation and commentary, than
any photograph can possibly be. Painters can tell us what they feel
about the subject on a level of complexity denied the chance moments of
photography. The minority tradition of realism which persisted in the 20th
century, and whose great genius is Edward Hopper, has given us a vision
of at least part of our age. Does anyone really think that what Hopper
has given us could be replaced by photographs? That a photo taken in a
bar at night could ever equal “Nighthawks”? Any more than Joyce’s Dubliners could be replaced by a selection of Dublin
newspaper clippings of his time? How could any photograph possibly
imbue human figures with the sense of isolation, of alienation, of
melancholy solitude, which Hopper gives his characters through the
liberties he takes with space, the oppressive solidity of walls and
furniture, the play of garish light and deep shadow, the curious blend
of naturalism and frozen, puppet-like stillness he imparts to them? How
could photographs have the same iconic quality as scenes of 20th
century American life that his paintings have – and yet be lucidly
devoid of any sentimental haze of nostalgia for the past?
The
fact that a photograph is real is precisely its damning limitation as a
work of art. A photograph drips with nostalgia for a vanished past. The
real person in it is somebody now dead, to be pitied and sorrowed over
and forgiven, in a way that Mona Lisa will never be dead, and the
firing squad in Goya’s “Third of May” will never be forgiven. Even
photographs of Hitler and Stalin evoke the lie of nostalgia: they
conjure up a bygone age now swathed in mists of universal compassion.
The dead are always forgiven because we know they belong to the past;
they have entered the world of tragedy, of mortality, of history. The
characters in a painting are eternally present, eternally alive, beyond
the need or reach of pity or forgiveness, and we see them clearly as
they are. A painting defeats time; a photograph merely records it. A
photograph, no matter how brilliant, can never be more than
documentary; only a painting can have the eternity, the existence
outside time, the proof against nostalgia, of a work of art.
22) ABSTRACTIONISM AND THE ALTERNATIVE CULTURE
What
is remarkable about the century-long, monotonous reign of the
abstractionist and conceptual art tradition is how dated and out of
step it is with society at the start of the 21st century.
That tradition embodies all the characteristics of what we have argued
is the over-masculinization of the Western mind in the twentieth
century: mathematical, geometrical, scientific, industrial, mechanical,
machine-made, inhuman, unemotional, impersonal, anti-nature,
anti-beauty, anti-sensual, hate-filled, destructive. These are not only
characteristics associated with the masculine mind at the limits of its
autistic and psychopathic extremes; they are also at the root of the
fascist and communist totalitarian ideologies responsible for all the
horrors of the 20th century. There can be no greater
contrast between these and the values that most young and middle-aged
Westerners today espouse. Those values are derived mainly from the
alternative youth culture of the Woodstock generation – the first great revolt against 20th
century militarism and the ultra-masculine personality – and from the
ecological movement which that generation developed. Among those values
are a deep feeling for Nature, a belief in love (whether romantic love,
love for children, friendship or general human solidarity), a belief in
expressing the emotions, in the exploration of different mental or
spiritual states, and a sense of the beauty of sex and of the human
body. That is why the average young person today finds a lot more to
his taste in an Impressionist exhibition than a Modernist one, because
Impressionism, with its feminine sensuality, its celebration of Nature
and beautiful women, corresponds more to the sensibility of the young
in our time than the Modernist cult of the machine and the abstract.
It
is surprising at first sight that the great movement of cultural revolt
of the 1960’s and 1970’s, which continues to influence popular music
and the Green movement till this day, produced so little visual art
that embodied its values (apart from a few psychedelic posters.) But
perhaps it is not surprising when one considers the total control of
the visual arts by the academic establishment, and the lack of any mass
market for art through which popular taste can exert its influence. In
place of the values of the Woodstock
generation, we had the cynicism of that corrupt, sold-out, neurotic
self-publicist, Andy Warhol. He managed to usurp the role of the
alternative artist and peddle his commercial junk, the product of his
capitalist advertising background, as the art of the 60’s. Pop art
Warhol-style was not a rebellion against the values of the capitalist
consumer society but a celebration of them. “Buying,” he proclaimed
cheerfully, “is much more American than thinking.” 73
Warhol, born in 1928, was part of a post-war generation fascinated by
the new technological gadgetry of the consumer society – and not at all
part of the hippie revolt against it. He claimed that he had “married
his tape-recorder” in 1964, and later said he was having affairs with
four television sets. His relationship with these gadgets, he confessed, had “really finished whatever emotional life I might have had, but I was glad to see it go.” 74
His world was increasingly limited to watching TV and playing with his
tape recorder, despite being surrounded by a ragtag of hangers-on,
transvestites, rock singers and porn actors, drinking and drugging
themselves into oblivion. His advertising background, as well as the
milieu of fame-groupies he moved in, made him see that art could be
reduced merely to mass-produced images – famous faces, famous soup
brands, peddled not to make a point or convey an emotion but merely to
affirm their brand-status. He used a silk screen workshop to replicate
the images in series like rows of brand products on a supermarket shelf
– Campbell’s
tomato soup, Goethe and Marilyn Monroe, all reduced to the equal status
conferred by brand recognition. He had instant success, which only
reinforced his obsession with image and marketing – to the point of
donning a silver wig and acting a public persona. Image became his only
reality. He embodied an age so commercialized and falsified by the
advertising industry that in his words, “people forgot what emotions
were supposed to be.” 75 But the zany, send-up parodist’s
attitude cannot disguise the fact that he sees nothing wrong with this
culture: he registers it with the blank indifference of a coke-head who
has no moral, intellectual or emotional basis from which to reject it.
If anything, he wallows in it. Just as the generation of artists of the
1910’s and 1920’s (De Stijl, Suprematism, Constructivism, the Bauhaus)
worshipped the machine age and wanted all art to be mechanical, Warhol
worshipped the age of gadgets and advertising, of the media usurping
reality, and reduced art to that level. His consecration of a canned
soup advertisement, his reduction of Marilyn Monroe and Jackie Kennedy
or Goethe to mass-produced objects, are not a critique of a repugnant,
commercial society. They are a jeering and cynical glorification of it
by a mind too empty to see the obscenity of what he is depicting. His
films reduce sex to pornography and voyeurism, but they evoke no
emotions except boredom. Since he did not believe in the reality of
human emotions, he did not even see what was missing. His art
represents not critique or satire but cynical profiteering. His mockery
and irony are not directed against the society he depicts but against
anyone who would be so naive as to object to it seriously. But
this irony allows him to pose as an intellectual, to give the
impression of a critical perspective – like that other con-man,
Duchamp. His obsession with the zany extremes of commercialization and
image-manipulation is simply the bug-eyed, zombie fascination with TV
images of the zonked out coke-heads he mixed with. It is clear that he
has no alternative values from which to criticize the age. He does not
even see why there should be such values. Warhol is the nearest the
world has come to an autistic artist, a man without empathy for human
beings, without emotions, without values, without moral or spiritual
beliefs or the perception of the need for them. Machine man glorifying
the machine – image man glorifying the image – the autistic embodiment
of the technological, marketing age.
Just
as Warhol seized on the upheaval of the sixties to peddle a kind of
commercialized perversion of social commentary, where send-up and
glorification become indistinguishable, so other aspects of the Woodstock
generation’s alternative culture were taken over and exploited by the
cynical, sick con-men of the Revolutionary Art sect. Sexual liberation
entered the art of these neurotics not as celebration but as
degradation. A woman’s body is represented as a coal scuttle and two
melons. A frozen chicken’s arse is held in front of a man’s body in a
parody of a vagina. Nature entered this art not as primeval beauty but
as butchered and mutilated animals preserved in formaldehyde. The naked
human body featured not as an object of beauty but as a sack of
excrement, or an object to be viciously sodomized. Every human value
which the counter-culture of the late 60’s tried to revive and
rehabilitate in a jaded world has been shat on, pissed on, and raped by
the nihilistic, hate-filled psychopaths of the Revolutionary Art gang.
Out of the Woodstock
generation’s idealistic revolt against the cult of the machine and of
commerce, the academic Revolutionary Art sect produced a twisted
caricature, a psychotic, mad, hate-filled rejection of life itself, and
a jeering glorification of the machine and the commercial falsification
of reality. Capitalism deals with revolt not by crushing it but by
taking it over and perverting it in its own image. Pop-art and its
obscene derivatives were the capitalist perversion of the revolt of the
alternative culture.
As
a result, the counter-culture at its best (with its values of love,
peace, nature and a spiritual quest) left little direct mark on the
visual arts. But the one medium of expression of the counter-culture
generation, rock music, at least managed to escape the poisonous
anti-life philosophy of the psychotic Revolutionary Art sect. We may
criticize the commercialism and banality of much rock and pop music,
but we can also be thankful it is no worse. If popular music had been
taken over by the Revolutionary Art sect as the visual arts were, we
would have records that consisted entirely of human and animal farts,
obscene words, the screams of the tortured, and the sounds of chair
legs being scraped, interspersed with long minutes of silence. Instead
we have (among much inferior and trivial stuff) songs inspired by Blake
or Burns, by troubadour love-songs or Elizabethan madrigals, and rock
anthems as stirring as military marches. Once again the benign effect
of the buying power of millions of individuals is what has saved
popular music from total degradation. Not only has it remained within
the great humanist tradition of Western art in its celebration of love
and human emotions, and its cultivation (even if repetitive and
limited) of melody and harmony; it has also maintained a current of
social criticism. There is more real social protest in the songs of Bob
Dylan, Pink Floyd, Dire Straits or U2 than in the hundred years of
hideous ugliness inflicted on us by the abstract-conceptual-pop-art
sect – in the name (some would have us believe) of some kind of
“protest against Society”. The reason that popular music has remained
healthy is that it is not a product of the universities or art schools.
Its makers are not indoctrinated with the arrogant, academic
pseudo-Marxist disease. Hatred of nature, of beauty, and of Philistine
“Society”, putting two fingers up to the public, is not an ideological
requirement to get popular songs aired. In contrast, that branch of
music which was taken over by the universities – so-called “serious” or
“atonal” music – has fallen into the same sterile nihilism as the
visual arts. It has gone down the path of the scraping chair-leg – a
combination of sounds designed to set the teeth on edge and
deliberately violate the brain’s expectation of harmony. Nobody listens
to it but the masochistic members of the Sect. The overwhelming
majority of serious music-lovers today listen only to works that are at
least a hundred years old – a situation unprecedented in the history of
classical music.
Given
the overwhelming popularity in our age of the arts of rock/pop music,
cinema and literature (as well as the great music and painting of the
past), and the marginalization of the contemporary plastic arts into a
zany freak show, kept in the public eye by sensationalism, scandal and
trivial fashion snobbery, it is clear that this whole
abstract-conceptual tradition of art is now totally out of step with
the sensibility of the age. Only those neurotic souls filled with an
irrational hatred of the past, with a nihilistic urge to destroy all
beauty because they have none in their own lives, find contemporary
modernist art, with its cult of ugliness and autism, of the machine and
the inhuman, of rubbish tips and excrement, in any way satisfying. The
new young artists who are finding their public and selling prints by
the thousand draw their inspiration from other traditions: from the
figurative art of Hopper, of the Expressionists, the Impressionists, or
the Dutch masters. They are inspired by the same humanist values as the
rock music world: love, sensuality, nature, human emotions and dreams.
They will one day sweep this rusting, failed, hate-filled revolutionary
garbage, this hang-over from 20th century abstract totalitarianism, out of the museums and onto the rubbish tips where it belongs.
23) THE CULT OF UGLINESS
What
can we expect from a sane, humanistic art when the century-long
dictatorship of the Institutional Revolutionary Art Party is finally
broken? The return of art to sanity will probably be a return of art to
beauty – the proclaimed goal of nearly all art until the Modernist
period. The sheer ugliness of most art after the death of Matisse is
the most striking feature of it. This is not confined to the abstract
artists. Many of the Modernist figurative artists produce works which
repel by their ugliness and soullessness. Now this is often defended on
the grounds that these artists are expressing their alienation from the
world. If they were painting factories, urban slums, traffic jams or
wartime atrocities then a certain alienation might be a sign of health.
But since they are painting their wives, their children, their friends,
their pets, it is quite surprising that they should want to express
alienation from these things by making them as ugly as possible. What
emerges is a prevailing sense of depression, neurosis and disgust with
life. This applies even to the greatest names among the early
modernists. Picasso does one or two beautiful portraits of Olga at the
start of their relationship, but after his youthful period the vast
majority of his scores of nude women are grotesque deconstructions of
the female body, chopping it in pieces or distorting it cruelly into
something repulsive. The mutilations and physical contortions of Guernica
would be more moving as an anti-war protest if they were not simply a
part of his violent, grotesque distortion of the human body from around
1928 onwards, present in works that have nothing to do with war. This
contrasts with two and a half millennia of Western art where beautiful
(or lovingly observed) human figures, and above all women, are the
paramount subject – whether goddesses, angels, saints or living people.
This entire tradition is dead by 1920, with the deaths of Modigliani,
Klimt and Shiele. After this, there are very few portraits of beautiful
women in the entire modernist repertoire apart from Matisse – and the
odd surrealistic dream-image in Dali or Delvaux. We have to go outside
the Modernists to anathemized traditionalists like Pietro Annigoni to
see beautiful women as the main subject of a painting. If we define the
erotic as the representation of nudity as beautiful, and the obscene as
the representation of nudity as ugly, then 20th century Modernist art is often obscene but almost never erotic.
This
tendency towards the ugly began even as early as Manet, whose nude
“Olympia” is a coarse, vulgar creature, stiffly posed, with skin like
cardboard, totally devoid of sensuality. Today’s art academics regard
this as a triumphant rejection of the sensual, erotic tradition of
Ingres, Cabanel, and Moreau, whose voluptuous nudes they see (with a
curious 20th century Puritanism) as cheap pornography for 19th century French bankers. They don’t seem to see that Manet, in his ugly caricature, is rejecting not only 19th
century eroticism, but the whole tradition of painting beautiful nude
women that goes back through Goya and Rubens to Titian and Botticelli.
Do today’s academics despise Titian’s nude Venuses as cheap pornography
for Venetian bankers, the way they despise Cabanel’s? Cabanel’s “Birth
of Venus” is an erotic masterpiece: the softness of the flesh, the
naturalness and languid sensuality of the pose are remarkable. The
little cupids are a bit twee but they are also a playful parody of the
cherubs of religious art. Why should erotic masterpieces be downgraded
as cheap, vulgar entertainment in the 19th century when they were high art in the 16th century?
And why should Manet’s reduction of these erotic dream-images to a
plain, coarse little whore (eyeing the spectator as though to calculate
how much she can screw out of him) be seen as some kind of moral
triumph? What lies behind this curious anti-sensual Puritanism of the
modern academic? The answer is: one of the main characteristics of the
20th century mind – the degradation of women and of the
feminine ideal, the violent rejection of that idealization of female
beauty which had been one of the characteristics of Western art from
classical times. The over-masculinized mind, as we saw in Henry Miller,
hates the idealization of female beauty or of sex. It sees not a superb
body but “a cunt steaming like manure”. It despises the idea of
“love-making” as a sentimental falsehood hiding “the ugly reality of
the sexual assault.” In this degradation of the female to whore status
there is an element of disgust, of Puritanism, of asceticism, of hatred
of the flesh and desire to see it as dirty. What the Modernist academic
likes in Manet is the nude woman reduced from love goddess to cheap,
calculating, unwashed, unappetizing whore. And what the Modernist mind
hates in Cabanel or Leighton is the idealization of female erotic
beauty as both innocent and sublime. Manet is a forerunner of that
whole tendency in Modernist painters to see female bodies as just
“cunts steaming like manure”, coarse, ugly, and repulsive. His
destruction of the tradition of the beautiful female nude is a signpost
pointing to the 20th century rejection of the feminine – summed up in the slogan of Marinetti’s Futurists: “Contempt for women!”
Some
Impressionists like Renoir fight back and continue the healthy
sensuality of the earlier tradition, the love of the female body. His
adoring portraits of women and young girls are an exuberant affirmation
of life. But with the Modernist period representations of women as
desirable become very rare. A misogynistic caricaturing of sex (as in Duchamp’s
“The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors”, a jumble of bits of wire
and incongruous objects) or grotesque mutilations of female bodies (as
in Duchamp’s obscene peep-show “Etant Donnés” or Picasso’s “Grand Nu au
Fauteuil Rouge” and “Femme au Fauteuil Rouge”) become the typical
Modernist approaches. There are no Modernist artists after Matisse that
actually love female bodies (Annigoni, as we said, is not regarded as a
Modernist.) We might even suggest that the representation of women in
art is a barometer of the attitude to life itself. Hatred of women
equals hatred of life. The deconstruction of women’s bodies into ugly
and grotesque distortions (a compulsion with Piccaso) is certainly part
of what we have already seen as the misogyny of Modernism, and this is
related to the over-masculinity of the Modernist mind. (This
“over-masculinity” is in no way related to sexual orientation. Many
Modernist artists of the second half of the 20th century are
homosexual, but none of them have the feminine sensibility of both gay
and straight artists of the Renaissance, who all loved painting women.)
As we have seen already in Henry Miller, the over-masculine,
aggressive, mechanistic, anti-romantic, analytical male mind scornfully
rejects any tendency to idealize and spiritualize women’s beauty. It
feels indifference if not contempt for the delicate, sensual, feminine
prettiness which works its magic on more feminine, sensitive men – who
see a beautiful female nude as an image of perfection, and idealize
their own attraction towards her as a poetic love of beauty. To the
aggressively masculine mind a naked female is simply a whore. His
irritation at his own attraction to this obscure object of desire leads
him to want to rape and then destroy it – in artistic terms, to
degrade, distort and mutilate it. The disappearance of the beautiful
female nude from art is the sign of a change of human sensibility and
character more profound than anything else that has ever happened in
the history of Western art.
The
loss by the modern ultra-masculine mind of the feminine faculty of
idealization of physical beauty strikes at the very root of the Western
tradition of art. One might almost say that Western art arose from an
attempt by the Greeks to represent spiritual values in terms of sublime
naked bodies. The cult of beauty may have been the mysticism the Greeks
invented because they were losing faith in religion and needed some
other way of transcending death. Art until the twentieth century was
universally regarded in the West as synonymous with a cult of beauty.
Keats’ famous line “Beauty is truth, truth beauty” is only one of many
similar statements made by a number of great artists and poets in
Western history. If you had asked any artist between the 15th and late 19th centuries what is the goal of art, he would have answered in one word: beauty. The 20th
century’s attack on the cult of beauty is tantamount to the abandonment
of the whole Western tradition of art. The rejection of beautiful women
as a subject of painting is closely linked to the 20th
century rejection of the feminine half of human nature – not only the
rejection of woman as an object embodying beauty, but of the feminine
mental process of idealization and spiritualization of the physical.
24) BEAUTY AND THE FEMININE
The
very concept of beauty appears to have some connection with the
feminine. The evidence from all cultures and ages suggests that women
are naturally narcissistic, if we judge only by the amount of time they
spend in front of mirrors cultivating their beauty. A man who spent
anything like that time in front of a mirror would at once be suspected
of homosexuality – that is, he would be suspected of having certain
feminine traits of personality, leading him probably to feminine sexual
behaviour. This popular prejudice indicates that we instinctively
associate narcissism with female sexuality. The woman seeks to make
herself an object of desire and admiration by men, because she finds
male desire exciting. Her enjoyment of her own beauty comes through
seeing or imagining its effect on men. No beautiful woman wants to
spend all her evenings alone in her room. She wants to be out somewhere
where she will be admired – above all by men. Now the feminist
ideologues starting with Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre have tried to
make out that this narcissism of woman (seeing herself as object rather
than subject) is some crippling defect of the female personality, a
form of psychic imprisonment of woman, a relegation to “second sex”
status, a sign of a pathetic dependence on the observing eye of another
for her sense of identity. They saw it as something that woman must
overcome in order to liberate herself. This is of course neo-Marxist
tripe. This narcissism and theatricality, the desire to be permanently
on stage, is simply one of the characteristics of the feminine
personality. Attracting attention to their looks is the means by which
women dominate a room. Men who have this characteristic, like some
famous ballet dancers or actors, are often homosexual. Is the male
homosexual personality also (heaven forbid!) to be regarded as abnormal
by these feminist ideologues – something to be overcome so that the
narcissistic person-as-object can become the straight
person-as-subject? Is the heterosexual male the only norm, and all
other beings a falling short of this wonderful ideal? That is the
implication of de Beauvoir’s drivel. It shows the extent to which, in
an over-masculine age, even the intellectual women lost any
understanding of what femininity is. They could only see any
characteristic by which women differed from men as a defect, a
crippling disadvantage in their quest for total equality. The idea that
femininity might have some value in itself was alien to their
world-view. They saw femininity as something to be got beyond, if women
were to “progress” towards the ideal of the masculine personality.
Now
just as the feminine woman tends to be obsessed with her own beauty and
the impression she is making on men, the man she impresses most, who
tends to become most obsessed with her beauty, is the feminine man. A
glance at the history of art suggests that most painters as well as
poets have been relatively feminine men. Most of them were not
homosexual (though the two greatest Italian artists, Leonardo and
Michelangelo, may have been.) But it is difficult not to connect the
fascination with sensual female beauty of heterosexual painters like
Rubens, Van Dyck or Raphael with their own very delicate, rather
feminine good looks. Is it a degree of narcissism (though not enough to
become homosexual) that triggers their obsession with female beauty –
because the “fairer sex” embodies to a more perfect degree the beauty
they find attractive in themselves? Very masculine men, by contrast,
are often indifferent to beauty in their women. They see sex as largely
functional, and pay little attention to the elegance of the mantelpiece
as they are poking the fire. Masculine men have coarse taste and may
scarcely notice the difference between an average good-looking woman
and one of exceptional beauty – any more than between a hamburger and a
gourmet meal. They lack sensitivity to beauty, perhaps because they
lack narcissism. The Victorian military heroes out conquering and
colonizing the world seemed to get on very well without women and were
uncomfortable in their presence. It is relatively feminine men who fall
hopelessly in love with beautiful women, and who want to write them
poems, paint them, sculpt them, or immortalize them in novels. It was a
commonplace in the age of Shakespeare (as we have already noted) that
the very masculine man loved war, and the rather feminine man loved
women.
The
poets of past centuries, especially of the Western European
(post-classical) civilization, were obsessed with beauty, and they saw
it primarily incarnated in women. The cult of courtly love which we
examined earlier is very much a cult of female beauty. A vast quantity
of European poetry is devoted to sexual love and the praise of the
beauty of women. A vast number of European paintings depict beautiful
women, whether praying Virgin or naked Venus. All of this changes in
the 20th century. There is an active rejection of beauty, an
ideological attack upon it as somehow false, sentimental, a hiding from
reality. The rejection of feminine beauty is part of the wider 20th
century rejection of the feminine: a loss of what might be called the
feminine aspects of the thought process itself – intuition,
imagination, emotion, the capacity to spiritualize the physical. All
these feminine mental processes are crucial to the creation of art. In
some ways art has something magical about it, which requires the
feminine mind both to produce it and respond to it. Unleash the
masculine, analytical mind upon it and the result is an attempt to
analyse it out of existence, to dismiss its magic as superstition, to
strip it of its mystique, to reduce its mystery to a mere intellectual
conundrum: to keep asking over and over the same idiot questions: “What
is art? What makes a thing art? How do we know it is art? What purpose
does art serve?” as if these very questions were not designed to
puncture the entire illusion and conjuring trick on which art is based.
Renoir, the most sensual and feminine of the Impressionists, the one
most given to painting beautiful women, hated all theoretical
discussion of art, which his colleagues were more and more addicted to.
For him art was a purely instinctual process, and analysing it could
only kill it.
The 17th
century philosopher John Locke famously asked the question: “What is
the use of poetry?” and signalled the first attack of the analytical
masculine mind – the modern industrial, scientific mind – on the
feminine, emotional, magical tradition of art, practised almost
exclusively by rather feminine men.
Analysis
kills creation, it kills imagination, it kills emotion. It is like a
man analysing the sex act – why sex? What makes me do it? Why this
object of desire and not another? Why a woman? Why not a coal scuttle?
Why screw this particular hole? Why not her ear? Why not a dog’s ear? –
until he is finally impotent. That is where this age has now got to in
the visual arts: creative impotence through the analytical
over-masculine mind asking absurd questions until the instinctive,
emotional magic of art no longer happens.
Almost
all the conceptual art produced today claims to be precisely a
questioning of art – making people stop and ask : “What is art? What
makes this art?” That was the alleged point (according to the judges)
of the crumpled A4 sheet of paper on a plinth, short-listed for the
Turner Prize in 2001. It is the point of the pickled sheep and the
unmade bed or the blown-up plastic toy sold for a million. All these
works are merely displays of creative impotence – the calling into
question of the impulse that makes art, until it can no longer make it.
They are at once cause, analysis and illustration of the disease of
artistic impotence – the loss of capacity for an instinctive,
imaginative, emotional process through the corrosive effect of
conscious intellectual questioning, and the substitution of this
questioning for the instinctive act of creation.
The
very notion of conceptual art is a contradiction in terms. Art does not
start from a concept. It starts from an emotion. Art does not come from
the masculine part of the mind – the analytical, questioning,
intellectual part. It springs from the feminine part of the mind – emotion, imagination, sensuality. As Nietzsche argued in The Birth of Tragedy,
art is only Apollonian intellectual perfection in its finished form. In
its surging inspiration it is Dionysian frenzy, intoxication, trance.
Art is the use of intellectual technique for the expression of
spontaneous emotion. It is a masculine brain at work shaping the
emotions of a largely feminine soul. If this blend of feminine and
masculine mental impulses does not occur, then art is impossible. In an
over-masculine age, it simply dies.
25) BEAUTY IS TRUTH, TRUTH BEAUTY
Nothing
has been more misunderstood and misrepresented by the modernist
academic propagandists than the notion of beauty in art. They pretend
that the only alternative to the heaps of rubbish and cans of shit in
the modern art museums is the idealized sunny landscapes on sale in the
artists’ market of any major European city. There is either the ugly
and hate-filled, or the pretty-pretty and vacuous: nothing else exists.
Yet there was no general tendency in the art of the five hundred years
before modernism to ignore the unpleasant realities of life, or present
a prettified, idealized world. A stroll through any great museum of the
art of the past will reveal as many crucifixions, burials, scenes of
torture, massacre, battle, rape, death, horror, poverty and damnation
as the most suicidal pessimist could reasonably wish for. There are as
many ugly kings and cardinals as beautiful young women or angels. What
makes all these subjects in some aesthetic sense beautiful is not just
the artist’s technique but his penetrating insight, his compassion, his
unconditional love for what he sees (even if he is painting a tyrant,
he sees the human being; if he is painting an execution, he sees every
human emotion in the scene.) Art is a process of visionary
transformation of what one sees until it becomes, in some sense, the
beautiful. It is a spiritual meditation upon a subject until it becomes
irradiated with unconditional love. All great art is the record of what
Joyce called epiphanies, little visionary experiences, brief sensations
of union with the universe. Various religions have cultivated these
sensations through prayer or spiritual exercises. Western man was able
to maintain a tradition of spiritual experience that was purely
artistic and not religious through a peculiar secular faith invented by
the Greeks – the cult of beauty. Thanks to this cult of beauty, which
spread all over the West and beyond, artists were led to experience a
minor mystic vision through the contemplation of the physical, sensual
world itself – something they were forbidden to do in cultures governed
by more austere, other-worldly religions. Keats experienced such a
vision contemplating a Greek vase, and enunciated the simplest doctrine
of the cult: beauty is truth, truth beauty. This means (for the sake of
those, like T.S.Eliot, so allergic to both these terms that their
brains cease functioning when they hear them): the sight of beauty gave
Keats a feeling of unconditional love and oneness with the universe
(experienced as a mystical perception of “truth”) and this experience
in turn reinforced his sense of the beauty of things.
But
more humble objects than Greek vases can provoke the same sensations.
Constable remarked : “I never saw an ugly thing in my life: for let the
form of an object be what it may, – light, shade, and perspective will
always make it beautiful.” 76 The philosopher David Hume
had already observed: “Beauty is no quality in things themselves. It
exists merely in the mind which contemplates them.” 77 It
is therefore the mind which transforms things into the beautiful – and
some minds can never see beauty anywhere. Van Gogh could see beauty not
just in sunflowers but in an old chair, a labourer in a field, or a
dish of lemons. His love transformed these objects; they became
irradiated with beauty and spiritual significance. Their “whatness”, as
Gerard Manley Hopkins called the mysterious, unique existence of a
thing, became in itself a kind of miraculous manifestation of the
divine, which Van Gogh tried to transmit through his paintings. Even
when objects inspired him with terror, the intensity of the terror
became a perverse form of beauty, and the tortured houses or lowering
clouds or sinister swarms of crows became also epiphanies, filled with
a joyful affirmation even in the horror he felt for them. Nietschze
summed up his favourite mystic experience as a demand that the whole
universe, the whole history of the human race, be replayed again and
again from the beginning, eternally, the artist calling out “da capo,
da capo”, insatiably, as if he cannot have enough of sensations,
whether of suffering or of joy. 78 From this ecstatic
vision he derived his idea of Eternal Return, the greatest attempt ever
made to intellectualize a mystic experience. It is this that lies at
the heart of the cult of beauty: the mystical irradiation of all things
with love and eternal affirmation. It is this paradox, that even pain
and suffering and horror are to be loved by the artist-mystic, that
underlies Titian’s final despairing Pietà, or his horrific painting of
the flaying of Marsyas. Even this repulsive scene of torture is
beautiful and to be affirmed because it belongs to our world, and our
perishable, fleeting world must be affirmed in all its aspects, loved
even in its crimes and horrors, in defiance of the void of darkness and
eternal nothingness. The cult of beauty is the faith of men standing on
the edge of the abyss of infinite time and space and affirming against
all reason that their mental sensations are immortal. And art is the
concrete attempt to make sensations immortal, to make one human being’s
fleeting spiritual illumination of a scene, face or event, defy death
and communicate itself to other human beings, beyond the oceans of time
and space.
The
great neglected genius of the totalitarian period we are emerging from,
Pietro Annigoni, made the link between art and the affirmation of life:
I
am convinced that the works of today’s avant-garde are the poisoned
fruit of a spiritual decadence, with all the consequences that arise
from a tragic loss of love for life. 79
When artists lose the love of life, their gaze can no longer transform every object into the beautiful. That is why so many of them lost any interest in depicting the physical world.
Because they could no longer see it with spiritual eyes, it no longer
gave them one of Joyce’s (or Van Gogh’s) epiphanies. They could no
longer, like Constable, see that ugly objects do not exist. The cult of
beauty is nothing to do with the prettifying of reality: it is to do
with the spiritual insight into reality. It is that which was lost in
the masculine age, because it requires an intuitive, emotional and
spiritual response to the world, which is alien to the over-masculine
mind.
We are only now beginning to grasp the degree of sickness and perversion of the 20th
century mind. You do not have a century in which more people were
murdered in Europe and Asia than in the previous twenty centuries put
together without this being the reflection of a deeply psychotic age.
It is time we began to see the art of the period as part of that
psychosis. Modernist artists did not evolve in a social vacuum. Despite
the pious myths, most of them were not opponents of totalitarianism,
but on the contrary, manifested all its inhuman, mechanistic and
destructive impulses in their work. It is time we rejected the
sentimental hero-worship of every Modernist artist propagated by the
academic groupies of Modernism. It is time we saw the mental
disturbance that lies beneath most of the art of the 20th century. We
have analysed this mental disturbance as a pathological
over-masculinisation of the mind of modern Western man, which made him
both autistic and psychopathic – unable to feel, unable to empathize,
unable to transform the objects he saw into the beautiful, and
irrationally given to disgust, hatred and violence. One of the
expressions of the psychopathic personality is the revolutionary
impulse, the desire to destroy the past and everything that has ever
existed, and begin again from zero on some new, more rational basis.
This impulse lies at the root of the totalitarian ideologies of mass
murder, as it lies at the root of the Modernist, abstractionist art
tradition. This nihilistic impulse still governs the thinking of those
who control the art world today. It may be expressed in a far more
frivolous and buffoon-like manner than in the gas chambers or the
gulags or the killing fields – but the intent is the same: the
destruction of human civilization and all humane values out of a
poisonous hatred of life. Their world-view is summed up in Marx’s
favourite dictum, the words of Goethe’s Mephistopheles: “Everything
that is must be destroyed.”
26) THE END OF THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION
The
totalitarian art revolutionaries believed they could set up a regime of
perpetual revolution – like Mao’s permanent revolution it would renew
itself constantly, and hence never come to an end. They thought that
this was the spirit of the age: that technology’s permanent revolution
must impose the same perpetual change on art. But the cult of perpetual
revolution is inherently destructive. It becomes obsessed with the
destruction of all that existed before the revolution began; it
measures its progress by the amount that it destroys. Change for its
own sake is always destructive, and ends by destroying itself. After it
has eliminated all complexity, all capacity to express emotion or
convey a vision, what is left is a kind of imbecility, childishness,
idiocy – blank canvases, doodles, children’s boxes, slogans on walls,
chewing gum on pedestals. What it creates is astonishingly repetitive,
static, limited, vacuous. The changes become more superficial, more
trivial, concealing a fundamental immobility. One artist moves his
single vertical line an inch to the left. Another changes the colour of
his monochrome square. Another changes the breed of fish he puts in
formaldehyde. It is a world of uniformity, of the total failure of
imagination. It is utterly static. Change has destroyed change.
Great
art, on the other hand, changes slowly according to the evolution of
minds, souls, visions of life. It uses the new technical tools that
come along, but carefully, selectively, to express what it wants to. It
is not a slave to the vagaries of fashion or the constant innovations
of technology. The fashions in clothes of four hundred years ago make
us laugh; their technology makes us smile with pity; but their great
art still moves us to tears or to admiration. The reduction of art to
the same status as technology or fashion is part of the
totalitarian-industrial heresy of the 20th century – the
heresy of a generation of artists overwhelmed and awed by the
unfamiliar power of technological progress, and without the spiritual
or intellectual resources to see its irrelevance to the artist’s task.
They thought their work had to submit to this new god, and become part
of the capitalist-industrial cult of perpetual change. But that cult
rules on the sliding surface of things. Art exists on a level where the
passage of two thousand years makes no difference to the power of an
artist to reach our souls or stir our emotions.
The delusion of the revolutionary art sects of the early 20th
century was to believe not only that they could reject the past, but
that they could arrest history. They thought that in rejecting the past
they could make a definitive break with it – as if they themselves
would not one day become the past, as if their revolutionary movement
itself would not one day become passé, dated, obsolete – a fossilized
establishment that has suppressed the new for decades and prevented it
coming to birth. The notion of permanent revolution is a delusion. It
always presupposes a definitive break between the start of the
permanent revolution and all that went before. But there are no
definitive breaks in history. Everything becomes the past. And nothing
can stop the cycles of change from going back to what was definitively
rejected by the last “permanent” revolution.
Every
revolutionary movement errs by imagining it can foresee and control the
new, that the next movement must resemble it, only in a more extreme
form – when in fact the new is just as likely to come along looking
like something very old. When the ignorant foot-soldiers of the tired
revolutionary army repeat their refrain : “We can’t go on making art
like in the past!”, they are speaking a truth without realizing it.
They and their revolution are the past, they and their empty nihilism
and cynical buffoonery are what has dominated the art world for the
past hundred years, and it is time it was left behind.
NOTES
CHAPTER ONE: THE IMAGE OF WESTERN MAN
1) Steve Jones Y, The Descent of Men (London, 2002) p.249
2) Ibid., p.125
3) Ibid., p.82
4) Ibid., p.81
5) Conrad Peter, Modern Times, Modern Places (London, 1998) p.14
6) Ibid., p.16
7) Ibid.
8) Fascism, edit. Roger Griffin (Oxford, 1995) p.26
9) Conrad, op cit., p.25
10) Fascism, p.109, quoting from Battle as an Inner Experience, 1929.
11) Ibid., p. 28
12) Drei Abhandlungen Zur Sexualtheorie. Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality, in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, trans Strachey, VII, p. 219, n. Cited in Peter Gay, The Cultivation of Hatred (New York, 1993) p.105
13) Quoted in Anne Moir and David Jessel, Brainsex London, 1989, p. 125
14) Stanley Kurtz, “Can We Make Boys and Girls Alike?” City Journal,
Spring 2005, citing feminist pioneer Nancy Chodorow. See website
www.city-journal.org
15) Anne Moir and David Jessel, Brainsex London, 1989. See also Matt
Ridley, The Red Queen, Penguin, 1994; Steve Jones Y, The Descent of Men, London, 2002; Doreen Kimura, “Sex Differences in the Brain” at www.mermaids.freeuk.com and Sex and Cognition (MIT Press, 1999)
16) Kimura, op.cit, “Sex Differences….”, citing Jang-Ning Zhou of the
Amsterdam Institute of Brain research.
17) Brainsex pp. 113-125 ; Kimura, op.cit.
18) On estimates of transsexual numbers, see Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association’s “The Standards of Care for GID” The
International Journal of Transgenderism, Vol 5, No 1, Jan-March 2001
Website : www.symposion.com/ijt/soc_2001
19) See various articles on transsexualism at www.mermaids.freeuk.com
20) Milton Diamond, H.K. Sigmundson, “Sex Re-assignment at Birth: Long
Term Review and Clinical Implications”, Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, 1997. 151, pp. 298-304
21) Brainsex p.123
22) Thomas A Mably & others “In Utero and Lactational exposure of Male
Rats to 2,3,7,8- Tetrachlorodibenzo-P-dioxin. 1. Effects on Androgenic Status.” Toxicology and AppliedPharmacology Vol 114 (May 1992) pp. 97-107
23) Time magazine, article 14 October 2002
24) On brain structure: Brainsex pp. 42-3; on testosterone Anne and Bill
Moir, Why Men Don’t Iron , p. 221, quoting Hoyenga KB, Hoyenga KT, Gender Related Differences, Allyn & Bacon, 1993, p. 377; Antony Clare, op.cit., p. 20.
25) Quoted in Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford, 1989) p. 286
26) Why Men Don’t Iron, p. 173; Brainsex pp 15-17; and Steve Jones p.226.
Pease, p.188
27) Why Men Don’t Iron, p. 117, citing Hoyenga.
28) Ibid, p. 118; also Brainsex p.89-90, citing the research of Benbow and Stanley.
29) Steve Jones, op. cit, p. 226
30) Moir Anne and Bill, Why Men Don’t Iron, p.260 ; Brainsex p.16-18
31) Brainsex, pp. 18-19 ; Why Men Don’t Iron p. 116
32) Why Men don’t Iron p. 261
33) Tacitus, Germania, 27 p.124 Penguin 1948
34) Brainsex, pp. 46-8
35) R. Clark and E. Hatfield, 1989, “Parental Investment”, in Psychology and
Human Sexuality, Essential Readings, ed. R. Baumeister,(Taylor and
Francis 2001) pp 39-55.
36) Buss, Larsen, Westen & Semmelroth, “Sex Differences in Jealousy”,
Psychological Science, 3, pp 251-255, 1992, 1999; Buunk et al. 1996;
Malsowska et al. 2000; Voracek 2001.
37) Luis Amaral, H.E. Stanley et al, “The Web of Human Sexual Contacts”,
Nature June 11, 2001
38) Steve Jones, pp. 165-166
39) Article at www.amazinginfoonhomosexuals.com , citing Baker & Bellis
Human Sperm Competition, Copulation, Masturbation and Infidelity (London, NY, 1995) ; Fethers, Marks, Mindel, Estcourt, Sex Transm Infect, 76, 345 (Oct 2000); McCaghy & Skipper, Social Problems,17, 262 (1969)
40) Why Men don’t Iron pp. 187-189; Pease, Why Men Don’t Listen and
Women Can’t Read Maps, pp. 132-134
41) Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae, (Yale, 1990), p.149
42) Ibid., pp. 149-152
43) Ibid., p. 146.
44) Ibid., p. 165
45) Henry Fielding, Tom Jones, (1749) Penguin ed. (1973) p. 78
46) Rider Haggard, King Solomon’s Mines (London 1885) Penguin (1977) p.13
47) Zane Grey, Riders of the Purple Sage, (Dover Publications, 2002) p. 206.
48) Tom Jones, p.79
49) Ibid., pp. 195, 197
50) Ibid., pp. 223 – 224
51) Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (1929) Penguin (1970), p.25
52) Ibid., pp. 27-28
53) Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, The World’s Classics, OUP, 1981, pp 182-3
54) Hemingway, op cit, p. 19
55) Stendhal, Scarlet and Black, Penguin, 1953, pp. 37-8
56) Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine, Part II, Act 1, Scene 4. Lines 21- 31.
57) Shakespeare, Richard III, Act 1, Scene 1, ll. 10-13
58) Tamburlaine, Part I, Act 3, Scene 2, lines 40 – 46
59) Shakespeare, Henry 1V, Part 1, Act II, Scene 4, ll 110-15 (OUP 1963)
60) Stendhal, op. cit, p. 46-8
61) Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises, Schribner Paperbacks, NY, p.62
62) Ibid., p. 251
63) Leslie A. Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel, p. 210-11
64) Paglia, op cit. pp. 584-88
65) Jack London, Martin Eden, Penguin, pp. 42-43
66) Tennessee Williams, A Streetcar Named Desire, Penguin Plays, p. 164
67) Tropic of Capricorn (Panther) pp. 68-69
68) Quiet Days in Clichy (1956) Allen (1991) pp. 42-43
69) Ibid., p. 43
70) Ibid., p. 45
71) Ibid., pp. 118-9
72) Ibid., p. 124
73) Ibid., p. 126
74) Nexus (Paris, 1960) Grafton (1988) p. 40
75) Ibid.
76) The Waste Land (1922), lines 253-256
77) Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (1969), Virago edition (1997) p.340, citing
Jean Genet, The Miracle of the Rose, p. 27
78) Ibid., p. 309
79) Ibid.
80) Ibid., p.303
81) Norman Mailer, The Time of our Time, (1999, Abacus) p.207.
82) Mailer, Cannibals and Christians, 1966, in The Time of our Time, p. 4
83) Mailer, “The Time of Her Time”, in The Time of our Time, p.335
84) Ibid., pp. 339-340
85) Ibid., p. 342
86) Mailer, An American Dream (Dell, 1966) p. 47
87) TV programme on France 3, 16 October 2002, interviewing a rape victim
turned porn actress
88) Mailer, An American Dream (Dell, 1966) p. 65
89) Mailer, The Time of Our Time, p. 4
90) Ibid., p. 465
91) Mailer, An American Dream (Dell, 1966) p. 165. 92) The Time of Our Time p. 1088 93) Ibid., p. 207 94) Ibid., p. 227 95) Mailer, An American Dream (Dell 1966)
p. 11-12 96) “How the Wimp Won the War” (1991) in The Time of Our Time, p. 1088 97) “More Than A Little Violence in Me” in The Time of Our Time, p. 207 98) Mailer, The Time of Our Time, p. 285
CHAPTER TWO : WAR AND WESTERN MAN
1) John Keegan A History of Warfare, (Pimlico, 1994) p. 189, quoting
Ratchnevsky, Ghengis Khan, (Oxford, 1991) p. 155.
2) Tacitus, Germania, 14 (Penguin, 1987) p. 113
3) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, chapter 7, Section 1177b; Tacitus,
Agricola, 33 (Penguin, 1987, trans. Mattingly) p. 84
4) Keegan, op cit., p. 244- 246.
5) Hesiod, Works and Days ll 144 – 156, (Penguin, 1973, trans. Wender) p. 62
6) Iliad, p. 451-2
7) Homer, The Odyssey (Penguin, 1981) p. 364
8) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (Penguin, 1972) p. 149-50
9) Tacitus, Germania, 14, p. 113
10) Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, Winchester Manuscript, Michael Swanton (Dent,
London, 1996) pp. 106-110.
11) Keegan, op cit., p. 290
12) See Urban II’s speech in Guibert de Nogent Historia Quae dicitur Gesta
Dei per Francos, at website www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/guibert-cde.html
13) August C Krey, The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eyewitnesses and
Participants (Princeton, 1921) pp. 256-7. See website: www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/gesta-cde.html
14) Fulcher of Chartres, Gesta Francorum Jerusalem Expugnantium (The
Deeds of the Franks who Attacked Jerusalem) in Duncan and Kreys
Parallel Source Problems in Medieval History (New York, 1912, pp 109- 115) See website above, note 13.
15) Froissart, Chronicles (Penguin, 1983) p. 122.
16) Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, (Penguin 1990) vol 2, p. 465.
17) Ibid., p. 8
18) Ibid., p. 133
19) Fulcher of Chartres Chronicles Bk III at
www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/fulk3.html
20) Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi ed. William Stubbs,
Rolls Series (London, Longmans 1864) VI, 27-28 (pp. 427-30) trans. James Brundage, The Crusades Milwaukie 1962 (pp. 185-6). Website: www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1192peace.html
21) Froissart, op cit., p. 144, 167-9
22) Runciman, op cit., p. 463, 466
23) Ibid., p. 468
24) Ibid., p. 441
25) Froissart, op cit., p. 178
26) Ibid., p. 179
27) Ibid., p. 89
28) Ibid., p. 93
29) Ibid., p. 106
30) Ibid.
31) Ibid. p. 109
32) Keegan, op cit., p. 333; Charles Townsend, ed, Modern War, (Oxford,
1997) p. 22, quoting Blaise de Montluc.
33) Marlowe, Dido Queen of Carthage, Act 2, Scene 1, ll. 188 - 199
34) Ibid, Act 2, Scene 1, ll. 238 - 242
35) Marlowe, The Massacre at Paris , Act 1, Scene 5, ll 42 – 44
36) Dido Queen of Carthage, Act 2, Scene 1, ll. 270 – 279
37) Tamburlaine Part I, Act 1, Scene 2, ll. 36 – 38
38) Ibid, Act 1, Scene 2, ll.93 – 99
39) Ibid, Act 5, Scene 2, ll. 389 – 405
40) Ibid, Part II, Act 1, Scene 4, ll. 79 – 95
41) Marlowe, Lucan’s First Book, ll.34– 51, Complete Poems (Penguin) p. 190
42) J.B. Steane, Marlowe: A Critical Study (Cambridge UP 1964)
43) Marlowe, The Massacre at Paris, Act 5, Scene 5, ll. 76- 77
44) Ibid, Act 5, Scene 5, ll. 100- 101
45) Ibid, Act 5, Scene 5, ll. 68-70
46) Marlowe, Tamburlaine Part II, Act 2, Scene 1, ll. 49 – 59
47) Quoted by J.A. Wylie A History of Protestantism (Cassell 1879, Vol. ii,
p.591) (Source Epp.Pii V à Gobau (Antwep, 1640) by Francis Gobau, Secretary to the Spanish embassy in Rome.)
48) Tamburlaine Part II, Act 2, Scene 2, ll. 36 – 64
49) “Of Coaches” The Essays of Montaigne, trans. George Ives, (New York,
Heritage, 1946) Vol II, p. 1238
50) Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, A Voyage to Brobdingnag, (Wordsworth) 7, pp.
141-2.
51) Keegan, op cit., p. 343
52) Roszak, Betty & Theodore, Masculine/Feminine (Harper, NY, 1969) pp.
97, 92.
53) Tolstoy, War and Peace (Penguin) p.216.
54) Tolstoy, The Sebastopol Sketches (Penguin) p. 108
55) John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell (John Hopkins, Baltimore 1989) p. 172
56) Ibid., p.172
57) Ibid., p.172
58) Owen, “Arms and The Boy”, World War One British Poets, NY, 1997.
59) Wilfred Owen, “Dulce et Decorum Est”, World War One British Poets.
60) Ibid., Owen, “Strange Meeting”
61) Ibid., Siegfried Sassoon, “They”.
62) Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That, (1929; Penguin) pp. 111 –12
63) Ibid., pp. 127-8
64) Ibid., p. 131
65) Ibid., p. 120
66) Alexander Aitken, the Somme, 1916; cited Ellis, Eye Deep in Hell, p.101
67) Ellis, Eye Deep in Hell. p. 102.
68) Ibid., p. 102
69) Graves, Good-bye to All That p. 204
70) Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, (Abacus, 1997) p. 251
71) Mein Kampf (New York, Mariner, 1999) p.199.
72) Eric Maria Remarque, All Quiet On The Western Front (Heineman) p. 236
73) Ibid., p. 246
74) Ibid., p. 98
75) Ibid., p. 99
76) Ibid., p. 100
77) Ibid., p. 101
78) Ibid., p. 102-3
79) Ibid., p. 104-5
80) Ibid., p. 105-6
81) Ibid., p. 5 (foreword)
82) Ibid., p. 143
83) Ibid., p. 114
84) Ibid., p. 116
85) Ibid., p. 245
86) Ibid., p. 89
87) Ibid., p. 248
88) Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (1941) Grafton (1976) p. 284
89) Ibid., p. 107
90) Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (Penguin, 1953) p. 116-7
91) Ibid.
92) Ibid., p. 119, 120
93) Ibid., p. 123.
94) Ibid., p. 128
95) Ibid., p. 116, 119, 134
96) Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls, p. 409
97) Norman Mailer, The Naked and the Dead (1948) Owl Books (1998) p. xii.
98) Leo Tolstoy, The Sebastopol Sketches (1856) Penguin (1986) p. 96
99) Ibid., p. 97
100) Mailer, The Naked and the Dead, p. 37
101) Ibid., p. 37-38
102) Ibid., p. 29
103) Ibid., p. 444-5
104) Ibid., p. 684
105) Ibid., p. 576
106) Ibid., p. 687
107) Ibid., p. 661.
108) Ibid., p. 522
109) Graves, op. cit., p.162
110) Mailer, The Naked and the Dead, p. 195-6
111) Ibid., p. 718-9
112) Ibid., p. 595-6
113) Ibid., p. 719
114) Ibid., p. 719
115) Graves, op. cit., p. 154
116) Mailer, op. cit., p. 530.
117) Stephen Wright Meditations in Green, (1983) Abacus (1985) p. 330
118) Ibid., p. 332
119) Ibid., p. 334
120) Ibid., p. 337
121) Orwell, 1984, Ch 1, Penguin Complete Novels (1983) p.747
122) Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, Houhyhyns, V, (Wordsworth ed.) p. 264
123) Interview with Swiss Romand TV, 2001
124) Ezra Pound, “Hugh Selwyn Mauberley” Selected Poems (Faber 1928)
125) See Norman Davies, Europe (Pimlico, London 1997) pp. 1328-9 plus
estimates of Chinese death toll under Mao of 70 million by Jung Chang & Jon Halliday, Mao the Unknown Story (London, 2005)
126) James Bacque, Other Losses (Toronto, Stoddard, 1989)
127) Goldhagen, p. 212
128) Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (1952) Pelican (1962) p. 641
129) Bullock, p. 642
130) William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London 1962) p.
854
131) Goldhagen, pp. 212-3
132) Goldhagen, p. 149
133) Goldhagen, p. 157
134) Goldhagen, p. 251
135) Graves, op. cit., p. 155
136) Graves, op. cit., p. 205
137) Hibbert, op. cit., p. 710
CHAPTER THREE: MODERNISM
1) See Gay Peter, The Cultivation of Hatred (Norton, NY 1993) pp 95-127
2) Fascism, edit. Roger Griffin (Oxford, 1995) p.26; Conrad, p. 96 ; also
see Manifesto of Futurism, published in Figaro in 1909 on many websites.
3) Dagmar Herzog, Sex After Fascism (New York, 2005)
4) Catrine Clay and Michael Leapman, Master Race (Coronet 1995) p. 56 ;
William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London, 1959) p.254
5) W.B.Yeats Collected Poems, (MacMillan 1967) “Under Ben Bulben” p.400
6) Ibid. “Song of the Happy Shepherd”, p. 7
7) Ibid. “Sailing to Byzantium”, p. 218
8) Ibid. “Under Ben Bulben” p. 400
9) Pound, Selected Poems (Faber 1928) “Hugh Selwyn Mauberley”, p.173-4
10) T.S.Eliot, “The Waste Land”, Collected Poems, (Faber 1963) p. 70
11) Ibid., p. 72
12) James Joyce, Ulysses (Penguin, 1986) 13, p. 300-1
13) Ezra Pound, Selected Poems, (Faber 1928) Introduction, p. 8
14) Ibid., p. 10
15) Arnold, “Dover Beach”, Norton Anthology of Poetry (1983) p. 794
16) Eliot, op.cit., “Gerontion”, p. 39
17) Eliot, op. cit., “The Love Song of J.Alfred Prufrock”, p. 13
18) Ibid., p.15
19) Ibid., p.17
20) Eliot, op.cit., “Choruses from The Rock”, p. 163
21) Yeats, Collected Poems, “O Do Not Love Too Long”, p. 93
22) Ibid., “When You Are Old”, p. 46
23) Ibid., “Lake Isle of Innisfree”, p. 44
24) Ibid., “Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen”, p. 233
25) Ibid., p. 237
26) Ibid., “The Second Coming”, p. 210
27) Auden, “September 1, 1939”, on www.poemhunter.com
28) Yeats, op. cit., “Sailing to Byzantium”, p. 217
29) Pound, op. cit., “Exile’s Letter”, p. 134-5
30) Edward Thomas, “Rain”, in Georgian Poetry (Penguin 1962) p.72
31) W.H. Auden, “Through the Looking Glass” in Collected Shorter
Poems,1966, p. 74
32) Ibid, “Sonnets from China”, XV, p. 135
33) Sassoon, “Concert Interpretation”, Georgian Poetry (Penguin 1962) p.103
34) Auden, “In Memory of W.B.Yeats” (1939), op. cit., p.141
35) Ben Jonson, “Come my Celia” (1606) Norton Anthology p. 237
36) Auden, op. cit., p. 107
37) Norton Anthology, p. 2295-6
38) Auden, op. cit., p. 142
39) Stephen Spender, “Seascape” (1947), Norton Anthology, p.1127
40) Dylan Thomas, “Fern Hill” (1946), Norton, p.1180
41) Alan Ginsberg, “Howl” (1955) Norton, p. 1273
42) Ibid., p. 1274
43) Walt Whitman, “On the Beach at Night” (1871), Norton, p. 774
44) D.H.Lawrence, “Snake” (1923) Norton, p. 952
45) Sylvia Plath “Black Rook in Rainy Weather” (1956) Norton, p. 1345
46) Charles Bukowski “the trash men” (1974) Norton p. 1213
47) Marianne Moore, “Poetry” (1921) Norton, p. 986
48) Seamus Heaney, “The Strand at Lough Beg” (1979) Norton p. 1384
49) Shakespeare, King Lear, V, .
50) Yeats, “The Magi” (1914), op. cit., p. 141
51) Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesy (1595), Norton, p. 513
52) Anna Moszynska, Abstract Art (London 1990) p. 106
53) Ibid., p. 71
54) Ibid., p. 102
55) Ibid., p. 84
56) Ibid., p. 93
57) Ibid., P. 197-8
58) BBC series, “Living with the Enemy” (with two artist couples, 2005)
59) BBC News, 19 May 2000, on www.news.bbc.co.uk
60) Moszynska, Abstract Art, p. 104
61) Ibid, p. 109
62) Conrad, Peter, Modern Times, Modern Places (London 1998) p. 103-4
63) Moszynska, Abstract Art, p. 88.
64) Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper: The CIA and the Cultural
Cold War (Granta 2005) pp. 272-5. See review on www.mltoday.com
65) Moszynska, Abstract Art, p.190.
66) Ibid.
67) Collings, Matthew (London, 2000) This is Modern Art, p. 151
68) Ibid.
69) Christiansen, Keith, Italian Painting, (New York 1992) p. 308.
70) Ibid.
71) Brian Sewell An Alphabet of Villains, (London 1995) quoted in Robert
Dixon, “The Tate Gallery and the Cult of Modern Art”, Cultural Notes
No. 37 1997, on www.libertarian.co.uk
72) The Independent, 18 January 2002, p. 7
73) Conrad, op. cit., p. 580
74) Ibid. p. 610
75) Ibid. p. 611
76) C.R. Leslie Memoirs of the Life of John Constable (1843)
77) Hume, Of the Standard of Taste (1757)
78) Nietszche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886)
79) Annigoni, website: www.annigoni.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I
Prologue
The Age of
Aggression
Chapter 1: THE IMAGE OF WESTERN MAN
1. The Revolt of the Sixties
2. Masculinity : Constant or Variable?
3. Us and the Men of the Past
4. Masculine and Feminine: still “confused
concepts”?
5. The Sexing of the Fœtus
6. Sex in the Head
Raging
Bull
Man the Space Traveller
The Dyslexic Mathematician
Insensitive Bastard
A Crying Shame
Heartless Monsters
The Eternal Playboy
Vive
la Différence!
Which
Way the Sexes?
7. Images of Men in the Art of the Past
8. Images of Men in Literature since 1700
9. Men in Love, Yesterday and Today
10. Love in Hard Times
11. Change
of Life: Masculine and Feminine at the Start of the Twentieth Century
12. Sex in the Masculine Century: Henry
Miller
13. Sex as Aggression: Miller
14. Sex as War: Norman Mailer
Chapter 2: WAR AND WESTERN MAN: IMAGES OF WAR
IN WESTERN LITERATURE
1. Why War?
2. War
in Classical Literature
3. War in Christian Europe
4. Co-existence in Outremer
5.
Chivalry
in the Hundred Years’ War
6. War as Mad Atrocity: Christopher
Marlowe
7. Enlightenment Satire, Romantic Protest
8.
The
Humanist Vision: Tolstoy
9.
War as Universal Madness: The First World
War
10. War as a Paradigm of Life: Hemingway
11. War as Virility Test: Mailer
12. War as Hallucination: Vietnam
13. War as After-Image in the Mind of the 20th
Century
14. The Age of Mass Murder
15.
Totalitarianism and Revolution
Chapter 3 : MODERNISM
1. The
Zeitgeist
2. Modernism and Fascism
3. Modernism
in Literature
4. The Revolution that Never Happened
5. The
Second Generation
6.
Modernism in the Visual Arts
7. History of a Failed Revolution
8.
Anatomy of a Collective Psychosis
The Cult of the Machine
Art as Ideological Dogma
Impersonality:
The Disappearing Artist and the Artist as Guru
The Rejection of Nature
Abstractionism and Totalitarianism
9. The Revolution Goes Capitalist
10. The Paradox: Abstraction as Emotion
11. Formalism
12. Conceptual Art
13. Art as Hoax
14. The Sore-Arse Test
15. The Failure of the Totalitarians
16. Abstractionism and the Alternative
Culture
17. The Cult of Ugliness
18. Beauty and Femininity
19. Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty
20. The Death of the Permanent Revolution
PART II
Chapter 4: THE GROWTH OF THE CULT OF AGGRESSION
1. Getting
our Bearings
2. The
Transformation of the English
3. The
English Public (Private) School
4. The
Absent Mother
5. Hierarchy
and Baubles
6. Friendship
over Love
7. The
Triumph of the Inarticulate
8. The
Voice of the People
9. English
as the Language of Class War
10. The
Rise of Moronic Language
11. The
Colonial Connection
12. The
Cult of Manliness
13. Sport
as Military Training
Chapter 5: THE IDEOLOGIES OF AGGRESSION: DARWINISM
1. Darwin,
Marx and the Brutalization of Social Thought
2. Darwin’s
Influence
3. Darwinism as an Ideology
4. Spencer and the Survival of the Fittest
5. Darwin and Hitler
6. Nietzsche’s Attack on the Spiritual
Plane
7. After All, Was Darwin Right?
8. Is Death Genetically Selective?
9. Darwin’s
Second String: Sexual Selection
10. A Digression on Sexual Selection Among
Humans
11. How neo can neo-Darwinism Get?
12. Darwinism as a Religious World-View
13. Replacing Darwin
14. Evolution as Group Divergence
15. Does Evolution Require Genetic Change?
16. The Motor of Evolution: Catastrophe or Opportunity?
17. Requiem for a Dead Ideology
Chapter 6: MARXISM
1. Revolution as a Version of Apocalypse
2. Marx and Factory Reform
3. The Failed Revolutionary Blueprint
4. Pity and Hatred: The Revolutionary
Symbiosis
5. Marxism and Sadomasochism
6. Marxism as Eternal Warfare
7. Marxism as Racism
8. Western Self-Hatred: The Triumph of
neo-Marxism
9. History as a Fable of Western Evil
10. The Marxist Rewriting of the Slave Trade
11. Self-Criticism Becomes Self-Hatred
12. The Myth of Genocide in America
13. Judging the Past: Is Moral Law Timeless?
14. Re-imaging the White Race as Oppressor for
the Multi-
Cultural Classroom
15. Western Self-Hatred Rides to the Rescue
of the Collapsing
Marxist Worldview
16. The Disavowal of Progress and the Embrace
of a new Racism
17. The Future of the Great Ideological
Divide
18. Feminism: the Last Phase of
Masculinization
19. Feminism as Urban Myth
20. The Feminist Rewriting of History
PART III
Chapter 7: A BRIEF, POLITICALLY INCORRECT HISTORY OF WOMEN
1. The Division of Sex Roles
2. Matriliny and Patriliny
3. The Origins of the Subordination of
Women
4. Engels: Father of Feminism
5. The Feminist Rage Against Marriage
6. The Quest for the Promiscuous Paradise
7. Traces of Matriliny in Europe
8. Ancient Tales of Amazons
9. The Feminist Paradox: Totalitarianism
Born of Individualism
10. What is Oppression?
11. On Condemning or Accepting the Past
12. The Position of Women in Ancient Times
13. Women Among the Jews and the Romans
14. Women in Christian Europe
15. Women and the Cult of Courtly Love
16. Love in the Real World
17. The Feminization of Court Life
18. Women Enter the World of Learning
19. The Masculine Century
20. Women and the Law
21. Protestantism and the Subordination of
Women
22. The Witch-Hunts
23. Bowdlerized Women
Chapter 8: THE FEMINIST REVOLUTION
1. Women Start to Organize
2. Women’s Liberation
3. Radical Feminism
4. The Sexual Revolution
5. The Sexual Revolution and Feminism
6. The Demonization of Men
7. The Demographics of the 1980’s
8. The 80’s Workplace
9. Feminism in Crisis
10. The Equal Pay Debate
11. Slavery and Choice
Chapter 9: THE ECONOMICS OF THE FEMINIST SOCIETY
1. The Slave Society
2. Cutting Working Hours – a Global
Solution
3. The Bugbear of Globalization
4. The Social Imperative to Change
5. Demographic Decline and Cultural
Disintegration
6. Immigration: a Leftist Sacred Cow
7. The Culture Wars
8. Western Self-Hatred
9. Fear of Drowning
10. The Choice Ahead
Chapter 10: GENDER WARS AND THE STERILE SOCIETY
1. Sharing the Domestic Role
2. Abortion
3. The Feminist Attack on the Female
Gender
4. Gender: A Confused Concept
5. Gender-Bending and Gender-Convergence
6. The Return of the Eternal Masculine
7. The Decline of Marriage
8. The Victim Culture as a Social Cancer
9. The Institutionalization of Feminism
10. The Normalization of Academic Lying
11. The Hijacking of Domestic Violence
12. Feminism: Equality at What Cost?
Chapter 11: A TALE OF TWO IDEOLOGIES
1. The Shock of September 11
2. The Plague Collapse
3. The Great Ideological Merger
4. Is it Too late?
5. How the West was Lost
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